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In 1991, independent Ukraine entered the international system of states with many 
drawbacks: in addition to lacking the legitimacy provided by prolonged periods of 
sovereignty, Ukraine suffered from economic over-dependence on Russia and was 
weakened by internal political and social cleavages. This thesis argues that in order to 
tackle the threats to its sovereignty, the new state adopted a foreign and security policy 
with two key objectives. Firstly, Kyiv sought to establish bilateral ties with all regional 
neighbours. Secondly, along the Western azimuth Kyiv established the 'strategic 
objective' of integration with the European Union via membership of subregional 
institutions. The desire to integrate with Western institutions implied a reluctance to 
integrate more deeply with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) along the 
North-eastern azimuth. However, the nature of Ukraine's ties with Russia meant that 
relations between them came to dwarf Kyiv's relations with neighbours along the 
Western azimuth. Thus it is argued that Ukraine's foreign policy was conceived as an 
attempt to balance the demands of these two azimuths. Along the Southern azimuth 
relations with Black Sea littoral states provided a means for Ukraine to consolidate its 
independence- bilateral, subregional and regional objectives along the Southern azimuth 
were to complement goals along the Western vector, while simultaneously preventing 
Ukraine's re-integration along the North-eastern azimuth. 
The thesis concludes that although Ukraine failed to fully integrate with key 
subregional and regional institutions along its Western azimuth, by the end of its first 
decade of independence, its security was enhanced thanks to bilateral, subregional and 
regional relations along that azimuth. Furthermore, although it failed to fully avoid 
integration with the CIS along the North-eastern azimuth, by the end of 2000 Ukraine 
remained anything but a fully-fledged member of the CIS. The achievement of objectives 
along the Southern azimuth facilitated the respective achievements along the Western and 
North-eastern azimuths. 
The thesis also explored theoretical contributions to an understanding of 
Ukraine's regional aspirations on three analytical levels. Amongst the systemic theories, 
it was concluded that the robustness of the realist approach continues to present a 
formidable challenge to newer pretenders. However, with its greater allowance for the 
economic aspects of international relations, complex interdependence also maintains its 
explanatory power. As for regional level theories, although neofunctionalism provides 
some insight into Ukraine's regional behaviour, as does neoliberal institutionalism, both 
struggle to provide a coherent and consistent explanation along all three azimuths. While 
the normative 'subregional' regionalist approach is limited by the contradictory demands 
of regional and subregional institutions, the emphasis placed on the politico-economic 
aspect of regionalism by New Wave regionalists has extended our understanding of 
regionalism. The domestic level of analysis indeed revealed a relationship between 
Ukrainian regional prospects and the ongoing democratization process. 
Introduction 
When in August 1991 Ukraine unexpectedly stumbled into independence, nobody, 
perhaps least of all the Ukrainians, really knew what further to expect. Indeed, the 
event was as much of a shock to the Ukrainians as it was to the rest of the world. Up 
until it actually happened, they did not really demand it, expect it, or prepare for it. As 
a result of its suddenness, fundamental questions had not even been asked, let alone 
answered. How would Moscow respond? For that matter, how would the West 
respond? What was going to be the likely reaction of the huge Russian minority in 
Ukraine, to being 'cut off from ethnic brethren? What was going to happen to the 
nuclear weapons on the territory of Ukraine - surely the commitment to denuclearise, 
made in 1990, was a declaration rather than a statement of intent? How would the 
Soviet military forces in Ukraine be dealt with? In the days and weeks that followed 
independence, Ukrainian policy makers had to hazard a guess as to likely answers. It 
was this guesswork that guided policy-making and policy-implementation in the days 
and weeks that followed, as the Ukrainian national-economic-political elite grabbed 
with both hands the opportunities presented by independence. The fact that Ukraine 
lacked a foreign policy elite compounded the problem of not knowing the answers. 
However, the inability to find solutions was not merely a matter of time and 
personnel. Ukrainian independence reflected a much more profound change, namely, 
the collapse of bipolarity on the European continent. With the breakdown of 
bipolarity, regions gained a hitherto subordinated prominence, at least in Europe. As 
has been pointed out 'the world has now changed. The regional level stands more 
clearly on its own as the locus of conflict and co-operation for states and as the level 
of analysis for scholars seeking to explore contemporary security affairs'. 
I This thesis 
will argue that the solutions to Ukraine's problems lay at the regional level. 
From Ukraine's point of view, the key date, which reflected the completion of 
the transition of regions from obscurity to prominence, was probably 1994. That was 
the year in which Ukraine signed a Partnership for Peace Programme (PfP) with the 
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North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), and a Partnership and Co-operation 
Agreement (PCA) with the European Union (EU); it was the year in which Ukraine 
institutionalised the role of the United States (US) in its relations with Russia through 
the signing of the Trilateral Agreement which finally terminated Ukraine's nuclear 
status; it was also the year in which Central and East European States (CEES) started 
to demand NATO membership. While all of these events suggested that Ukraine was 
(regionally aware', deteriorating relations with Russia and NATO enlargement 
compelled Ukraine to adopt regional solutions to local problems, especially after 
efforts to persuade the Poles not to join NATO failed. All of the above mentioned 
events reflected the increased salience of regions in international politics, along with 
the new threats and opportunities that emerged within them. As will be seen, 
Ukrainian foreign and security policy implementation in 1994 and the years that 
followed reflected this shift of emphasis to regions and the role Ukraine could play 
therein. With ever increasing assertiveness, from that time on, Ukraine sought 
solutions to security threats in regional policies and approaches. This thesis will 
explore these policies and approaches. The first part of the thesis introduces the 
hypothesis, which has guided the research: that Ukraine a) consistently pursued a 
policy of responding to security threats by attempting to participate in or explicitly 
avoid participating in regional security complexes along each of three azimuths: the 
North-eastern, Western and Southern; b) achieved a degree of success in preserving its 
security and enlarging its freedom of manoeuvre by so doing, bearing in mind the 
numerous internal and external obstacles it faced. The outline of the hypothesis will 
be followed by a review of three theoretical perspectives that purport to explain 
regionalism, namely systemic, regional and domestic level theories. 
Part 2 of the thesis will examine Ukraine's regional policy along its North- 
eastern azimuth. Chapter 2 will focus on Ukraine's relations with Russia and Kyiv's 
efforts to come to terms with the ramifications of ties with Moscow, and the 
challenges these ties presented to the attainment of Ukraine's proclaimed objective of 
integrating with Western institutions. The chapter also examines Ukraine's relations 
with Belarus, a particular challenge for Ky1v in the light of Minsk's deference to 
D. A. Lake and P. M. Morgan, 'The New Regionalism in Security Affairs', in D. A. Lake and P. M. Morgan, 
(eds. ), Regional Orders - Building Security in a New World (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press 
1997) p. 6. 
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Moscow's demands and needs. It will be seen that their respective relations with 
Moscow have largely shaped Kyiv's relations with Minsk. Chapter 3 will start by 
examining the fruitless efforts by Minsk (and to an extent Moscow) to draw Ukraine 
into a subregional Slavic Union with them. The Chapter will focus in particular on 
Kyiv's response to economic and political pressures exerted by Moscow to integrate 
Ukraine more deeply with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). 
Part 3 examines Ukraine's regional ambitions along the Western azimuth. 
Chapter 4 analyses Ukraine's bilateral ties with its CEE neighbours. It will be seen 
that each of Ukraine's Western CEE neighbours had a invaluable role to play in 
Ukraine's intended reorientation from East to West. 2 None were as important as was 
Poland, Ukraine's hitherto perennial enemy, and potentially crucial partner. As 
Brzezinski has argued, 'tight co-operative relations (between Ukraine and Poland) that 
strengthen each others vitality and economic development would caution Germany 
and Russia from the temptation which has encouraged imperial ambitions in Eastern 
Europe in the past'. 3 It might be argued that by corollary Ukraine's ties with 
remaining CEES are of secondary importance. This is to an extent true of Ukraine's 
relations with Hungary and Slovakia, though this is not to neglect the role that these 
states played in facilitating Ukraine's reorientation. Ukraine's relations with the two 
CEES along its south western border, Romania and Moldova, were more complicated. 
Ukraine's ties with Romania were poisoned from the very beginning by a long 
running territorial dispute that Kyiv inherited with independence. Indeed, relations 
were unable to develop beyond the barest of contacts until this territorial spat was 
resolved in 1997, an achievement in which NATO enlargement played no small role. 4 
Relations with the fifth of Ukraine's CEE neighbours, Moldova, were complicated 
primarily because of the presence of the relatively powerful former Soviet 14th army 
there, something that once again threw into focus Ukraine's relations with Russia. 
While Moldova does not form a 'natural' CEE state owing to its status as a former 
Soviet republic and its somewhat Southerly location, it has been included along the 
2 CEES will be deemed to include Poland, Hungary, Slovakia (and formerly Czechoslovakia), and along the South 
Western azimuth Romania, Moldova and Bulgaria. 
3 Quoted in O. L Valevsky and M. M. Honchar, Struktura Heopolitichnych Interesiv Ukrainy, Vypusk 45 (Kyiv: 
Natsionainy Institut Stratehichnych Doslidzen 1995) p. 42. 
4 For more detail on this issue see R. Wolczuk, 'Relations between Ukraine and Romania in the Context of NATO 
Enlargement', Ukrainian Review, Vol. 44, No. 4, Winter 1997, pp. 34-41. 
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Western azimuth because of its proclaimed political objectives of membership of 
Western regional institutions and strong ties with Romania. 
Bilateral relations with CEES along the Western azimuth were also perceived 
as stepping stones toward integration with the subregional and regional institutional 
5 
structures of Europe . This is strongly suggested by the willingness with which 
Ukraine used bilateral ties to pursue membership of subregional institutions such as 
the Central European Free Trade Area (CEFTA), the Visegrad Group, and to recruit 
supporters for its own initiatives for new formations, as examined in Chapter 5. The 
ultimate goal for Ukraine was membership of the big regional institutions, the EU, 
and, possibly, NATO, relations with which are the focus of the remainder of Chapter 
5. Chapter 5 will also assess the extent to which this westward focus impacted on 
relations with Russia. The Western azimuth of Ukraine's policy reflected a will on the 
part of the new state to discredit the forces of the apparent geographical and historical 
determinism of integration with Russia, which had dominated in Ukraine for the last 
seven centuries. In turn the extent to which Russia, using its economic might and 
Ukraine's dependence on it, tried to prevent this westward lunge will also be analysed. 
However, ties with the West were not to be simply at the expense of ties with the 
North-east; neither were ties with the North-east were to be at the expense of ties with 
the West. As Sherr points out 'Ukraine's mainstream, centrist political establishment 
(as opposed to Rukh and a number of other 'national democrats') believe that 
Ukraine's integration into the West will not be achieved without success along the 
second vector: a 'special partnership' with Russia .... 
just as internal stability and 
Western support have been seen as the precondition for securing friendly relations 
with Russia, so friendly relations with Russia have been seen as the precondition for 
-) 6 drawing closer to the West . 
Objectives along both azimuths were thus compatible, 
balanced and not mutually exclusive. 7 
If the Western azimuth to Ukraine's regional policy reflected a means of 
counterbalancing and even counteracting the overweening influence of Russia on 
5 For a more detailed analysis of these issues see R. Wolczuk, 'Ukraine and Europe: Relations Since 
independence', Ukrainian Review, Vol. 44, No. 1, Spring 1997, pp. 38-53 and also 'Ukraine in the Context of 
NATO Enlargement', Ukrainian Review, Vol. 44, No. 3, Autumn 1997, pp. 3-23. 
6 j. Sherr, Ukraine's Neý4- Time of Troubles, G67 (Conflict Studies Research Centre: Camberley 1998) pp. 18-19. 
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Ukraine, the Southern azimuth, the basis for the fourth part of the thesis, represented a 
qualitatively different set of opportunities for Ukraine. As Ukraine struggled to 
balance the opportunities and threats presented by East and West, the Southern 
azimuth offered Ukraine the chance to pursue other avenues by forming closer ties 
with all non-Russian Black Sea littoral statesý and this is the focus of chapter 6. 
Particular attention is paid to relations with Turkey, a potential competitor to Russia 
in the region and a budding ally for Ukraine in the evolving geopolitics of the region. 
Along this azimuth, Ukraine was also able to provide a semblance of support and a 
forin of protection for former Soviet Republics around the sea, in particular Georgia 
and, by extension, its neighbour Azerbaijan. In doing so, Ukraine strove to undermine 
Russia's influence in the region and within the CIS. The most explicit evidence of this 
was Ukraine's contribution to the development of subregional institutions, which will 
be examined in chapter 7. Ukraine supported the lead of Turkey in creating the Black 
Sea Economic Co-operation Forum (BSEC), and took a particularly proactive role in 
the creation of GUUAM, a loose grouping of states that originally included Georgia, 
Ukraine, and Azerbaijan, was soon joined by first Moldova, and then in 1999 by 
Uzbekistan. The emergence of GUUAM is particularly significant in terms of its 
negative reverberations for the CIS. The Southern azimuth needs to be seen in the 
context of the above 'Northeast-West' dimension. Simply put, exploiting the Southern 
azimuth was a means for Kyiv to avoid over-reliance on Russia, and one which could 
contribute to Ukraine's integration into Western institutional structures. The fifth and 
final part of the thesis brings all of these themes together, arguing that Ukraine's 
regional policies along the three azimuths outlined above combined to form a coherent 
strategy to reduce Ukraine traditional vulnerability located between Northeast and 
West, that is to 'escape' from the Northeast (or at least reduce its energy dependence 
on it), and 'join' the West. Throughout the thesis, the theories outlined in the first part 
of the thesis will be used to analyse the empirical data presented in order to explain 
Ukraine's regional behaviour. 
For a more detailed examination of Ukraine's foreign and security policy as regarding these objectives see R. 
Wolczuk, 'The Evolution of Ukraine's Foreign and Security Policy 1991-1994', Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 
12, No. 3 (September 1999) pp. 18-37 . 
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Part I- Regionalism 
And Security Policy 
and Ukraine's Foreign 
Chapter 1: The Tools Of Research 
The Research Hypothesis 
Independent Ukraine has variously been referred to as a pivot or keystone. ' A pivot 
refers to a bearing on which something oscillates or turns. A keystone is the central, 
stress bearing stone or crown at the very peak of an arch that locks the remaining parts 
of the arch into place. The common theme therefore is that of load bearing centrality: 
the importance of the pivot lies in the central location of the support it provides to the 
whole and on which the balance of the whole depends; the centrality of the keystone is 
critical to the very existence of the structure of which it is an integral part. Without a 
pivot, no oscillation takes place, turning becomes impossible; with the removal of the 
keystone, the arch collapses. To refer to Ukraine, then, as a pivot or a keystone is to 
confer a rare honour: Ukraine is seemingly the pivot on which the European continent 
crevolves'; it is the keystone that locks the remaining members of the European 
geographical arch into place. Ukraine is thus seen as a central and even critical feature 
in the European security structure: if at the end of the twentieth century, 'geography 
and geopolitics still matter' Ukraine's geography and geopolitics seem to matter more 
than most, at least on the European continent. 2 
The term 'Pivot' was used by the British Foreign Secretary, Malcolm Rifkind. Quoted in J. E. Mroz and 0. 
PavlIuk, 'Ukraine: Europe's Linchpin', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 3, May/June 1996, p. 59. See also S. W. 
Garnett, Keystone in the Arch. - Ukraine in the Emerging Security Environment of Central and Eastern Europe 
(Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 1997). 
2 J. Hillen and M. P. Noonan, 'The Geopolitics of NATO Enlargement', Parameters, Autumn 1998, p. 2 1. 
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Up to a point it is self-evident that the emergence of any new nation-state in 
Europe was going to be an event of no small significance. However, Ukraine was not 
just 'any' nation state. Firstly, Ukraine is one of the largest states in Europe at 603,700 
sq. kilometres. Secondly, it is one of Europe's most populous states with over 50 
million citizens. Thirdly, on independence Ukraine was, after Russia, Europe's most 
powerful state, in the sense that it possessed (if not actually controlled) the third 
largest nuclear arsenal in the world; even after denuclearisation , its military might 
remains formidable. Finally, it is probably Europe's most well endowed state in terms 
3 of resources, possessing an estimated 5 per cent of total world mineral resources . To 
paraphrase the second President of Ukraine, Leonid Kuchma, Ukraine is no 
Switzerland. These four features, in conjunction with the fact that Ukraine is located 
in what is historically, a volatile part of a geopolitically critical region, between 'East 
and West', or between Europe and Eurasia, or even between Gen-nany and Russia, 
help contextualise the importance of the emergence Ukraine's independence in 1991.4 
This is because geography remains important as 'geography defines the players (which 
are territorially organised states or would like to be), frequently defines the stakes for 
which players contend and always defines the terms in which they measure security 
relative to others'. 5 If so, the emergence of an independent Ukraine not only redefined 
the geography of the region, it also introduced new stakes into the reckoning and 
fundamentally challenged the hitherto long established regional security nonns. 6 The 
upset of such norrns is problematic at the best of times; it is especially problematic 
'when states are surrounded, or are bordered by states with historical grudges or by 
states that have previously used their power against weaker states'. 7 Independent 
Ukraine was such a bordered state. 
3 Financial Times, 5 May 1998. 
4 See H. J. Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality (New York: Norton 1962) for a collection of Mackinder's 
classic papers including the seminal 'The Geographical Pivot of History' (1904); for a more modem application 
of Mackinder's work read C. S. Gray 'The Geopolitics of Superpower' (Kentucky: University of Kentucky Press 
1988). More dated examinations of Ukraine's geopolitical context include R. Kjellen, Die Politische Probleme 
des Weltkrieges (Leipzig) 1918, and also F. Naumann, Werke (K61n and Opladen 1966). 
5 Gray, The Geopolitics of Super Power, pp. 1-2. 
6 On the establishment of norms in international relations see P. Keal, Unspoken Rules And Superpower 
Dominance (London: Macmillan Press 1983). 
7 Hillen and Noonan, 'The Geopolitics of NATO Enlargement', p. 25. 
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However, beyond mere geography the measures adopted by Kyiv to integrate 
with Western institutions following independence in 1991 reflected the continuation 
of an evolving phenomenon, namely the emerging salience of regions in general, and 
the CEE states in particular in international politiCS. 8 If it is true to suggest that the 
end of the Cold War contributed to the new-found prominence of CEE, the 
diminished stature of Russia and the reduced inclination of the US to intervene in 
regional conflicts suggest that the end of Cold War hostilities opened up hitherto 
unexpected possibilities for regional co-operation. With the irrevocable breakdown of 
bipolarity, it has been suggested by Richard Rosecrance that 'autonomy has been 
restored to the separate regions of the world'. 9 
The research hypothesis proposes that because of the restoration of this 
autonomy Ukraine consistently pursued a policy of responding to the security threats 
that emanated from this context by attempting to integrate with or avoid integrating 
with regional security complexes (RSC). In particular, the hypothesis argues that 
Ukraine sought to integrate with RSCs along the Western azimuth and avoided 
integrating with RSCs along the North-eastern azimuth. Furthermore, Ukraine's 
objective of integration along the Western azimuth was pursued in conjunction with 
the pursuit of a special relationship with Russia and highly circumscribed relations 
with the CIS along the North-eastern azimuth. The thesis will further argue that 
participation in RSCs along the Southern azimuth was pursued insofar as they 
facilitated the achievement of the previous two objectives. " It is further hypothesised 
8 Lake and Morgan 'The New Regionalism in Security Affairs' in Lake and Morgan, pp. 3-20. 
9 R. Rosecrance, 'Regionalism and the Post-Cold War Era', International Journal, XLVI, Summer 199 1, p. 373. 
10 The notion of regional security complex is used in preference to the term 'region', the definition of which is 
plagued with difficulties. Efforts to establish outer geographical or 'scientific' limits to a 'region', while useful 
in explaining the term 'region', also cloud understanding. One effort in the field of geography for classifying 
regional systems differentiated between at least two types of region. A homogenous or uniform region is an 
'area within which the variations and co-variations of one or more selected characteristics fall within some 
specified range of variability around a norm, in contrast with areas that fall outside the range. Such a region ... is 
a result of the process of regional I sation. ' In other words, a region is formed when a degree of cohesiveness is 
conferred on an area on the basis of specified and shared attributes. In contrast, a region of 'coherent 
organisation' or 'functional region is defined as one in which one or more selected phenomena of movement 
connect localities within it into a functional whole', that is where the behaviour of localities is organised so that 
the behaviour of the localities functions as a whole. See B. J. L. Berry and T. D. Hankins, A Bibliographic 
Guide to the Economic Regions of the United States (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1963) Department 
of Chicago Research Paper, No. 87, p. 134. Taken from D. Grigg, 'The Logic of Regional Systems', Annals of 
the Association of American Geographers, No. 55,1965, p. 473. Most definitions of regionalism in 
International Relations take advantage of both to come to an unsatisfactory amalgam. For example, Russet 
suggests that on the one hand cultural and social homogeneity, external behaviour, and on the other hand 
economic interdependence and geographic proximity are necessary in the formation of a 'region'. B. M Russett, 
'International Regimes and the Study of Regions', International Studies Quarterly, 13/4, December 1969, pp. 
123-133. Cantori and Spiegel while arguing for geographic proximity and regular international interaction, also 
13 
that Ukraine achieved a degree of success in preserving its security and enlarging its 
freedom of manoeuvre by integrating or avoiding integration with RSCs, bearing in 
mind the numerous internal and external obstacles it faced. 
A security complex is defined by Buzan as a 'group of states whose primary 
security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot 
realistically be considered apart from one another In addition to the security 
interdependence between member states that the conception of RSCs implies, 
geographical propinquity and an autonomous existence apart from the global system 
are also deemed characteristics of RSCs. In a considerable refinement of the 
conception of RSCs, Lake introduces the notion of externalities to address what are 
seen as flaws in the conception of RSCs, namely their inability to sufficiently 
distinguish between regional and global level interaction. 12 Externalities are benefits 
(positive externalities) and costs (negative externalities) that are conferred on actors 
other than those that are the sources of such externalities and thus help delineate more 
precisely the parameters of that which may be defined as an RSC. This thesis 
identifies three geographically-based RSCs in which Ukraine participates, although 
other conceptualisations exist. 13 These three azimuthial RCSs are the North-eastern, 
Western and Southern. 
The role of Ukraine along each azimuth will be analysed on two levels. First, 
in terms of Ukraine's regional bilateral relations with a particular neighbour along a 
given azimuth, or within a given RSC. Second, in terms of Ukraine's relations with 
subregional and regional institutions along a given azimuth, or within a given RSC. In 
propose cornmon historical, linguistic, cultural, ethnic and social bonds (as opposed to homogeneity) and a 
sense of identity the distinctiveness of which is underlined by actors from beyond the region. L. J. Canton and 
S. L. Spiegel (eds. ), The International Politics o Regions. - A Comparative Approach (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice-Hall 1970). See also, L. J. Cantori and S. L. Spiegel, 'The Analysis of Regional International Politics: 
The Integration Versus the Empirical Systems Approach', International Organization, 27(4), 1973, pp. 465- 
494. Katzenstein's efforts to escape from the ambiguities of 'geographical proximity', 'homogeneity' and 
6regular international interaction', by defining 'a region as a set of countries markedly interdependent over a 
wide range of different dimensions' fail to avoid the 'unavoidable empirical ambiguities and differences in 
analytical perspectives' he himself highlights. P. J. Katzenstein, 'Regionalism in Comparative Perspective', 
Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 31(2), 1996, p. 130. 
11 B. Buzan, People, States and Fear. - An Agendafor International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era. 2d 
ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner 199 1) p. 190. 
12 Externalities help address this problem. D. A. Lake, 'Regional Security Complexes: A Systems Approach' in 
Lake and Morgan, pp. 45 - 67. 
13 In addition to the Western, Russian, Central European and the CIS azimuths, Sherr conceptualises two other 
4quasi-azimuths': 'the development of ... relations with resource rich regions of the Russian Federation itself' 
and 'the azimuth of Black Sea co-operation'. See J. Sherr, 'Ukraine's New Time of Troubles', G27 (Sandhurst, 
UK: Conflict Studies Research Centre October 1998) p. 19. 
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pursuit of analytic clarity and academic utility an institutional definition of the tem-is 
4 regional' and 'subregional' will be utilised. 14 
As far as the tenn 'regional' is concerned, it has been pointed out 'Europe is 
now defined by the membership of different clubs. Today you are what you belong to. 
We are no longer governed by history or geography, but by institutions ,. 15 These 
different 'clubs' or institutions have different objectives and geographical scope. For 
example, the EU, NATO are clearly within the European/Transatlantic geographical 
area, something which the CIS, in the widest geographical sense, is not. Yet clearly, in 
terms of geographical scope, they are all regional institutions, adequately satisfying 
the criteria of 'regionship' referred to above. Furthermore, their functions and 
objectives affect or impact upon the fundamentals of individual states - security, 
defence, sovereignty. Integration with institutions such as the EU, NATO and the CIS 
profoundly affects the most fundamental aspects of the character of the member states. 
This distinguishes these regional institutions from other ostensibly regional 
institutions such as the OSCE and the Council of Europe. The functional scope of the 
latter two is notably less intrusive (statehood is not encroached upon to anything like 
the same extent as occurs in the case of membership of the EU or CIS) and the criteria 
for membership are notably less stringent and hence less discriminating. ' 6 
Subregional institutions, in the area covered by this thesis, turn out to be 
institutions whose members have either the explicit or implicit goal of membership or 
avoidance of membership of the regional institution of the geographical area within 
which the subregional institution finds itself Thus, CEFTA and the Visegrad group 
(originally made up of Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic) were patently 
subsets of the NATO/EU region, drawn as they were to the West from the earliest 
days of the collapse of the Soviet Union. In addition, CEFTA and Visegad had as a 
functional goal membership of the EU for its member states. Similarly, the BSEC and 
the informal GUUAM are subregional formations in that they ftinction in the shadow 
of the regional institutions (i. e. the CIS), and have as a functional objective impacting 
14 Although Lake rejects institutional definitions on the grounds that not all RSCs are institutionalised. Lake 
'Regional Security Complexes' in Lake and Morgan, p. 46-47. 
15 R. Cooper, 'The Meaning of 1989', Prospect, December 1999, p. 29. 
16 In the case of the OSCE the criteria are recognised statehood and agreement with certain basic norms and 
adherence to the Helsinki Principles of 1975 and 1992, and the Budapest Document of 1994; the 
Council of 
Europe require adherence to legal norms and respect for human rights. 
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either positively or negatively on the regional institution. Thus the BSEC, fornied 
under the leadership of Ankara, was designed to facilltate Turkey's chances of 
integrating with the EU. It is for this same reason that Ukraine is an enthusiastic 
supporter and participant in the institution. GUUAM on the other hand has had as one 
of its explicit goals the transportation of Caspian oil by its member states beyond 
Russian control. Kyiv hoped to facilitate its chances of membership of the European 
Union, by becoming part of the energy transportation system taking Caspian oil 
westward. It was also hoped that the emergence of GUUAM would inhibit Kyjv's 
further integration into the CIS to the extent that GUUAM actively contributed to the 
unravelling of certain aspects of the CIS. Defining the proposed Slavic Union as 
subregional is somewhat more problematic in light of the sheer size and importance of 
Russia, one of its constituent states. However,, if it was ever to emerge, a Slavic Union 
would be distinctly subregional in the sense that its main proponents see it very much 
as forming a core within the CIS. As such, the Slavic Union has always been 
envisaged as an albeit important subset of the CIS. 
In sum, three azimuths will be examined, along which are found three RSCs, 
each of which will be analysed on two levels: 
The North-eastern azimuth/RSC: 
A. bilateral relations with Russia and Belarus 
B. subregional level - Slavic Union 
regional level - relations/membership of the CIS 
The Western azimuth/RSC: 
A. bilateral relations with Poland, Hungary, Slovakia (and 
formerly Czechoslovakia), Romania and Moldova 
B. subregional level - relations with CEFTA, the Visegrad group 
regional level - relations with EU, NATO 
The Southern azimuth/RSC: 
A. bilateral relations with the Black Sea littoral states: Russia, 
Georgia, Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania 
B. subregional level - relations with BSEC, GUUAM 
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regional level - relations with EU, NATO, CIS 
Ukraine was motivated by externalities on the bilateral and regional levels. On the 
bilateral level, Ukraine was reluctant to renew Soviet-era military, political and 
economic ties with Russia. Thus a special, but circumscribed relationship was sought 
with Moscow by Kyiv. Above all, however, Kyiv was focused on avoiding deep 
integration with the CIS, a negative non-secunty externality to the extent that it was 
seen in Kyiv as synonymous with continued industrial ossification. Such integration 
was likely to be accompanied by risks to Ukraine's independence and sovereignty, a 
clear negative security externality. 
Conversely, along the Western azimuth, Ukraine was motivated by the 
positive security and non-security externalities that would accrue from harmonious 
bilateral ties with CEES and, eventually, from ties with Western subregional and 
regional institutional structures. 
The Southern azimuth bridges the two above-mentioned azimuths. On the one 
hand, Ukraine was driven by the positive non-secunty externality that might accrue if 
Ukraine was to be involved in the transportation of Caspian energy, a prerequisite of 
which were strong ties with 'key' Black Sea states. The institutionalisation of these 
ties in Southern subregional institutional structures, such as the BSEC and GUUAM, 
was one of the means with which Ukraine hoped to attain goals along this azimuth. 
The Southern azimuth was important for two other reasons. First, these subregional 
goals might facilitate the attainment of regional goals along the Western azimuth, 
namely membership of the EU. Second, Kyiv hoped that membership of subregional 
institutions along the Southern azimuth might inhibit Ukraine's deeper integration 
along the North-eastern azimuth. (See Table I- see p. 22). 
In sum, each of the two levels of analysis identified above, namely Ukraine's 
bilateral ties with neighbours, and relations with subregional and regional institutions 
will be examined in order to assess the extent to which Ukraine achieved regional 
goals along the North-eastem, Western and Southern azimuths. 
Regional Orders 
17 
In order to measure 'success' or 'failure' within a given RSC, an assessment will be 
made of the extent to which Ukraine influenced the dominant pattern of security 
management, or regional orders, along each of the azimuths. Five forms of regional 
orders (or dependent variables) will be utilised. These five variables can be placed in a 
hierarchy of ideal types requiring increasing levels of co-operation with regional 
neighbours: power-restraining power, concert, collective security, pluralistic security 
community and, finally, integration. 17 
Power-restraining power refers to the classic pursuit of security through the 
achievement of balance of power. In an RSC where security is primarily pursued via 
balance of power, stability is sought in either a unipolar/hegemonic (hegemonic 
stability theory), bipolar or multipolar regional order. With the collapse of bipolarity 
on the European continent, and the instability that has ensued a new regional order has 
been sought by the CEES. CEES are unambiguous as to what sort of order they desire: 
'in Eastern Europe there is a strong reluctance to trust other forms of security 
management in view of Russia's past behaviour and uncertainties about its political 
future. Poland, the Baltic states, and others have been eager to join NATO as an 
alliance against Russia, seeking security in a traditional power-balancing way 
(original italics). 08 All available evidence suggests that such an unambiguous choice 
was not available to Ukraine if Kyiv was to avoid the wrath of Russia: Moscow would 
never countenance Kyiv's membership of an alliance against it. 
Hegemonic stability theory predicts that a hegemon will establish order or 
pursue security in a given region by dominating or exploiting smaller states. However, 
Ukraine's gravitation towards the Russian pole, as predicted by the hegemonic 
stability theory, was not an appealing option to Kyiv, as the benefits to Ukraine of 
order or security presented by hegemonic stability were outbalanced by the fact that 
domination or exploitation by the hegemon threatened its independence. 
A concert refers to regional great powers adopting collective responsibility 
within a regional security complex. While concerts primarily benefit the most 
powerful states of the concert, the stability that ensues benefits the 'lesser' parties of 
the region. However, by virtue of the fact that great powers allow for each others' 
11 p. M. Morgan, 'Regional SecuritY Complexes and Regional Orders' in Lake and Morgan, pp. 21-44 
18 ibid., p. 34. 
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4vital influence' in a region, concerts are perceived by the 'subjects' of the concert to 
have negative ramifications. In the European theatre, for example, Ukraine reacted 
with abhorrence to the Russian offer for such a concert in its 'near abroad' when in 
February 1993 Yeltsin argued that 'the moment has arrived for authoritative 
international organisations, including the United Nations, to grant Russia special 
powers as the guarantor of peace and stability in this (i. e. the former Soviet Union) 
region'. 19 In technical terms, as will be argued, the negative externality of the risk 
posed to Ukraine's sovereignty and independence by such an offer was too great for 
Kyiv to countenance. 
The collective security approach is a more inclusive alternative to a great 
power concert. By reducing the prerogative of the great powers to manage regional 
security, regional powers seek to influence regional decisions. Such powers agree to 
abstain from the use of force in resolving differences, and instead revert to collective 
responses to rule violations by an aggressor against a victim. 20 The common interests 
which motivate such co-operation include 'shared fears of unrestricted violence or 
unstable agreements, or insecurity about independence or sovereignty'. 21 
Certainly, the collective security approach is one on which Ukraine has put 
great store, pinning its hopes on the conversion of NATO into a regional collective 
security system along the Western azimuth. To an extent, these hopes have already 
been realised: the establishment of the Partnership for Peace Programme (PfP), and 
the creation of North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC) are significant moves in 
this direction. It is precisely through the creating of institutions such as these and the 
subsequent enlargement of NATO in 1997 that it has been argued that 'NATO's 
founding mission of collective defence organised against the Soviet threat has been 
fundamentally transformed... NATO's enlargement may have ... set the alliance on a 
trend in the direction of a diluted collective security institution'. 22 In addition it will 
be shown that Kyiv's ambitions along the Western azimuth were bolstered by an 
unwillingness on the part of Ukraine to participate in the Tashkent Treaty, a collective 
19 ITAR-TASS, I March 1993. See P. M. Morgan, 'Regional Security Complexes and Regional Orders' in Lake and 
Morgan, p. 34. 
20 C. A. Snyder, 'Regional Security Structures' in C. A. Snyder (ed. ), Contemporary Security and Strategy 
(London: Macmillan Press, 1999) pp. 102-119. 
21 ibid., p. 107. 
22 S. Kay, NATO and the Future ofEuropean Security (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998) pp. 1-2. 
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security system headed by Russia along the North-eastern azimuth. The underlying 
rationale of collective security, namely the recognition of common interests among 
states, implies that Ukraine perceived a greater degree of common interest with states 
along the Western azimuth than with states along the Eastern azimuth. 
Ukraine was interested above all in the last two of the five options, namely 
either joining a pluralistic security community, or ideally, integrating with institutions, 
though in both cases only along its Western azimuth. 
A pluralistic security community is characterised by 'a sense of community 
and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a 
long time, dependable expectations and peaceful change'. This socially constructed 
and identity-driven approach involves a commitment to the non-use of threats or 
force, inviolability of borders, arms and force reduction, defensive military postures, 
and greater transborder flows. 23 In simple terms, force becomes unthinkable between 
community members. A perusal of the history of post-Cold War CEE and Ukraine, 
suggests that such a community is some way off, both along the Western and North- 
eastern azimuth. The friction between Ukraine and Russia between 1991 and 1997 is 
ample testimony to the elusiveness of the notion of community between two nation- 
states that had hitherto regarded themselves as 'fraternal'. 
Integration implies the subordination of state prerogatives to those of a 
supranational institution in pursuit of security. As Morgan points out, cmany 
governments in Eastern Europe regard membership in the EU (an integrated security 
community) as the ultimate guarantee of security'. 24 This included Ukraine, which as 
early as 1996 had set itself the goal of integration along the Western azimuth in the 
form of membership of the European Union. By contrast, neither membership of a 
pluralistic security community nor integration along the North-eastern azimuth was 
desirable to Kyiv. 
23 See P. M. Morgan, 'Regional Security Complexes and Regional Orders' in Lake and Morgan, p. 37. 
24 ibid., p. 38. As ever, the perennial problem for the study of integration remains bogged down in definitions. As 
Haas pointed out, 'the task of selecting and justifying variables and explaining their hypothesised 
interdependence cannot be accomplished without an agreement as to possible conditions to which the process is 
expected to lead. In short, we need a dependent variable'. See E. Haas, 'The Study of Regional Integration: 
Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorising' in L. N. Lindberg and S. A. Scheingold (eds. ), European 
Integration. - Theory and Research (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1971) p. 18 and B. Rosamond, 
Theories ofEuropean Integration (London: MacMillan Press 2000) pp. II- 12. 
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To summarise, the extent to which Ukraine influenced the dominant pattern of 
security management, or regional orders along the North-eastern, Western and 
Southern azimuths will be assessed on two levels, namely in terrns of bilateral 
relations with regional neighbours, and relations with subregional and regional 
institutions. Along the North-eastem azimuth, it will be argued that Ukraine sought to 
establish harmonious bilateral relations with regional neighbours, but impede 
subregional and regional institutional developments to the extent that such 
developments negatively impacted on Ukrainian sovereignty. Along the Western 
azimuth, it will be contended that Ukraine utilised bilateral ties with regional 
neighbours in pursuit of membership of subregional and regional institutions. The 
Southern azimuth needs to be seen in the context of the previous two azimuths. The 
case will be made that Southern developments i. e. bilateral ties, and relations with 
subregional and regional institutions, were pursued to the extent to which they 
facilitated the achievements of objectives along the aforementioned two azimuths. 
While the two levels (bilateral, and subregional/regional) are ostensibly 
discrete, the interaction between them was explicit as expressed in Ukrainian foreign 
policy objectives along each of the azimuths. An effort will be made to explore two- 
level interaction (bilateral- subregional, subregional-regional, bilateral-regional) and 
hence gain an albeit limited insight into factors involved in policy objective formation 
in Kyiv and the impact these objectives had on influencing regional orders. Multi- 
level interaction analysis (i. e. the interaction between all three e. g. bilateral- 
subregional-regional etc. ) has been avoided owing to its inherent complexity. 
25 
25 According to Lake and Morgan 'integrating regional politics into nascent models of multilevel games will 
produce theories of staggering complexity' a problem compounded by the fact that methodological tools are 
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On independence in 1991, Ukraine immediately faced a number of major security 
dilemmas. As will become clear, the threats were not only those of a classic military 
type. Despite appearances and the invective flying around Kyiv and Moscow in the 
post-independence phase, Ukraine was not at any time faced with the prospect of a 
Russian assault, attack or invasion, despite the 'realist' thinking that charactensed 
Ukrainian strategic planning. Instead, the narrow military-defence conception of 
Ukraine's national security i. e. that the military power of other states presented the 
main threat to the security of the state and that the state was only defensible with 
military power, was merely the pinnacle of a pyramid of concerns that could be 
labelled security issues. Barry Buzan elaborates a conceptualisation of security that 
lends to itself to Ukraine's predicament particularly well. 
Buzan argues that the security of what he calls human collectives consists of 5 
types of threat sectors: military, political, economic, environmental and societal. The 
placing first of the military threat reflects Buzan's acknowledgement of the primacy of 
the assumptions of realism, namely, the anarchy that characterises the international 
system of states. As such the military sector 'concerns the two-level interplay of the 
armed offensive and defensive capabilities of states, and states' perceptions of each 
other's intentions'. 26 Undoubtedly, as will be explored below, a military threat to 
Ukraine's security existed from the very earliest days of its independence. This took a 
number of forms ranging from a direct challenge to the territorial integrity of Ukraine 
by both Romania and Russia, to a refusal by Moscow to countenance the unilateral 
decision of Kyiv to nationalise all forces on Ukrainian territory, especially the Black 
Sea Fleet. 
The second sector, political security, 'concerns the organisational stability of 
states, systems of government and the ideologies that give them legitimacy. 527 On 
these criteria, on independence Ukraine was a highly vulnerable state burdened with 
the task of simultaneous and yet urgent nation and state building. The organisational 
26 B. Buzan, People, States and Fear, p. 19. 
27 ibid., p. 19. 
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stability of the state was missing. In the immediate aftermath of the coup in Moscow 
in 1991, the Communist party, the very backbone of stability throughout the Soviet 
Union was banned and its property confiscated. While independent Ukraine inherited 
a system of government, it was soon deemed as incongruent with the needs of the new 
state. Mere tinkering to modify rather than replace it began soon after independence. 
This consisted of creating new institutions such as the presidency, and eliminating old 
ones like Communist party rule. Such tinkering also included the manipulation of 
existing institutions, such as first changing the existing Soviet era constitution, and 
then abandoning them altogether. All the while the new found prominence of the 
Ukrainian parliament, the Rada, threw into sharp focus the structural and ideological 
divides that permeated Ukraine society: the ongoing battles between the dominant 
left-wing and the reformist national democrats were to blight Ukraine's political scene 
from day one. In turn, the parliament was in conflict with the presidency, an 
institution the communists were vehemently opposed to. 28 The fact that all of this took 
place in the context of an economy which was experiencing a collapse of disastrous 
proportions and an increasingly unfavourable international environment merely 
exacerbated the situation. For all of these reasons, Ukraine lacked organisational 
stability. 
The third sector, economic security, concerns 4access to the resources, finance 
and markets necessary to sustain acceptable levels of welfare and state power'. 29 With 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine's access to resources, finance and markets 
collapsed. Indeed, Kyiv and Moscow had regular conflicts on the issue of access to the 
market - trade between them was characterised by the sudden imposition of tariffs, 
and counter-tariffs. In terms of economic security, Ukraine was sorely lacking. 
Because of a past scarred by industrial and nuclear pollution, Ukraine was 
vulnerable in the fourth sector, namely that of environmental security, which 
according to Buzan, is 'the maintenance of the local and the planetary biosphere as the 
essential support system on which all other human enterprises depend' . 
30 Furthermore 
it was a deteriorating situation, with an economy heavily dependent on unsafe nuclear 
For an in depth analysis of post-independence constitutional developments in Ukraine, see the unpublished PhD 
thesis by K. Wolczuk, Politics of Statebuilding - The Constitutional Process in Ukraine 1990-1996, University 
of Birmingham, 2000. 
29 B. Buzan, People, States and Fear, pp. 19-20. 
" ibid., p. 20. 
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reactors and vast swathes of South Eastern Ukraine littered with dirty and inefficient 
industries providing much needed employment to an underemployed population. 
The fifth sector, that of societal security, 'concerns the sustainability, within 
acceptable conditions for evolution of traditional patterns of language, culture and 
regional and national identity and Custom. 5 31 Ukraine's internal structural divides have 
been postulated as the source of its greatest vulnerability, and hence threat to the 
integrity of the state. Ukraine is a nation-state geographically split, or perhaps more 
accurately dividable, along ethnic, linguistic, political, religious, and political lines. In 
terms of societal security, Ukraine was susceptible on two counts. Internally, Ukraine 
was vulnerable to the centrifugal tendencies that tend to characterise states with 
minorities as large and as concentrated as the Russian minority in South-eastern 
Ukraine. As Buzan points out 'if societal security is about the sustainability within 
acceptable conditions for evolution of traditional patterns of language, cultural and 
religious and ethnic identity and custom, then threats to these values come much more 
frequently from within the state than from outside it'. 32 This was certainly true as 
Ukraine pursued nation-building policies, which involved adopting the policies of 
what was termed a 'nationalising state'. Inevitably, such nationalising policies were 
seen as threatening to and by the minorities, something that could trigger centrifugal 
tendencies. Furthermore, these centrifugal tendencies were prone to further 
aggravation by powers intent on causing internal turmoil in Ukraine. 
In themselves, no single one of these sectors presented an insurmountable 
security threat. Cumulatively, they were potentially overwhelming. Furthermore, the 
effects of the emergence of a challenge in any one of the 5 sectors could reverberate 
across to other sectors - the threat of a domino effect was ever present. 
However, despite his misgivings as to the continued treatment of the state as 
the principal 'referent object of security' (that is an object the security of which is of 
primary concern), Buzan accepts the primacy of state security owing to the anarchical 
international environment. Despite his contention that threats to national security are 
more likely to be internally than externally generated, he acknowledges that the threats 
presented by external factors are the greatest source of danger. As he points out: 
31 ibid., p. 19. 
32 ibid., p. 19. 
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'Because the use of force can wreak major undesired changes very swiftly, military 
threats are traditionally accorded the higher priority in national security concerns. 
Military action can wreck the work of centuries in all other sectors. , 33 This concern 
with military threats, by implication demands a focus on external determinants of 
threats to the national security of the state, something this thesis will primarily 
concern itself with, as well as the means Ukraine used to counteract them. 
Theories Of Regionalism: Frameworks for Analysis 
While the regionalisation of international behaviour is a phenomenon that has long 
received attention in international relations theory, theoretical interest in the 
phenomenon has been reinvigorated in recent years by the collapse of the bipolar 
system. 34 This thesis will employ a framework developed by Hurrell in which he sets 
out 'the major sets of theories that may be deployed to explain the dynamics of 
regionalism'. 35 Hurrell identifies three categories of theories - systemic, regional 
interdependence and domestic level theories - each of which will now be examined. 
Systemic Level Theories of Regionalism 
Systemic level theories provide the context within which the effects of wider 
political and economic processes on regionalism can be investigated. Thus 'systems 
theories ... are theories that explain 
how the organisation of a realm acts as a 
constraining and disposing force on the interacting units within it. Such theories tell 
us about the forces the units are subjects to. , 
36 However, by rejecting a reductionist 
approach to International Relations, systemic theories propagate the notion that 
33 ibid., p. 117. 
34 For an early comparative perspective on regionalisation see, for example, E. Haas, 'International Integration: the 
European and the Universal Process', International Political Communities. - An Anthology (Garden City, NY: 
Doubleday, Anchor Books) pp. 93-129. For a post Cold War perspective, see P. J. Katzenstein, 'Regionalism in 
Comparative Perspective', pp. 123-159; M. Alagappa, 'Regionalism and Conflict Management: a Framework 
for Analysis', Review of International Studies, 1995, Vol. 21, pp. 359-387; J. H. Mittelman, 'Rethinking the 
"New Regionalism" in the Context of Globalisation', Global Governance, 1996, Vol. 2, pp. 189-213. 
35 A. Hurrell, 'Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective' in L. Fawcett and A. Hurrell, Regionalism in World 
politics (oxford: Oxford University Press 1998) p. 37. 
36 K. Waltz, Theory ofInternational Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979) p. 72. 
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regionalism and regional behaviour are products of systemic forces. Indeed, it has 
been argued that any attempt to define a region is little more than 'trying to put 
boundaries that do not exist around areas that do not matter I. 37 
Two broad approaches can be discerned that strive to contribute to an 
understanding of regional and subregional behaviour at the systemic level: the 
realist/neorealist approach on the one hand, and structural interdependence and 
globalisation on the other hand. 
Realism and Neorealism 
For realists, regionalism is a strategy reverted to by weak states when their security is 
threatened by the presence of or stance adopted by stronger states or hegemons. Put 
succinctly 'regionalist groupings are basically the natural response of weak states 
trapped in the world of the strong'. 38 Such a strategy is a corollary of a theoretical 
conceptualisation of international relations that makes stark assumptions about the 
international system of states. 39 Firstly, the structure of international political systems 
is made up of interactions between states. Secondly, international systems are 
anarchic, lacking an overarching authority, forcing states to revert to self help to 
ensure survival . 
40 The formation and strengthening of alliances is thus a self-help 
strategy as states strive to balance against a perceived foe. Thirdly, classic realists 
suggest that the prime objective of the state is power, although neorealists argue that 
power is only a means to an end, namely survival .41 Fourthly, states are deigned to 
pursue rational policies in pursuit of survival, security or power; such policies as a 
minimum include the use of military threat or actual force. However, survival, under 
conditions of anarchy, is not only a matter of the application of force - it is also a 
matter of continuous adaptation in a highly competitive environment. For the 
neorealist such adaptation involves the pursuit of economic and technological 
37 p. Cloke, C. Pilo and D. Sadler, Approaching Human Geography (New York: Paul Chapman Publishing 1991) 
P. 10. 
38 ibid, p. 49. 
39 The sheer diversity of (neo)realist theories, suggests that it is meaningful to talk about a (neo)reallst approach, as 
such theories tend to share a common core of assumptions and beliefs. 
40 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 9 1. 
41 ibid., p. 58. 
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advantage in neomercantilist economic competition. From this perspective, the 
economic objectives that are believed to underlie "regional integration do not derive 
from the pursuit of welfare, but from the close relationship that exists between 
9ý 42 economic wealth and political power . 
For realists and neorealists hegemons act as stimuli to the formation of 
regions. Firstly, in pursuit of a balance of power, states may form regional groupings 
in response to the threat presented by a hegemon. As such, the formation of regional 
alignments corresponds to that of Walt's alliance formation. 43 Such formations, Walt 
argues, do not just strive to balance against states that are more powerful, especially 
when a state is perceived as either threatening or as having aggressive intentions. 
Secondly, the formation of regional alignments may reflect 'an attempt to restrict the 
free exercise of hegemonic power through the creation of regional institutions'. 44 
Indeed, this very objective may be seen behind Ukraine's insistence that Russia be 
granted membership of the Council of Europe. In particular, Kyiv hoped that 
Moscow's activities in Chechnya might be in part curtailed by the requirements of 
membership of the CoE. However, it is an isolated example. Russia, as the realist's 
realist, was unlikely to ever allow itself to be severely constrained in this way. 
Thirdly, the sheer proximity and overwhelming power of hegemons may elicit the 
fon-nation of alliances of neighbouring states with the hegemon. This process of 
'bandwagoning', or aligning with the hegemon is predicted to occur in the absence of 
any alternative to that of seeking accommodation with the hegemonic power. In fact, 
the entire underlying objective of Ukraine's foreign and security policy can be 
characterised as a search for an alternative to alignment with the hegemon. Fourthly, 
in the case of declining hegemony, there may exist the tendency for the regional group 
and the hegemon to collaborate in the establishment of common institutions. 
Declining hegemons are said to institute co-operation in pursuit of burden sharing, 
problem solving, as a means of legitimising and gamering international support 
for 
policies in pursuit of interests. Such a process can be seen at work in Russia's 
desire 
42 Hurrell, 'Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective' p. 48. 
S. M. Walt, The Origins of Alliance (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1987). Walt defines an alliance as 
'a 
formal or informal arrangement for security cooperation between two or more sovereign states' in contrast 
to 
Snyder's definition of an alliance as a 'formal association of states for the use (or non-use) of Military 
force, 
intended for either the security or the aggrandizement of their members, against specific other states'. 
See G. H. 
Snyder, 'Alliance Theory: A Neorealist First Cut', Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 44,1990, p. 
104. 
44 Hurrell, 'Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective', in Fawcett and Hurrell, p. 50. 
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for a post-Soviet institution and Ukraine's opposition to it. For all of these reasons, it 
is anticipated that realism will provide some powerful insights into Ukraine's regional 
strategy along all three azimuths. 
Structural Interdependence 
The theory of structural interdependence strives to address what it sees as an 
oversimplification and mischaracterization by realists of the international system. The 
analytical approach of the theory consists of three key themes; interdependence, 
complex interdependence and regime change, each of which impacts on the degree of 
integration. 
Interdependence, the first theme, is defined as the mutual dependence that 
derives from international transactions across boundaries. In Ukraine's case, on 
independence, its economic, political and military interdependence with Russia was 
profound. This was more than mere interconnectedness as 'where there are reciprocal 
(although not necessarily symmetrical) costly effects of transactions, there is 
interdependence. Where interactions do not have significant costly effects, there is 
simply interconnectedness. ' 45 The break-up of this extremely close relationship would 
prove to be costly for both parties, with Ukraine especially vulnerable. This 
vulnerability was caused by the asymmetry in the degree of mutual dependence 
between the two actors (i. e. the extent to which one actor depends on another and vice 
versa) that determines the amount of power any one actor possess in an interdependent 
relationship. As a provider of much of Ukraine's energy and raw materials, Russia, 
was on this measure by far the more powerful of the two. There are two dimensions to 
dependence: sensitivity interdependence and vulnerability interdependence. 
Sensitivity interdependence is defined as the 'liability to costly effects imposed from 
outside before policies are altered to try and change the situation'; vulnerability 
interdependence is the 'liability to suffer costs imposed by external events even after 
46 
policies have been altered' . On these two measures, 
Ukraine was not only sensitive 
but it was especially vulnerable to its interdependence with Russia. Indeed, empirical 
45 R. 0. Keohane and J. S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, 2nd edition (Scott Foresman and Company: Boston 
1989) p. 9. 
46 ibid., p. 13 
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findings not only support the theoretical affirmation that vulnerability interdependence 
is more important than sensitivity interdependence in establishing power relations 
between actors but also, more importantly, the contention that asymmetrical 
interdependencies are sources of power among actors. 
The second theme of structural interdependence theory, namely, complex 
interdependence, builds on simple interdependence by emphasising three key features: 
multiple channels of contact or access between states (interstate, transgovemmental 
and transnational), the absence of a hierarchy of issues to be addressed between states 
(that is, military security does not dominate the agenda), and a low salience of the use 
of military force. Clearly, where these three features are present, prospects for 
integration are enhanced. In the case of relations between Kyiv and Moscow, the fact 
that military security dominated the agenda in the development of relations in the first 
few years following Ukrainian independence was sufficient to discourage Ukraine's 
renewed integration with Russia notwithstanding the multiple channels of contact that 
continued to link the two states (extensive familial ties, elite ties, educational/training 
cooperation). The fact that Kyiv was guided by the perception that military force on 
the part of Moscow had a high salience merely reinforced Kyiv's conviction. 
The final theme, that of regime change (where a regime is defined as network 
of rules, norms and procedures that regularise behaviour and control its effects) aims 
to explain how regimes undergo transition from one type (e. g. interconnectedness) to 
another (e. g. integration). It focuses on the distribution of power (predominantly 
military power) among states as a determinant of the nature of the prevailing 
international regime. As a result, it is argued that 'as the power of states changes ... the 
rules that comprise international regimes will change accordingly'. 
47 Thus a collapse 
in the power of the hegemon compels it not only to become more accommodating, 
but 
is accompanied by an increase in assertiveness on the part of secondary powers, 
the 
net result of which is a change in the economic regime, albeit in the absence of either 
significant shifts in the balance of power or war. Interdependence 
theorists attribute a 
prominent role to issue structure as an explanation of regime change, an area 
neglected by realists. Thus although Russia attempted 
to impose rules within a given 
issue area, the uneven distribution of military and economic strength of 
Russia meant 
47 ibid., p. 43. 
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that attempts to link issue areas by Moscow were often unsuccessful, something which 
was exploited by Ukraine to pursue its regional ambitions and bolster its security. 
Despite its inherent complexity and lack of parsimony, the theory of structural 
interdependence highlights the important role of key variables affecting Ukraine's 
relations with Russia which are perhaps underestimated by realism. By underlining the 
significance of these variables, the theory of structural interdependence will have 
provided a powerful insight into Ukraine's regional behaviour, at least along the 
Northeastem azimuth 
Globalisation 
The final systemic approach to regionalism is that of globalisation, an 'informal 
integration which consists of those intense patterns of interaction which develop 
without the intervention of deliberate governmental decisions, following the dynamics 
of markets, technology, communications networks and social exchange, or the 
influence of religious, social or political movements'. 48 
Four interrelated features distinguish the process of globalisation. Firstly, it 
refers to a growth in the primarily economic interconnectedness and interdependence 
between nation-states. Secondly, interconnectedness and interdependence leads to a 
diffusion of technology, in particular, transport, information and communication 
technology which in turn reinforces the existing economic links between the nation- 
states and eventually leads to a growth in social exchange between their citizens. 
Thirdly, and building on the previous two points, the resulting material infrastructure 
leads to a growth of societal interdependence. This interdependence, when bolstered 
by 'the integrating and homogenising influence of market forces, facilitates increased 
flows of values, knowledge, and ideas, and increases the ability of like-minded groups 
to organise across national boundaries, creating a transnational civil society that 
includes both transnational policy communities and transnational social 
movements'. 49The result is a single global community. 
48 W. Wallace, The Transformation of Western Europe (London: Pinter 1990) p. 54. 
49 Hurrell, 'Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective', in Fawcett and Hurrell, p. 55. 
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Globalisation contributes to the emergence of regionalism in a number of 
ways. Firstly, the need to tackle issues that exceed the ability of individual nation 
states to cope imposes a requirement for collective management. The 
institutionalisation of such collective management is a more feasible prospect when 
undertaken at the regional level, where the actors share a world outlook, social system, 
and historical and cultural experiences, strive for political and security convergence 
and are characterised by homogeneity of norms and values. Secondly, despite the 
apparent global nature of many problems, the solutions are often regional; 
additionally, any enforcement of standards agreed at the global level is likely to take 
place at the regional level. Thirdly, the incongruity between the forces driving on the 
one hand, integration and globalisation (e. g. market pressure, technological diffusion), 
and on the other the trend toward fragmentation is likely to be resolved at the regional 
level. Finally, globalisation drives regionalism by impacting on policy goals adopted 
by states. For example, in the competition for the finite foreign investment and 
technology available and the hoped for economic development that follows in their 
wake, governments are driven to adopt ever more mercantilist market-liberal policies 
which are increasingly homogeneous with those of competitors in an ever more 
crowded market-place. Conversely, global forces are forcing states to congregate or 
join forces in larger units in pursuit not only of economic efficiency but also the 
political weight necessary to ensure they are treated with sufficient seriousness in the 
world economic institutions. 
However5 despite the growing appeal of globalization as a theory in the 
context of an ever integrating or regionalising world, it is expected to offer little in 
terrns of explanatory power regarding Ukraine's regional predicament in the first 
decade of its independence. This is because Ukraine's regional behaviour was geared 
toward consolidating its sovereignty and integrity, rather than tapping into global 
flows of capital or technology which it was incapable of absorbing, let along attracting 
in the absence of a proper regulatory framework. 
Regional Level Theories of Regionalism 
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An alternative to the systemic approach is provided by regional level theories. By 
emphasising the role of institutions, regional cohesion, and pluralism, these theories 
attempt to link regionalism with the interdependence that characterises regional level 
interaction. 
Neofunctionalism 
The essence of (neoffunctionalism is that rising interdependence demands co- 
operation which in turn leads to integration, in the shape of some forin of 
supranational institution. While initially the role of the institution is limited to some 
pre-determined issue-area, with time the influence of such an institution 'spills-over' 
into other areas, a process which again moves the independent states along the spiral 
of further integration. Functional spill-over, the first of three types of spill-over, 
occurs when integration causes problems the solution to which is further integration. 
Political spill-over is the tendency for the political elites that 'Inhabit' supranational 
institutions (and whose loyalties have perhaps shifted to the institution) to encourage 
further integration, perhaps via institution-building. Cultivated spill-over refers to the 
role central institutions play as mediators in negotiations, a role which then may spill- 
over into an upgrading of the common interest, the result of which is greater 
integration. 50 Overall, integration is believed by (neoffunctionalists to be a self 
perpetuating process - as integration occurred in one area , it would expand into others. 
Haas, in his seminal work on European integration between 1950 and 1957 argues that 
his findings were sufficiently general to explain the formation of political 
communities subject to firstly the participants being industrial economies, tightly 
linked to international trade and financial flows, and secondly that they be pluralist 
50 Early neo-functionalists identified four process mechanisms, which contributed to the formation of regional 
organisation: the functional linkages of tasks; increasing flows or transactions; linkages and coalitions and, 
finally, the formation of pressure groups. Later research adds three more: regional group formation; ideological- 
identitive appeal and the involvement of external actors in the process. The integrative potential of a given 
region is determined by four structural features: the economic equality of units, elite value complementarity, 
pluralism and the capacity of member states to adapt and respond. In addition to structural features, perceptual 
conditions are deemed important. These included the perceived equity of distribution of benefits, perceptions of 
cogency and low visible costs. See J. S. Nye, 'Comparing Common Markets: A Revised Neo-Functionalist 
Model', in F. Kratochwil and E. D. Mansfield, (eds. ), International Organization. - A Reader (New York: 
HarperCollins College Publishers) pp. 286-300. 
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societies governed by identifiable elites under conditions of democracy and 
51 constitutionalism. 
Yet as Hurrell points out 'despite its [neofunctionalism's] influence on both 
the theory and practice of European regionalism, its relevance to contemporary 
52 regionalism elsewhere is rather less clear'. Indeed, its relevance to Ukraine between 
1991 and 2000 will be seen as distinctly marginal. 
According to Hurrell, there are three criticisms supporters of the theory need to 
address. Firstly, and especially relevant in the case of Ukraine's regional efforts, is the 
fact that while (neo) functionalism is relatively successful in explaining the evolution 
of regional institutions, it struggles to explain the emergence of regionalist schemes. 
Secondly, the prominence attributed to regional institutions by (neo) functionalists 
contrasts sharply with the distinctly secondary and declining role states are deemed to 
play. Thirdly, by neglecting the distinction between 'high' and 'low' politics, 
neo functionalists fail to recognise that 'high' politics remain the realm of the state, 
and that only issues of 'low' politics lend themselves to integrationist schemes. 53 
Neoliberal Institutionalism 
In contrast to (neo)functionalism, which de-emphasises the role of the state, for neo- 
liberal institutionalism the state remains important as the interface between domestic 
and international fora. However, because of the limitations of unilateral action and the 
growing interdependence between states, institutions are seen as the solution to the 
demands thrown up by problems of collective action such as the free rider problem or 
the dangers of defection. For example, collective defence collaboration, when 
institutionalised, is not only deemed an effective means of deterring attack; it also 
provides cohesion to a group that might otherwise be liable to fragment. As such, 
institutions are more than a means to an end - they are a forum for reciprocal feedback 
by providing information, facilitating communication, maintaining transparency, 
repeated interactions, sanctioning and allowing monitoring; they also provide a forum 
51E. B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces 1950-1957 (Stanford, California: 
Stanford University Press 1968) pp. xxxv-xxxvi. 
52 Hurrell, 'Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective', in Fawcett and Hurrell, pp. 56-57. 
53 ibid. 
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in which threats can be signalled, promises made, intentions transmitted and 
capabilities assessed. In sum, institutions enhance security by reducing uncertainty. 
And while strategic interdependence - that is, the interdependence between security 
strategies of states - is a zero-sum game in realist theory, for institutionalists it leads to 
more informed and hence more efficient security strategies. 
Institutional theorists acknowledge the potentially divisive efforts that relative 
gains can bring about. However, while some issues tend to result in zero-sum relative 
gains (competing territorial claims, expansionism), the comparative rarity of issues 
that lend themselves to forceful resolution allied to the eroding utility of military force 
renders the relative gain problem mainly a worst-case scenario issue. Clearly a 
distinction needs to be made between Ukraine's objectives along the Western 
azimuth- namely, membership of key institutions - and its stated desire to avoid 
integration with institutions along the North-eastern azimuth. According to Wallander, 
institutionalists would explain this divergence through the relative density of the 
network of institutions along the respective azimuths. Along the Western azimuth, 
institutions such as the Council of Europe, the OSCE, the NACC, the EU and NATO 
reinforce 'the availability of defensive strategies in the face of shifting intentions or 
exploitative behaviour. States can afford to participate in security institutions designed 
for transparency and mediation if they can count on the monitoring and sanctioning 
capabilities of an institution designed for collaboration as well... In contrast, Russia 
lacks a similar network of strong security institutions. If multilateral strategies were to 
fall, Russia would be left with little but traditional military and diplomatic responses 
to exploitative strategies. ' 54 With this point alone, neoliberal institutionalism 
contributes to an understanding of why Ukraine pursued membership of Western 
subregional and regional institutions so vigourously, yet so vehemently sought to 
avoid all but the most shallow terms of membership of the CIS. 
Overall, co-operation, rather than simply being driven by a need for alliance 
formation or concerns about balance of power, is a process of intergovernmental 
bargaining the result of which is ever greater co-operation within an increasingly more 
complex whole. As has been pointed out, 'patterns of success in effective multilateral 
54 C. E. Wallander, Mortal Friends, Best Enemies - German-Russian Cooperation After the Cold War (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press 1999) pp. 38-39. 
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security co-operation cannot be explained solely by power and interests but must take 
international institutions into account'. 55 
Constructivism 
In contrast to both (neo) functionalists and neoliberal institutionalists, both of which 
stress the institutional dimension of regionalism, cognitions are at the root of the 
constructivist approach to regionalism. Such a cognitive approach resonates strongly 
in Ukraine in two mutually exclusive ways. Simply, the stress Ukraine places on its 
Central European roots is at odds with the emphasis Russia places on the its common 
East Slavic extraction with Ukraine. According to constructivists the development of 
ccognitive regionalism', is a result of the psychological dynamics that interdependence 
brings about. Both of the two different constructivist approaches focus on the sense of 
community that emerges from interdependence. 
The first approach, based on the integration theory of Deutsch, argues that the 
emergence of an inter-state community is based on two platforms. 56 The first platform 
is a sense of community between the states, a degree of sympathy for and loyalty to 
one another, a commonality of norms and understanding and a sharing of principles. 
The second platform consists not only of a compatibility of political and economic 
values (which contribute to a sense of community) but also the [ inter- societal] 
communication that results from transactions taking place between states or societies. 
In Ukraine's case, the latter, namely the lack of communication with its Western 
neigbours for the past 50 years precluded the development of compatible political and 
economic values, all of which meant that on independence in 1991 Ukraine has a 
weak sense of community with its Western neighbours. This was a series of deficits 
the Ukrainian elite tried to rapidly rectify on independence. The fact that this 
community building took place at the same time as the long established community 
55 Wallander points out that institutions differ from cooperation in that the former - that is, 'explicit, persistent and 
connected sets of rules that prescribe behavioural roles and constrain activity' - facilitate the latter. Wallander, 
Mortal Friends, p. 16. For an oustanding analysis of institutions see D. C. North, Institutions, Institutional 
Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1990); and R. 0. Keohane, 
'International Institutions: Two Approaches' in Kratochwil and Mansfield, International Organization, pp. 44- 
61. 
56 K. Deutsch, S. Burrell and R. Kann, Political Community in the North Atlantic Area (Princeton: Princeton UP, 
1958). 
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with its North-eastern neighbour was being disbanded has empirical resonance the 
theory must deal with in order to reaffirm its validity. 
The second, Wendtian approach also gives prominence to processes that 
contribute to community formation. However, it also allows for the actors' 
interpretation of the world, and the influence of culture and history something which 
explains Kyiv's concerted efforts to emphasise its European heritage as it mapped out 
its 'return to Europe'. Wendt's view that 'states are not structurally or exogenously 
given but constructed by historically contingent interactions' was quickly latched onto 
as Ukraine's political elite sought to create a European Ukraine. 57 If Ukraine wanted 
to join a CEE community, it had to share a CEE identity. Wendt identifies at least 
three mechanisms that lead to the formation of collective identities. The first, the 
structural context, consists 'of the shared understandings, expectations, and social 
knowledge embedded in international institutions and threat complexes, in tenns of 
58 which states define (some of) their identities and interests'. For Ukraine, the creation 
of such a context meant above all joining European institutions, even if only CEE 
subregional institutions, a key determinant in the fort-nation of a European identity at 
the end of the twentieth century. The second mechanism, systemic processes, 
encourages collective identity formation through, firstly, rising interdependence, and 
secondly, transnational convergence. Interdependence rises as a result of both a 
growth in intensity of capital and trade flows, and the emergence of a common 
threatening 'Other', all of which intensifies the propensity to form a collective 
identity. Indeed, the weight Ukraine placed on a growth in interdependence with its 
Western neighbours and the emphasis it repeatedly placed on Russia as the 'Other' 
speaks volumes about Ukraine's regional ambitions in CEE. The transnational 
convergence that results from the increasing homogeneity of outlook that comes with 
a confluence of cultural and political values, and cross-cultural or cross-border 
learning was a long-term goal for Kyiv as it sought to 'Europeanise'. The functioning 
of the third mechanism, strategic practice, suggests that repeated instances of co- 
operation may lead to collective identity formation and the emergence of 
communities. Indeed, Ukraine's effort to ensure repeated instances of co-operation 
57 A. Wendt, 'Collective Identity Formation and the International State', The American Political Science Review, 
Vol. 88, Issue 2 (Jun., 1994), p. 385. 
" ibid., p. 389. 
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with its Western neighbours is indicative of the extent to which Kyiv was intent to be 
part of any emergent CEE community. As will be seen, constructivism was at the 
heart of Ukraine's efforts along the Western azimuth, and as such provides a powerftil 
insight into the strategies Ukrainian policy makers adopted in pursuit of membership 
of subregional and regional institutions. 
New Wave Regionalism 
By examining the extent to which power relations guide the formation and 
development of regional institutions and their economic effects, New Wave 
regionalism attempts to fill a gap left by Hurrell's ftamework . 
59 'New Wave' 
regionalists examine regionalism as a 'political process characterized by economic 
policy cooperation and coordination among countries' [italics in original] . 
60 They 
highlight the extent to which regionalism is a politico-economic phenomemon. 
Accordingly, the proliferation of preferential trading arrangements (PTAs) across 
regions of the world represents not only the economic arrangements between members 
states of that region but also is reflective of the inter-state politics within that region. 
This relationship between politics and economics will be made explicit in the 
following chapters as it will be seen that along the Western azimuth, Ukraine sought 
to participate in separate PTAs with both CEFTA and the EU precisely because of the 
political ramifications of such participation. In contrast, along the Northeastern 
azimuth, Ukraine sought to tightly circumscribe the political dimension of the CIS 
PTAs and to limit them to economic matters only. In other words, the extent to which 
Ukraine has tried to participate in PTAs reflects the political dimension it perceives as 
underlying that particular regional arrangement. As has been stated, 'states do not 
make the decision to enter a PTA in an international political vacuum'. 61 Rarely can 
New Wave regionalism have had more resonance than for Ukraine, a country which 
following independence found itself on the cusp of two regions, each of which were 
forming PTAs for clearly interrelated political and economic reasons. 
59 E. Mansfield and H. Milner, 'The New Wave of Regionalism', International Organization, Vol. 53, No. 3, 
Summer 1999, pp. 589-627. 
60 ibid., p. 591. 
" ibid., p. 608. 
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Crucially, while welfare considerations underlying regionalism are a key 
feature of the study of the phenomenon for 'New Wave' regionalists, considerations 
which were in fact very important to Ukraine, Kyiv was, perhaps for understandable 
reasons, inordinately preoccupied by the political dimension of the process. 62 In fact 
Ukraine's stance on the PTAs of the CIS needs to be seen in the political context of 
the vastly attenuated power of its key member, Russia, and with an eye on all of the 
attendant implications for that state's security relations and Moscow's efforts to 
minimise the pernicious effects of its decline in power. Conversely, EU PTAs 'have 
been used with increasing regularity to help prompt and consolidate economic and 
political reforius', something which affected Ukraine's relations with that institution 
and Kyiv's prospects for membership. 63 The different objectives underlying the 
policies on which the PTAs of these two regional bodies are based have conditioned 
Ukraine's stance towards regional developments on its borders and will be explored in 
the following chapters. 
'Subregional Regionalism' 
Within the study of regionalism, a growing body of research has sought to focus on 
subregional developments, (again beyond the scope of Hurrell's theoretical 
framework) as a distinct yet complementary subset of larger integration processes. 
The very existence of subregional institutions in CEE is a product of a dichotomy on 
the European continent. On the one hand, subregional institutions emerged in CEE to 
help fill the political vacuum which followed the end of the Cold War. On the other 
hand, their existence (and membership of them) was based on the strict premise that 
subregional institutions should neither replace regional institutions nor replicate their 
functions, which as shall be elaborated on below, were a potential impediment to their 
evolution. 64 
Although research on subregional integration adopts a normative approach, 
and does not aspire to the status of theory, it strives to highlight the factors or 
62 However, the welfare benefits of regionalism remain unclear and Inconsistent as 'economic analyses indicate 
that regionalism's welfare implications have varied starkly over time and across PTAs', ibid., p. 595, 
63 ibid., p. 601. 
64 A. J. Bayles, 'Sub-regional Organizations: The Cinderellas of European Security', IVA TO Review, No. 2, Vol. 45, 
Mar 1997, pp. 27-3 1. 
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variables driving subregional integration. Firstly, for the newly independent or 
recently 'de-satellitised' states of CEE, membership of subregional institutions 
ostensibly offered the means of attainining proportionally greater influence - 
collectivism carries greater weight than individualism. Secondly, subregional 
institutions potentially provided those same states with convenient staging posts 
between the individualism and isolation of the immediate post-Cold War era, and the 
distant prospect of membership of the major regional institutions in Westem Europe. 
(Indeed, for some CEES, in particular Ukraine, membership of subregional 
institutions was the only options on offer along the Westem azimuth in tenns of 
institutional membership functionally important in the pursuit of membership of key 
regional institutions. ) Thirdly, subregional institutions offered the prospect of 
providing all-too-rare fora for CEES to participate in equal status negotiations and 
65 
exchange of information not only with member states, but also other institutions . 
Perhaps above all, 'subregional groups had the potential to sustain cooperation and 
help to avert the development of potentially dangerous divisions in the new Europe'. 66 
If the 'benefits (of such cooperation) for the small and more remote states are 
particularly clear' they were equally evident to weak and remote states such as 
Ukraine. 67 It is worth reiterating that it was evident to policy makers in Kyiv from the 
very first days of independence, that because NATO and EU membership was 
precluded, participation in subregional groupings was effectively the only avenue 
open to Ukraine along the Western azimuth if it wanted to 'retum to Europe'. As has 
been pointed out, 'today you are what you belong to'. 68 Above all, subregional 
cooperation is believed to increase security by 'promoting confidence and trust 
between states and peoples of the region, reinforcing mutual dependence, 
strengthening democratic structures, reducing economic differences, promoting 
65 ibid., p. 27-28. 
66 A. Cottey 'Introduction' in A. Cottey (ed. ), Subregional Cooperation In The New Europe - Building Security, 
Prosperity and Solidarityftoni the Barents to the Black Sea, (London: Macmillan Press 1999), p. 3. 
67 Bayles, 'Subregional Organizations', p. 28. 
68 Cooper, 'The Meaning of 1989'. 
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economic and social development, reducing region-specific risks and threats, and 
promoting further regional cooperation . 
69 
Despite the high hopes held out for the role of subregional institutions, 
particularly in CEE, to be successful, that is to attain the goals outlined above, they 
would have to surmount a number of flaws inherent to them. Firstly, certainly along 
the Western azimuth, subregional institutions would be placed in direct competition 
with the regional institutions to which CEE states aspired. Yet, where a member state 
was intent on joining regional institutions, subregional institutions were unlikely to be 
an adequate substitute. This presented Ukraine with the prospect of joining 
institutions which were subsequently abandoned by founding and key member states. 
Secondly, in pursuit of membership of regional institutions, and lacking 'mediating' 
mechanisms put in place by regional institutions which might discourage 
individualistic approaches, subregional member states were likely to be in competition 
with each other for entry into regional institutions. It is evident that in the absence of 
an unambiguous message from regional institutions that 'a good record of cooperation 
at [the] subregional level will help not handicap states which otherwise meet the 
conditions of membership' it was unlikely that subregional institutions would 
prosper . 
70 Ukraine needed them to prosper. A third point is that membership of 
subregional institutions potentially condemns the group to collectively move at the 
pace of the slowest member, amongst which Ukraine would inevitably find itself, 
certainly along the Western azimuth. 
Although the ramifications of these inherent contradictions were potentially 
profoundly negative for Ukraine's prospects for membership of subregional 
institutions, the contradictions were not irreconcilable if 'the larger European 
organizations, including NATO, should articulate policies which more clearly support 
the sub-regions'. 71 
Domestic Level Theories of Regionalism 
69 A. Bjumer, 'Reflections on Subregionalism and Wider European Security' in R. Dwan (ed. ), Building Security in 
Europe's New Borderlands - Subregional Cooperation in the Wider Europe, (M. E. Sharpe: London 
1999), pp. 
11-12 
70 Bayles, 'Subregional Organizations', p. 28. 
71 ibid. p. 27. 
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Domestic level theories aim to explain the emergence of regionalism in terins of the 
experiences shared by polities of a given geographical space. Among such experiences 
are religion, culture, race, ethnicity and even extraction, a similarity of language, and 
an awareness of a shared history and heritage. While ostensibly similar to 
neo functionalism (which also stresses certain domestic prerequisites to regionalism), 
domestic level theories, highlight the internal political make-up of states or the 
internal dynamics that takes place within states as the independent variable rather than 
postulate interaction between states as the causal variable. Two versions of domestic 
level theories will be examined. 
Regionalism And State Coherence 
The state coherence approach suggests that the very integrity, viability and coherence 
of states in a given region are a prelude to integration and regional co-operation 
between those states. Conversely, partaking in regionalism does not appear to be a 
viable option for states that are themselves disintegrating under the burdens imposed 
by a lack of internal legitimacy, ineffective or deleterious state structures and 
economic and political mismanagement. Ukraine was such a state. Owing to political 
and social fragmentation and the marginal internal legitimacy that ensues, let alone the 
economic and political mismanagement that has characterised the Ukrainian 
landscape 
in the first decade of independence, Ukraine's greatest security threat was and remains 
internal rather than external. 
72 Specifically, because of different historical trajectories, 
the experiences of Western Ukraine have been very different to those of 
'Greater 
Ukraine'. While 'Greater Ukraine', under Russia, was over the centuries exposed to 
Russification, mass immigration of ethnic Russians, collectivisation and rapid 
industrialisation, Western Ukraine was only subjected to Russian/Soviet practices 
73 from 1939 onwards . 
As a result of these divergent historical paths, on independence 
Ukraine was (and continues to be) a highly fractured state. 
Ethnically, Ukraine is 
essentially a nation of two parts: 72.7% or 37.4 million 
Ukrainians, and 22.1% or 11 .4 
million Russians; 80% of the Russians are urban 
dwellers based in the South and East. 
72 See R. Wolczuk 'The Evolution of 
Ukraine's Foreign and Security Policy'. 
73 'Greater Ukraine' is a colloquialism 
for Central, Eastern and Southern Ukraine collectively. 
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Ethno-geographically, it is a mixed nation with sizeable Russian minorities in Central, 
Eastern and Southern regions, an outright Russian majority and a fast growing Tartar 
minority in Crimea, and small but significant Russian minorities in Western regions. 
Linguistically it is also a nation of two parts - 43.4% are Ukrainophones and 56.6% 
74 Russophones 
. It is noteworthy that a large proportion of ethnic Ukrainians are in fact 
Russophones. As a broad generalisation, Central, Eastern and Southern Ukrainians 
tend to be Russophone, while Western Ukrainians are predominantly Ukrainophones. 
Furthermore, there is a strong correlation between language used (the so-called 
language of convenience) and attitudes toward the 'Russian issue' and political 
affiliation . 
75 For example, the Ukrainian Left, with its strong pro-CIS, pro-Russian, 
anti-capitalist and anti-West orientation, tends to be elected by the ethnically Russian 
and Russophone constituency in the cities and rural areas of Southern, Eastem and 
Central Ukraine. In contrast, leaning toward the right of centre, the National 
Democrats have their powerbase in Western Ukraine with some support in Kyiv. The 
extent to which this internal fragmentation influenced Ukraine's regional behaviour 
will be assessed where relevant. 
The state coherence approach also suggests that prospects for regionalism are 
likely to be further damaged in the absence of mutually agreed and accepted territorial 
boundaries between states of a given region. 76 Therefore the impact on regionalism of 
the historically-legitimised threat Ukraine faced from some of its neighbours, in 
particular Romania and Russia, will also be explored. 
Regime Type And Democratisation 
The essence of the Democratic Peace Theory (or more accurately Hypothesis) as 
applied to regionalism is that the noted lack of wars between democratic regimes is 
77 
conducive to regionalism. Two versions of the theory have been postulated . The 
first 
74 Arel suggests that 3/4 of Ukrainians living West of the Dnipro are Ukrainophone, while 3/4 of the population to 
the East is Russophone. For a comprehensive discussion of the much misunderstood issue of language use see 
D. Arel, and V. Khmelko, 'The Russian Factor and Polarization in Ukraine', The Harriman Review, 9,1 (1996) 
pp. 81-9 1. 
75 D. Arel and V. Khmelko, 'The Russian Factor and Polarization in U-kralne', p. 84. 
76 Hurrell, 'Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective', in Fawcett and Hurrell, p. 67. 
77 M. W. Doyle, 'Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs', Part I, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 12, No. 
3 (Summer 1983), pp. 205-235. See also, M. W. Doyle, 'Liberalism and World Politics', Atnerican Political 
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Pik 
suggests that the very nature of democracy, and the power it confers on the populace, 
constrains the elected government from pursuing actions the material consequences of 
which are then bome by the population. The second argues that the very institutional 
structures inherent to democratic regimes (that is the 'check and balances' so 
beholden to political scientists) render war-making a last resort option for politicians. 
Furthermore, the norms and practices for conflict resolution within democratic 
regimes seem to be applied to external issues. Thus, when two such democratic states 
face up to each other, not only are they limited by the same structural and normative 
constraints on their own behaviour, but crucially, theyperceive each other as such. As 
Russett points out 'the culture, perceptions andpractices that pennit compromise and 
the peaceful resolution of conflicts without the threat of violence within countries 
come to apply across national boundaries toward other democratic countries'. 78 The 
net result of these two theories is that democracies do not conduct war with each other 
even though democracies may wage war with non-democratic regimes, which they do 
not perceive as limited by these same internal constraints . 
79 From the Democratic 
Peace Hypothesis/Theory, it is but a short step to the argument that democratisation is 
a precondition of regionalism. The fact that the difference between a democratising 
state, and a fully democratised polity has yet to be fully elaborated, is highly pertinent 
in Ukraine's case as a less than fully democratic state. 
Methodology 
Foreign policy outcomes are not the pnme focus of this thesis - strategies are, 
although outcomes are convenient dependent (i. e. measureable, or assessable) 
variables. As a result, where possible contemporaneous evidence has been employed. 
Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 4 (December 1986), pp. 1151-1169; B. Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace. - 
Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1993); B. Russett, 'Can a 
Democratic Peace Be Built', International Interactions, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Spring 1993), pp. 277-282. The key 
article on the subject is M. Small and J. D. Singer, 'The War-proneness of Democratic Regimes, 1816-1865', 
Jerusalem Journal ofInternational Relations, Vol. 1, No. 4 (Summer 1976), pp. 50-69. 
78 B. Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace. - Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press 1993) p. 31 (italics in original). 
79 The democratic peace theory has been subject to swingeing criticism, most notably by Mearshelmer, who is so 
dismissive of it that he questions the very basis on which it purports to be a theory. See J. J. Mearsheimer, 'Back 
to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War', International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1, (Summer 1990), 
pp. 5-56; see also C. Layne, 'Kant or Cant: The 
Myth of the Democratic Peace', International Security, Vol. 19, 
No. 2 (Fall 1994), pp. 5-49. 
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The main sources of such evidence are primarily newspaper articles (including 
interviews with key actors), interviews with involved actors and public government 
documents. The use of secondary sources has been kept to a minimum. 
The thesis has sought to understand Ukraine as a regional actor as well as 
explain its behaviour. The onus will however be on 'understand'. Rather than simply 
seeking to identify specific causal factors as leading to particular outcomes, the thesis 
has sought in the words of Woods to "search not so much for the cause of an event as 
for its meaning. Scholars seeking to understand will prefer to investigate a particular 
event or state of affairs, rather than a set of cases, delving into history not as a bank of 
information which might falsify a theory, but as a narrative which permits a greater 
appreciation of the origins, evolution, and consequences of an event". 80 
The case study approach adopted in this thesis has sought to comment as 
objectively as possible on events, while at the same time give some meaning to those 
events, a meaning gleaned from the wider context in which those events took place. 
Inevitably the interpretation of events is a more fraught exercise that is the 
interpretation of data as the former tends to be experiential and even impressionistic 
while the latter employs operationalised variables, controlled conditions and pre- 
determined independent and dependent variables. While there is clearly a danger that 
the interpretation adopted may be a fallacious one, it is hoped that the problem may be 
minimised by ensuring that the final product consists of 'strictly determined findings' 
but only 'loosely determined assertions'. 81 
Ultimately, by definition, the approach adopted is rationalist-constructivistic 
i. e. the end product reflects the author's perception of events. Thus rather than 
'knowledge' having been discovered, it has been constructed. Nevertheless, the 
objective throughout has been that even this constructed version of reality bears some 
correspondence to a reality the reader may recognise. This has in part been ensured by 
the thesis having been guided, though most definitely not determined, by other work 
80 N. Woods, 'The Uses of Theory in the Study of International Relations' in N. Woods (ed. ), Explaining 
International Relations Since 1945, (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1996) p. 11. 
81 R. E Stake, The Art of Case Study Research, (London: Sage Publications 1995) p. 12. 
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in the field; the thesis aims to make a contribution to the body of knowledge on 
Ukraine. 
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Part 2- The North-eastern Azimuth 
At the root of all Ukraine's objectives along its North-eastern azimuth lay the 
resolution of its troubled relationship with Russia. Thus, from the very earliest days of 
independence Ukraine pursued the normalisation of political, economic and military 
ties with Russia. This was an essential objective along the North-eastern azimuth as 
the nature of Kyiv's ties with Moscow would invariably impact on Ukraine's relations 
with Russia within the CIS. In turn, the nature of relations with Russia would also 
help define Ukraine's status within the CIS. A bilateral relationship with Russia in 
which Ukraine was the self-evident junior partner would demean the latter's status 
within the CIS and impose on Kyiv undesired institutional constraints. 
Within this context, Ukraine's relations with Belarus on a bilateral level were 
always going to be of secondary importance. They were, however, not unimportant. In 
particular, there is some evidence to suggest that both Ukraine and Belarus took 
advantage of each other when it came to resolving difficulties each was having with 
Russia. Although relations between Kyiv and Minsk were inevitably dwarfed by their 
respective relations with Moscow, they are particularly interesting in the light of 
Minsk's efforts to instil some life into the idea of a Slavic subregional institution, a 
Slavic 'Brotherhood'. While this idea aroused some interest in Moscow, in Kyiv it fell 
on deaf ears. Kyiv was wary of any device that might drag it too deeply into 
institutional relationships with Former Soviet republics that were not of its making, 
choosing or shaping. This, obviously, meant the CIS. However, it is worth reiterating 
that it was important for Ukraine to obtain "a 'special partnership' with Russia' and 
bring about, in the words of James Sherr 'the conviction in Russia that a friendly and 
independent Ukraine represents the best of all possible worlds' (original italics). ' 
1 Sherr, Ukraine's New Time of Troubles, p. 18. 
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Chapter 2: Ukraine's Relations With Slavic States 
Relations With Russia 
Following the coup in Moscow in August 1991, and the subsequent proclamation of 
Ukrainian independence, the political elite in Kyiv immediately started to implement 
the foreign and security policy which was enshrined in the Declaration of Sovereignty 
of 1990. The main impetus behind this policy was an unravelling of the hugely 
complicated network of economic, political and military ties that bound Ukraine to 
Russia. 
As Garnett correctly noted in 1997, there were two sets of objectives 
underlying policy, namely 'a long and difficult agenda of issues relating to both the 
legacy of the break-up of the USSR and the contours of future state-to-state 
relations Only by resolving the problems of the past could Kyiv influence the shape 
of future relations, and only once these two separate aspects to relations had been 
dealt with effectively did the possibility of genuine participation in European 
structures open up; without a normalisation of relations, the European option was 
precluded. Kyiv's relations with Moscow were critical in terms of their impact on 
Ukraine's ultimate participation in the wider scheme of things taking place in the 
West. Furthermore, only by establishing the contours of 'normal' bilateral relations 
could Ukraine hope to avoid being overwhelmed by the institutional constraints of 
membership of a CIS in which Russia was by far the dominant member. 
Garnett identifies five key issues that were crucial in the resolution of 'the 
past' and preparation for 'the future': the recognition of borders, the military balance 
between Ukraine and Russia (including the BSF problem), economic and, in 
particular, energy relations and CIS integration. Each of these will now be examined 
in detail. Special attention will also be paid to each of these issues in terms of how 
they impacted on LJkraine's subregional and regional objectives along the three 
azimuths under examination. 
1 Garnett, Keystone in the Arch, p. 4 1. 
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Problems In The Recognition Of Ukraine's Borders 
If 'there is no more fundamental aspect of sovereignty than international respect for 
existing borders', then there was no clearer example of Russia's inability to come to 
terms with Ukraine's sovereignty than Moscow's procrastination over the 
unconditional recognition of Ukraine's borders. 2 An insight into the mindset of at 
least one member of Russia's political elite is provided by comments made by 
Yevgeny Ambartsumov, the Chair of the Russian Supreme Soviet's Committee on 
International Affairs, who argued that it is possible to "'overrate the principle of the 
inviolability of borders" and that changing the borders of the newly independent states 
can be justified by both human rights considerations and "the general geopolitical 
3 interests of Russia"' . It was precisely this type of stance, adopted by a member of the 
Democratic Russia Movement that made the recognition of borders such a pressing 
issue for Kyiv. 
While technically Ukraine was a sovereign state, on independence in August 
1991, its sovereignty remained circumscribed by the November 1990 Treaty on the 
Basic Principles of Relations between the Russian Federation and the Ukrainian SSR 
which 'acknowledge(d) and respected the territorial integrity of the Ukrainian SSR 
and the RSFSR inside the borders presently existing within the framework of the 
4 USSR' (italics added) . In the absence of a new 
bilateral Treaty specifying the mutual 
unconditional recognition of borders, the qualification of the latter part of the Article 
was far from satisfactory from Kyiv's point of view. Yet the willingness to sign a new 
more 'equal' Treaty was far from forthcoming on the part of Moscow. While Yeltsin, 
in his fervour to bring about the demise of the Soviet Union and deprive Gorbachov of 
a power base, supported Kyiv's pursuit of independence, the collapse of the Soviet 
Union in December 1991 was not accompanied by an unconditional and mutual 
recognition of borders on the part of Russia. Instead, rather than formallse in a treaty 
the new ties that had arisen between Ukraine and Russia since their independence, 
ibid., p. 57 
3 "Russian official Advocates Border Revision", SOVSET, 24 June 1992 in N. V. Lamont, Territorial Dimensions 
of Ethnic Conflict-, The Moldovan Case (Kansas: Foreign Military Studies Office 1996). A 
former version of the 
article appeared as 'Ethnic Conflict in the Transdniester' in Military Review, December - February 1995. 
4 "Treaty on the Principles of Relations Between the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR, " Article 6. See Radyanska 
Ukraina, 21 Nov. 1990, p. I- 
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Moscow continued to insist on the recognition of Ukraines territorial integrity and the 
inviolability of its borders within the context of the newly formed CIS, the successor 
to the USSR. An effort on the part of the Ukrainian parliament to eliminate this 
conditionality by unilaterally amending the Agreement establishing the CIS and, 
instead bilateralising the recognition, respect and inviolability of mutual borders was 
summarily dismissed by Russia in a subsequent barrage of attacks on Ukraine's 
sovereignty and integrity. 
Ostensibly, the essential problem preventing Russia's recognition of Ukraine's 
borders was the status of Crimea. More pointedly, Ukraine's relations with Russia 
were from 1991 complicated by Russian aspirations to Crimea in toto and Sevastopol 
in particular, along with the Black Sea Fleet based there. In theory these issues were 
not inextricably connected - they only came to be so through the efforts of Moscow. 
Russian Claims To Crimea And Sevastopol 
Technically, Crimea was indisputably Ukrainian territory, at least since 1954 when it 
was 'donated' to Ukraine by Khrushchev. 5 This decision was effectively validated in 
the referendum on independence in 1991, when Crimea voted for the independence of 
Ukraine, albeit by a narrow majority - 54 per cent, the smallest majority in all of the 
oblasts of Ukraine. 
However, despite Ukraine's technical ownership of Crimea, using a 
combination of moral and ethical arguments the Russian parliament, without the input 
of the presidency which remained much more restrained on the issue, launched a 
campaign from the very earliest days of Ukrainian independence to reclaim Crimea by 
questioning the legitimacy of Ukraine's possession of the peninsula. In May 1992, the 
Russian Supreme Soviet issued a resolution challenging the 1954 decision by Soviet 
authorities to change the status of Crimea from that of a Russian to that of a Ukrainian 
autonomous republic. This was followed on 5 December 1992, by an adoption of the 
5 On 5 February 1954, a resolution of the Presidium of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet launched an initiative to 
transfer Crimea to the jurisdiction of the Ukrainian SSR. This initiative was then followed on 19 February 1954 
by a decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet transferring the territory. The decision was enshrined 
in the 'Law on the Transfer of the Crimean Oblast from the RSFSR to the Ukrainian 
SSR' on 26 April 1954 by 
Supreme Soviet of the USSR. A thorough discussion of the legalities of the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine is 
discussed in Narodna Arnziya, 23 November 1996. A detailed elaboration on the laws of the transfer is provided 
by the Ukrainian Minster of Justice, Serhiy Holovatyl in Narodna Armiya, 26 December 1996. 
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Congress of the People's Deputies of the Russian Federation, of a decision to 
authorise an examination of the issue of the status of Sevastopol by the Russian 
Supreme Soviet. 6 
The latent rationale behind Moscow's desire for the rusting an-nada that made 
up the BSF was the basing rights that came with the fleet: ownership of the fleet also 
conferred ownership of the infrastructure that went with it. The two apparently 
disparate threads of fleet and territory were deliberately linked by Moscow: a refusal 
by the Kyiv to divide the Fleet meant that a treaty could not be signed; the 
consequence of a lack of a treaty was Moscow's non-recognition of the territorial 
integrity of Ukraine. On the other hand, an agreement to divide the Fleet automatically 
legitimised Russia's military presence on Ukrainian territory. Ukraine was in a no-win 
situation. As was pointed out by Vladimir Lukin, the head of the Russian 
Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations 'the 
Ukrainian leadership will be confronted with a dilemma: either it agrees to the transfer 
of the fleet and (its) bases to Russia or (the status of) Crimea as part of Ukraine will 
be called into question'. 7 Yet by transferring the fleet, the status of Crimea would be 
automatically brought into question because of the legitimisation of the presence of 
Russian forces on Crimean territory. lt was this dilemma that was to haunt Ukrainian 
policy makers as they sought a resolution to the deadlock in the following years. As 
the Ukrainian Deputy Foreign Minister put it 'we don't see a reason to tie the question 
of the division of the fleet with the signing of the treaty'. 8 Unfortunately for Kyiv, 
Moscow could see a reason for tying the two issues. 
Summits On The Basing Rights Of The BSF - The Territorial Dimension 
The original agreement on the BSF in January 1992, in the immediate aftermath of the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union, for Ukraine to take 30 per cent of the BSF (excluding 
nuclear capable warships) was never implemented. No decision was made as regards 
6 It was in part to deal with the 'Russian' problem in Crimea that the OSCE was invited in by Kyiv to act as a 
dispassionate observer. Author's conversation with Michael Wygant, Head of OSCE Mission to Ukraine, Kylv 
July 1997. 
Komsontolskaya Pravda, 22 January 1992, in R. Solchanyk, 'Russia, Ukraine and the Imperial Legacy', Post- 
Soviet Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 4,1993, pp. 359-360, 
8 Zerkalo Nedeli, 23 August, 1996. 
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basing or territorial rights. 9 Instead, there followed a 'war of decrees' between the two 
parties, which ftirther muddled the already murky waters. ' 0 
The first serious attempt to bring about reconciliation between the two parties 
was in Dragomys in 23 June 1992, the result of which was an agreement on 'the 
creation of Ukrainian and Russian Navies based on the Black Sea Fleet, the details of 
which are to be worked out in continuing talks'. " The deferment of the BSF issue, 
along with the demurral of the associated matter of the 'ownership" of Crimea, meant 
that fundamental features of Kyiv's relations with Moscow, namely Ukraine's 
territorial integrity and the recognition of it as such, were not addressed. While the 
subsequent Yalta agreement in August 1992 introduced a semblance of calm into 
relations, in that a 50: 50 division of the fleet was agreed, a fundamental stumbling 
block remained: a lack of agreement on the division of the infrastructure on land. Only 
too aware of the implications of allocating Russia 'ownership' of the infrastructure, 
the Ukrainians remained steadfast on the agreement for a 50: 50 division of the Fleet 
as applying only to the military craft/ships and vessels, and not infrastructure. 
Unsurprisingly, this was something Moscow was firinly against. 
An uneasy peace reigned until the summit in Moscow in 17 June 1993, which 
ended in an agreement which reiterated the 50: 50 division of the fleet. More 
importantly, it also provisionally accepted the concept of leasing Sevastopol to Russia, 
something which reflected Ukraine's deteriorating negotiating position. Indeed, so 
strong was Russia's position that following the Massandra summit in September 1993 
Yeltsin triumphantly announced that Russia was taking ownership of Ukraine's 
portion of the BSF in return for a reduction in its gas debt to Russia (though 
apparently, this deal was presented in the form of an ultimatum). 12 While it is 
accepted that the Russians 'were excessively optimistic' in their far-reaching 
9 Pravda Ukrainy, 14 January 1992. 
10 For example, on 5 April 1992 the Ukrainian President Kravchuk in his decree 'On Urgent Measures Necessary 
for the Creation of Military Forces of Ukraine' ordered the formation of a Ukrainian Navy on the basis of units 
of the BSF located on Ukraine's territory. In turn, on 7 April 1992, President Yeltsin responded with the decree 
'On the Transfer of the Black Sea Fleet to the Russian Federation'. On 8 April, Directive no. 8 'On the 
Formation of Ukraine's Navy' was issued by the Ukrainian Minister of Defence. On 9 April, over the phone, 
both presidents agreed to halt the claims and counter-claims. in N. Savchenko, Anatomia Neobyalvlenoy Voyny 
(Kyiv: Ukrainska Perspektiva 1997) pp. 44-6 1. 
1 'Ukrainian-Russian Summit at Dragomys', RFEIRL Research Report, Vol. 1, No. 30,24 July 1992, p. 38. James 
Sherr suggests that in January 1992 a 50: 50 split was agreed between the two parties; see J. Sherr, 'Russia- 
Ukraine Rapprochement?: The Black See Fleet Accords', Survival, Vol. 39, No. 3, Autumn 1997, p. 36. 
Savchenko, Anatomia Neobyalvlenoy Vqyny, pp. 135-135. 
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conclusions, Kravchuk indeed 'favoured selling part of the BSF and leasing 
Sevastopol to Russia'. 13 Kxavchuk conceded as it would have increased the likelihood 
of the signing of friendship and co-operation treaty. The signing of a treaty would 
have been very welcome as by that stage Ukraine had discovered that the desire to 
hang onto its nuclear weapons aroused the wrath of the West, rather than elicited its 
support. Indeed, not only was the West marginalizing Ukraine because of its stance on 
nuclear weapons, but, according to Smith, 'the Massandra summit reveals that it has 
become difficult for Ukraine to break away from Moscow's orbit. Its economic and 
political weaknesses have forced Ukraine's leaders to the realisation that the ties 
binding them to Moscow are more constraining than previously thought'. 14 
A significant milestone in the resolution of both the nuclear and borders issues 
was the 1994 Trilateral Agreement signed between Ukraine, Russia and the United 
States. Crucially, the Agreement removed the clause that made Ukraine's territorial 
recognition by Russia conditional upon Ukraine's participation in the CIS. 
The conditions contained in the Sochi accords, signed on 9 June 1995, 
included significant concessions on the part of Kyiv and again reflected the weak 
negotiating position of Ukraine. In particular, the agreement that Sevastopol be the 
main naval base of the Russian portion of the BSF (article 2) was a direct 
contradiction of the Ukrainian constitution, and in fact legitimised the presence of 
Russian forces on Ukrainian territory. According to Ukrainian analysts, this decision 
was in effect an acknowledgement that the status of Sevastopol was open to 
negotiation and hence dispute. 15 Indeed, they argue that it was the Sochi accords that 
legitimised Russian claims that Sevastopol was a Russian City. 16 In turn, doubt over 
the city's national status came to legitimise Moscow's insistence that Sevastopol 
remain for the exclusive use of the Russian portion of the Fleet. On 9 September 
1995, Yeltsin again cancelled his visit to Kyiv to sign a treaty on the grounds that 'a 
resolution of the BSF issue has been postponed'. 
17 
13 M. A. Smith, Russian Hegemony in the Near Abroad (Sandhurst: Conflict Studies Research Centre July 1994) 
p. 9. gopher: //marvin. nc3a. nato. int: 70/00/secdef/csrc/f4Omas. txt. 
14 ibid., p. 9. 
S. Kudriachov, S. Odarych, Y. Orobets and M. Tomenko, Carta Sevastopolya: Triumph Presidentiv, Trahedia 
Ukrainy (Kyiv: Ukrainska Perspektiva 1997) p. 14. 
16 ibid., p. 12. 
17 Narodna Arntiya, 27 February, 1997. 
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From the point of view of Ukraine, with the signing of the Sochi accords, the 
two issues, namely that of Ukraine's sovereignty over Sevastopol and Crimea on the 
one hand, and the division of the BSF on the other hand, became , if anything, even 
more tightly interconnected. Despite the signing of an agreement on the technicalities 
of the division of the Fleet (and a number of other issues including military co- 
operation, the transfer of strategic bombers to Russia, transit rights for the 14th army 
from Moldova to Russia, the establishment of a common policy on changes to CFE 
flank restrictions), in November 1995, again in Sochi, disagreements soon arose. 18 
While the first stage of the handover took place with some misgivings on the part of 
the Ukrainians, who accused the Russians of stripping material off ships to be handed 
over to the Ukrainians, and of tampering with the inventory of the BSF, the second 
stage stalled for a number of reasons. 19 The key one remained, as ever, an inability to 
come to an agreement on basing rights. 
President Yeltsin's planned visit to Ukraine on 4 April 1996 to sign the 
friendship and co-operation treaty was postponed for the sixth time on the grounds 
that 'Russia wants to see Sevastopol as the exclusive base for the Russian portion of 
the fleet'. 20 (It is worth pointing out that Yeltsin also had a domestic constituency to 
play to, especially in light of the upcoming elections in June/July 1996; significantly 
the above planned visit was cancelled soon after the Russian Duma's vote on 15 
March to abrogate the Belovezha accords). Soon after, an unexpected concession of a 
legislative nature was made on the part of the Ukrainians, triggered in part by their 
fear that a Communist might come to power in place of a visibly ailing Yeltsin. The 
long awaited passing of the Ukrainian constitution on 28 June 1996, and the inclusion 
of a Transitional Provision (Point 14) providing for 'the use of existing military bases 
on the territory of Ukraine for the temporary stationing of foreign military 
formations .... on the terms of lease' thereby avoiding an overt contradiction of 
Article 
17 of the constitution which expressly forbids foreign military bases on the territory of 
Ukraine. This provision finally allowed for the possibility of a leasing arrangement. 21 
18 Summary of World Broadcasts, SU/2470,2471 and 2473. 
19 Savchenko, Anatomia Neobyalvlenoy Voyny, pp. 261-269. 
20 Narodna Arnziya, 27 February, 1997,. 
21 For a thorough discussion of the legalities surrounding the division of the Black Sea Fleet 
by the Ukrainian 
Minister of Justice, Serhiy Holovatyl, see Narodna Armiya, 29 October 1996. Article 2 of the new constitution 
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By autumn, following a Yeltsin victory in Russia, relations between the tNvo 
states had again started to deteriorate. On 16 October, 1996, the Russian Duma 
virtually unanimously (334 voted in favour, I against, and 3 abstentions) barred the 
division of the BSF, and challenged the status of Sevastopol as a Ukrainian city. The 
vote was non-binding on the Russian president, and the latter distanced himself from 
the judgement. Then, on 24 October, the day preceding the planned summit between 
Kuchma and Yelstin, the Russian Duma passed a resolution warning Ukraine 
646against a unilateral approach" to the status of Sevastopol and announced that 
Sevastopol remained under the jurisdiction Of MOSCOW,. 22 Soon after, on 26 
November, Igor Rodionov, the Russian Defence Minister, suggested that Russia could 
not agree to the joint basing of both the Russian and Ukrainian portions of the fleet at 
Sevastopol. 23 The Ukrainians, despite the pressure, refused to agree to a change of 
status of Sevastopol. 
It has been argued that Ukraine's intransigence suited some segments of the 
Russian political spectrum. In fact, it has been suggested that 'the signing of a 
Ukrainian-Russian treaty was uncomfortable for Moscow. Because .... its signing will 
allow Ukraine to enter the North Atlantic alliance, entry to which is barred for those 
states which have unresolved difficulties with neighbours'. 24 However, there was a 
downside for Russia of forcing Ukraine into an apparent comer, 'despite the 
Ukrainian effort to persuade Russia that its policies were driving Ukraine into the 
25 arms of NATO' . Difficulties with Russia were behind the evolution of Ukraine's 
relations with NATO, which were progressing better than anyone had dared expect 
when negotiations first started between Kyiv and Brussels. Furthermore, NATO 
enlargement in general was looming as an ever more likely possibility, while Belarus' 
integration with Russia was at a virtual standstill, despite Minsk's enthusiasm. 
Russia's geopolitical position was deteriorating to the extent that the signing of a 
treaty with Ukraine was by 1997 emerging as a desirable objective. Indeed, Mykhallo 
Pohrebynsky, the director of the Kyiv Centre for Political Studies and Conflict 
affirrns the sovereignty of Ukraine over all its territory; Article 133 codifies the status of Sevastopol as 
Ukrainian territory. See Narodna Armiya, 26 December 1996. 
22 Narodna Armiya, 27 February 1997. 
23 ibid. 
24 Narodna Armiya, 8 May 1997. 
25 Sherr, Ukraine's New Tinte of Troubles, p. 28. 
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Research, has suggested that Moscow started to seek a quid pro quo: in return for the 
signing of a treaty, the Russians sought a commitment on the part of Ukraine not to 
26 
enter NATO . The signing of the Treaty and NATO enlargement had seemingly 
become interlinked. 
The Signing Of The Treaty -A Resolution Of The Border Problem? 
According to Sherr, up until that point it was the very public nature of the series of 
discussions that contributed to their ultimate failure. This mistake was not repeated in 
the series of meetings leading up to the final signing of both the Friendship and Co- 
operation Treaty in May 1997, and the officially unrelated agreements on the division 
of the fleet and its infrastructure. Yet, even in the final days leading up to the signing 
of the treaties tricks were tried. At the last minute the Russians voiced reservations 
11t, about the joint basing of the two fleets as 'joint basing would disrupt command and 
control and, worse, provide Ukraine with a formula that might be used to allow 
NATO to lease facilities in Crimea at some future date'. 27 Russia was even then 
seeking to limit the sovereignty of Kyiv over parts of the territory of Ukraine. 
Yet with the imminence of NATO enlargement, and the signing of a Charter 
between Ukraine and NATO to take place at the July 1997 Madrid summit, Russia's 
room for manoeuvre was limited. On 31 May 1997, a Friendship, Co-operation and 
Partnership Treaty was finally signed as an inter-state document between Ukraine and 
Russia. According to Volodymyr Chumak of Ukraine's National Institute of Strategic 
Studies, Russia signed the agreement with Ukraine because of the latter's successes in 
signing bilateral agreements with neighbours, and because of the fact that Ukraine was 
becoming more prominent within the CIS. 28 Three agreements on the fate of the BSF 
were signed as inter-governmental documents somewhat earlier on 28 May 1997. Of 
26 ibid. 
27 Sherr, 'Russia-Ukraine Rapprochement? ' p. 38. 
28 Conversation with author, Kyiv, July 1997. This view is confin-ned by an official from the Ukrainian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs who added that a finalised version of the Treaty had been ready some two years earlier but 
remained unsigned on the insistence of Moscow. (Conversation with author, Kyiv, July 1997). Puzzlingly, the 
eventual version signed was, from Moscow's point of view, slightly inferior to the original version. Sherr 
supports this interpretation arguing that the eventual agreements were 'more favourable to Ukraine than those 
which Russia had, to all intents and purposes, torpedoed in October 1996'. See Sherr, Ukraine's New Time of 
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most import was the one specifying the status and conditions of the stationing of the 
BSF on the territory of Ukraine, which will be discussed later. 
As far as the recognition of borders was concerned, the treaty was seen as a 
major achievement for the Ukrainians, as Article 2 of the treaty was an unconditional 
commitment on the part of both parties, that they 'respect the territorial integrity of 
each other and affirm the inviolability of the borders that exist between them'. 
However, despite the apparent success Ukraine analysts remained suspicious 
of Russia's commitment to respect Ukraine's territorial integrity on a number of 
grounds. Two types of border problems are distinguished: land and marine. As far as 
the 2,063 kilometre land border between Ukraine and Russia was concerned, a 
number of objections were raised. 
The only borders that existed technically up until that point, were those that 
were recorded on large scale Soviet-era maps; these maps were designed to reflect 
administrative differences between republics (indeed the thickness of lines drawn on 
the maps was estimated to literally extend up to several kilometres when transposed 
from paper to territory. )29 Furthermore, according to a Ukrainian interpretation, the 
Russians insisted that any demarcation that took place was acknowledged by Kyiv as 
demarcating internal, porous CIS borders thereby excluding them from the constraints 
imposed by the Helsinki treaty regarding the recognition of international boundaries. 30 
Although some preliminary, even token, discussions had taken place, the actual 
delimitation of land borders had not yet been started; yet the treaty presupposed the 
existence of such formally delineated and demarcated borders. 31 The Ukrainians 
claimed that proposals to resolve the issue had been rebuffed on at least '8, maybe 
even 10 occasions' by the Russians. 32 Inevitably, the issue of demarcation and 
delineation was tied to the status of the BSF and the signing of the Treaty between the 
two states i. e. the border issues could only be resolved once the BSF issue had been 
Troubles, p. 28. See also J. Sherr, A New Storm Over the Black Sea Fleet, (Conflict Studies Research Centre: 
Sandhurst, 1996). 
29 Kudriachov, Odarych, and Orobets, Carta Sevastopolya, pp. 2-3. 
30 Den, 13 May 1997. 
31 in December 1995 a protocol of intent on the demarcation of borders between Ukraine and Russia was signed. 
S WB SU/2491- By September 1996, an agreement was reached on the necessity of starting the legal 
delimitation of borders. SWB SU/2712. So little progress was made that in February 1997 the Ukrainian foreign 
minister hinted that Ukraine might unilaterally delimit its border. SWB SU/2843,2844. Russia's intransigence 
was perceived as being caused by the BSF issue and the status of Sevastopol/Crimea. 
32 Zerkalo Nedeli, 23 August, 1996; see also Den, 13 February 1997. 
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dealt with. Threats by Kyiv to unilaterally delimit and demarcate the border, were 
acknowledged by the Ukrainians as effectively unviable owing to the fact that there 
was no guarantee that the Russian side would accept any decisions made. 
As far as marine borders were concerned, the sticking point was the status of 
the Sea of Azov and the Kerch straits. The problem lay in the fact that the Russians 
rejected any moves that would remove the sea's 'internal' status. It was believed by 
Moscow that such a move would remove barriers to its exploitation by 'foreign 
forces'. 33 
However, Kyiv's greatest concern was reserved for the fact that the signing of 
the various documents could negatively affect Ukraine's subregional and regional 
objectives. In particular Ukrainian analysts argue that the signing of the Treaty and the 
associated Agreements could be interpreted as abandoning neutrality and effectively 
entering a military alliance with Russia. The corollary of such an interpretation is that 
Ukraine has precluded itself from NATO membership for the duration of the period 
for which Sevastopol is leased to Moscow, that is the 20 years until 2017. It has also 
been argued that the stationing of Russian military forces in Crimea make Ukraine a 
likely target in the event of a war between Russia and a third party. 34 This is so as 
under the resolution of the 29th session of the UN General Assembly, Ukraine could 
be regarded as a co-aggressor if Russian warships stationed on its territory take part in 
combat operations. Furthen-nore, no provision was made in the Treaty for Ukraine to 
ban the use of the BSF against other states. 35 And while the Treaty expressly forbade 
the deployment of nuclear weapons in Crimea by Russia, there is some evidence to 
suggest that by striving to locate tactical nuclear weapons in Crimea, Russia has 
sought to provide de facto eivdence that Ukraine is prepared to accomodate the 
military and political interests of Russia's thereby turning Ukraine into a potential 
36 
military ally of Russia in its confrontation with NATO . Ukraine 
looked to have paid 
33 While Kudriachov et al, argue that the Russians point blank refused to discuss the delimitation of marine 
borders, (Kudriachov, Odarych, and Orobets, Carta Sevastopolya, pp. 2-3), Sherr suggests that a sub- 
commission on the issue, 'on 22 October 1996 took up in detail the demarcation of the Sea of Azov and the 
Kerch Strait' (Sherr, 'Russia-Ukraine Rapprochement, p. 36). By 1998, little progress had been made on the 
sea's status; see Narodna Armiya, 18 September 1998. 
34KYil, post, 01 April 1999. 
35 Monitoring Foreign and Security Policy of Ukraine: On The Ratification of Black Sea Fleet Agreements by 
Ukraine, The Ukraine List, (UKL) #39, p. 4 
36 
ibid., p. 5. 
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a heavy price in the resolution of its territorial dispute with Russia and the 
preservation and protection of its territorial integrity. Nevertheless, Ukraine ratified 
the Treaty on 14 January 1998 although not the BSF accords. On 25 December 1998 
the Russian Duma ratified the Treaty (though only after four postponements). 
However, the Federation Council (the upper house) postponed its vote on the Treaty. 37 
Yet even then, long after the signing of the treaty, the Russians continued to link the 
Treaty and the Black Sea Fleet. Moscow refused to exchange ratification documents 
concerning the treaty until Ukraine had ratified the accords on the Black Sea Fleet 
legitimising Russia's military presence on Ukrainian territory. This Ukraine duly did 
on 24 March 1999 with a small majority. 38 
Overall, the signing of the treaty was in the main a symbolic political success 
from Ukraine's point of view, though with some well scored points. The key 
Ukrainian success was the unconditional recognition of the territorial integrity of 
Ukraine on the part of Moscow, something that was not to be underestimated, 
especially in light of the tortuous process needed to reach that stage. However, in 
many other respects the Treaty was a Pyrrhic victory for Kyiv. 
The first and most immediate cost incurred by Ukraine was the 'temporary' 
accommodation of the BSF on Ukrainian territory. Having gained basing rights, 
Russia obtained a significant foothold on Ukrainian territory. This in turn led to 
another series of costs. The most tangible of these was a significant diminution of 
Ukraine's portion of the fleet. In addition, despite the fact that the stationing of 
Russian forces was a temporary phenomenon, it still was a direct contravention of 
Ukraine's constitution. In addition, the inclusion of the provision in the joint 
declaration on the part of both parties to 'co-operate in ensuring the security of the 
southern borders of our two countries' is interpreted by Sherr as showing that 'in 
resonance if not in substance .... 
border co-operation can be a slippery slope from non- 
alignment to military alliance'. 39 
37 Ukraine - Country Report, 
Economist Intelligence Unit, 1999,1 st Quarter, p. 13. 
38 KYiV poSt, I April 1999. 
39 Sherr, 'Russia-Ukraine Rapprochenient, p. 40. 
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The Military Balance Between Ukraine And Russia 
Two days after the coup attempt in Moscow, the Ukrainian parliament, keen to avoid 
the mistakes of the previous independent administration, created its own armed forces 
in one fell swoop on 24 August 1991 by placing under its jurisdiction the Soviet 
forces on its territory. 40 This was a blow to Russia in four regards. Firstly, it 
represented a failure in Moscow's attempts to maintain a unified military body. 
Secondly, it left gaping holes in Moscow's much cherished 'common defence space' 
due 
, in particular, to the loss of the Ukrainian component of the strategically critical 
early warning system. Thirdly, it represented the loss of its first echelon defence 
forces, along with some of the best Soviet military equipment available, including 
nuclear weapons. Above all, it demonstrated Kyiv's intention to pursue independence 
in its fuller sense. 
The resulting Ukrainian forces were significant by any standards. According to 
data based on Soviet inventories compiled prior to the August 1991 coup, Ukraine 
inherited some 30 per cent of the Soviet tank inventory, 20-30 per cent of infantry 
vehicles, and 25 per cent of the USSR aircraft inventory on the European side of the 
Urals. On sea, the Soviet legacy to Ukraine was in the form of the Black Sea Fleet 
(BSF). Based on the Crimean peninsula and with 55 ma . or surface warships and 20 J 
submarines, the BSF not only patrolled the Black Sea Coast but was also the backbone 
of Soviet sea power in the Mediterranean. Incorporated within the Fleet were 
substantial aviation (some 450 combat aircraft) and ground forces (with 
approximately 1240 armoured vehicles of various types including tanks) . 
41 The fact 
that both states ratified the CFE treaty in July 1992 represented an acceptance on the 
part of Moscow of Ukraine's appropriation of the former Soviet forces on its soil. 
Despite the relatively straightforward transfer of Soviet forces to Ukrainian 
jurisdiction, a problem emerged in two key areas - the transfer of nuclear forces, and 
the Black Sea Fleet. 
40 The short-lived and non-militarised Ukrainska Narodna Republica (1917-1920) failed to mobilise any military 
forces, something which ultimately led to its downfall.. 
41 Stephen J. Zaloga. 'Armed Forces in Ukraine'. Jane's Intelligence Review, March 1992, pp. 131-134. 
According to data in Krymskaya Pravda, 5-9 January 1992, the Fleet was made up of 45 major warships, 28 
submarines, 300 medium and small vessels, 151 airplanes and 85 helicopters. The discrepancy is probably 
attributable to the vested interests of underestimating the extent of the fleet by local actors. 
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The Division of Nuclear Forces 
The Ukrainisation of Soviet forces did not extend to nuclear forces as separate 
provisions for these weapons were made early on by Kyiv. In December 1991 Kyiv 
volunteered for destruction all 176 ICBMs based in Ukraine, and their 1180 warheads. 
At the same time, Ukraine agreed to sign the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a 
non-nuclear power, to eliminate all tactical weapons on its territory, transfer its 
strategic bombers to Russia, and take off alert status all strategic weapons on 
Ukrainian territory. However, as relations with Russia deteriorated in 1992, primarily 
owing to the territorial dispute and the associated matter of the status of the BSF, so 
Kyiv came to renege on what was seen as its unambiguous commitment to full 
denuclearisation. However, this was only in part an anti-Russian stance. Although the 
deteriorating state of relations between them was clearly a cause of concern for both 
Kyiv and Moscow, it was evident that 'other factors in Ukraine and Russia could be 
counted upon to prevent the nuclear issue from escalating to a nuclear 
confrontation'. 42 Despite appearances, problems with the resolution of the nuclear 
issue were not at the foundation of Ukraine's relations with Russia. Instead, the matter 
lay in other spheres, in particular, the lack of attention and material resources Ukraine 
was getting from the West, especially when compared to the amounts expected, and 
the fact that Moscow was selling off the nuclear material from weapons already 
returned to Russia by Ukraine. This explains why the Trilateral Agreement signed in 
1994 resolved the matter so relatively promp tly. 43 And with nuclear weapons removed 
from the reckoning, Kyiv and Moscow could continue seeking a solution to the 
problem that lay at the foundation of their deteriorating relationship: disagreement 
over territory, or at a deeper level, an inability on the part of Russia to come to terms 
with Ukraine's independence, a problem that came to be crystallised in the matter of 
the BSF, which will now be examined. 
42 Garnett, Keystone in the Arch, p. 111 
43 For a more elaborated exploration of the role of nuclear weapons in Ukraine's foreign policy formation between 
1991 and 1994 see R. Wolczuk, 'The Evolution of Ukraine Foreign and Security Policy 1991-1994', Slavic 
Military Studies, Vol. 12, No. 3 (September 1999) pp. 18-37. 
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The BSF 
As has been mentioned, the issue of the BSF was intricately tied up with the 
resolution of the Crimea/Sevastopol issue. While earlier it was touched on in the 
context of the territorial dispute between Ukraine and Russia, it will be examined here 
per se. (Only a brief overview will be provided here, as the issue has been examined 
in detail elsewhere . )44 
The early provisional agreements on the exact division of the BSF made on 
Ukraine's independence collapsed on the grounds that as a former constituent part of 
the Soviet Union, Ukraine felt it was entitled to a portion of all Soviet Union fleets, 
something which worked out as considerably more than the 40 per cent of the BSF 
being offered by Russia. 
By mid-1992 the inability to come to an agreement on a basic division of the 
fleet, aside from the infrastructure, was indicative of the deteriorating state of relations 
between the two neighbours. In an effort to prevent further damage to the already 
strained relations, at a meeting in Yalta in August 1992 an agreement was signed 
between Russia and Ukraine 'On the principles of the Creation of a Ukrainian Navy 
and Russian Black Sea Navy on the basis of the fon-ner Soviet Union Black Sea 
Fleet'. This agreement removed the BSF from under CIS jurisdiction, thereby 
bilateralising a technically multilateral issue - in theory, up until that point, all CIS 
states could launch a claim to a portion of the Fleet. Additionally, a 50: 50 division 
was agreed, and until a final agreement on the basing of the fleet was made (planned 
for 1995), the fleet was to remain under the command of a jointly appointed admiral. 
At a subsequent meeting in Moscow in 17 June 1993, the two presidents signed yet 
another agreement 'On Urgent Measures on the Fon-nation of the Russian and 
Ukrainian Navies on the basis of the Black Sea Fleet' in which both parties reiterated 
their support for a 50: 50 division of the Fleet. 
Ukraine's deteriorating negotiating position was exposed at the Massandra 
summit in September 1993 when the Russian side announced that it was claiming the 
whole fleet, including Ukraine's portion. This meant that Ukraine would 'remain 
without a navy for many years to come' while Russia would place itself in the position 
44 See Sherr, 'Russia-Ukraine Rapprochenient'. For a more detailed breakdown on the make up of the fleet see 
Kuzio, Ukrainian Securitv Policy, passini. For an expos6 see Savchenko, Anatomia Neobyavlenoy Voyny. 
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of being able to 'control Abkhazia, Transdniester and Crimea, Moldova, and 
obviously Ukraine, and also the Balkans. 45 The agreement on the part of Kyiv to give 
up its portion of the fleet in lieu of part of its growing debt to Russia, was retracted as 
the full force of domestic opposition to the offer became clear. 46 
As Ukraine's economic crisis intensified throughout 1994, its negotiating 
position reached a nadir. As a result, its claim to 50 per cent of the fleet was 
dramatically watered down in the Sochi accords, signed on 9 June 1995 between the 
Russian and Ukrainian presidents. 47 The subsequent second Sochi accords of 25 
November 1995 detailed the technicalities of the division of the fleet, the first part of 
which went, more or less, according to plan. The Ukrainians, however had serious 
misgivings as to Russian conduct: they not only suspected the Russians of stripping 
arms off the ships, but also of reducing the inventory of the BSF prior to the division 
taking place. 
Yet the prospects for progress were improving as indicated by the acceptance 
of the new Ukrainian constitution in June 1996 and its provisions for the temporary 
stationing of foreign forces on Ukrainian territory, Yeltsin's presidential victory soon 
after, and above all progress in the NATO enlargement talks. In August 1996, a joint 
commission announced it was close to, but not yet at the stage of 'finalising 
agreements on the status and conditions for deploying the BSF on Ukrainian territory; 
parameters governing the division of the Fleet and its infrastructure, and the allocation 
of Sevastopol's bays; and the term of the lease and the system of lease payments'. 48 In 
a flurry of events, key issues came to be resolved. As soon as 28 May 1997, a day after 
the signing of the Founding Act between Russia and NATO on 27 May, Ukraine and 
Russia signed three inter-governmental agreements resolving the division, basing and 
45 Savchenko, Anatomia Neobyavlenoy Voyny, p. 137. 
46 The decision to 'hand over' the entire fleet contributed to the Minister of Defence Morozov's eventual 
resignation in October 1993. 
47 In Article 4 of the Accords, Ukraine was allocated 18.3 per cent of the fleet with the remaining 81.7 going to 
Russia (this division was on the basis of a 50: 50 split with Ukraine forfeiting the bulk of its portion in lieu of its 
debt to Russia). As the BSF was estimated to make up 10 per cent of the total Soviet fleet, a 50: 50 division 
technically meant that Ukraine was in theory getting just 5 per cent of the total fleet. This meant Ukraine was to 
end up with one third of the 16 per cent it was entitled to according to the formula, which allocated the wealth 
of the Soviet Union to the various republics in proportion to population size of the republic. As the Ukrainian 
population made up 16 per cent of the population of the Soviet Union, it was entitled to 16 per cent of its 
wealth). However, the further reduction of this 50 per cent to 18.7 per cent meant that Ukraine was getting less 
than 2 per cent of total Soviet fleet forces. See Savchenko, Anatomia Neobyavlenoy Voyny, pp. 269-270 
48 Sherr, 'Russia-Ukraine Rapprochement', p. 36. 
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costing of the BSF. This was followed three days later, on 31 May, by the signing of 
the long-awaited interstate treaty was between Ukraine and Russia. 
According to Sherr, 'the political provisions of the agreements are highly 
favourable to Ukraine. The same cannot be said of the military provisions. "49 Two 
separate issues stand out. Firstly, the agreements allow for the leasing of port facilities 
in Crimea to the BSF for a period of 20 years, with scope for extension for a further 5 
years subject to the agreement of both parties. Without doubt, Russia's concession on 
joint basing rights was a significant achievement for Kyiv, especially in the light of 
Moscow's fears that Ukraine's Crimean bases could in practice eventually be leased 
out to NATO forces, however unlikely that prospect appeared at the time. However, as 
far as the Russian side was concerned, the benefits could be argued to outweigh the 
disadvantages. Primarily, the legitimisation of the presence of Russian forces on 
Ukrainian territory for the next 20 to 25 years was a noteworthy achievement. 
Similarly, the actual subdivision of the fleet and above all its infrastructure was highly 
unfavourable to Ukraine, as were the limitations placed on the quantity and quality of 
berths available for the Ukrainian portion on the fleet. 50 Further rubbing salt into the 
wounds were the lamentably poor terms Ukraine obtained for leasing facilities, an 
additional premium paid by Kyiv for the political concessions obtained with the 
signing of the Treaty. 51 
Sherr identifies three key 'uncertainties' resulting from the agreements. Firstly, 
he argues that while the institutionalisation of the recognition of the territorial 
integrity of Ukraine by Russia was not unimportant, the fact that the accords 'did 
nothing to diminish Russia's principal levers of influence over Ukraine' was no less 
noteworthy. Secondly, the vagueness of accords means that they lend themselves to a 
variety of interpretations. Thirdly, the unhindered implementation of the agreements 
49 ibid., p. 40. 
50 ibid., p. 42. 
51 The terms were for Russia to lease out facilities for $97 million per annum. Ukrainian analysts have calculated 
that Ukraine leased out 18232.62 hectares of Crimea for the sum of $0.53 per square meter per annum including 
the cost of the leasing out 4591 buildings. No provision was made for recompensing Ukraine 
for stationing the 
Russian portion of the Fleet for the 6 years during which the treaty and agreements were negotiated. As 
far as 
the division of the fleet was concerned, in line with the already agreed 50: 50 split of the fleet, and an earlier 
concession by the Ukrainians, the final split was 81.3 per cent of the 
fleet going to Russia, and the remaining 
18.7 per cent going to Ukraine; Ukraine was compensated by a reduction 
in its energy debt by $521 million (for 
the 31.7 per cent ceded to Russia), a significant reduction on the $2992.78 million Ukraine was 
demanding in 
August 1995. This suggests a total valuation of the fleet at some $1.6 billion, a significant reduction on the $80 
billion Kyiv originally claimed the fleet was worth. Kudriachov, Odarych and Orobets, Carta Sevastopolya, pp. 
7-8 
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has not followed in the wake of their signing. For example, ratification of the 
agreements was not a straightforward process, hindered as it was by Moscow on 
frequent occasions. In fact the Russians made the ratification of the treaty conditional 
upon the Ukrainians ratifying the BSF accords, duly accomplished by Kyiv on March 
24 1999.52 
Nevertheless, in retrospect the overall transfer of forces from Soviet to 
Ukrainian jurisdiction proved to be less troublesome than might have originally been 
expected. Problems were limited to two narrow albeit important areas, nuclear forces 
and the BSF. As far as Ukraine was concerned, behind the battles for the ownership of 
the nuclear weapons lay a contest for economic resources and the influence that such 
weapons were expected to bring. More profound were the troubles regarding the BSF. 
Ultimately, the dispute over the BSF touched on more profound issues, in particular 
the exchange of unconditional recognition of the sovereignty and territorial integrity 
of Ukraine for the accommodation of Russian forces on Ukrainian territory and the 
writing off of a signifcant proportion of a fleet of doubtful value. Yet despite this, the 
alacrity with which Kyiv signed the treaty once Moscow had agreed to it suggests that 
Ukraine found that this was an exchange worth making. 
Economic Relations. 
The above record of intransigence and confrontation between Ukraine and Russia up 
until 1997 camouflaged a mutual economic interdependence from which neither side 
could easily escape, despite the posturing. There are four dimensions to these 
economic relations: asymmetries of interdependence, Ukraine's energy dependence on 
Russia, energy transportation issues and military-industrial co-operation. 
Main destination of Main origin of 
Ukraine's exports 53 Ukraine's imports 
52 Sherr, Ukraine's New Tinie of Troubles, p. 29. 
53 Figures taken from Ukraine - Country Report, Economist Intelligence Unit, (Quarterly 
issues between 1996 - 
1999). 
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1995 Russia 43.1% Russia 52.3% 
1996 Russia 38.7% Russia 48.0% 
cis 54.1% CIS 67.8% 
1997 Russia 26.2% Russia 45.8% 
cis 42.9% CIS 58.4% 
I aDle 1. 
Asymmetries Of Interdependence 
As Table I suggests, Ukraine remains heavily dependent on Russia both as a source of 
imports (primarily energy) and as the destination of its exports. However, owing to the 
much larger size of the Russian economy, compared to that of Ukraine, Kyiv is much 
more dependent on Moscow for trade, than is vice versa. This remains true despite 
Ukraine's success in diversifying its trade away from Russia, as shown by the relative 
fall in both exports to and imports from Russia since 1995, indicated in Table 1. (It 
should be noted that the above figures fail to reflect a massive deterioration in 
Ukraine's export base and the fact that the reduction of exports to Russia was not a 
voluntary phenomenon). However, Ukraine's traditional dependence on Russian 
imports has remained substantial, primarily due to the its heavy reliance on Russian 
energy supplies. 
Economic theory suggests that Ukraine's traditional dependence on Russia is 
artificial, unhealthy and disfiguring of Ukraine's economy. The so-called gravity 
equation predicts that the amount of trade between two states is correlated with the 
geographical distance between them and their GDP - crudely, the closer are the two 
states geographically, and the richer they are, the higher is the amount of trade that 
tends to occur between them. Using this model, the Ukrainian-European Policy and 
Legal Advice Centre (a project funded by the European Union's TACIS Programme), 
suggests that Ukraine's exports should more 'naturally' gravitate toward Europe and 
only to a much lesser extent towards Russia. Indeed, extrapolating into the future, 
according to the model, the pattern of Ukraine's trade should look something like the 
following: 
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Structure of Ukrainian exports in time perspective (% of total exports) 
Russia Belarus Moldova ex-Comecon Other 
1987 56.2 5.9 2.9 17.8 0.9 
1995 44.1 4.3 1.2 8.8 36.8 
Predicted 
long-term 
8.0 1.4 0.5 6.9 81.8 
In other words, Ukraine's economic integration with Central Europe and neighbours 
other than Russia is a 'natural' phenomenon if unimpeded. However this Westward 
integration remains impeded by existing ties with Russia, as it has been for much if 
not all of Ukraine's time as a modem industrialised state. 
A number of strategies have been used by Moscow to prevent Ukraine's 
reorientation toward its 'natural' trading partners in the West. For example, Russia has 
tried to take advantage of Ukraine's indebtedness to prevent a westward drift. In 
particular, as Ukraine's debt to Russia has grown, Moscow has tried to convert this 
debt into assets , in particular 
by attempting to gain stakes in 'strategic' segments of 
Ukraine's infrastructure such as ownership of gas pipelines and oil refineries. 54 Not 
only would this maintain and even with time reinforce the structural ties linking 
Ukraine and Russia, it would also prevent independent moves on the part of Ukraine 
to take advantage of one of its few worthwhile assets - the vast transportation system 
linking the energy sources of the East with markets in the West. Furthermore, losing 
control of its infrastructure would impede Ukraine's reorientation from East to West 
as Kyiv would be deprived of control of a significant component of foreign policy 
formation. 
54 M. M. Balmaceda, 'Gas, Oil and the Linkages between Domestic and Foreign Policies: The Case of Ukraine', 
Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 50, No. 2,1998, pp. 257-286. 
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Furthermore, Moscow has striven to undermine Ukraine's attempts at 
economic independence. This is something Ukraine is particularly vulnerable to 
owing to the nature of the production cycle that exists between Ukraine and Russia. 
Specifically, very few goods were produced in a closed production cycle in Ukraine 
with most goods produced in co-operation with Russia: Ukraine's exports are notable 
for the high proportion of either raw materials or goods needing low processing, with 
55 Russia completing production of most of them. An example of Moscow's efforts to 
take advantage of this interdependent production cycle was the steps it took to 
undermine Ukraine's ability to fulfil its contract to deliver 350 tanks to Pakistan (a 
contract worth $650 millions) by refusing to issue export licenses for Russian firms 
56 involved in providing parts to the Ukrainian tank-manufacturers. This mutual 
production interdependence is argued to benefit the Russians as 'to a large extent, 
such an approach creates the danger of an artificial prolongation of the orientation of 
Ukrainian manufacturers toward the Russian market, manufacturing policy and 
economic infrastructure ... which threatens the continuation of 
(Ukraine's) 
technological backwardness and lack of competitiveness on international markets' and 
hence continued dependence on the Russian market. 57 
However, the single biggest problem preventing a diversification away from 
Russia is Ukraine's dependence on Russia for energy. 
Ukraine's Weak Spot - Energy Dependence On Russia 
Ukraine's 'energy predicament' is serious, as the actual degree of dependence on 
Russian energy supplies is very high: Ukraine is the largest importer of natural gas in 
the world, most of it coming from Russia. 
58 Specifically, of the roughly 80 billion 
cubic meters needed by Ukraine annually, in the six years between 1994 and 
1999, 
Ukraine imported from Russia 69,66.35 70,53,56, and 55 billion cubic meters 
respectively; the balance was made up of domestic supplies and 
deliveries from 
55 1. Burakovsky and V. Biletsky, Ukraine's Way to the European Union -A 
View from Ukraine, Analytical 
Report No. 12 (Kyiv: Centre for Peace, Conversion and Foreign Policy of Ukraine, 
1999) p. 7. 
56 Ukraine - Country 
Report, Economist Intelligence Unit, 1997,2nd Quarter, p. 38. 
57 Zerkalo Nedeli, 21 March 1998. 
58 Balmaceda, 'Gas, Oil and the Linkages between Domestic and 
Foreign Policies', p. 258. 
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Turkmenistan. 59 Ukraine is also heavily, though not as overwhelmingly, dependent on 
Russian oil, importing between 12 and 16 million tons between 1994 and 1999.60 
The matter has been exacerbated by problems presented by 'the often 
inflexible infrastructural ties inherited from the Soviet period... "which effectively 
hinder switching to other suppliers -)qý - 
61 This in turn has made Ukraine more 
vulnerable to other pressures. In particular Moscow has striven to deprive Ukraine of 
badly needed investment currency, in particular by unilaterally imposing almost 
arbitrary prices on Ukraine, and as a result overcharging Ukraine for gas provided. 
The amounts involved are significant. Apparently 'Ukraine is overpaying Russia $2 
billion annually, giving Russia a bigger net profit from gas sales to Ukraine than from 
its 
... exports to 19 west European economies - hence its huge debt. The chairman of 
the Russian gas monopoly, Gazprom, Rem Vyakhirev, admitted to the Ukrainian 
prime minister, Valeriy Pustovoitenko, that the pricing policy was unfair and "does 
62 not correspond to reality"' . Indeed, it seems that over 1998, Ukraine paid $80 dollars 
per 1000 cubic meters, $3 more than Gennany paid, despite the fact that the latter 
should have theoretically incurred substantially greater transportation costs, estimated 
63 
at $25-35 for the additional 1500 kilometres the gas had to travel . 
However , it is likely that Ukraine's energy dependence on Russia might be 
coming to an enforced end. Russia is facing an energy shortage of its own, something 
which is likely to have negative reverberations for Ukraine should Kyiv not diversify 
its energy supplies. Quite simply, both oil and gas extraction rates in Russia have been 
declining for some time, and are expected to continue to do so in the future as can be 
seen in the Table 2. 
'9 Ukraine - Country Report, 
Economist Intelligence Unit, (Quarterly issues between 1997-1999). 
60 ibid. 
61 Balmaceda, 'Gas, Oil and the Linkages between Domestic and Foreign Policies', p. 258. 
62 Ukraine - Country Report, 
Economist Intelligence Unit, 2nd Quarter 1999, p. 23. 
63 Holos Ukrainy, 5 August 1998. The article discusses the vagaries of gas and oil pricing and transportation, 
taking them into account when drawing its conclusions. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit, Ukraine 
failed to benefit from the dramatic price decrease obtained by Germany when gas prices fell from $100 to $40 
per cubic meter. These figures suggest that Ukraine was overpaying 
by $2 billion per annum. See Ukraine - 
Countri, Report, Economist Intelligence Unit, 2nd Quarter, 1999, p. 22-23. 
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Oil extraction 





rates in Russia 
(billions of 
cubic meters) 
1983 619* 1987 544 
1990 516 1990 640 
1991 461 1991 643* 
1992 395 1992 641 
1993 354 1993 619 
1994 318 1994 607 
1995 307 1995 595 
1996 293 1996 575 
1997 297 1997 544 
1998 303 1998 559 
1999 280** 1999 554** 
12000 1 220** 2000 1 534** 
Table 2 
* peak extraction figures 
** estimates 
Thus as extraction rates decline, Russia will find itself in a dilemma. The desire to 
satisfy domestic consumers and Western customers paying in hard currencies, will 
undoubtedly be at the expense of non-hard currency paying consumers such as 
Ukraine and other former Soviet republics, though in turn this is likely to trigger 
centrifugal trends within the CIS. 
Ukraine has tried both to reduce its energy dependence and to anticipate this 
energy shortfall in a number of ways. Firstly, in order to deal with its immediate 
needs, Ukraine sourced energy from other members of the CIS, namely Turkmenistaný 
and to a lesser extent Kazakhstan. Similarly, Ukraine established partnerships with 
separate regions of the Russian Federation, in particular the Tuymen' oblast and 
64 Figures taken ftom M. Honchar, 0. Moskalets and S. Nalivka, 'Vidhorrýn Serpnevoho Strusu', Polityka I Chas, 
No. 2, February 1999, p. 40. 
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western Siberia. 65 Secondly, Ukraine pursued ambitious long terin solutions. In 
particular, as will be explored in more detail in Chapter 7, it has also attempted to take 
advantage of the discovery of Caspian energy resources and Ukraine's key strength as 
a transit route for that energy. 
Ukraine's Ace: The Transportation Of Russian Energy 
If the downside of the structural ties that link Ukraine and Russia is the former's 
energy dependence on the latter, there is also an analogous downside for Russia. One 
of the strongest links binding Ukraine to Russia is the intricate network of pipelines 
for the transportation of both oil and gas westward. And as has been pointed out, 'just 
as Russia's richest asset is its massive reserves of gas and oil, Ukraine's richest asset 
is its bottleneck on the export of Russian oil and gas to the West'. 66 This point is 
evidenced by the fact that '90 percent of Russian oil and most of its gas is exported to 
Western and Central Europe through pipelines crossing Ukrainian territory'. 67 It has 
been estimated that Ukraine carries 17% of all the EU's gas. 68 This Russian 
dependence on Ukraine has been exploited by Kyiv either to relieve some of the 
pressure exerted by Moscow or, in turn, exert pressure on Moscow. Either way, the 
strategy has been the same. For example, in January 1996 Ukraine temporarily closed 
the pipelines for a few hours in pursuit of higher transit fees. 69 Similarly Ukraine has 
apparently not been averse to siphoning off westward bound gas in 'times of need'. 70 
Gazprom accused Ukraine of siphoning of 15 billion cubic meters of gas worth 
roughly $900 million in 2000 alone, a figure which Kyiv disputes. 71 
This strategy is, however, something of a double edged sword. Russia is 
making substantial efforts to literally get around this problem, but the solution is 
65 0. M. Smolenksy, 'Ukraine's Quest for Independence: The Fuel Factor', Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 47, No. 1, 
1995, p. 69. 
66 Kyiv Post, 25 Feb 1999. 
67 Balmaceda, 'Gas, Oil and the Linkages between Domestic and Foreign Policies', p. 259. See also Holos 
Ukrainy, 12 June 1998 for details of amounts transported and growth prospects. 
68 The European, 7 March 1993. 
69 Balmaceda, 'Gas, Oil and the Linkages between Domestic and Foreign Policies', p. 268 
70 Ukraine - Country Report, 
Economist Intelligence Unit, I st Quarter 1999, p. 23. 
71 Financial Times, 19 October 2000. 
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expensive: plans to build a pipeline around Ukraine, via Belarus, on to Poland, have 
been estimated to cost $3.6 billion, and have as a result not been implemented. 
However, although there are doubts over the prospects for the completion of the 
whole project, 'completion of the European part of the pipeline, off the Torzhok 
pipeline north of Moscow, is indeed feasible, and it is this part of the pipeline which 
would affect Ukraine most directly',. 72 Russia has also tried another means of reducing 
this dependency, and one which would bind Ukraine even more closely to it. By 
buying segments of Ukraine's 34400 kilometre gas transportation and 4000 kilometre 
oil transportation infrastructure and storage/refinement capacity, Russia would gain a 
foothold in a 'strategic industry'. Needless to say such controversial moves have been 
strongly resisted both by the Ukrainian parliament and the president. 73 Significantly, 
in this regard, Russia has a strong competitor in the West: in 1998 Shell offered to 
purchase a 50 percent stake in UkrGazProm, the state owned gas transportation 
company, for $2 billion. 74 However, on 16 October 2000, President Kuchrna at a 
meeting with President Putin offered Gazprom a stake in Ukraine's gas pipeline 
system in lieu of Ukraine"s gas debt to Russia. 75 The decision was also made in 
anticipation of an upcoming agreement between the EU and Russia. Specifically, later 
that month the EU and Russia signed an agreement on the building of a new pipeline 
designed to bring an extra 60 billion cubic meters from Russia to Western Europe. 
The pipeline would cross Belarus, Poland and Slovakia bypassing Ukraine 
altogether. 76 When Poland promptly announced that it would do nothing to harm its 
(strategic partner' Moscow nonchalantly hinted at a pipeline crossing the Baltic Sea, 
72 Balmaceda, 'Gas, Oil and the Linkages between Domestic and Foreign Policies', p. 269 
73 ibid., p. 263-264. For more details on Ukraine's gas infrastructure see Holos Ukrainy, 3 February 1998,16 
October 1998 and also 17 November 1998. 
74 Ukraine - Country Report, Economic Intelligence Unit, 2nd Quarter 1998, p. 23. As a prelude to ownership, 
Shell and UkrGazProm agreed to jointly evaluate both the physical and financial aspects of the gas pipeline and 
storage systems. From a geopolitical point of view, of interest is the fact that Ukraine's relations with Shell had 
been developing for some time. According to one report, Western interest (and Shell's in particular) in the 
Ukrainian gas infrastructure was promoted in a letter from President Clinton to President Kuchma in April 
1997. See Zerkalo Nedeli, 20 December 1997, Uriadovy Kurier, 9 October 1997 and Zerkalo Nedeli, II 
October 1997 on the development of Shell's interest in Ukraine, including its role in the transportation of 
Caspian oil, and extraction of gas in the Black Sea region. 
7' At the end of October the Prime Minister, Victor Yushchenko visited Western capitals to discuss the possibility 
of granting concessions to private companies to operate Ukraine's gas pipeline network. Financial Times, 23 
October 2000. 
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bypassing Poland as well. Moscow had called Kyiv's (and Warsaw's) bluff and 
Ukraine fell for it - Ukraine was not prepared to risk being totally sidelined in the 
energy transportation system between the EU and Russia. 
Overall, in terms of the energy interdependence between the two, it is hard to 
dispute Smolensky's point that 'the proclamation of independence, the adoption of 
state symbols, and a national anthem, the establishment of armed forces ... and even the 
presence on Ukrainian territory of nuclear missiles ... amount to 
little if another power, 
Russia, controls access to fuel without which Ukraine cannot survive economically'. 77 
This is certainly a profound predicament for Ukraine. However, it could be added that 
the wealth effect of Russia's energy resources is considerably reduced if they cannot 
be brought to market. In sum, there is a mutual interdependence between the two 
parties that continue to bind them, for better or for worse. 
Military-industrial Co-operation: Aerospace And Aeronautics 
The fourth noteworthy aspect of the economic relations between Ukraine and Russia, 
in addition to the three identified, are the strong ties that continue to exist in military- 
industrial production. 
Historically, the Ukrainian SSR in close co-operation with the RSFSR was 
virtually the sole source of space, aeronautical and missile technology within the 
USSR. Indeed, on independence, Ukraine possessed some 30 percent of all of the 
fortner Soviet defence industry. 78 Nevertheless, as in most other areas of production, 
Ukraine and Russia were bound by integrated production cycles. For example, the 
Russian "Proton" and "Soyuz" rockets' contol systems are made in Kharkiv, while the 
launch platform for the Ukrainian-built 'Cyclone' is built in Russia. 
79 This co- 
operation has continued in the post-Soviet era, as in the case of the joint effort to build 
the Zenit-3 rocket used in the Sea Launch project - an commercial effort to launch and 
place satellites in space from a platform in international waters (successfully tested in 
1999). The Zenit rocket used consisted of two lower boosters made by the Ukrainians 
77 Smolenksy, Ukraine's Quest for Independence', p. 85 
78 Ukraine- Aircraft and Parts, Bain & Company for The Commercial Service of the U. S., Kyiv, August 
1995. 
79 Narodna Armiya, II February 1997. 
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(Yuzhmash) with the top one made by the Russians-'O Similarly, the Ukrainians and 
Russians have great hopes for a common space project In which both parties have a 
50: 50 stake. 81 
A similar strain of interdependence continues to exist between Ukraine and 
Russia in aeronautics. On independence in 1991, Ukraine inherited the Antonov 
Aircraft Design Bureau based in Dnipropetrovs'k, the Motor Sich engine 
manufacturing plant based in Zaporizhya, and two aircraft assembly plants, the Kyiv 
Aviation Industrial Unit, and the Kharkiv Aviation Industrial Unit. There is a single 
helicopter manufacturing factory in Ukraine, the Dubove helicopter factory, which co- 
operates with the Russian Komov Design Bureau in the production of the helicopters. 
Because of the very high degree of integration in the manufacturing of parts and 
aircraft in the Soviet Union, on independence the Ukrainian sector was starved of 
supplies and indeed raw materials used in domestic manufacturing from other sectors 
of the former Soviet Union. 82 Ukraine's key prospect for the future, the extremely 
advanced AN-70 cargo aircraft, is heavily dependent on co-operation with Russia both 
in terms of design and construction. 83 
In arms production the profound interdependence continues. As has been 
pointed out, 'without the partnership of Russia, it is very difficult for Ukraine to 
deliver complete systems - from designing projects to completing and delivering 
systems and after sales technical support. The time of individual successes has passed. 
It is impossible to break into markets and compete with the West without co-operation 
between CIS states 5.84 For this reason, in March 1997, an agreement was reached 
between Ukrspetsexport, the Ukrainian exporter of military production, and the 
Rosvoorouzhenie, the Russian equivalent, on payment policy and production in areas 
80 The Russian RSC-Energia was a 25 percent partner in the consortium, Ukraine's Yuzhmash and Yuzhnoye 
Design Bureau joint 15 per cent partners; Boeing had 40 percent and Kvaerner Maritime of Norway, 20 percent. 
Kyiv Post, 01 April 1999. 
81 The Russian companies involved are Rosobschemach and Ascond; in addition to the ubiquitous Yuzhmash and 
the Yuznoye Design Bureau on the Ukrainian side, Khartron, a company based in Kharkiv, was also involved. 
Kyiv Post, 25 March 1999. Khartron was in fact a top-secret producer of space technology in the Soviet Union. 
Amongst other things, it produced the control system for the Mir space station. The company is particularly 
keen on tighter ties with Russia: 'we are keen that our Russian customers become participants in the company: 
we will give them shares; they will give us orders'. Zerkalo Nedeli, 14 March 1998. 
82 Ukraine - Aircraft and 
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84 Zerkalo Nedeli, 15 February 1997 
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of co-operation on military production. 85 However, this agreement did not work out 
leading Kuchma and Yeltsin to resolve the matter at a meeting in Moscow in March 
1998, as a result of which it was announced that 'at last the question of military - 
technical co-operation between the two countries is resolved and they will enter world 
military markets together'. 86 The fact that such co-operation extended to a joint 
presentation at the Abu-Dhabi Military Show (Aidex 97) led the Ukrainian Minister of 
Defence Kuzmuk to comment, 'I cannot say that I am happy with such companionship 
with the Russian delegation. ' 87 Clearly, in relations between Ukraine and Russia, 
politics remain intricately intertwined with economics. 
Inevitably such close ties are perceived by the Ukrainian political elite as 
having negative ramifications for Ukraine's prospects for subregional and regional 
integration with the West. In particular, the Ukrainian National Institute for Strategic 
Studies has taken the view that Ukraine's geopolitical stance, searching for a balance 
between East and West, at least in the early years following independence, is at odds 
with tight military-technical co-operation with any one side, or more specifically, 
Russia. The reality of ties is at odds with strategic industrial objectives. This is 
particularly true since 1995, when Ukraine started to pursue a less balanced and more 
pro-Western foreign policy stance. The model for such ties was provided by Central 
European states that found that the quickest way to participate in the European 
integration process was by first becoming integrated with pan-European security 
structures. In order to follow this same path the NISS deemed it necessary that 
Ukrainian weapons become fully adapted to pan-European standards and procedures. 
In particular it is envisaged that 'today's excessive ties with the Russian military- 
industrial complex will, with time be replaced with strong integration with European 
manufacturers, and a wider diversification of exports. A gradual 'emergence 
from the 
orbit' of the Russian defence complex, is, for understandable reasons, the most 
complex, lengthy but also most principled (sic) duty ..... 
Russia's strategy is 
88 
unacceptable to Ukraine' according to the NISS. Particular emphasis is 
laid on the 
minimisation of Ukraine's dependence on Russia in the 
fields of rocket and space 
" Zerkalo Nedeli, 09 September 1997. 
86 Narodna Armiya, 13 March 1998. 
87 Zerkalo Nedeli, 09 September 1997. 
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technology, and aircraft manufacturing, two areas in which the Institute views 
Ukraine's prospects as being particularly bright. 
Overall, Ukraine's bilateral relations with Russia represented a problem from the very 
earliest days of Ukraine's independence. This was inevitable as Ukraine started to 
unravel the deep political, economic and military ties that existed between the two 
states. Russia's references to an independent Ukraine through gritted teeth, while 
acknowledging its formal status, demonstrates the difficulties Moscow had with 
bilateralising ties at least on a political level. Nevertheless, the fact remains that there 
exists a strong vein of economic interdependence linking the two countries, on which 
Ukraine is more reliant than Russia. In recognition of the importance of these ties, 
Ukraine signed a ten year economic treaty with Russia in 1998, which was designed to 
reinvigorate ties between the two states. 89 In theory such a treaty would reintroduce 
Ukraine to its perpetual dilemma: a restimulation of its economy, though at the 
expense of an intensification of Ukraine's dependence on Russia, (though in practise 
such a restimulation was unlikely). 90 However, by signing up to such a treaty, Ukraine 
was in danger of returning to its former status of dependency on Russia. It appeared 
clear to Ukrainian commentators that 
'if Ukraine accepts Russian integrationist initiatives, it will remain 
isolated from Europe and world processes. This will preclude the 
technological modemisation to the extent that the country will end up 
in an unfavourable economic environment. The closed CIS region will 
preserve the technological ossification of its participants. Under those 
89 Although the treaty required both parties to harmomse economic legislations, Sherr points out that no-one asked 
'how Ukraine could harmonise economic legislation with Russia and the European Union at the same time'. See 
Sherr, Ukraine's New Time of Troubles, p. 30. 
90 M. Honchar, 0 Moskalets and S Nallvka, 'Vidhomin Serpnevoho Strusu', Polityka I Chas, No. 2,1999, p. 45. 
Artificial efforts to inject some life into Ukrainian-Russian economic relations, as in the case of the economic 
cooperation treaty, tend to be flawed. Firstly, the agreement 
lacks a mechanism for implementing its well- 
meaning objectives, namely a significant growth in trade 
between the two. Secondly, the agreement as an inter- 
state document pays little heed to the essentially inter-manufacturer cooperation needed 
for the achievement of 
its objectives, notwithstanding the wide-ranging ownership of such enterprises 
by the state. As such the 
agreement is little more than a set of recommendations. 
Furthermore, no provision within the agreement is made 
for the harmonisation of its requirements with those of the norms and standards 
demanded by the EU, WTO or 
other significant international 
financial bodies. See Zerkalo Nedeli, 21 March 1998. 
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conditions, Ukraine, as other countries of the CIS, will end up as a 
country condemned to chase the world outsider - Russia. '
91 
In sum, it was believed in Kyiv that the maintenance of tighter ties between Ukraine 
and Russia would preserve existing production structures and their common 
technological backwardness, especially when compared to Europe, Japan and the 
US. 92 Such a predicament merely underlined Ukraine's geopolitical dilemma. On the 
one hand, 'a reanimation (of ties) would mean a return to the status of an internal 
colony', something policy makers were intent on avoiding, despite the obvious 
economic mutual interdependence that linked the two neighbours. 93 On the other 
hand, it was argued that 'it is worth bidding farewell to the illusion that Ukraine is the 
breadbasket of Europe, which in fact is an agricultural over producer ... Ukraine's most 
needy market remains Russia'. 94 Such realism was well-founded as Ukraine's 
relations with the EU failed to remotely meet the expections of Ukraine, as will be 
explored in later chapters. And while something of an oversimplification, the quote 
neatly encapsulates the essence of Ukraine's dilemma along its Western azimuth, in 
the shadow of its Eastern azimuth. And it is for reasons such as these that Garnett 
points out, 'under almost any future scenario imaginable coping with Russia and 
Russian power will remain the core element of Ukrainian foreign policy. ' 
95 
Relations With Belarus 
From the outset, relations between Ukraine and Belarus were secondary to each of 
those states' relations with their common Eastern neighbour, Russia. 
However, this is 
not to understate the importance of Minsk in Ukrainian perspectives. 
As has been 
pointed out, 'Ukraine's two biggest mistakes would be to either 
declare 'cold war' on 
91 Honchar, Moskalets and Nalivka, 'Vidhomin Serpnevoho Strusu', p. 38. 
92 1. Burakovsky and V. Biletsky, Ukraine's Way to the European Union, p. 
15. 
93 Den, 17 December 1996. 
94 Den, 17 December 1996. 
95 Garnett, Keystone in the Arch, p. 49. 
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the Belarussians (that is Oleksandr Lukashenko), or to toy with the regime in 
Minsk' In other words, Belarus was not an insignif . 
96 
icant factor either on a bilateral 
level, or in terms of the role it could play in Ukraine's tussles with Russia. While the 
two were relatively closely allied in the early days of their respective independence, 
and hence could formulate policies relatively conducive to each others needs, with the 
election of Oleksandr Lukashenko they followed widely different geopolitical 
trajectories. And yet, a curious empathy remained between them throughout, as will 
now be seen. 
Russia - An Ever Present Shadow 
It is noteworthy that in the early days Belarus' foreign policy followed a path that 
closely resembled that of Ukraine. For example, Minsk felt compelled to announce 
independence soon after Ukraine in 1991. Similarly, Minsk's commitment to 
neutrality, nuclear free status, along with its proposals for a nuclear free zone (put 
forward by the Belarussian Foreign Minister Pyotr Kravchenko) bore a strong 
resemblance to Ukraine's own adopted policies. 
After independence, Ukraine's relations with Belarus were proper and cordial 
rather than 'brotherly'. There were a few minor agreements, but relations between 
Ukraine and Belarus were not fonnalised in grand treaties, although there were no 
outstanding disputes preventing relations from developing in the early days of their 
independence. This was primarily because both parties were focused on internal 
developments (in particular the economic crises which were endemic to both states) as 
well as on relations with their giant common neighbour. As a result a Treaty on 
Friendship, Good-Neighbourliness and Co-operation between Kyiv and Minsk was 
only signed in July 1996 after prolonged but essentially trouble free negotiations. 
Similarly, the signing of an agreement on the delineation and delimitation of state 
borders (the first such agreement within the CIS), signed in May 1997, was equally 
unproblematic. However, the relative paucity of bilateral relations between the two is 
in stark contrast to Belarus' (and Ukraine's) relations with Russia, which form an 
interesting contrast. 
96 Den, 27 February 1997. 
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Even in the early years of independence, Minsk was always more focused on 
developing relations with Moscow than relations with Kyiv. In July 1992 an 
agreement was signed concerning economic and military co-operation between 
Belarus and Russia. Although Belarus along with Ukraine was not a signatory to the 
Tashkent Collective Security Agreement in May 1992, Russian pressure and the needs 
of the defence industry were such that Minsk eventually succumbed in December 
97 1993 . However, this was not without the Belarussians negotiating an amendment 
whereby Belarussian personnel were excluded from service outside Belarus without 
98 the explicit consent of the Belarussian parliament . On the 12 April 1994, an 
agreement was signed on monetary union granting Russia's central bank the 
monopoly over the right of currency issue and monetary policy; the agreement was 
never implemented. This focus on Russia left little space for an intensification of ties 
with Ukraine. 
It this was true prior to 1994, then Belarussian relations with Russia took on a 
new dynamic with the election of Oleksandr Lukashenko as President in the middle of 
1994, arguably at the expense of ties with Ukraine. At the same time, Belarus' role in 
the CIS integration process took on a renewed impetus as did Minsk's efforts at 
creating some kind of subregional Slavic grouping, in both cases starting with much 
closer ties with Russia. Kyiv could only stand by as a bemused onlooker as a whole 
series of measures instigated by Lukashenko were taken to bring about a reintegration 
of the two states. For example, as far as political relations with Russia were 
concerned, in February 1995 a Treaty on Friendship, Good Neighbourliness and Co- 
operation was signed between the two states, followed soon after by an Agreement on 
the Creation of a Customs Union. Following a referendum in May 1995 in Belarus, 
the Belarussian-Russian border was effectively dismantled. 99 On the 2 April 1996 a 
Treaty on the Formation of a Community of Belarus and Russia was signed. In April 
1997 an agreement was signed to upgrade this to a Union, a goal that was finally 
achieved in December 1999. Overall, relations between Belarus and Russia were 
97 K. J. Mihalisko, 'Belarus: Retreat to Authoritarianism' in K. Dawisha and B. Parrott, (eds. ), Democratic 
Changes and Authoritarian Reactions in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova (Cambridge: 
Cambridge 
University Press 1997) p. 248 
98 V. Paznyak, 'Belarus: In Search of a Security Identity', in R. Allison and C. Bluth, (eds. ), Security Dilemmas in 
Russia and Eurasia (London: RIIA 1998) p. 159. 
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characterised as consisting of a chain of 'economic unions, monetary unions, defence 
pacts, integration, restoration, "common social spaces" and so ad infinitum'. 100 
On military issues Belarus was guided by Russian priorities. For example, 
following Lukashenko's accession to power in 1994, the planned withdrawal of 
Russian secondary troops prior to a general withdrawal as required by the Belarussian 
commitment to neutrality, renounced in 1993, was halted. 101 More antagonistically, in 
July 1995 the withdrawal of the Russian Strategic Rocket forces was suspended, 
though this was finally completed in November 1996.102 Furthermore, in a move 
clearly designed to speed up the glacial pace of the movement towards the political 
union for which Lukashenko so yearned, in February 1998 the Belarussian president 
offered to host Russian nuclear weapons as a countermeasure to NATO expansion. ' 03 
This message was quickly taken up by Roman Popkovich, the chair of the defence 
committee within the Russian Duma who suggested that the 'treaty setting up a closer 
union between Moscow and Minsk might give Russia the right to base nuclear 
missiles in Belarus'. 104 In April 1998 Minsk ratified a treaty of defence co-operation 
with Russia signed in 1997, which envisaged the harmonisation of defence policies 
and legislation in military affairs. 105 
Up to a point, Belarussian policy played into Ukraine's hands. Indeed, it 
facilitated the attainment of Ukraine's foreign policy objectives of closer ties with 
European and North Atlantic defence structures. As Minsk and Russia moved ever 
closer, especially in military terms, Ukraine became an ever more important factor in 
Westem military planning. While the return of nuclear weapons to Belarus would 
have been a retrograde step by any standards of assessment of European military 
security, it would have been made immeasurably worse by a de jure or de facto 
99 0. Y Manachinski, Suchasni Voyenno-Politychny Vidnosyny Ukrainy iz Sumizno-PrylehlYmY Derzavami, 
Vypusk 2 (Kyiv: Natsionaly Institut Stratehichnych Doslidzen 1996) p. 9. 
100 K. J. Mihalisko, 'Belarus: Retreat to Authoritarianism', p. 274. 
101 ibid., p. 273. 
102 V. Paznyak, 'Belarus: in Search of a Security Identity', p. 165 
103 Agence France-Presse, 25 February 1998. 
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reintegration of Ukraine into the Russian sphere. Such a move would be quite a coup 
and explains the insistence on the part of the Russian and Belarussian presidents, that 
as their two states got ever closer, Ukraine join them in a troika. 
Belarus' offer of military co-operation with Russia was not quite as altruistic 
as it was made out to be by Lukashenko. Belarus was suffering economically, and 
stronger economic ties with Russia were one of the few available escape routes for 
Minsk. The particular problem lay in the fact that in economic ten-ns 'Belarus was 
exceptional in the degree to which it was integrated with the other Soviet republics, 
especially Russia and Ukraine'. 106 Almost inevitably, Belarus was virtually 
completely dependent on Russia for its energy, importing 90 per cent of its energy 
requirements from there. Thus following his election and the intensification of the 
economic collapse, Lukashenko tried to instil some life into the moribund integration 
process. (Balmaceda argues that a deepened relationship was appealing to Lukashenko 
insofar as it strengthened his own position within Belarus, or conversely as long as it 
did not challenge his personal power. ) 107 Yet by 1998, the proposed Union was still 
very much at the discussion stage. At a meeting between the Russian Prime Minister 
Primakov and Lukashenko, matters such as economic ties, joint economic institutions, 
a common currency, Belarussian debt for energy supplies were still being discussed, 
despite earlier commitments to, for example, the common currency. 
108 This was much 
to the consternation of Lukashenko, who lamented that Belarus and Russia might 
merge 'if Russians muster the will'. 109 Russia was not prepared to exchange the 
closeness in security ties with Belarus for taking on the burden of an effectively 
unreformed and bankrupt Belarussian economy. Although plans for integration were 
greatly set back with the Russian economic crisis of the summer of 1998, prospects 
for economic integration were dim even prior to that. The differences in the 
degree of 
reform in the two economies (such as degrees of price liberalisation, privatisation, the 
implementation of hard budget constraints, volatility of currencies and levels of 
inflation) made genuine economic unification a burden 
for Russia such that it would 
106 G. Sanford, 'Belarus on the Road to Nationhood', Survival, Vol. 38, No. 1, Spring 1996, p. 138. 
107 M. M. Balmaceda, 'Belarus and Russia after Yeltsin', paper presented at the 
Special Seminar on Belarus, 
University of Bath, 10- 11 February 2000. 
108 Agence France-Presse, 25 February 1999. 
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be hard pressed to bear. This stance has been reinforced by the new Russian President, 
Vladimir Putin, who has reaffirmed that Russia Is only Interested in the type of 
integration that might actually confer some advantage on Russia. Further disruption to 
the Russian-Belarussian relationship is likely following the opening of key segments 
of the Yamal gas pipeline in September 1999. While ostensibly a unifying feature of 
the Minsk-Moscow relationship, the inherent contradiction thrown up by the 
transportation of Russian energy across Belarus may prove insurmountable. For 
example, while the ownership of the Belarussian segment of the pipeline belongs de 
facto and dejure to Gazprom, the details regarding the ownership and leasing of the 
territory over which the pipeline passes remain murky and beyond scrutiny. In 
addition, while Belarus had been happy to lower transportation costs in exchange for 
cheaper Russian energy prior to the opening of the Yamal pipeline, such is the 
capacity (a potential quadrupling) and strategic importance of the new pipeline now 
that Ukraine has been substantially marginalised in energy transportation, that Belarus 
might be impelled to return to a standard quantity-based charging system. 110 
For Ukraine, ties with Belarus were one of the means with which Kyiv could 
alleviate some of the pressure exerted on it by Moscow. This was particularly true in 
the field of economic relations. Tighter economic ties with Minsk were taken 
advantage of by Kyiv to alleviate the pressures of the de facto economic blockade 
placed on Ukraine following the imposition of VAT on Ukrainian goods in 1996 by 
Russia. "' This restimulation of ties was something that the Belarussians were 
themselves not averse to owing to their own economic crisis: any stimulation of the 
economy was welcome. Furthen-nore, in pursuit of its own wider objectives, Ukraine 
has offered to act as the West's representative in Belarus, in order to prevent the total 
international isolation of Minsk. 
112 
Relations between the triumvirate of Kuchma, Lukashenko and Yeltsin 
worked in Russia's favour. In particular, Minsk was taken advantage of by Moscow as 
a counterweight to moves by Kyiv. Indeed, the more insubordinate Ukraine 
became, 
the more important Belarus became to Russia from an economic and military-security 
110 M. M. Balmaceda, 'Belarus and Russia after Yeltsin'. 
111 Den, 14 May 1997. 
112 Den, 27 February 1997. 
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point of view. " 3 According to the Russian Institute of Strategic Studies 'closeness 
with Belarus, taking into account all possible negative and positive sides, in the 
whole, is in the best national interest of Russia, and gives a succession of geopolitical, 
and with time, economic advantages'. ' 14 It was simply that Russia was not yet willing 
to pay the economic price for these advantages. 
Conclusion 
Ukraine was the outsider in relations involving the three Slavic CIS states. While after 
1994 Minsk appeared desperate for closer ties with Moscow, Kyiv seemed to have an 
almost pathological fear of any initiatives or moves emanating from Moscow. 
Anything and everything was interpreted in terms of its implications for Ukrainian 
independence and sovereignty. While the price to be paid for such a stance was in 
some ways relatively negligible (military and political independence were relatively 
cost free and achieved quite quickly) it was profound in economic ternis. Yet any 
moves to reanimate economic ties between the two states that could be taken 
advantage of by Russia to bring about a reintegration of Ukraine were avoided by 
Kyiv. These constraints on the development of economic ties meant that both 
economies suffered unduly from the collapse of the Soviet Union; there is little 
evidence that Ukraine was prepared to budge on its principles. Yet this stance toward 
Russia merely exposed the very vulnerability of Ukraine - in the absence of stronger 
ties with its neighbours other than Russia, it remained overwhelmingly dependent on 
ties with its Muscovite neighbour. This is why relations along the Western azimuth 
were so important to Ukraine, as will be seen in Part 3. And even as Ukraine's 
economic predicament worsened, Kyiv did not budge until it had at least received 
from Russia the unconditional recognition of its territorial integrity. 
The sheer number of political, economic and military ties developing between 
Minsk and Moscow, and the relative paucity of such ties between Kyiv and Moscow 
highlight the gulf in geopolitical outlook that existed between Ukraine and Belarus 
especially in the years following Lukashenko's election. It could not be disguised by 
113 Narodna Armiya, II September 1996. 
114 Nezavisimost, 16 September 1997. 
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the Belarussian weak efforts to put a gloss on relations. The gap was at its most 
glaring on the international scene. A good example was the stance adopted by both 
states toward NATO enlargement. Belarus adopted an overtly oppositionist and 
confrontational stance toward NATO enlargement; indeed this stance grew firmer to 
the extent that it extended to a willingness to accommodate nuclear weapons on its 
territory, and form military alliances with Russia. This outlook contrasted with 
Ukraine's lack of objection to NATO enlargement. Similarly, Ukraine demonstrated a 
clearly pro-Western stance when it responded to US pressure by cancelling an 
agreement it had signed with Iran to help build a nuclear power station there in 
conjunction with Russia. The vacancy was quickly filled by Belarus. 115 More recently, 
while Belarus responded in bellicose tones to the NATO attack on Serbia, Ukraine 
adopted more measured tones, vowing to continue its participation in the Partnership 
for Peace Programme. This divergent geopolitical outlook, was reflected in opposing 
geopolitical tra ectories adopted by the two states on a subregional and regional level 
(see next chapter). 
What light do the events recounted in this chapter shed on the relevance of the 
theoretical approaches described in Chapter 1? In theoretical tenns, in the days and 
early years following independence, Ukraine implemented a strategy regarding Russia 
which was in line with that predicted by realist theory. Although Ukraine was never 
under a military threat from Russia, the pursuit of self-help through the creation of 
fully independent forces, irrespective of the disruption it caused in terms of relations 
with its Russian brethren (especially economic costs), spoke volumes about the mind- 
set prevailing in Kyiv. However, it was also indicative of the determination of policy- 
makers to pursue independence in its fullest sense. Ukraine's decision to adhere to the 
committment made in 1990 in the Declaration of Sovereignty to denuclearise can also 
be seen in this light - the maintenance of 'Ukrainian' nuclear forces imposed a 
dependence on Russia which was incompatible with independence. However, while 
for realists Ukraine's decision to denuclearise was counter-intuitive, KYIv's 
subsequent decision to renege on that committment in 1992-3 was more in keeping 
with realism and apparently reflected the sense of threat Kyiv perceived to be 
emanating from Russia. In reality, the decision was not as strongly guided by 'realist' 
115 Voice ofAmerica, 7 March 1998. 
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rationale as realists might believe. It was in fact more indicative of the real challenge 
Ukraine faced - nuclear weapons could be 'sold' and thereby help alleviate the 
bankruptcy brought about by the severe economic depression that had taken hold in 
Ukraine. 
The theory of structural interdependence helps fill the gaps left by realism. As 
Ukraine deintegrated from former Soviet political, economic and military structures, 
its interdependence (the first theme of the theory) with Russia was laid bare. However 
this interdependence was assymetrical - Ukraine was far more reliant on Russia than 
vice versa. In line with the tenets of the theory of structural interdependence, Ukraine 
was extremely sensitive and vulnerable to any changes in energy prices imposed by 
Russia (as Moscow introduced world energy pricing), especially in the context of the 
overall economic collapse. Yet the economic cost was a price Kyiv was willing to pay 
in order to distance itself from Moscow. This is because, firstly, Ukraine was 
concerned as to the frequency with which military solutions were reverted to by 
Moscow to 'resolve' issues in its 'near abroad' (i. e. there was a high salience of use of 
force -a tenet of the second theme of the theory - something which was damaging to 
the continued interdependence between the two states as was the fact that force tended 
to be high on the Russian political agenda). Secondly, it was indicative of Ukraine's 
resolve to take advantage of the changed power structure (a tenet of the third theme of 
the theory) of the post-Soviet space in pursuit of its own goals. 
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Chapter 3: The North-eastern Azimuth: Subregional 
And Regional Integration 
Following the unexpected demise of the Soviet Union, there was a real danger that the 
collapse of institutional ties linking the former Soviet republics would result in an 
economic and political vacuum. The all-pervasive nature of the Soviet Union as an 
organising framework would have ensured such an implosion. From the very outset of 
discussions on the successor to the Soviet Union, it was apparent that the views of 
Ukraine and Russia were incongruent. Ukraine was adamant that participation in any 
successor institution was, at best, a temporary exercise to bring about 'a civilised 
divorce'. In this regard, Ukraine differed sharply from its two Slavic 'Eastern' 
neighbours. At the outset, both Russia and Belarus were intent on drawing Ukraine 
into a subregional menage a trois. This early Ukrainian resistance was to become a 
permanent feature in its dealings with Belarus and Russia. These early subregional 
efforts on the part of Moscow and Minsk were only abandoned under pressure from 
other Former Soviet republics, unwilling to be left outside such a post-Soviet 
grouping. This pressure resulted in the formation of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States. Yet as the CIS foundered, something which is at least in some 
measure attributable to Ukraine's obstructionism, the Slavic theme was returned to. 
Subregional Integration Within The CIS 
From the very earliest hours following the collapse of the Soviet Union, pressures 
were exerted on Kyiv to enter some sort of confederation with the Original founding 
members of the Soviet Union, namely Russia and Belarus, to the exclusion of other 
former Soviet republics. Kravchuk, Ukraine's newly elected President, refused to join 
any sort of confederation, opting instead for a much looser commonwealth. 
' In fact, 
1 R. Solchanyk, 'Russia, Ukraine and the Imperial Legacy', Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 4,1993, pp. 356-357. 
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Minsk's objectives were subtly different to those of Moscow. Belarus was focused on 
tripartite co-operation with Russia and Ukraine; Russia was keen to involve all of the 
former republics. 2 For Minsk this was a matter of self preservation, as there is some 
evidence to suggest Russian analysts rejected the notion of a community 
recommending instead a formal annexation of Belarus by Russia. 3 
There were adequate grounds for an ethnically based Slavic subregional 
grouping. The three Slavic republics collectively constituted by the far the greatest 
contributors to the Soviet Union in terms of geography, population, economic 
potential. They were further linked by interdependence, and a common Slavic 
extraction. This common extraction related to the fact that they were all Eastern Slavs 
as opposed to the Poles, and others in Central and Eastern European who were 
Western Slavs. The fact that Eastern Slavs shared a Cyrillic-based Slavic language, 
and Orthodoxy as a religion also differentiated them from other Slavs such as the 
Poles. Strong cultural and ethnic bonds, particularly the high number of Russians 
resident in both Belarus and Ukraine and Ukrainians in Russia, further reinforced this 
sense of commonness. Furthermore, as Pritzel points out, 'the fact that the decision to 
dissolve the Soviet Union and replace it with a Commonwealth of Independent States 
was made by the three Slavic Republics ... was clearly a reflection of the marginal 
position that the Caucasus and Central Asia occupied in the minds of Russia's policy 
makers'. 4 The non-Slav republics simply did not figure prominently in policy making, 
at least in the immediate days following the collapse of the Soviet Union. In sum, 
there was a strong basis for a subregional, Slav based grouping in the early days 
following the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Following the initial rejection by Kyiv of the very notion of a subregional 
grouping made up of former Soviet Slavic states, the idea evaporated until the election 
of Oleksandr Lukashenko in 1994, who immediately started to push for closer ties 
between Minsk and Moscow. In pursuit of stronger sub-CIS ties, on 2 April 1996 a 
treaty was signed between Russia and Belarus on 'The Creation of a Community (or 
Commonwealth) of Sovereign Republics' something which the Belarussian president 
2 G. Sanford, 'Belarus on the Road to Nationhood', p. 148. 
3 Narodna Armiya, 10 June 1997. 
4 1. Pritzel, National Identity and Foreign Policy: Nationalisni and Leadership in Poland, Russia and Ukraine 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1998) p. 280. 
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Lukashenko charactensed as the 'first stage' of the CIS. Ultimately a three speed CIS 
was envisaged in which the 'big four (namely Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgystan) made up the second stage, with the remaining member states belonging to 
the third stage. 5 While Belarus and Moscow were clearly keen that Ukraine should 
belong to this first group, it was evident from early on that at best Kyiv was going to 
be a reluctant participant in the third. 
The new Belarussian-Russian Community was soon endowed with formal 
institutions such as a Supreme Council, and Executive Committee with a 
Parliamentary Assembly in the pipeline. Yet the rhetoric and institutionalisation of the 
new body failed to camouflage the vast discrepancy between the economic and 
political stances adopted by the two member states: authoritarianism and a centralised 
economy continued to be the main themes within Belarus as opposed to the flawed but 
nevertheless real Russian democratic system and market economy. 
Minsk was lured by the prospect of Russian economic support for the 
collapsing Belarussian economy. Belarus was hopelessly reliant on Russia for energy 
producing only 2 million of the 150 million tons of oil it had the refining capacity for, 
and the raw materials for its electronics industry and orders for its machine building 
factories. There is little doubt that Lukashenko believed 'that he was utterly 
indispensable to the Russian authorities, which would at any cost, even their own 
economic interests, please Minsk'. 6 In the immediate future the benefits were obvious. 
For Russia, the new union represented a countermove in advance of NATO 
enlargement. It was, however, also a move designed for the domestic electorate. In 
March 1996, the Russian Duma denounced the 1991 Belovezha Agreements on the 
demise of the Soviet Union. By agreeing to the Union, Yeltsin was trying to appease 
the electorate in preparation for the upcoming Presidential elections. Yet it was soon 
clear that the benefits, such as they were, were somewhat one-sided. While Belarus 
failed to gain either the much hoped for substantial credits or loans, Moscow, in 
addition to appeasing a tetchy electorate, also managed to gain free leases on 
substantial military facilities based in Belarus, low charges on the transportation of the 
'Holos Ukrainy, II June 1996. 
6 Nezavisi'llost, 16 September 1997. 
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80 per cent of all of its goods it transported westward and the opportunity to take an 
7 interest (means 'ownership') in strategic Belarussian enterprises . 
As ties between Belarus and Russia intensified, so did the pressure on Ukraine 
to join them in a formal union. Kyiv remained aloof For example, when in the spring 
of 1999 Lukashenko proposed the creation of a pan-Slavic bloc to counter NATO 
influence in Europe, Ukraine responded by reiterating its commitment to the Alliance 
and continued co-operation in the Pfl?. 8 Lukashenko was left clutching at straws when, 
following an outright rejection of Ukraine joining the Union by Kyiv, he stated that he 
felt 'grateful that Kuchma supported ... 
(the idea)... that we Slavic brothers, Russians, 
Ukrainians and Belarussians will hold consultations and work out a memorandum on 
our strategic partnership in all areas, not just economic. ' Minsk's hopes were exposed 
as hollow when in the run up to the 1999 presidential elections, the incumbent Leonid 
Kuchma was asked why it was that he did not want to join the Russian-Belarus 
alliance, he replied that 'When a pauper is joined by two others, they do not end up 
richer. Russia is simply not in a position to help Ukraine today. It has to deal with its 
own problems'. 9 
Overall, Ukraine refused to particpate in any moves aimed at the creation of a 
subregional multilateral body within the CIS involving Russia. Kyiv was suspicious of 
any moves that might drag it into some form of integration process, especially as the 
subregional and regional processes were clearly linked in Belarussian and Russian 
minds. Lukashenko demonstrated this when he pressured the Ukrainians to join the 
Russia-Belarus Union and the CIS Customs Union, arguing that 'Ukraine will get 
nowhere without tighter integration with the CIS'. 
10 In the early days, Belarussian 
efforts at subregional structures were partially aimed at avoiding its own total 
subordination to Russia. However, following the election of Lukashenko, these efforts 
were really geared toward some form of new Slavic Soviet Union. Russia's goals were 
more far-reaching. Above all, Moscow was focused on Ukraine's full reintegration 
into the post-Soviet space by ensuring its membership of the CIS. 
7 0. Hrynkevych, "Things Return to Their 'Natural' State: Russia, Belarus and the 'New Commonwealth"', 
Politics and the Times, February 1996, pp. 85-91. 
8 Reuters, 15 March 1999. 
9A rguinen4, I Fak,, 3 August 1999. 
10 Den, 14 May 1997. 
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CIS Integration: Rationale, Issues And Milestones 
The ongoing friction between Ukraine and Russia found resonance in their totally 
different stance and approach toward the characterisation of the post-Soviet space. 
Kyiv and Moscow approached the former Soviet space from incongruent and 
incompatible points of view. For Ukraine, the new geopolitical space was to be 
inhabited by sovereign and independent states. In contrast, Russia envisaged a new 
form of Union based around the Ukrainian-Russian tandem. Indeed, evidence suggests 
that if necessary, this new relationship could have been shaped according to the 
demands of Kyiv - the prime goal from Moscow's point of view was that a formal 
relationship or 'partnership' continued. " 
Ukraine's conceptualisation of CIS integration parallels that of Garnett, who 
suggests that CIS integration is a process of 'responding to the problems of a currently 
weak zone of states and instability on Russia's borders with a political and security 
structure shaped by Russian interests'. 12 For Kyiv, the CIS was inevitably going to be 
Russocentric, dominated by Russian perspectives on events. Furthermore, Kyiv was 
only too well aware that membership of the CIS meant an intense relationship with an 
economic, military and political heavyweight, something that was always going to 
have negative reverberations for Ukraine's own sovereignty and independence. The 
fact that the two key members of the CIS held diametrically opposed views of the CIS 
was thus highly problematic, both for Russia and the institution itself. This disparity 
of views was merely compounded by the structural, constitutional and financial 
inadequacies that plagued the CIS from its inception. 13 
Yet for Russia the very existence of the CIS was crucial. There were many 
reasons for this, but two stand out. Firstly, at the very least the CIS slowed down the 
economic and social disintegration that was taking place in the structures linking the 
According to reports, 'Yeltsin, acting as Gorbachev's spokesman, informed Kravchuk that the Soviet President 
was prepared to let Ukraine make any amendments to the text of the Union treaty that it desired, but only under 
one condition: that it sign the document ... Kravchuk responded that if Ukraine were to propose its version the 
result would not be a confederative state but a commonwealth of states. ' See R. Solchanyk, 'Russia, Ukraine 
and the Imperial Legacy', p. 354. 
12 Gamett, Keystone in the Arch, p .61. 
" Olcott, Asluhd and Gamett, Getting it Wrong, passim. 
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states of the fonner Soviet Union. Indeed it has been postulated by some Ukrainian 
officials that the existence of the CIS was designed to prevent the break-up of the 
Russian Federation itself 14 Secondly, the CIS legitimised the presence of Russian 
forces throughout the CIS. 
The central importance of Ukraine to the CIS was made clear by Yeltsin, who 
openly admitted that creation of the CIS 'was the only way of pulling Ukraine into the 
orbit of some sort of new union-like relationship on a totally new basis, and therefore 
to cool the fervour of our military and national patriots, who threatened us with a new 
putsch, related to the exit of Ukraine'. 15 
Ukraine was crucial to the success of the CIS for a number of reasons. Above 
all, Ukraine's size, resources, military-technical infrastructure, military might, socio- 
economic structure, historical and ethnic ties made the Ukraine-Russia tandem the 
obvious foundation on which to build the CIS as a multilateral forum. Alternatively, 
Ukraine's non or limited involvement in the CIS would strongly suggest a centrifugal 
tendency between the two key partners forging paths in different directions. As 
Garnett points out, 'Ukraine's participation is crucial to defining whether the CIS can 
meaningfully unite the key states of the former USSR'. 16 Such divergence would 
have clear negative ramifications for future integration, especially if Ukraine was to 
gain adherents to its cause. In addition, according to Garnett, Ukraine's participation 
would add 'a strong Slavic and European flavour to the CIS', as well as 'restore a 
European element to what could develop into a lopsidedly "Eurasian" organisation'. 
17 
The 'lack' of Ukraine would leave Russia locked out of the European space. Another 
benefit of Ukraine's participation in the CIS was that it would legitimise the 
institution. Conversely, Ukraine's absence might embolden other CIS states to search 
for extraneous partners beyond the commonwealth. Russia saw the CIS as a means of 
rebuilding ties between former Soviet republics, and in particular with Ukraine, on a 
new more voluntary basis now that the 'glue' of fear and ideology binding them had 
failed. Arguably, the success of this policy could be measured by the extent of 
Ukraine's involvement in the institution. 
14 Author's discussion with an official from the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kyiv, July 1997. 
15 Arguinenty I Fakty, 199 1, No. 50, p. I 
16 Garnett, Keystone in the Arch, p. 62. 
17 
ibid., pp. 62-63. 
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Ukraine's recalcitrance at being drawn in was a response to perceived Russian 
expectations as to what kind of vehicle the CIS was to be. In contrast to the 
consultative role (to bring about a 'civilised divorce') anticipated by Ukraine, Russia 
envisaged and developed the ClS as an integrative body along the lines of the 
European Union, on the origins of which it was modelled. 18 This divergence of views 
was to shape both the various institutions of the ClS, and the role each of the two key 
members were to play within them. 
In Ukraine's favour with regard to its objectives within the CIS was the fact 
that there were a number of key factors working against the viability of the institution. 
First, member states were at vastly different levels of economic development. The 
Muslim states, with their low level of economic development, relatively 
underdeveloped infrastructure and limited industrialisation, contrasted with the 
economies of the Slavic republics. Second, the CIS region was neither ethnically, 
culturally, or in terms of religion, homogeneous. Third, the CIS was riven with 
internal disputes, of which the Russo-Ukrainian one was perhaps the most significant. 
Fourth, many member states were motivated by their own economic potential and 
therefore loath to retransfer power back to an imperial centre. Fifth, many states 
neighboured more prosperous, or potentially more prosperous regional groupings, and 
hence competitors to the CIS. This was particularly true in Ukraine's case. Sixth, 
many member states suffered internal ruptures, in most of which Russia's influence 
could be detected. If nothing else, this alienated those states from Russia. Seventh, 
member states had individual and indeed sometimes contradictory geopolitical 
objectives triggered by membership of different geographical regions. For example, 
Ukraine was westward looking, while Kazakhstan saw markets in the East. Russia 
wanted to keep them both close. So while Russia attempted to intensify the centripetal 
tendencies of the CIS by continuing to provide energy, encouraging the formation of 
CIS institutions, stationing troops on the outer borders of the CIS, Ukraine energised 
the centrifugal effects acting on the institution by not participating in CIS structures 
and emphasising the formation of bilateral ties with CIS member states and the 
formation of subregional institutions within and beyond it, frequently made up of CIS 
" it is worth pointing out that while the CIS was explicitly integrative (as codified in the Minsk Ageement and 
CIS Charter), the institutional structures designed to implement these agreements were either consultative or not 
empowered to impose on member states legally 
binding decisions. Olcott, Asluhd and Garnett, Getting it 
Wrong, p. 10. 
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member states. Finally, the member states, including Russia, were just too poor to 
make it viable. 
Three areas of CIS co-operation or integration were envisaged by Russia: 
political, economic and military. 
Political Co-operation 
From the very beginning, Ukraine put obstacles in the way of the development of the 
CIS as a forum for political co-operation let alone as an integrationist structure. 
Despite agreeing to being a founding member of the CIS on 8 December 1991, at 
subsequent meetings the Ukrainian delegation overtly opposed the CIS developing 
either into a state entity, or a supranational institution, preferring that it remain as a 
loose forum for independent states. Soon after the signing of the Agreement it was 
ratified by the Ukrainian parliament on 12 December 1991 (and subsequently 
announced in a Declaration on 20 December). However, ratification was only 
completed with a whole host of conditions and exemptions attached by Kyiv in order 
to preserve Ukraine's sovereignty and independence, and prevent Ukraine's full 
integration into the CIS in the face of what it saw as Moscow's attempts to renew 
fonner ties. 19 Of the 12 qualifying points made by the Rada, the most important 
included the recognition and respect of territorial integrity and immutability of 
existing national borders (as opposed to administrative-territorial borders within the 
CIS); a rejection of the co-ordination of foreign policy activities, and an offer of co- 
operation instead; and a rejection of unified CIS armed forces. In general, the Rada 
was against the formation of the CIS as a supranational institution, with its own 
executive organs and co-ordinating structures, deemed so essential by Moscow. 
However, so unsatisfactory were the conditions of continued membership of 
the CIS, that in January 1992 Kravchuk threatened to leave the CIS because of what 
he saw as the continued violation of CIS agreements by member states, and Russian 
interference in Ukrainian affairs and those of other republics. 
20 This was a response to 
Indeed, so fearful of the renewal of empire were the Ukrainians, that they even insisted that the word 
6commonwealth' be written with a lower case V to avoid conferring on the institution any state like attributes 
that might be inferred if an upper case 'C' was used. Holos Ukrainy, II June 1996. 
20 RFEIRL, 17 January 1992. 
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the open threats made by the Russians as to the possibility of linking non participation 
in CIS agreements and Russian interference in the internal affairs of FSU states. For 
example, Ruslan Khasbulatov, the Chainnan of the Russian Duma suggested that the 
resolution of border issues within the CIS (with Moldova ostentatiously singled out as 
an example) was dependent on the republics' continued membership of the CIS. 21 
The proposal for the writing of a Charter for the CIS in May 1992 was a 
natural progression for the institution as a supranational structure. In itself the 
document was important, as the CIS lacked a clear, useable statute, and was instead 
structured according to the documents and agreements signed up until that point. 
Indeed, until a charter was signed, CIS members, rather than linked according to a 
statute, were in fact linked according to common extraction (as former members of the 
Soviet Union), economic interdependence and the rapidly deteriorating bonds that still 
nevertheless linked the former Soviet nomenklatura in power in many of the states. 
Inevitably, any such Charter was anathema to Kyiv. In general terms, Ukraine 
was against anything which locked it into anything other than a West European 
institution. In more specific terins, some of the provisions of the Charter were 
undesirable per se for Ukraine. For example, Kyiv was against Article 4 on a common 
economic space, and common external borders (which implied that CIS 'internal' 
borders were administrative rather than state borders). Article 11, on collective 
military forces, directly contradicted the foreign and security policy of Ukraine; each 
article was an abhorrence to Kyiv . 
22 Even the supposedly pro-Russian and pro-CIS 
Ukrainian Prime Minister Kuchma was against the Charter, stating categorically at a 
CIS heads of government meeting in November 1992, that Ukraine would neither 
adhere to nor sign a charter in the form presented. 
23 As a result, at the CIS summit in 
Minsk in January 1993, the CIS charter, providing for a new legal framework and 
closer relations, was left unsigned by Ukraine along with Turkmenistan, Moldova, and 
Azerbaijan, while Georgia did not even attend the meeting. 
24 This was despite the 
21 RFEIRL, 24 April 1992. 
22 See Bohdan Horyn, the noted Ukrainian parliamentarian and activist's article 'Ukraina I SND' 
in Narodna 
y incongruence 
between the Ukrainian constituti Armi a, 6 August 1996, for a more 
detailed breakdown of the ii ion 
and the CIS Charter. 
23 RFEIRL, 16 Nov 1992 
24 As of I September 1997, the CIS was made up of 
74 conu-nittees, 54 of which Ukraine participated in: in 27 as a 
full member, and the other 27 as an observer. 
V. Tkachenko, Spivdruznist Nezaleznych Derzav ta Natsionalni 
Interesy Ukrainy (Kyiv: Institut Hromadskoho Suspilstva 1998) p. 
20. Although the Charter was ready in 
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efforts of the Russians who, somewhat exasperatedly, felt that they had 'laid so much 
stress on independence and non-intervention (in the Charter) that it would be 
useless'. 25 
Kyiv's tactics did not lead to Ukraine's isolation within the CIS. On the 
contrary, Ukraine's oppositionist stance consolidated its position within the body as 
an alternative pole to Russia. An early example of this was Moldova's siding with 
Ukraine in its opposition to the 'new centralism' and Kishinev's insistence that it 
would not sign the Charter if Kyiv did not. 26 Thus simultaneously, as the CIS failed to 
take on the cohesion to make it a meaningful body, a strengthening of ties was taking 
place between some of its members within the institution. Indeed, the start of a 
subregional sub-CIS formation was in the offing. 
At the same time as the Charter was being prepared, the formation of the 
Interparliamentary Assembly was under way, agreed to by 7 of the II member states 
of the CIS in March 1992. Fearful of the creation of a supranational institution, with 
all of its associated threats to Ukrainian sovereignty and independence, Kyiv proposed 
inter-parliamentary consultations rather than an assembly. 27 Nevertheless, despite 
Ukraine's objections, the EPA held its first session in Bishkek on 15 September 
1992 
. 
28 As a consultative institution 5 it was ostensibly 
designed to co-ordinate the 
process of co-operation between member states, the development of proposals for the 
activities of national parliaments, and the promotion of proximity and harmonisation 
between different national legislatures. However, Ukraine suspected alternative 
motives behind the institution. 29 It has in fact been argued that the rPA was the 
political superstructure being built on the economic foundation that the CIS was trying 
to recreate between member states; thus it was to act as a new Union parliament, 
30 creating a new Union legislature. Indeed, the acceptance of the Convention of the 
IPA of the CIS in May 1995 allowed for the IPA to establish and sign treaties on 
January 1993, Ukraine (along with Moldova and Turkmenistan) has as of 1999 still not signed, nor has the 
Supreme Rada ratified it. 
25 RFEIRL, 30 November 1992 
26 RFEIRL, 01 December 1992 
27 RFEIRL, 30 March 1992. 
28 A. Rudnyk, Politychna Karta SND (Kylv: UkraInska Perspektyva 1996) p. 7. 
29 Tkachenko, Spivdruznist Nezaleznych Derzav ta Natsionalni Interesy Ukrainy, p. 4 1. 
30 ibid., p. 41. 
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behalf of member states. It had gained inter-state powers. Unsurprisingly, the proposal 
in September 1993 by the Chainnan of the Russian Duma for the setting up of a CIS 
Parliamentary Assembly - effectively a common CIS government - was rejected by the 
Ukrainians out of hand. 31 Ukraine's suspicions as to the intentions of the Russians 
were further confirmed in 1994 by the head of Russian Foreign Intelligence, Yevgeniy 
Primakov, who suggested that the organisation of the CIS 'lends to itself to the 
formation of a union under the leadership of Russia, to the supranational structures of 
which member states will delegate some of their defence and economic functions. 
Such a structure is very similar to the political make up of the former Soviet Union'. 32 
Kyiv's suspicions and scepticism appear to have been well founded. Ukraine's 
reluctance to get too deeply entangled with the CIS economic and political structures 
was further reinforced by the belief that such structures would be effectively under the 
control of the Russians. 33 
As political integration progressed, Ukraine's antipathy toward political, 
economic, military or other forms of integration with the CIS, was unambiguously laid 
out by President Kuchma, a supposedly pro-Russian president. During his speech to 
the Western European Union in June 1996 he not only underlined his pro-European 
orientation, but also shut the door quite categorically on any hopes for a new 
supranational role for the CIS, let alone the revival of the USSR: 
'I wish to underline the role of the CIS as a mechanism leading to a 
peaceful and democratic resolution of all the problems associated with 
the collapse of the USSR ... and that 
it was on the initiative of Ukraine 
that the CIS was confirmed as neither a supranational nor state-like 
31 RFEIRL, 15 Sep 1993. 
32 Primakov quoted in Tkachenko, Spivdruznist Nezaleznych Derzav ta Natsionalni Interesy Ukrainy, p. 42. 
33 Ukrainian researchers point to the proposed voting system in the CIS Interparliamentary Assembly as a good 
example of this. Voting in this institution was to be on the basis of one vote per delegation with proposals 
requiring 'a consensus' (i. e. unanimity) in order to be carried. However, hidden amongst the clauses was the 
suggestion that 'the one vote per delegation will apply as long as no other decisions have been taken which 
supersede the aforementioned point'. A good example of the possible emergence of such a 'superseding 
decision' was the suggestion made in the Russian Duma in April 1995 for voting to take place 'on a quota basis' 
i. e. with votes weighed according to percentage of the population, with Russia getting something like 40% of 
the vote (in line with the fact that it has 40% of the total CIS population) and Ukraine 17%. If decisions in the 
CIS body were subsequently to be made on the basis of a qualified majority (which has been mooted, 
incidentally), something easily achieved by the Russians thanks to the trusted support of the Belarussians and 
some of the Muslim republics, the Ukrainians could be easily outvoted on all major issues, 
demeaning their role 
in the body to that of observers. A. Filipenko, 'The CIS Economic Union: Pros and Cons', Politics and the 
Times, October-December, 1995, pp. 58-65. 
97 
creation... Our country opposes any form of supranational activities on 
the part of the CIS. Furthermore, Ukraine is categorically against any 
efforts at reanimating in any shape or form the former Soviet Union. -)34 
This sent a clear shot across the bows of the Russian Duma that had passed a 
resolution in March 1996, 'On the deepening of the integration of nations, that were 
united in the USSR, and a reversal of the resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the 
RSFSR from 12 December 1991', that is a reversal of the decision to abolish the 
Soviet Union in Belovezha. It is noteworthy that a change in the constellation of 
forces within Ukraine in 1999 brought about a change in Ukraine's status in relation 
to the EPA . 
35 The election of the left-winger Tkachenko as speaker of the Ukrainian 
parliament led to Ukraine joining the IPA in March 1999 (up until then it had been an 
observer), with 230 voters in favour, just passing the 226 threshold necessary. 36 it 
worth noting that in joining the EPA Ukraine became a member of a body which is 
regulated by Article 36 of the Charter of the CIS to which Ukraine is not a signatory. 37 
Membership of this body had potential consequences for Ukraine's 'strategic' 
goal of integration with subregional and regional bodies along the Western azimuth. 
In particular, the national democrats in the Ukrainian Rada were concerned that the 
harmonisation of the legislature of the IPA member states might contradict the steps 
taken by Kyiv to harmonise Ukraine's legislature with Western institutions. For 
example, the Council of Europe has specific requirements for civil, criminal and 
procedural legislation, which might be at odds with those of the IPA. This potential 
problem was exacerbated by the fact that many IPA members (Kazakhstan, 
Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgystan) are never likely to be Council of Europe 
members, and thus need not agree to or abide by legislation moulded by the needs of 
Council of Europe or some other such institution. Furthermore, Ukraine was already 
34 Uriadovy Kurier, 8th June 1996. 
35 Events in both Russia and Ukraine highlight the need to distinguish between positions taken up by the 
respective governments and legislatures of the two states. I am indebted to Professor Neil Malcolm for 
reminding me of this point. 
36 Ukraine - Country Report, Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 2 nd Quarter, 1999, p. 13. 
37 RFEIRL, 03 March 1999. The importance of the CIS IPA has been dismissed by Nationalists in the Ukrainian 
parliament on the grounds that it can hold consultations and make recommendations, 
but not enforce anything. 
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moving away from the demands of the EPA as Kyiv sought to harmonise its legislation 
with that of the EU and the OSCE. 
Overall, Ukraine's joining the CIS IPA was one of the few meaningful positive 
political developments within the CIS involving Kyiv as in the main Ukraine was 
simply unwilling to delegate autonomy to the institution. 
Military Issues 
If the military split between Russia and Ukraine was the source of acrimony between 
Kyiv and Moscow on a bilateral basis, the frisson continued between them within the 
CIS as a multilateral forum. Soon after the Belovezha Agreement Kravchuk started 
ploughing a lone furrow gradually de-integrating Ukraine ftom its economic, political 
and above all, military ties with the FSU republics. Ukraine was guided by a set of 
principles which precluded the reintegration of Ukraine's forces with those of Russia 
and the CIS, namely, Article IX which specified neutrality, non-bloc and non-nuclear 
status. 38 While the suitability of such policies for Ukraine is open to question, they did 
represent an unambiguous set of guidelines for Ukraine's leaders to pursue in their 
dealings with Moscow as to the eventual shape of the military fort-nations in the post- 
Soviet world. 
As we have seen, as part of implementing these guidelines, on 12 December 
1991, President Kravchuk decreed the transfer of all military material and forces in 
Ukraine to Ukrainian command, excluding those associated with strategic-nuclear 
deterrence. By early 1992, irrespective of Russian efforts to create a CIS military 
budget, Ukraine was providing the bulk of finance for forces stationed in Ukraine. 
39 
At a meeting of CIS defence ministers, Ukraine, along with Azerbaijan, conspicuously 
refused to initial any of the 11 drafts presented that were to do with the creation of 
CIS common defence structures. 40 The depths to which relations between Ukraine and 
Russia had sunk was made more than evident when Kravchuk refused to attend the 
38 For a more detailed analysis of the evolution of Ukraine's foreign and security policy, see R. Wolczuk, 'The 
Evolution of Ukraine Foreign and Security Policy 1991-1994', Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 12, No. 3, 
(September 1999) PP- 18-37. 
39 RFEIRL, 05 February 1992. 
40 RFEIRL, 8 April 1992. 
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CIS summit in Tashkent in May 1992, citing a scheduled meeting as an excuse. 
Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Armenia all signed the 
collective security agreement. This agreement was designed to work along the lines of 
NATO interrelations, whereby an attack on one member states was deemed an attack 
on all other states, thereby obliging them to render military and other assistance. 
Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova and Belarus all refused to sign; Georgia was not a 
member of the CIS at that time. 41 With the exception of Belarus, the members of the 
group, along with Georgia, went on to forrn a subregional institution that came to be 
known by the acronym GUAM, later to be joined in 1999 by Uzbekistan (to form 
GUUAM). In October 1992 Ukraine and Moldova refused to initial a draft treaty 'On 
Defence and Collective Security'. 42 
As relations between Kyiv and Moscow deteriorated over the course of 1992, 
the frequency of clashes between them within the CIS increased. With the removal of 
the BSF from the jurisdiction of the CIS at the bilateral Yalta summit in August 1992 
between Ukraine and Russia, the nuclear forces stationed in Ukraine and the matter of 
joint air defences remained the most significant bones of contention within the CIS. 
While the nuclear issue was finally addressed in 1994 with the Trilateral agreement 
signed between Ukraine, Russia and the USA, the matter of air defences became a 
more prolonged affair. 
Joint air defences were a crucial factor driving Russia's interest in the 
formation of a military union with Ukraine. Following the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, Russia remained effectively undefended from missile attack. Of the 8 early 
warning stations located around the Soviet Union, only 3 were located on the territory 
of the RSFSR. While the CIS Collective Defence Treaty proposed in Tashkent in May 
1992 was supposed to resolve the problem, it did not do so as Ukraine failed to sip 
the Treaty. Subsequent pressure in the form of arm twisting over oil and gas supplies 
eventually resulted in the Ukrainian Minister of Defence Shmarov initialling an 
41 RFEIRL, 18 May 1992. Georgia joined the CIS in October 1993 under what it saw as duress. Apparently 
Shevardnadze was told, 'if you want gas, oil, raw materials then Join the CIS'; see RFEIRL, II October 1993. 
The Azeri parliament refused to ratify former President Mutabilov's decision in December 1991 committing 
Azerbaijan to CIS membership; subsequently, following the election of President Aliev, the parliament reversed 
its decision in September 1993; see RFEIRL, 21 Sep 1993, and 20 March 1996. 
42 RFEIRL, 9 Oct 1992. 
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43 agreement on participation in a common air defence system in February 1995 . It has 
been argued that not only did Ukraine effectively lose its non-bloc status with this 
move, but it also opened itself to uncontrolled incursions by flights from member 
44 
states. An agreement on the use by Russia of the two early warning stations based in 
Mukachevo and Sevastopol (which covered Europe and the Mediterranean) at a cost 
45 of $4 million per annum was finally signed in February 1997 . 
Overall, so great were the tensions in the Ukrainian-Russian relationship from 
the very first days of the Commonwealth that according to the President of 
Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbaev, the continued friction between Kyiv and Moscow 
as regards military issues was affecting the stability of the CIS. 46 The fact that the CIS 
failed to function effectively as a military alliance from there on ultimately 
undermined the credibility of the institution. This lack of credibility was amply 
demonstrated in April 1999 when owing to a refusal on the part of Azerbaijan, 
Georgia and Uzbekistan to sign a protocol to the treaty in order to prolong it, the 
Tashkent Treaty effectively started to unravel. The fact that this was followed by an 
announcement at the NATO summit in 1999 of a commitment by the non-signatories 
to subregional integration in the form of a growth and hence consolidation of GUAM 
to GUUAM, only served to magnify the impact and significance of the event, a point 
which will be explored in some detail in Chapter 7. It reflected a further diminution in 
the stature of Russia and the CIS in favour of Ukraine's status within GUUAM, as 
well as of the Western Alliance. There can be little doubt that Ukraine contributed to 
the unravelling of the Tashkent Treaty in two key ways. Firstly, by adopting an 
oppositionist stance with no ostensible repercussions, Kyiv modelled a position that 
was clearly appealing to other CIS members. Secondly, by remaining in steadfast 
opposition to the CIS Ukraine established itself as a leader of renegades within the 
CIS, of which GUUAM was the most powerful example. Without Ukraine, a 
43 Narodna Armiya, 6 August 1996. Olcott et al argue that this interest was triggered by hopes for an injection of 
funds into Ukraine's military infrastructure. Olcott, Asluhd and Garnett, Getting it Wrong p. 9 1. 
44 Tkachenko, Spivdruznist Nezaleznych Derzav ta Natsionalni Interesy Ukrainy, p. 67. 
45 Den, I March 1997. V. Zerebestky, a member of the Ukrainian parliament and a member of the Parliamentary 
Committee of Foreign Affairs stated that the agreement needed to be subjected to ratification by the parliament. 
However, the right wing dominated committee refused to process the agreement as the left-wing dominated 
parliament would have been certain to ratify it. In the view of Zerebetsky, such a ratification would legitinuse 
Russia's presence on Ukraine's territory beyond the parameters of the Treaty signed between the two states in 
1997, something that was unacceptable to the committee. (Conversation with author, Kylv, July 1997). 
46 RFEIRL, 24 April 1992. 
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GUUAM was effectively inconceivable. Without Ukraine (and its 'followers'), a 
military union of CIS states was rendered meaningless. Along with political 
integration, military integration was a key area in which Ukraine could reject Russian 
moves for greater ties with impunity. The same cannot be said for economic ties, the 
strongest glue binding Ukraine to Russia. 
Economic Integration 
In October 1991 , two months after the Ukrainian declaration of independence, and 
two months before the formal unravelling of the Soviet Union, a Treaty on Economic 
Community was signed by eight of the twelve former Union republics. The treaty was 
designed to create a common economic space in which signatory states would co- 
operate on issues of trade and economic policy; the treaty also allowed for the setting 
up of inter-republican bodies that would regulate the economies. Highly significant, 
and indicative of things to come on the subregional dimension, was the fact that 
Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova (the GUAM states) all refused to sign the 
treaty. Ukraine's main objectives were to maintain bilateral ties with other republics, 
and avoid participating in a renewed Moscow-centred economic system. This was 
despite the fact that the Soviet Union was a major source of Ukraine's imports and a 
significant market for its exports. However, ties with Russia dominated this market. 
Russia took some 75 per cent of all of Ukraine's Soviet exports, and was the source of 
perhaps 80 per cent of its Soviet imports. As far as Kyiv was concerned, the problem 
lay in the fact that Moscow saw economic ties as a means to a political end. For 
example, the tight link between economics and politics was evident as according to 
Smith it is the 'close knit economic integration, which reflects the Russian desire to 
tie economically the near abroad to the Russian Federation. This would increase the 
dependence of these states on Russia, and so make it more difficult for them to pursue 
foreign policies that Moscow might consider anti-Russian'. 
47 
In contrast, for Ukraine economic relations both on a bilateral basis with CIS 
states, and multilateral basis within the CIS, were not meant to be as exclusive as they 
had been hitherto. While relations with former Soviet republics were clearly 
47 Smith, Russian Hegentony in the Near Abroad, p. 3. 
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fundamental to an economy as heavily integrated with theirs as was Ukraine's, KYiv's 
objectives along the Western and Southern azimuths demanded a reorientation of ties 
westward. As a result, the Russians were hesitant to make any proposals that might be 
perceived by Ukraine as directly impeding their drive westward. So although a central 
CIS bank was mooted as early as January 1992, Moscow was mindful of 'the general 
scepticism over Russia's role in the CIS, and the hatred of "central" anything (sic) 
among member states'. 48 Similarly, it was argued that 'the planned establishment of a 
consultative co-ordination economic council and economic court was extremely 
important to arrest the economic decline in the CIS states. The creation of the council 
seems unlikely, however, given President Yeltsin's reluctance to force the issue, 
presumably out of a desire not to antagonise Ukraine'. 49 
Nevertheless, despite Ukrainian sensibilities, institutional CIS economic 
integration, with all of its political connotations and inherent institutional flaws, 
proceeded without Kyiv. Tighter relations with Ukraine, while important, were not 
indispensable to Russia. Repeatedly, Ukraine refused to participate in any steps 
toward economic integration despite the mutually binding ties that existed with Russia 
and other CIS states. At the Bishkek Summit in October 1993, Ukraine refused to take 
part in the Consultative Economic Committee, signing only 5 out of the 15 documents 
presented at the summit. In May 1993, at the CIS summit in Moscow, while Kravchuk 
signed a joint declaration, which proposed greater economic integration and the 
creation of a common market for services and goods, he objected to the creation of an 
Economic Union. Thus, Ukraine did not sign the Agreement on an Economic Union, 
on 24 September 1993, which anticipated the creation of a free trade association, a 
customs union (the main benefit of which was duty-free import of Russian energy for 
non-Russian states), and a common market (for goods, work and capital, and a rouble 
zone) as a full member. Instead, Ukraine, along with Turkmenistan, joined only as an 
associate member, a status of an unspecified nature, in April 1994. Similar 
recalcitrance was demonstrated by Kyiv when Ukraine joined the Interstate Economic 
Committee in October 1994, after posting a whole host of reservations. In particular, 
Kyiv insisted that a provision be made for each country independently to 
decide on 
48 RFEIRL, 13 January 1992. 
49 RFEIRL, 7 October 1992. 
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exactly which functions would be delegated to the Committee. The second 
precondition was that Ukraine remain outside the payments union, while the third was 
that national legislation not be overridden by the rulings of the Committee. 
In January 1995, Russia proposed the setting up of the long awaited Customs 
Union, with two prime conditions of membership. The first condition required the 
harmonisation of customs and economic (hospodarche) legislation with that of 
Russia; the harmonisation of external economic activity with that of the Russian 
Federation was the second condition. 50 While Russia was joined by Belarus and 
Kazakhstan in the Union, Ukraine remained resolutely beyond it because it reduced 
the prospects for Ukraine's membership of Western subregional and regional 
institutions, from which it believed it would effectively be debarred. 51 
Subsequently, in March 1996 Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgystan 
signed an agreement 'On Deepening Integration' that was regarded as a forerunner to 
a Eurasian Union, a CIS version of the European Union. As ever, Ukraine remained 
conspicuously to one side. 52 While the proposal to create a CIS free economic zone 
was endorsed by CIS prime ministers in November 1998, the suggestion for merging 
the CIS Interstate Economic Committee and the Executive Secretariat was rejected by 
Ukraine amongst others, despite Prime Minister Primakov's assurance that it would 
not become a supra-national body. 53 
Past evidence suggested otherwise to Kylv. Russia occupied leadership 
positions in key institutions, such as the Interstate Economic Committee, and 
maintained majority voting rights in others. 54 That Moscow took advantage of those 
institutions (e. g. the rouble based accounts settlements of the Interstate Bank 
ultimately result in the provision of free credit for the Russian economy) was not 
Kyiv's only worry. 55 Above all, Kyiv was animated by concerns that Moscow's 
control over key CIS structures would help it convert the CIS into a vehicle which it 
would then use to return to its former hegemonic status, thereby undermining the 
50 Uriadovy Kurier, 18 January 1997. 
51 Author's conversation with an official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kyiv, November 
1999. 
52 HOIOS Ukrainy, II June 1996. 
53 RFEIRL, 01 December 1998. 
54 Filipenko, 'The CIS Economic Union: Pros and Cons'. 
55 ibid. 
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sovereignty of individual republics. Furthermore, despite the ostensible focus of the 
CIS on economic integration, Ukraine suspected that political integration remained the 
covert objective. For example, there was an explicit link made by the Russians 
between the creation of a Customs Union on the one hand, and 'reliable protection of 
the outer border of the CIS' on the other. 56 A common border defence system was 
mooted, something which was anathema to Ukraine and which it subsequently 
57 rej ected. Similarly, the Russian Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandr Shokhin 'told 
journalists that Moscow was making it clear that joining the economic union "would 
result in a partial loss of not just economic sovereignty, but political sovereignty as 
well"', something that was unacceptable to Kyiv. 58 Threats against non-particip ants 
were not just implicit: Russia suggested that Ukraine join the CIS Customs Union as a 
means of avoiding the inevitable negative consequences of being beyondit. 59 
Evidence suggests that had the CIS maintained an economic rather than 
political focus Ukraine might have been a more compliant partner. Kuchma, a much 
hoped for ally of Moscow, was critical of the absence of any real economic CIS 
integration, something which suffered at the expense of Russia's more political 
ambitions. 60 As an alternative, Kyiv came up with its own more economy-oriented 
proposals for a new style CIS. It proposed a reduction in CIS co-operation on political 
and military matters, on border protection, military-technical issues, and on issues 
concerned with collective security, and matters to do with humanitarian aid, legal 
issues, exchange of information and ecology. Instead, 'the Ukrainian representation 
wants to transform the CIS into a mechanism for economic co-operation, provided 
that its structures do not duplicate those of other European and international bodies 
and hinder the integration of CIS member countries into those bodies' (author's 
italics) 
. 
61 Needless, to say, these proposals came to nothing. 
56 RFEIRL, 29 Nov 1994. 
57 RFEIRL, 26 Jan 1995 and 25 April 1995. 
" Solchnanyk, 'Russia, Ukraine and the Imperial Legacy'. 
59 Narodna Arndya, 3 June 1997. 
60 RFEIRL, 19 Sep 1997. 
61 RFEIRL, 23 July 1998, (authors italics). 
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Conclusion 
Overall, the successful resolution of difficulties with Russia was to be the foundation 
on which all Ukraine's other foreign policy successes were to be built. Russia 
represented the single greatest threat to Ukraine's security and independence. In 
addition to using the Crimean issue to challenge the territorial integrity of Ukraine - 
no mean threat to a state as fragmented and fragile as Ukraine - Moscow also tried to 
bring about Ukraine's isolation. Kyiv was unlikely to garner many allies while it 
found itself in a drawn out and sometimes tense confrontation with a spurned and 
angered Russia. 
The failure of Moscow's policy was not only indicative of the dire economic 
and political straits Russia itself was in. Failure was also a corollary of the successful 
implementation of Ukraine's foreign and security policy and Kylv's refusal to buckle 
under the psychological and economic pressure exerted by Russia. Relations with 
Belarus were helpful in this regard. Furthermore, as Belarus drew ever closer to 
Moscow, Kyiv grew ever more important from the point of view of the West. 
These bilateral level achievements were very much at the expense of the 
formation of the Slavic subregional institutions that were mooted by in particular, 
Belarus. If anything, this was even more true of the CIS. The more issues that were 
resolved between Russia and Ukraine beyond the CIS, the lower became the 
credibility of the CIS as a forum designed to resolve issues. 
According to one assessment of the development of the CIS in 1992, 'future 
relations among its component states will develop along three lines: as allies (Belarus- 
Russia); rivals (Ukraine-Russia); or adversaries (Annenia-Azerbaijan) ). 62 These 
predictions have certainly been bome out. Ukraine's rivalry with Russia is evident on 
the bilateral, subregional and regional levels. At each of these levels Ukraine has felt 
confident enough to either resist or challenge Russian objectives. 
62 N. V. Lamont, Territorial Dimensions of Ethnic Conflict: The Moldovan Case, Foreign Military Studies Office, 
Fort Leavenworth, K. S., p. 2, a version of the article appeared as 'Ethnic Conflict in the Transdniester' in 
Militai),, Review, December-February 1995. 
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Admittedly, there is a real contradiction in Ukraine's attitude toward the CIS. 
Without a doubt Ukraine has been one of the most vociferous critics of the CIS, in 
particular of its failure to function effectively as an economic entity, incapable of 
integrating the separate and disparate functions of the members states of the CIS into a 
cohesive whole. Yet it is true to say that Kyiv is guilty of contributing to this failure. 
By blocking developments at every turn, Kyiv helped paralyse the institution. This 
blocking strategy was driven by Ukraine's suspicion, justified or not, that economic 
integration was a cloak for political reintegration. There is little doubt that Moscow 
was not very successful in allaying these fears. On the contrary, evidence suggests that 
such fears were well founded: unguarded public remarks by prominent Russian public 
figures are testimony to that. Furthermore, the Georgian president, Eduard 
Shevardnadze suggested that the existence of the CIS had a deleterious impact on 
relations between CIS member states. Specifically, he argued that 'Russia and Ukraine 
would have found a rapport with each other but for the CIS5.63 In a similar vein, in 
February 1997 Volodymyr Horbulin, the influential former Head of the Ukrainian 
National Security and Defence Committee, expressed the view that the CIS effectively 
had no prospects for the future, and that instead Ukraine should concentrate on 
developing its bilateral relations with other states. 
64 
The divergence between Ukraine and Russia in terms of their attitudes toward 
the CIS threatens the institution: 'Russia must either deepen its hold on the more 
willing states, such as Belarus, and thus permanently divide and weaken the CIS as a 
structure covering the whole of the former USSR, or it must follow a path toward co- 
operation. ' 65 Not only was this divide already in evidence as Ukraine sought ever 
closer ties with Western institutions. It was exacerbated by other events taking place 
within the CIS. For example, at the beginning of 1997, Kyrgystan, 
Kazakhstan, 
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan signed an agreement on 'eternal friendship'. 
The 
intensification of ties between the Central Asian republics (Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, 
Kyrgystan, Kazakhstan and Tadzhikistan) was interpreted as a continuation of intra- 
CIS subregional activities initiated by GUUAM (and by early 
1998 was referred to as 
63 RFEIRL, 22 Nov 1992. 
64 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 5 February 1997. 
65 Gamett, Keystone in the Arch, p. 69. 
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the "5+4=9" process) conspicuously excluding Russia. 66 Furthermore, owing to 
Ukraine's reluctance to participate in the CIS as a full member, Russia was itself 
forced to go along this ultimately divisive route, as shown by the signing of the 
agreement 'On Deepening Integration' between Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgystan on 29 March 1996 in preparation for a Eurasian Union, thereby creating an 
'in' and an 'out' group. Furthermore, CIS summits were frequently characterised by 
the proliferation of both bilateral and subregional ties, at the expense of progress in 
the evolution of the CjS. 67 
Crude statistics reveal the sheer extent of the failure of the CIS. Between its 
inception in 1992 and 1997 the CIS approved 786 documents of various types. Of 
these, Ukraine signed 558 (or 70.9 percent), though 81 of these were only signed with 
reservations attached (i. e. only 60.6 per cent of documents were signed 
unconditionally). 228 documents went unsigned by Kyiv. 65 of the 558 signed 
documents required either ratification or some form of processing. Of the 65,15 had 
been ratified by the Ukrainian parliament, 14 confirmed by the President and the 
Cabinet of Ministers, while 27 needed further processing; the remaining 9 were 
regarded as 'Inexpedient'. Of the 228 documents left unsigned by Ukraine, 71 
pertained to organisation-administrative matters, 30 to economic and social affairs, 
while the remaining 127 were of a military-political nature. Of the 90 statutory 
structures established within the CIS, Ukraine participates in 58 (64.4 per cent); of 
these 3 are based in Ukraine, and 50 in Russia. 68 Yet the quantitative dimension of 
above mentioned statistics, while starkly revealing Ukraine's recalcitrance at being 
drawn into the CIS, fails to reveal the qualitative nature of some of the documents 
which went unsigned. As of 1999, Ukraine remains beyond the Tashkent treaty, the 
Economic Union, and the Customs Union. The most important documents signed 
between Ukraine and Russia remain the bilateral Friendship Treaty with Russia and 
the BSF agreements, all resolutely beyond the framework of the CIS. 
For a number of reasons remaining beyond the integrative grasp of the CIS 
was fundamental to Ukraine's future as a European state. Firstly, porous borders with 
Russia, and the opportunity for illegal and economic migrants to wind their way 
66 Zerkajo Nedeli, 10- 16 January, 1998 
67 Zerkalo Nedeli, 25-31 October 1997. 
68 Uriadoiy Kurier, 18 January 1997. 
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westward through Ukraine, meant that a Ukraine firmly tied to Russia would be 
looked on unfavourably by the European Union, especially following Poland's 
accession. (It has been estimated that most immigrants from Asia and Africa heading 
for the EU enter through Ukraine, probably via Russia. In 2000, there were half a 
million illegal immigrants in Ukraine and two million in Russia. ). 69 
Secondly, by joining any CIS free trade zones, or customs or payment unions, 
Ukraine would not only prejudice its chances of joining the EU (which are negligible 
in any case) but would also in fact break the law on 'The Basic Direction of Foreign 
Policy of Ukraine' which forbids Ukraine's participation in 'the institutionalisation of 
forms of international co-operation with the CIS which are capable of transforming 
the Commonwealth into a supranational. structure of a federal or confederative 
character'. 70 There remained a looming threat to such a strategy, which was pointed 
out by A. Migranyan, a member of the Presidential Council of the Russian Federation 
(and therefore decidedly not a representative of the Foreign Ministry), who argued that 
'Russia would sooner destabilise the whole post-Soviet space, rather than allow the 
emergence of a number of anti-Russian centres .... 
This is the basis of the existence of 
the Russian state'. 71 
It is misleading to suggest that Kyiv was responsible for all the moves that 
blocked deeper co-operation within the CIS. There were faults within the institution 
itself, primarily the poorly or vaguely defined mechanisms for the implementation of 
decisions, as has been extensively discussed elsewhere. 72 Exacerbating the problem 
was the lack of trust between partners, and the absence of any means of conflict 
resolution between partners who were often in confrontation with each other. It is 
hardly surprising that the CIS has been lampooned as the Community of Dependent 
States, and the CIS integration process itself has been condemned as 'a policy of 
condemning oneself to vegetate in the backyard of the world economy for the sake of 
the ideological stereotypes of the past' by the Uzbek president Islam Karimov in April 
73 1996 . 
69 RFEIRL, 27 June 2000. 
70 Honchar, Moskalets and Nallvka, 'Vldhomln Serpnevoho Strusu', p. 39. 
71 Uriadovy Kurier, 29 March 1997. 
72 01COtt, Asluhd and Garnett, Getting it Wrong. 
73 Uriadovy Kurier, 5 May 1996. 
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Membership of the CIS has placed Ukraine in a profound dilemma, which has 
not been fully resolved. By eschewing ties with Russia and the CIS, Ukraine was in 
danger of cutting off its nose to spite its face - it lacks sufficiently extensive or strong 
economic ties with other states to take up the slack. Ties along Ukraine's Eastern 
azimuth were so fundamental to its needs that it could not afford to simply break 
them. Yet by rebuilding economic ties with Russia and with CIS member states, 
Ukraine was in danger of undermining its sovereignty and independence, and 
becoming debarred from the Western azimuth where it sought economic salvation in 
albeit limited access to credit and the technology of the future. According to Sherr, 
Ukraine's problems along the North-eastem azimuth lie in the fact that 'Ukraine's 
dependencies on Russia, and the failures of its own elite and of the West's reformers 
to shift the balance make Russia's power to damage seem greater than the West's 
power to deliver'. 74 
In theoretical terms realists would predict that Russia, as a declining hegemon, 
would be driven to create an institution such as the CIS to manage the regime change 
taking place in the post-Soviet space. Yet Kyiv was neither willing to bandwagon with 
Russia within the CIS, nor share the burden of managing the process of regime 
formation by helping bolster the CIS with its much needed support. Somewhat 
awkwardly for the realist theory, while Ukraine was not willing to participate in 
political or military cooperation, it continuously sought to expand the economic 
dimension of the CIS. 
The fact that Kyiv would have preferred that the focus of the CIS be reserved 
for economic issues reflected Ukraine's economic interdependence not only with 
Russia, with which it was heavily interdependent (and thus sensitive and vulnerable to 
any changes introduced by Moscow), but all former Soviet states. Yet despite this 
interdependence with CIS member states, Ukraine refused to be drawn into the 
institution more deeply than deemed strictly necessary by Kyiv. This was because 
Russia, as the dominant partner within the CIS, imposed an agenda on the institution 
which accorded to Moscow's priorities, and which jarred in Kylv. Thus for the CIS, as 
for Russia, military matters figured prominently on the CIS agenda and military power 
had a high salience (both tenets of the second theme of structural interdependence, 
74 Sherr, Ukraine's New Time of Troubles, p. 32. 
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namely complex interdependence). Furthermore, for policy-makers in Kyiv integration 
with the CIS seemingly ensured the continued obsolesence of Ukraine's technolgical 
base and a prolongation of declining economic standards at the popular level at a time 
when the overall power structure of the world had decisively and unambiguously 
shifted in favour of the West (a tenet of the third theme of structural interdependence, 
namely regime change). Indeed, it was because the overall power structure had 
changed to the disadvantage of Russia that Ukraine was able to be so much more 
assertive within issue-areas (again a tenet of regime change), avoid the pressures for 
deeper integration into the CIS and pursue its own agenda along other azimuths. 
As New Wave theorists might argue, it was precisely the politico-economic 
dimension of the CIS that conditioned Ukraine's stance towards that institution. The 
PTAs (such as the Customs Union or Economic Union) which Russia tried to get 
Ukraine to participate in, were seen by Ukraine as instruments designed to engender 
its renewed political subordination. Yet Kyiv was not prepared to countenance the 
political consequences of renewed economic integration with Russia within the CIS. 
That is not to say that welfare considerations were unimportant to Kyiv. In 1998 it 
attempted to transform the CIS, via tightly circumscribed PTAs, into a mechanism 
reserved for economic cooperation; the effort sank without a trace. In contrast, 
Russia, as one of the strongest states within the CIS, according to New Wave 
theorists, was likely to 'use PTAs as a means to consolidate [its] political influence 
over weaker counterparts'. 75 It is this 'misuse' which explains Ukraine's mainly 
unsuccessful attempts to impede the institutionalization of the CIS, fearing that the 
interests of Russia, as the dominant state, would be more powerfully reflected within 
those institutions, to the detriment of the security of weaker states. 
76 In the absence of 
a CIS shaped according to its needs, limited participation remained the only viable 
alternative for Ukraine. 
Prospects for subregional level along the Northeastern azimuth were 
recognised as doomed to failure by 'subregional' regionalist writers, 
in view of the 
fact that 'Russian attempts to assert a hegemonic role have led other NIS (Newly 
Independent States) to conclude that EU-style integration among equals is 
" Mansfield and Milner, 'The New Wave of 
Regionalism', p. 611. 
76 ibid., P. 611. 
ill 
unattainable, while Russian-dominated integration is not in their interests and the best 
option', which put-paid to a Slavic Union let alone Ukraine's participation in a CIS 
Customs or Economic Union. 
77 
77 1. Bremmer, S. Clement, A. Cottey and T. Dokos, 'Emerging Subregional Cooperation Processes: South-Eastem 
Europe, The Newly Independent States and the Mediterranean', in Cottey, 'Subregional Cooperation in the 
New Europe', P-227. 
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Part 3- The Western Azimuth 
Bilateral relations with the CEES states, specifically, Poland, Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia (until 1994), and Slovakia and the Czech Republic thereafter, 
Romania and Moldova, formed the foundation of Ukraine's Western regional policy, 
the objectives of which extended to membership of CEE subregional institutions, and 
the EU on a regional level, along with stronger ties with NATO. 
Establishing harmonious relations with CEE states was a key first goal if 
Ukraine was to achieve its strategic objective of integration with European structures. 
For reasons of size, geopolitics and history, Poland was by far the most important of 
these, and will receive the lion's share of attention. To suggest that relations with 
Budapest and Prague (up until 1994 and including Bratislava thereafter), were 
secondary would be to underestimate the collective role these CEE states played in 
Ukraine's journey 'back toward Europe'. Nevertheless, relations with Warsaw 
remained a priority for Kyiv from the period that preceded independence. If anything, 
the importance of this relationship increased as the international environment changed 
and, in particular, as subregional and regional processes evolved. Ties with Poland 
were one of the few means available to Kyiv to avoid being locked out of the Western 
integration process. They were also a means of alleviating pressures from its North- 
eastern borders. 
If relations along Ukraine's immediate Western flank were a source of hope, 
the South-western azimuth was a source of potential threat. Relations with Romania 
and Moldova stood out because of the potential dangers. On independence, a 
territorial issue with Romania that had lain effectively dormant under the Soviet 
Union raised the spectre of confrontation, only subdued because of the 
demands of 
NATO enlargement. Similarly, with the collapse of the Soviet Union the remnants of 
the heavily-armed 14th Amy stationed in Moldova elicited disquiet in this once 
quiescent comer of the fon-ner empire, as Moldova sought to carve out a space 
for 
itself as a non-Romanian, non-Russian nation-state. Its proximity meant that it was not 
a region that could be ignored by Kyiv. Indeed, Kishinev actively sought 
Kyiv's help 
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in tackling its problems to the extent that it allied itself with Ukraine in subregional 
fori-nations. 
In terms of subregional goals, Ukraine was particularly keen to participate in 
any groupings involving CEE states. This was because such groupings were invariably 
oriented toward joining key regional institutions along the Western azimuth. Kyiv was 
only too keen to join this bandwagon; alas, CEES were only to keen to jettison any 
laggards. In this regard, the helping hand provided by NATO, which was willing not 
only to form a Partnership with Kyiv but also sign a Charter, was a welcome 
development. In contrast, the development of Ukraine's relations with the EU would 
prove to be disappointment, in spite of Ukraine's high hopes of eventual integration 
with that body. 
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Chapter 4: Ukraine's Relations With Central And 
East European Neighbours 
Relations With Poland: From The Declarative To The 
Substantive 
If harmonious relations with Russia were the priority in Ukraine's foreign and security 
policy in the years following independence in 1991, relations with Poland came a 
close second. It is worth reiterating the truism that 'among the central European 
counties, Poland is for political, historical and economic reasons clearly the most 
important to Ukraine'. ' 'Historical reasons' refer to a series of turbulent episodes in 
relations between the two states, most recently in the aftermath of the Second World 
War. 2 The resurgence of such historical issues would be problematic for both parties, 
though more so for Ukraine as the more fractured of the two. As far as 'political and 
economic reasons' are concerned, stronger ties between Poland and Ukraine would 
help Kyiv avoid isolation. On the one hand strong and harmonious ties between Kyiv 
and Warsaw were one of the key means by which Ukraine could cope with the 
political and economic pressures of being an ex-member of the Soviet Union and 
resist being drawn more deeply into the CIS. On the other hand, strong ties between 
Ukraine and Poland could help establish a foundation for Ukraine's political and 
economic future as a fully fledged European state. Strong ties with Warsaw could help 
Kyiv redefine itself as a European state politically and economically. Politically, 
Poland could advise Ukraine on the adoption and consolidation of democratic forms 
of governance, the evolution of a civil society, the creation of a market economy, an 
appreciation of human rights, and establishing civilian authority over the military. In 
ten-ns of economic issues, the relative size of Poland's economy could certainly 
contribute to Ukraine's efforts to overcome the dreadful Soviet economic legacy. 
1 T. Bukkvol, Ukraine and European Security (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs 1997) p. 75. 
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Poland, as a geographically large and heavily populated state to the West, was 
Ukraine's 'natural' partner. 3 
Zbigniew Brzezinski stressed the importance of the bilateral relations between 
Ukraine and Poland in terms of their geopolitical context: 
'Poland and Ukraine are regions, located between Germany and 
Russia, that have historically played a decisive role in European 
geopolitics. The extensive territory of Poland and Ukraine, their 
populations, great economic and military potential have been the 
source of clashes and secret pacts between Berlin and Moscow ..... If 
Poland and Ukraine become economically and politically bankrupt, 
they will create a political vacuum, which will encourage Russian and 
German interference. On the other hand, tight co-operative relations, 
that strengthen each others vitality and economic development, would 
caution Germany and Russia from the temptation, which has 
encouraged imperial ambitions in Eastern Europe in the past'. 4 
Yet in themselves tight and co-operative relations between Warsaw and Kyiv were not 
enough to deal with their geopolitical predicament. While tight relations between 
Ukraine and Poland were indeed likely to provide a bedrock of stability in a 
historically volatile part of the region, for these ties to represent more than the 
emergence of new buffer zone in Central/Eastern Europe, it was believed in Kylv that 
they needed to be embedded in the wider framework made up of subregional and 
regional institutions. As will be seen, tight and co-operative relations between Ukraine 
and Poland were expected by Kyiv to bring immediate benefits at the subregional 
level, namely much tighter ties between Ukraine and the Central and East European 
institutions that had sprung up. In fact Kyiv, with Poland's help, was expectant of 
early membership of the key institutions such as the Central European Free Trade 
Area (CEFTA). In the longer term, it was further hoped by Kyiv that as Poland 
2 For an overview of relations see P. J. Potichnyj (ed. ), Poland and Ukraine - Past and Present (Toronto: CIUS 
1980). 
' Manachinsksi, Suchasni Voyenno-Politychny Vidnosyny Ukrainy, p. 68. 
4 Quoted in O. L. Valevsky and M. M Honchar, Struktura Heopolitichnych Interesiv Ukrainy, Vypusk 45 (Kyiv: 
Natsionainy Institut Stratehichnych Doslidzen 1995) p. 42. 
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became integrated into regional institutions, Warsaw would perform an ambassadorial 
role on behalf of Ukraine. In this way, as Poland became ever more integrated with 
regional western security and economic structures, tight relations with Warsaw were 
seen by Kyiv as Ukraine's best strategy for avoiding ending up on the wrong side of a 
new European divide running from the Baltic to the Black Sea. 
Two distinct periods have been identified in the development of Ukraine's 
relations with Poland. Up until 1994, while both actors were cognisant of the 
theoretical benefits that would accrue from 'tight and co-operative relations', each 
was driven by competing and incompatible demands. An examination of the substance 
behind the declarations reveals mutual ideologically based suspicions, domestic 
political and economic self-preoccupation, and the contradictory demands of wider 
integrative processes. As a result, between 1991 and 1994, relations were anything but 
tight and co-operative. It will be seen that change at the level of the political elite, the 
strengthening of ties between the two states, and the stimulating effects of subregional 
and regional integration had a positive impact on the extent to which the declarative 
became substantive from 1994 onwards. 
1991-1994: Unfulfilled Declarations 
On Ukrainian independence in 1991, Kyiv and Warsaw were on different political and 
economic trajectories. By 1991 a fervently nationalist Poland was well along the road 
to democracy and a full-blown market economy under the leadership of its first 
president, the arch anti-Communist Lech Walesa. As soon as it was able, Poland 
implemented rapid, immediate and profound economic and political change. The same 
could not be said for Ukraine. Ukraine was starting from a very different point, having 
to build a nation and a state simultaneously, two key features the Poles, despite the 
Socialist years, could take for granted. Furthermore, the democratic election of the (up 
until 1991) arch Communist and former party ideologue Leonid Kravchuk, as 
Ukrainian president in 1991 did not represent the same kind of break with the past in 
Ukraine that Walesa's election represented in Poland. Kravchuk's election reflected a 
fundamentally different value system on the part of the Ukrainians. The tried and 
trusted Kravchuk represented a degree of political continuity with the past Soviet 
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system that would have been unthinkable in Poland. This continuity was equally 
evident in the economic system. In his years in power, Kravchuk failed to implement 
any meaningful reform, as the ossified Ukrainian economy first seized up and then 
collapsed, affected as it was by the hyperinflation, commodity shortages, and currency 
devaluations that characterise the very worst declines. Without quite realising it at the 
time, in 1991 President Kravchuk was laying the foundations for the failure of his 
future foreign and security policy, which would come to have significant negative 
ramifications for Ukraine's relations with Poland. Indeed, the repercussions of the 
prolonged economic decline would come to haunt Kravchuk's successor, Leonid 
Kuchma, whose strategic objective of integration with the European Union would 
come to resemble little more than wishful thinking at the time of its proclamation in 
1996. 
Yet despite the incompatible political and economic ideologies, even prior to 
Ukraine's independence in 1991 there was a commitment on the part of influential 
Ukrainian and Polish figures to avoid the divisive mistakes of history. Certainly from 
the very earliest days of independence Poland was attributed a significant role in 
Ukraine's strategic planning, a role that went far beyond that allocated other CEES. 
President Kravchuk had high hopes for the relationship, arguing that 'the degree of co- 
operation with Poland will be higher than any country of the CIS, including Russia' a 
remarkable statement in light of the strength of Ukraine's economic, political and 
security ties with Russia. 5 In light of his pro-Russian orientation, the statement made 
by Prime Minister Kuchma in 1993 that 'from the point of view of economic interests, 
Poland is our number one state' was unexpected and indicative of the potential role 
Poland could play in Ukraine's foreign policy. 6 Primarily, these statements reflected 
hopes that Poland might serve as a counterbalance to what was perceived as Russia's 
overweening influence on Ukraine. President Kravchuk was convinced that Poland 
would serve as 'the gateway to the West' for Ukraine. 
7 The feelings were 
reciprocated. The importance of an independent Ukraine to Poland was shown in the 
frequent quoting of Pilsudski's famous statement that 'without an independent 
5 Ilya Prizel, 'The Influence of Ethnicity on Foreign Policy - The Case of Ukraine' in Roman Szporluk, ed., 
National Identity and Ethnicity in Russia and the New States of Eurasia (London: M. E. Sharpe 1994) p. 
112. 
Nashe Slovo, 31 Jan 1993. 
Ian Brzezinski, 'Polish-LTkrainian Relations: Europe's Neglected Strategic Axis', Survival, Vol. 35, No. 3, 
Autumn, 1993, p. 26. 
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Ukraine, there cannot be an independent Poland'. 8 What this in fact meant was that 
'Poland favours an independent Ukraine because it serves as a buffer between Poland 
and Russia". 9 Ukraine's role as a buffer explains why, according to Balmaceda 
'Ukraine's Central European neighbours - especially Poland and Hungary - under no 
circumstances would like to see Ukraine as a weak buffer between Russia and 
Europe'-10 It is in this context that the statement made by Lech Walesa that 'it is 
impossible to imagine Europe without a democratic and independent Ukraine' makes 
most sense. " 
The mutual esteem in which each party was apparently held was soon 
formallsed in the signing of variety of accords and treaties. For example, the new 
Polish non-communist government formed links with the still communist Ukrainian 
SSR government as early as October 1990. The Declaration on Basic Principles and 
Directions of the Development of Ukrainian-Polish Relations was the first bilateral 
document signed between the two states and the first of any kind signed by a 
Ukrainian government in 46 years. It is of symbolic if incidental significance that the 
last bilateral document signed by Ukraine those 46 years ago was in fact with 
Poland. 12 The subsequent signing in May 1992, of the Treaty on Good Neighbourly 
and Friendly Relations and Co-operation 13 and in January 1993 the Treaty on the 
Legal Regime on the Ukrainian-Polish National Boundaries, Co-operation and Mutual 
Support on Border Issues by the two states showed a more than satisfactory rate of 
progress and augured well for the future on important issues for both parties. 14 These 
successes, even if only at the level of protocol, are not to be underestimated. 15 
8 Indeed, this phrase was used by the Polish dissident Jacek Kuron in 1980. Adrian Karatnycky, 'A Polish Voice', 
New Leader, 15 June 198 1. 
9 Bukkvol, Ukraine and European Security, p. 76. 
10 M.. M. Balmaceda, 'Ukraine, Russia, and European Security; Thinking Beyond NATO Expansion', Problems of 
Post-Communism, Vol. 45, No. 1, January/February 1998, pp. 21-29. 
11 SWB, 26 May 1993. 
12 The only bilateral document known by the researcher to have been signed by the Ukrainian SSR was with 
Poland. The Agreement between the Ukrainian SSR and the Polish Committee of National Liberation 
Concerning the Evacuation of the Ukrainian Population from Polish Territory and the Polish Population from 
the territory of the Ukrainian SSR was signed on 9 Sep 1944 in Lublin. ne protocol of 6 May 1947 marked the 
completion of the operation. R. M. Slusser and J. F. Triska, A Calendar of Soviet Treaties, 1917-1957 (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press 1959), p. 216. 
13 Ukraina na Mizhnarodny Areni. Zbirnik Dokumentiv I Materialiv 1991-1995. Knyha 1, Ministerstvo 
Zakordonnych Sprav Ukrainy (Kyiv: Yurinkom Inter 1998) p. 250. 
14 ibid., p. 385. 
15 Garnett, Keystone in the Arch, pp. 86-91. 
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Ukrainian-Polish relations had never been especially cordial. In the mid-20th century 
in particular, they were disfigured by an ugly history of mutual detestation expressed 
in reciprocated atrocities. Furthermore, in the post war years the mutual recriminations 
and accompanying vociferous claims to historical territories by the Diaspora were 
never fully resolved at the state level. 16 Thus on Ukrainian independence, there were 
real concerns on the part of the Poles and the Ukrainians that psychologically and 
socially unresolved territorial issues could explode into life. The success of the Treaty 
on Good Neighbourly and Friendly Relations lay in the fact that it addressed these 
issues directly. In renouncing mutual territorial claims, recognising the inviolability of 
borders, and guaranteeing the rights of each others large national minorities a 
significant move in the direction of resolving, or at least neutralising the impact of 
mutual and deeply held grievances was made. 
However, away from the grandeur and formality of signing ceremonies and 
high level talks, there were, from the earliest days of independence, grounds to suspect 
that relations were not developing swimmingly. For example, much was at the time 
made of the fact that Poland was the first country to recognise Ukraine's 
independence after the referendum in December 1991.17 However, little mention was 
made of the fact that prior to the referendum, Poland '-while acknowledging 
Ukraine's free right to delineate its own external and internal situation, nevertheless 
reserved the right to forinulate its final thoughts on relations with Ukraine up until the 
December referendum'. 18 There was hesitancy on the part of Warsaw toward Kyiv, 
which spoke volumes both for Poland's readiness to defer to toward Moscow's 
anticipated reaction to events as well as Warsaw's undefined policy toward Ukraine. 
As for the emphasis placed on the fact that Warsaw was the first to recognise 
Ukraine's independence, it is of note that Poland was far from being the first country 
to establish diplomatic links with Ukraine - that honour was reserved for Hungary, 
with Poland only finally establishing formal links on 4 January. This hesitancy seemed 
to reflect Poland's suspicions regarding the intentions of Ukraine. Indeed, it was not 
16 It needs to be recalled that for a long time much of Western Ukraine had been part of Poland. Conversely much 
of the population of south eastern Poland is ethnically Ukrainian. 
17 For example, Leonid Kuchma in his speech to the Polish Sejm on 26 June 1996. Additionally, Przeglad 
Srodkowoeuropejski, Bezpieczenstwo Europy, Obronnosc, Integracja, No 14, Padzlernik 1995, p. 30. See also 
Janusz Dobrosz in Gazeta Wyborcza, 22 May 1997. 
18 Nashe Slow, 22 Sep 199. 
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long before the Poles became concerned at the trajectory Ukrainian foreign and 
security policy had taken. Demonstrating the still fragile nature of Ukrainian-Polish 
ties, and underlining the importance of seemingly symbolic events, Warsaw was 
somewhat taken aback and made suspicious by the fact that the first official 
international visit by the President of Ukraine following independence was to Bonn in 
February 1992. The Poles were 'fearful of a Gennan-Ukrainian encirclement'. 19 As a 
result, at a meeting of Ukrainian and Polish parliamentarians, ex-ministers and 
experts, great effort was exerted on the part of the Ukrainians to pacify the Poles by 
making clear that 'Poland is Ukraine's prime Western partner, and one cannot talk 
about any international peculiarities (sic) behind the back of Poland'. 20 To help 
eliminate such suspicions and give an impetus to the 'strategic partnership' between 
the two neighbours, a Ukrainian-Polish Presidential Consultative Committee was 
proposed by Polish President Lech Walesa and duly set up in 1993. Ironically, the 
single most distinctive feature of the Committee in the early years of its existence was 
that at one stage it failed to convene for over a year, although it would come into its 
own later. 
The most powerful indictment of the strategic relationship and the most 
obvious evidence for the lack of substance in Ukrainian-Polish relations was the 
insignificant development of economic relations between the two. By 1993 the glaring 
gap between word and deed was such that the normally diplomatic Ukrainian 
ambassador to Poland, Hennadiy Udovenko, was compelled to admit that 'it would be 
desirable if economic relations matched those of political relations. At the moment, 
however, such equivalence is missing'. 21 This refers to the fact that economic 
relations between the two states had not developed to the extent desired by the 
Ukrainians or to the extent necessary if Ukraine's economic dependence on Russia 
was to be reduced. This is in the main attributable to domestic economic problems in 
both of the states. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, a major market for Polish 
exports was decimated. Nevertheless, the Poles persisted with the painful Balcerowicz 
'shock therapy' programme. While the economic decline in Ukraine had been even 
" 1. Brzezinski, 'The Geopolitical Dimension', The National Interest, Spring 1992, p. 5 1. 
20 Nashe Slovo, I February 1992. 
21 Nashe Slovo, 23 May 1993. 
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more precipitous, no meaningful reform was implemented until Kuchma's election in 
1994.22 
Overall, while the frequent high level visits that took place between the two 
capitals between 1991 and 1994, officially resulted in harmonious political relations, 
in practice relations were hardly tight and co-operative. This is attributable to three 
key factors. Firstly, as has been noted by Garnett, Poland had three choices in terms of 
preventing the renewal of Russian hegemony: by turning Westward, by co-operating 
with Russia's neighbours, in particular Ukraine, and by co-operating with those forces 
in Russia that oppose the renewal of empire. Up till 1994, Poland had pursued only 
the first of those three options. It effectively had no Eastern policy, and certainly no 
coherent long-ten-n policy on relations with Ukraine as was reflected above. 23 
Secondly, this problem was exacerbated by the fact that 'since Ukraine became 
independent it has been equally neglected by the West', thereby reflecting the Russo- 
24 centric stance on the part of the West . In this regard Poland was but 'following the 
leader'. Thirdly, as will now be seen, matters were further compounded at the 
subregional level. From the very first days of its independence, to avoid the spectre of 
being locked out of a subregional and regional integration process to its West in which 
it wished to participate, and being locked into an integration process to its East which 
it wished to avoid participating in fully, the Ukrainians made a determined effort to 
take advantage of relations with Poland in pursuit of both of these objectives. 
However, the pressures placed on Ukraine and Poland at the subregional level by 
subregional and regional institutions between 1991 and 1994 made their respective 
subregional objectives incompatible. Indeed, the explicitness of the linkage between 
the development of bilateral relations, subregional and regional integration is striking. 
Neither could Ukraine's domestic politics be ignored. The Presidency of 
Leonid Kravchuk between 1991 and July 1994, when he was replaced by Leonid 
Kuchma, was a period characterised by a perplexing juxtaposition of national 
assertiveness and economic turmoil. While Kravchuk's new found nationalism 
provided the impetus for closer ties with the West, his failure to appreciate the need 
22 According to a UN Human Development Report, Ukrainian standards of living were estimated to have declined 
by 80 per cent between 1991 and 1995. Ukraine. Human Development Report (Kyiv: 
United Nations 
Development Programme) 1995. 
23 Garnett, 'Poland: Bulwark or BridgeT, Foreign Policy, 1996, No. 2, Spring, p. 71. 
24 Bukkvol, Ukraine and European Security, p. 75 
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for economic reform proved to be his Achilles heel. The connection between domestic 
economic reforrn and international objectives was lost on him. As a result, throughout 
his presidency, the ossified economy of Ukraine in fact proved to be a major 
impediment to closer economic ties with an increasingly marketised Poland. This all 
changed with the election of Ukraine's second president, Leonid Kuchma in July 
1994. 
1994 Onwards: The Declarative Becomes Substantive 
The election of a reform minded, though somewhat pro-Russian, Leonid Kuchma in 
July 1994 suggested that Russia rather than Poland would become the focus of 
Ukraine's international efforts. In fact, Kuchma was out to get the best from both 
worlds. By replacing Kravchuk's perception of Ukraine as a 'buffer', with a more 
pragmatic and economically viable and lucrative 'bridge', Kuchma underlined the 
bankruptcy of the former president's policy. While Poland as Ukraine's prime western 
neighbour would maintain the prominent position it held in the eyes of the previous 
administration, Russia would apparently come to be allocated its due weight. In 
reality, however, Poland continued to occupy a unique role in the eyes of the 
presidential administration. Kuchma regarded Poland as Ukraine's 'number one state' 
from an economic point of view. 25 Again there was evidence of the fact that larger 
goals were in mind. By 1996 Kuchma, continuing the policy of Kravchuk, was bold 
enough to proclaim the 'strategic goal of membership of the European Union'. 26 The 
new president's pragmatism was soon to be complemented by the election of the 
equally pragmatic Kwasniewski in Poland in autumn 1995. With these two leaders in 
power, there was now apparently a broad coincidence of political and economic 
ideology, despite the fact that Kuchma lacked reformist credentials, as it later 
emerged. 
In the light of the pro-Russian platforin on which Kuchma stood in his election 
campaign, the growth in military co-operation between Ukraine and Poland was 
unexpected. In Autumn 1995 a decision (strongly supported by the USA, which also 
25 Nashe Slovo, 31 Jan 1993. 
26 Uriadon, Kurier, 8 June 1996. 
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volunteered some financing for the project at the time of its inception) was taken to 
create a joint Ukrainian-Polish battalion, consisting of the Przemyszl 14th Tank 
27 Brigade and the Ukrainian Mechanised Border Regiment . After a protracted 
gestation it was finally brought into being in Autumn 1997, when it held its first 
manoeuvres. 28 Further ambitions for the battalion included participation in peace- 
keeping duties under the aegis of either the UN or the OSCE. The event soon became 
politicised. Reflecting the continued inter-ethnic turbulence between Ukrainians and 
Poles at the popular level in this highly sensitive region, the Poles became highly 
concerned at the news that the shift of the Tank Brigade to another part of the 
wojewodstwo would leave Przemyszl effectively undefended (from the Ukrainians 
presumably) . 
29Nevertheless, the brigade became a fixed military feature. There was 
also a pragmatic dimension to the military co-operation. This took the forin of the 
Ukrainians being awarded a $150-200 million contract in March 1994 to maintain and 
renovate Poland's large stocks of Soviet era weaponry which included the T-72 tank 
(which made up 40 per cent of all Polish tanks) and some 600 Mig 21, Mig 29, Su 25 
and Su 24MK aircraft . 
30 This contract was particularly welcome for the stimulus it 
provided to the under-employed Ukrainian military industry. Significantly, it also 
made Ukraine the victor in a direct contest with the Russian military industry. 
There was also significant growth in strategic co-operation between Ukraine 
and Poland. A particular factor in this regard was the emergence of the Caspian region 
as a rich source of hydrocarbons (for the West), as it highlighted the mutual and 
individual benefits that both Ukraine and Poland might derive if they were to co- 
operate on its transportation. There were a number of such benefits. Firstly, the two 
states were in themselves likely to be major consumers of the oil transported, as they 
strove to reduce their dependence on Russian sources. Secondly, the 
joint 
transportation of hydrocarbons would strengthen bilateral ties and reverse the 
geopolitics of the past whereby 'transportation networks which evolved 
in the last 
few decades isolated Poland and Ukraine from each other'. 
31 Thirdly, as has been 
27 Y. Berdesha, M. Honchar, and 0. Moskalets, Mistse Polshchi v Polititsi Bezpeky Ukrainy, (forthcornIng). 
28 Narodna Armiya, 8 Oct 1996. 
21 Nashe Slovo, 14 Dec 1997. 
30 1. Kobrinskaja, Dlugi Koniec Zimnej Wojny (Warsaw: Centrum Stosunkow 
Miedzynarodowych 1998) p. 146. 
31 Uriadov), Kurier, 24 May 1997. 
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pointed out by Ukrainian analysts, 'the linking of transport, communication and 
energy networks into the pan-European networks is a prerequisite for the future 
integration of Ukraine into the European Union and will serve to prevent the 
emergence of a new line of division in Europe as Poland and Hungary enter the EU. 32 
Fourthly, each would benefit from the income the transportation of energy resources 
generated. Furthermore, the Ukrainian-Polish route offered a number of significant 
advantages over the others. According to Ukrainian estimates, a route through Ukraine 
and Poland offered by far the shortest routes of all the alternatives. 33 As was pointed 
out by the Polish President 'the shortest route from the Near and Far East to Warsaw, 
Gdansk, Berlin, Hamburg and even Stockholm and London lies through Odesa, 
Illychivsk and Yuzniy'. 34 This in turn was estimated to reduce the costs of 
transportation by $20-30 per ton. 35 As a result of all of these factors, great efforts were 
placed into creating transport corridors between the Black Sea and Central and 
Western Europe on the one hand, and the Baltic and Black Sea regions in the form of 
a Gdansk-Odessa link, on the other. There were to be two distinct segments to the 
network. In the first instance, a 670 kilometre link would be built from the Yuzmy 
marine terminal (located about 35 kilometres to the East of Odesa in Southern 
Ukraine) to the Brody pumping station based along on the 'Druzhba' oil pipeline in 
Western Ukraine. This Yuzniy-Brody pipeline, with a capacity of 12 million tons of 
oil was due for completion in 1999. From Brody, the second stage of the pipeline was 
envisaged as linking the 'Yuznly-Brody' pipeline with the Polish city of Plotsk or the 
Adamowa Zastava. From there it would service Poland, Germany and link up with 
Gdansk in Northern Poland for transportation further north. 36 Indicative of the time 
(and cost) saving potential of such a pipeline as a link between Northern European 
32 Berdesha, Honchar and Moskalets, Mistse Polshchi v Polititsi Bezpeky Ukrainy. 
33 For example, a route from Tengiz, via Atyrau, Tlkhoretsk, Novorossysk, the Bosphorus, Wilhelmshaven to 
Leuna was estimated to be 93 10 kilometers in comparison to the 4700 kilometers if the route was to go from 
Tengiz via Baku, Supsa, the Yuzhniy pipeline to Brody, Plock, Shwedt and Leuna. 'Caspian Oil to European 
Markets through Ukraine', Project Presentation for the Business Forum of the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development by the State Committee for Oil, Gas and Oil Refining Industry of Ukraine, 
May 1998. 
34 Zerkalo Nedeli, 27 June -4 July 1997. 
35 Uriadovy Kurier, 24 May 1997. 
36 By linking the new Yuzniy pipeline with Druzhba, oil could also be transported to Slovakia, the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Austria, and Germany. 
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states and Turkey was the new Gdansk-Odessa rail link, which cut container 
transportation time between Istanbul and Gdansk from 16 days to about 2.5 days . 
37 
In the economic sphere, there was evidence of a growing interdependence. By 
1994 Ukraine was becoming an important trading partner for Poland. Despite the slow 
start, economic ties had grown at an impressive rate (though they were still some way 
down on the potential trade that might be expected between two such heavily 
populated countries). 6.6 million people passed through the Ukrainian-Polish border 
in 1994, swelling to 10.6 million by 1996.38 In fact the sheer volume of individuals 
crossing the border from Ukraine placed Poland amongst the top 10 of the most 
popular 'tourist' destinations in the world in 1996 . 
39 According to estimates, 
Ukrainian 'tourists' spent nearly $500 million in a burgeoning shuttle trade with 
Poland, and were second only to German tourists in terms of the total amount spent. 
Official trade also developed at a healthy rate though the totals involved were still 
small by absolute standards. $358 million dollars worth of trade occurred between 
Ukraine and Poland in 1994, providing Ukraine with a $5.3 million surplus. By 1997 
the overall figure had grown to $900 million, with Ukraine incur-ring a $140 million 
deficit. 40 In January 1998 the two Presidents jointly opened the largest customs point 
in Europe between the two states. 41 A report by the Department of Economic 
Development in Zamost, on the Polish side of the Polish-Ukrainian border, concluded 
that trade with Ukraine was one of the most important stimuli to economic activity in 
the poorly developed regions which border on Ukraine. 42 
Furthermore, there was a continuation of the previous successftil political ties 
between the two former enemies, culminating in the signing of a series of important 
documents in 1997. In a show of solidarity designed to reduce Ukraine's feeling of 
" Nashe Slovo, II October 1996. 
38 In light of the financial hardship that drove such cross-border transactions, it is somewhat ironic that these flows 
of people were categorised as 'tourist' for purposes of official statistics. 
39 Mieczyslaw Kowerski, 'Wplyw handlu z Ukraina na rozwOj wojewodztw przygranicznych', Gospodarka 
Narodowa, No. 3,1998. 
40 Berdesha, Honchar and Moskalets, Mistse Polshchi v Polititsi Bezpeky Ukrainy. As an aside, it is worth 
highlighting how much of the trade between two such industrialised parties is made up of raw materials. For 
example, in 1996,37.8 per cent of total Ukraine exports to Poland were made up of ore and metals, whilst 38 
per cent of Ukrainian imports from Poland were made up of energy resources. 
41 Narodna Armiya, 5 Jan 1998. This border crossing, between Krakovec and Korchova was the fifth such crossing 
between Poland and Ukraine. Many more exist between Poland and Genriany. 
42Kowerski, Wplyw handlu z Ukraina'. 
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isolation vis-a-vis Russia and the CIS, Warsaw and Kyiv signed a Memorandum on 
43 the Liberalisation of Trade, in January 1997 . The document was more than 
symbolic. The Memorandum was a highly significant development as, thanks to 
Poland, Ukraine had finally achieved a breakthrough in that it was an important first 
step toward creating a free trade area with Poland. This in turn had significance on a 
regional level, to the extent that free trade areas with all CEFTA members were a 
precondition to joining the CEFTA. The signing of the symbolic 'Declaration on 
Agreement and Unity' between Ukraine and Poland not long after, on 21 May 1997, 
was yet another milestone and was designed to draw a line under the unfortunate past 
the two states shared. As Bronislaw Geremek, the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs 
pointed out, 'the main problem becomes how an act founding new relations between 
Poland and Ukraine can simultaneously be an act expressing the obvious 'strategic 
partnership', a concept that has been talked about on an official level in Poland and 
Ukraine for the last five years'. 44 Significantly, the signing of the Declaration, as well 
as the Memorandum, was interpreted as preparing the ground for Victor 
Chernomyrdin's visit to Kyiv a week later, and Boris Yeltsin's oft postponed visit to 
Kyiv another two weeks later to sign the long awaited Ukrainian-Russian Treaty. 45 
The timing of both the Ukrainian-Polish Declaration and the Memorandum strongly 
suggests that it was part of a multi-pronged strategy to counter Russia's attempts to 
'divide and conquer' the two CEE states. Additionally the two Ukrainian-Polish 
documents were clearly designed to send the signal to Brussels, in anticipation of the 
impending enlargement of NATO in July 1997, that these two former enemies were 
taking great strides to eliminate causes of disquiet between them. It was also a 
continuation of the longer term strategy of preventing Ukraine's isolation as a buffer 
state between the Tashkent Treaty states and the new NATO states. In a similar 
supportive vein, the Presidential Consultative Committee, meeting on 19-20 May 
1997, examined the possibilities for the creation of a number of groups of three states 
in a forin of 'triangular co-operation' involving Ukraine and Poland. Thus, Ukraine 
and Poland would be joined by the USA to form one triangle, and also by Germany, 
Lithuania, and Belarus respectively to form three other 'triangles', though nothing has 
" Uriadovy Kurier, 20 March 1997. 
44 Gazeta Wyborcza, 22 May 1997. 
45 Gazeta Wyborcza, 21 May 1997. 
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yet been formalised. Ukraine's partnerships with key regional actors were becoming 
increasingly institutionalised in CEE. The idea was also mooted of Ukraine 
participating in the Weimar triangle, consisting of Poland, Germany and France, with 
observer status, though again this has not yet come to fruition. 46 By the end of 1997, 
ties between Ukraine and Poland were strong enough for Leszek Balcerowicz, the 
Polish Economics Minister to boldly proclaim that 'the Polish Ministry on Foreign 
Affairs had reoriented itself from Russia toward Ukraine'. 47 This reorientation was 
also reflected in a new found Polish attitude toward Ukraine's integration with 
subregional structures. 
Overall, after a hesitant start, Ukraine developed a fruitful but circumscribed 
working relationship with Poland. The two parties had managed to overcome 
potentially damaging historical episodes owing to the fact that both Kyiv and Warsaw 
had an eye firmly on the future, and their respective prospects for subregional and 
regional integration. As will be seen in the following chapter, despite their best 
endeavours, it was at the subregional and regional levels that Ukrainian-Polish 
relations were to meet with their greatest challenges. 
Relations With Hungary 
Kyiv's relations with Warsaw place Ukraine's relations with Hungary somewhat in 
the shade. Nevertheless, they are important in their own right for a number of reasons. 
Hungary has been highly supportive of Ukraine's westward orientation. 
Hungary played a prominent role in the days leading up to Ukraine's full 
independence, paralleling that of Poland in some important respects. For a start, 
Hungary gained a high profile in Ukraine when along with Poland, it reacted first to 
Ukraine's Declaration of Independence in July 1991. Indeed, on 3 December 1991, 
only 2 days after the referendum confirming Ukraine's status as a sovereign and 
independent state, Budapest established diplomatic relations with Kyiv. Only 3 days 
later, the foundation for a Treaty on Good Neighbourliness and Co-operation was laid. 
46 Uriadovy Kitrier, 24 May 1997. 
47 Zerkalo Nedeli, 27 December 1997. 
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Hungary achieved the distinction of being the first country to open an embassy in 
Ukraine in March 1992.48 
Of particular note is the political co-operation that exists between the two 
states, in particular in the sphere of ethnic minorities. It has been estimated that 
around 200,000 of the 3.5 million Hungarians living outside Hungary reside in 
Transcarpathia in Western Ukraine. Such is the treatment of this minority that 
Ukraine's approach to national minorities has been held up as a model for the 
treatment of ethnic minorities in Europe. However, as Hungary moves ever closer to 
the EU, and is forced to adopt the Schengen agreement, the visa regime demanded by 
the agreement will separate off the Hungarian minority in Ukraine from its brethren in 
Hungary. The fact that the cross-border trade that tends to benefit the Hungarian 
minority will probably cease is a particular worry as income rates in the region fall 
below the Ukrainian national average. Although a system is being considered whereby 
Hungarians resident abroad would have the right to passports, entitling them to travel 
to Hungary, but not the right to vote in elections or settle there, it is unlikely to be 
accepted by Brussels. 49 
Economic ties between the two countries are solid rather than spectacular: 
overall trade was $300 million in 1992, rising to $581.7 million in 1997.50 More 
importantly, in preparation for CEFTA membership for Ukraine, one of the conditions 
of which is the signing of a free trade agreement with each of its members, Kyiv by 
1996 was in deep discussions with Hungary on the signing of such an agreement 
(discussion were also well advanced with Poland, though not with Slovakia, with 
which discussions only started in earnest in 1996) .51 However, 
by 1999 agreements 
remained unsigned in all three cases, owing primarily to Ukraine's continued inability 
or reluctance to introduce meaningful economic reform. Certainly there is mutual 
trade dependence between the two. It has been estimated that between 25 and 30 per 
cent of Hungary's trade with the USSR was specifically with Ukraine. In particular, 
Hungary gets much of its energy via Ukraine, while the Ukrainian urban 
48 Zerkalo Nedeli, 7 May 1998. 
49 Financial Titnes (Special Supplenient - Hungary), 22 November 2000 
50 Narodna Armiya, 13 February 1997, and 14 October 1998. 
51 0. Mirus, 'Ne Metodom vyrishenya a shlyachom dosyahnenya', Polityka I Chas, May 1996, pp. 43-49. 
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transportation system is effectively based on the buses produced by the Hungarian 
company Ikarus. 52 
On a subregional level Ukraine and Hungary are competitors. For example, 
although in 1997 intra-CEFTA trade only accounted for 8 per cent of Hungary's total 
foreign trade, it was growing faster than was trade with the EU. However, this growth 
was at the expense of Russia, Ukraine and Moldova. To all intents and purposes, 
Ukraine was paying a price for remaining beyond CEFTA. 53 
On a military level, Ukraine's 103 kilometre border with Hungary has not been 
seen as a source of threat, and it would not be an exaggeration to suggest that 
Ukraine's bilateral relations with Hungary are amongst its most harmonious and 
trouble free. 
Hungary's key role as far as Kyiv was concerned was as a member of the 
group moving westward, both as an invitee to NATO, and applicant to the European 
Union. In this regard it is particularly noteworthy that following his appointment as 
Ukraine's foreign minister in April 1998 Boris Tarasiuk's first visit abroad was to 
Budapest, apparently much to the chagrin of Moscow. The visit was unplanned and 
occurred at what could only be regarded as an inconvenient time for the Hungarians, 
facing as they were domestic elections. Yet, mindful of the need to supportive of 
Ukraine, Budapest went out of its way to accommodate Tarasiuk. 54 Such a move was 
a clear signal of Tarasiuk's priorities - the new Ukrainian foreign minister seemed not 
to be overly concerned by diplomatic niceties as far as the Russians were concerned. 
The visit was also driven by Ukraine's concern as to the ever-present threat of a new 
divide emerging between Ukraine and this particular Westem neighbour as it joined 
NATO and moved ever closer to the EU. To this end Ukraine needed a lot of 
reassurance on the part of Budapest that Kyiv was not going to be abandoned. During 
his visit in April 1998 Tarasiuk received that reassurance, although it was somewhat 
55 qualified . 
5' A. Zolnayi, 'Uhorski Partnery Chekayut na Propozytslyl', Polityka I Chas, May 1995, pp. 56-59. 
53 Hugarian-CEFTA Trade, Central and Eastern Europe Business Information Centre, http: //iepntl. ltaiep. doc. gov/ 
eebic/cables/I 997/jan/bud42. htm. 
54 Zerkalo Nedeli, 7 May 1998. 
55 In fact Tarasiuk was told that 'the EU makes no exceptions for anyone, and the demands of the Schengen 
Agreement are rigourously applied to all sides'. Zerkalo 
Nedeli, 7 May 1998. 
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Relations With The Slovak Republic 
The collapse of the Czechoslovakian Federation in 1993 was a positive development 
as far as Ukraine was concerned. With the Federation firmly focused on the West, and 
its membership of the Visegrad grouping as a means of joining the West, Ukraine was 
denied much attention from its small neighbour. The break-up of Czechoslovakia in 
1993 changed the complexion of things considerably in that the leadership in Slovakia 
adopted a different stance to that of the leadership in the Czech Republic. Bratislava 
was much more Eastward oriented than Prague. While this orientation was primarily 
toward Russia, it also included Ukraine. For example, in 1997 Slovakia's top ten 
destinations for exports included both Russia and Ukraine, in contrast to the Czech 
Republic's much lower exports to those countries. 
These more intense ties between Ukraine and Slovakia, in contrast to those 
between Ukraine and the Czech Republic, can be explained by the structure of the 
Slovakian economy. For example, in 1993 65 per cent of the former Czechoslovakia's 
arms industry was located in Slovakia, for which the market had collapsed when its 
largest customer, Russia, went into economic meltdown. At the same time Russia was 
the source of most of the energy that powered Slovakia's energy intensive industries. 
In fact, Russia has provided up to 97.7 per cent of Slovakia's oil via Ukraine. 
In turn Slovakia was important to its Eastern neighbours. Druzhba, the 
pipeline taking oil from Russia via Ukraine to the West (including the Czech 
Republic) goes through Slovakia. 56 For this reason, the Russians have described 
Slovakia as strategic territory, with the link to this strategic territory provided by 
Ukraine. Indeed, the energy aspects of relations between Slovakia, Ukraine and Russia 
demonstrate that while Slovakia is trying to manage a successful reorientation from a 
heavy dependence on its Eastern neighbours toward its Western neighbours, the 
interdependence between the trio nevertheless remained substantial. 
There is a political dimension to these intense trade ties. For example, the 
natural gas agreement signed with Russia in May 1997, as a result of which Gazprom 
would remain the monopoly gas supplier for the next decade was criticised by the 
56 The pipeline has a capacity of about 20 Million tons, though since 1993, only about 12 million tons (including 
6-7 millions for the Czech Republic) has traversed the pipeline. See 'Slovakia: Economic Relations with the 
Russian Federation', KFEIRL, http: //iepntl. itaiep. doc. gov/eebic/CEFTA/CABLES/13RA1035. HTM 
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Slovaks themselves on the grounds of the questionable benefits it brought Bratislava. 
As was argued by Alexander Duleba, from the Research Centre of the Slovak Society 
for Foreign Policy, 'Gazprom is setting up a joint venture on Slovak territory, it 
(Gazprom) will in effect be negotiating prices with a company, half of which it 
owns-3.57 By tying Slovakia more closely to itself, Russia was increasing the reliance 
of the EU on itself - after all, Gazprom provided about one-third of European gas, a 
market that was set to rise by 75 per cent by 2010. Furthermore, by building 
underground gas storage tanks in Slovakia, Moscow would undermine the impact of 
Ukraine's ability to close off gas pipelines to the West in pursuit of political and 
economic advantage. 
It is worth pointing out that despite this Eastward orientation, CEFTA proved 
to be a much more important trading area for Slovakia than it did for the Czech 
Republic for example. In addition, by 1997 the largest percentage of both countries' 
exports were to the EU, a figure that had grown from 30 per cent in 1993 to 43 per 
cent in 1997 for Slovakia. Nevertheless, Ukraine was keen to take advantage of 
Slovakia's favourable trading position by promoting closer ties with Slovakia, perhaps 
in the form of a free trade zone as, for example, suggested by Russia in 1996. Such 
notions were rejected on the grounds that any subsequent increase in trade would be 
offset by a loss in trade with its CEFTA neighbours, most notably the Czech Republic. 
Furthermore, closer ties with Ukraine would have negative ramifications for 
Slovakia's goal of integration with the EU, in that membership would be precluded on 
the grounds of Ukraine's extensive tariff and non-tariff trade barriers by the standards 
of the WTO. 
For geographical and geopolitical reasons, Ukraine's relations with Slovakia 
are to a large extent shaped by Slovakia's ties with Russia. As was pointed out by the 
US embassy in Bratislava in 1997: 
'the Government of the Russian Federation has always made time for 
Slovakia be it in high level meetings in Moscow or through senior 
level visits to Bratislava. The Government of Slovakia, with important 
economic ties to Russia, has always seen itself as an East/West 
bridge; 
57 Slovakia: Natural Gas Agreement with Russia Criticised, RFEIRL, http: //www. rferl. org/nca/features/1997/05/ 
F. RU. 970522145848. htm] 
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official Russian activities here have nurtured that feeling. Unlike its 
neighbours, the government of Slovakia fears capitalist/Western 
domination more than a return of 'Soviet' influence. Consequently, 
though the tangible above board benefits are few, we anticipate an 
ongoing strong relationship between Russia and Slovakia well into the 
next century. ' 58 
It is in part for these reasons, as well as unfavourable domestic political 
developments, that Slovakia was overlooked in the first wave of NATO enlargements 
in July 1997, and why its application to the EU was rejected twice, first in July 1997 
and again in March of the following year, though ties have improved drammatically 
since the election of a new reformist Slovakian government. While this might 
normally expected to provide a favourable set of circumstance for a rapprochement 
with Ukraine, even this is likely to be usurped by Russia which will most probably 
seek to take advantage of Slovakia's marginalisation. 
Overall, ties between Ukraine and Slovakia have since 1997 remained cordial, 
as the two states have moved toward their shared strategic goal of membership of the 
European Union, albeit along different trajectories. Turbulent times for relations 
between the two states clearly lie ahead as Slovakia, with the more direct trajectory, 
moves more quickly towards membership of the European Union. As a result, Kyiv's 
relations with Bratislava are likely to be put under the same pressures as are Ukraine's 
relations with other EU contender states. 
Relations With Romania 
From the earliest days of Ukraine's independence, relations between Ukraine and 
Romania were soured by a territorial dispute. The issue concerned the formerly 
Romanian territories of Bukovina, Bessarabia, Hertza and Serpent's Island, which 
58 See 'Slovakia: Economic Relations with the Russian Federation', RFEIRL, 
http: //iepntI. itaiep. doc-gov/eebic/CEFTA/CABLES/BRA1035. HTM 
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were occupied by Soviet forces during the Second World War (or soon after in the 
case of the island) and came to form a constituent part of post-Soviet Ukraine. 
However, from the first days of Ukrainian independence, Romania started to 
challenge Ukraine's right to these lands. While the issue was a substantial stumbling 
block in the way of the signing of a Friendship and Co-operation Treaty between the 
two states, they were driven by competing objectives towards the final resolution of 
the dispute. Ukraine was primarily interested in the affirmation of its borders and 
consolidation of its fragile territorial integrity. Romania, on the other hand, was 
mesmerised by the prize of NATO membership, though at the cost of revoking any 
territorial claims against its neighbours. While this section of the chapter traces the 
evolution of relations between the two states, it does so in the context of NATO 
enlargement, as all other issues were addressed in its shadow. Relations between 
Ukraine and Romania are best understood when placed in the context of the 
integration process taking place on the continent. It will be seen that while NATO 
enlargement tangentially contributed to stability in Eastern Europe in the short to 
medium term, a long term resolution that addresses the structural deficits of this 
volatile region has yet to be found. 
The Territorial Dispute 
Following independence in August 1991, it was of paramount interest to the 
government in Kyiv that Friendship Treaties be signed with all of Ukraine's 
immediate neighbours. In addition to confirming Ukraine's borders, such treaties were 
perceived as consolidating Ukraine's position in the international system and 
symbolised acceptance of the newly emerged state. However, with independence, 
Ukraine inherited a territorial dispute with Romania that precluded the signing of such 
a Treaty and which had a number of far-reaching implicationS59. 
Firstly, by 
questioning the ownership of various Ukrainian territories, Romania challenged 
the 
sovereignty of the newly emergent Ukrainian state. Secondly, with this territorial 
claim, Romania undermined the integrity of a state already 
divided along ethnic and 
59 For a wider ranging discussion of this period see 
N. Dima, (1982) Bessarabia and Bukovina. - The Soviet- 
Ronianian Territorial Dispute (New York: Columbia University Press 1982). 
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linguistic lines. Thirdly, there existed the possibility that any appeasement on the part 
of Kyiv would invite other such territorial challenges, especially on the part of Russia. 
The dispute revolved around the lands of Bukovina, Bessarabia, Hertza and Serpents 
Island, which, even prior to Ukrainian independence, had been a source of contention 
between Romania and the Soviet Union. Soviet forces occupied Northern Bukovina, 
Bessarabia and Hertza in 1940, as provided for in the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact. The 
last of these three territories, the town of Hertza, was delineated for occupation by the 
Soviet anny when Molotov, the Soviet Foreign Minister, carelessly drew freehand a 
line on the map and inadvertently included the region. Following occupation, the 
USSR added the central six districts of Bessarabia to the Moldovan Autonomous 
Soviet Socialist Republic, originally formed in 1924 on the eastern bank of the 
Dniester, to create the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic. The Ukrainian SSR was 
allocated northern Bukovina, which along with a section of northern Bessarabia, the 
region of Khotyn and the area around the unfortunate Hertza, were transforined into 
the Chernivetska Oblast; the remaining districts of southern Bessarabia along with the 
regions of Izmail and Ackerman were added to the Odesa Oblast. Although the 
Romanians reoccupied the territories in June 1941, by 1944 they were firmly in Soviet 
hands again, and formally recognised as such in the Paris Peace Treaty with Romania 
in February 1947. While the Treaty included a basic territorial delimitation between 
the two states, it failed to provide for exact on site identification of the border. In 
order to clarify this murky situation, on 4 February 1948, the Protocol on the 
Clarification of the State Border between the USSR and Romania was signed, which 
also delineated as Soviet territory Serpents Island in the Danube Delta . 
60 Located 
about 40 kilometres east of the Danube Delta, this 0.17 km. sq. island-rock had, up 
until after World War II, little strategic significance, being in the unchallenged 
ownership of Romania. However, while the delimitation issue was dealt with 
satisfactorily in terms of land borders, with the result of the work of the Soviet- 
Romanian Commission on the Demarcation of Borders enshrined in the Treaty on the 
Regime of the Soviet-Romanian border of 1949 and subsequently ratified by both 
60 It has been suggested that in 1950 the Romanians agreed to 'give' the island to the USSR at the latter's request. 
N. Dima, Bessarabia and Bukovina, passint. 
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parliaments, insufficient attention was paid to marine border delimitation. 6 1 As will be 
seen below, this proved to be a troublesome oversight. 
Relations Since Independence 
There the matter effectively lay until the turmoil of independence in Ukraine provided 
a window of opportunity for the Romanians to start pressing their claim to the various 
disputed territories with renewed vigour, hope and assertiveness. When on 28 
November 1991 the Romanian parliament urged the executive to regain the territories 
lost as a result of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, the Romanian government responded 
the very next day with a statement affirming that 'the recognition of Ukraine's 
independence and the desire to develop mutually beneficial Romanian-Ukrainian 
relations do not entail the recognition of the inclusion in the territory of a newly 
independent Ukrainian state of northern Bukovina, the Hertza region, the Khotyn 
region or the region of southern Bessarabia, which were forcibly annexed by the 
USSR and thereafter incorporated into the territorial structure of Ukraine on the basis 
62 of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact. ' In addition , in the months 
leading up to the 
Ukrainian referendum on independence in December 1991, the Romanian parliament 
resolved not to recognise as binding the voting in the disputed areas. 63 If the aim of 
this resolution was to gauge the mood of voters in these regions, the 92.8 per cent of 
those who voted in the Chernivtsi Oblast and 85.4 per cent in the Odessa Oblast who 
voted in favour of Ukrainian independence, sent a clear message as to their views, 
despite the boycott of the referendum by some ethnic Romanians in parts of the 
Chernivtsi Oblast. 
Although from 1991 to 1994 relations between the two states remained 
strained, in 1995 they deteriorated significantly, triggered especially by the 
aforementioned issue of Serpents Island. As a result of the discovery of substantial 
amounts of mineral resources on the continental shelf surrounding the island, in 
'The Treaty on the Regime of the Soviet-Romanian Border, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance in Border 
Issues', concluded between the two states in February 1961 was in fact based on the 1947 Paris Treaty, the 
1948 Protocol and the 1949 Treaty. 
62 Press Release of the Ukrainian Government: 'On The Situation Concerning The State Border Between Ukraine 
and Romania', 27 Jan 1997. 
63 Demokratychna Ukraina, 5 Dec 1991. 
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December 1995 Romania announced its intention to appeal to the International Court 
of Justice in the Hague regarding ownership of the island. This intention to pursue the 
matter, in conjunction with having declared as invalid agreements made on the 
territorial status of the island, was interpreted by Kyiv as a territorial claim on 
Ukraine. 64 Ukraine's response was to update the facilities of the military garrison 
there along with the creation of a number of specialised installations (e. g. a seismic 
station) all as part of a comprehensive programme for the strengthening of Ukraine's 
state border. 65 
Thus in the early days of independence, Ukraine withstood some very serious 
challenges to its territorial integrity. The five issues (Bukovina, Hertza, Bessarabia, 
Serpents Island and the threat of mobilisation of the Romanian minority in Ukraine) 
were of such gravity that it was futile to talk about progress in the development of 
Ukrainian-Romanian relations; they were going from bad to worse. Ukraine was in no 
position to acquiesce on any of the points concerning the Romanians as any hint of 
weakness would have sent exactly the wrong signals to Ukraine's neighbours. On the 
other hand, the Romanian government, hampered by its small majority, was forced 
into responding to the demands of Romanian nationalists in parliament and pursuing 
an even more forceful line. Furthennore, the prospect of valuable minerals under the 
shelf around Serpents Island was a temptation too succulent to resist. 
The Catalyst To Progress: NATO Enlargement 
The real stimulus to progress proved to be the Romanian desire to be amongst the 
states invited to begin talks on membership with the transatlantic alliance at the 
Madrid summit in July 1997. Although Ukraine was not likely to be involved in the 
looming NATO enlargement process directly, Kyiv was in a favourable position to 
take advantage of the Romanian predicament. One of the criteria for NATO 
membership required that new members have no territorial disputes with any of its 
neighbours. Thus, relations with Kyiv desperately needed to be resolved by Bucharest 
if efforts at gaining NATO membership were to be meaningful. However, when the 
64 OMRI Daily Digest, 7 Dec 1995. 
65 UNIAN News Agency, 10 Feb 1995. 
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Prime Ministers of the two countries met in lzmail in Ukraine in March 1996, with the 
Madrid summit a still distant prospect, no progress was made on the Friendship 
Treaty. The main stumbling block remained the Romanian insistence that any treaty 
recognising the Ukrainian-Romanian border include a condemnation of the 
Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact with all of the associated implications of illegality in the 
transfer of territory from Romania to Ukraine. For its part, Kyiv was adamant in its 
refusal to get entrapped in the minefield of legalities associated with the denunciation 
of the act, fearful of the fact that any condemnation would leave Ukraine vulnerable to 
territorial claims. Instead, Kyiv retaliated by arguing that the USSR, rather than 
Ukraine, was party to the Pact, adding that the Pact itself was invalidated by the 1941 
attack of one party on the other. Furthermore, it was argued by Kyiv that Ukrainian 
deputies had in fact already condemned the Pact once before, as members of the 
USSR Congress of Peoples Deputies in 1989, which repudiated the Pact in a 
resolution. The Ukrainian Commission on Foreign Affairs, while not denying or 
disputing the repercussions of the Pact, responded to the Romanian demand by 
insisting that any reference to the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact in any treaty be 
accompanied by a comment on Romanian territorial gains made at the expense of 
Ukraine in 1918 and those that resulted from agreements made between Antonescu 
and Hitler during World War 11, something the Romanians balked at. 66 An alternative 
suggested by the Ukrainians, that of a general 'condemnation of the activities and 
crimes of totalitarian regimes, policy of force, etc. ' was similarly rejected by 
67 Bucharest. 
The end to this impasse was provided by the defeat of President Iliescu of 
Romania, in the elections in November 1996, after which it was very soon apparent 
that the new president, Emile Constantinescu, was willing to start making concessions 
in order to realise Romania's hopes of joining NATO (especially in the light of the 
now looming Madrid summit). Thus Emile Bistreanu, the ambassador of Romania to 
Ukraine, made clear that Serpents Island would no longer be subjected to any 
territorial claims, as Ukrainian ownership of the island, along with the borders which 
66 Antonescu was the Romanian Premier from 1940, and generalissimo and commander of Romanian an-nies after 
joining in Germany's war against the Soviet Union in 1941. See Holos Ukrainy, 26 June 1996 for the Romanian 
response. 
67 Press release of the Ukrainian Government: 'Finalization of the Draft Treaty between Ukraine and Romania on 
Good-Neighbourly Relations and Co-operation', 27 Jan 1997. 
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68 
were delineated after the war, was recognised . That this caused some pain in 
Bucharest was revealed by President Constantinescu himself, who, when visiting 
NATO headquarters, stated that 'northern Bukovina never belonged either to Ukraine 
or Russia, although the Romanians are prepared to make a "historical sacrifice"" in 
order to enter NATO' something hardly likely to inspire the confidence of the 
69 Ukrainians. With this apparent concession progress was becoming perceptible. 
However, the sticking points had changed: recognition of the Ukrainian-Romanian 
border had now become conditional on the satisfactory delimitation of both the 
continental shelf off the Black Sea coast and exclusive economic zones. The dropping 
of the condemnation of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact in the Treaty was a critical 
concession on the part of the Romanians and is indicative of the price that 
Constantinescu was willing to pay in return for NATO membership, a decision on 
which was less than 6 months away. The signing of the Treaty on Good-Neighbourly 
Relations and Co-operation was now being made contingent on the successful 
conclusion of a Treaty on the Regime of State Borders, implying that the former 
ratifications were invalid, something which was unacceptable to Kyiv. Thus, while 
ownership of the island was not subject to debate, the legalities of the delimitation of 
the shelf surrounding the island were - something that the Ukrainians acknowledged 
and were sensitive to. 70 However Kyiv was adamant that any such negotiations could 
only take place following the conclusion and ratification of a founding political treaty 
confirming the current Romanian-Ukrainian border and repudiating any territorial 
claims against Ukraine. 71 
An additional (and newly emerged) sticking point was the issue of Romanian 
minorities in Ukraine. While ostensibly this was to do with the existing discrepancy 
between Ukrainian and Romanian legislation with regard to citizenship, Kyiv 
suspected a more sinister motive behind Bucharest's manoeuvres. 
72 This scepticism 
68 Narodna Armiya, 26 Dec 1996. 
69 Ukraina I Svit, 8 Feb 1997. 
M According to a Member of the Ukrainian Parliament, Volodymyr Zerebetski, a member of the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs and the CIS ' The problem lies in the fact that while the land border between the USSR and 
Romania was agreed, they did not agree on the marine border - oil was plentiful and nobody paid that much 
attention to the issue'. (Conversation with the author, Kyiv 1997). 
Holos Ukrainy, 22 Jan 1997. 
72 Ukrainian legislation (designed so as to eliminate the dangers associated with giving the Russian minority 
resident In Ukraine joint citizenship as 
demanded by Moscow) permits the possession of only one citizenship, 
while Romanian legislation allows 
for dual citizenship. 
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was exacerbated by what the Ukrainians saw as Romanian insistence that the 
Romanian minority in Ukraine be given collective rights in line with 
Recommendation 1201 of the Council of Europe. Ukrainian analysts have interpreted 
this recommendation as 'the right to autonomy of the Romanian ethnic minority in 
Ukraine -)73 . Inadvertently, the Ukrainians themselves did the groundwork for this right 
to autonomy. In Article 2 of the Declaration On The Rights Of Minorities of Ukraine, 
issued in October 1991, 'the Ukrainian Government guarantees all minorities the right 
to secure their traditional areas of habitation and warrants the existence of national- 
administrative units' i. e. limited territorial autonomy. 74 It is something of a truism to 
suggest that this represents a threat to a country as ethnically and linguistically divided 
as Ukraine. 
The Signing Of The Good-Neighbourly Relations and Co-operation 
Treaty 
Despite the above difficulties, there was a certain inevitability about the eventual 
signing of the Treaty on Good-Neighbourly Relations and Co-operation between the 
two states, especially if Bucharest was serious about NATO membership. The tactics 
adopted by the Ukrainians reflected the fact that they were conscious of the time 
constraints the Romanians were under: the Madrid NATO summit was now clearly 
visible in the distance. Bucharest desperately wished to avoid the possibility of 
conceding too much to Kyiv in pursuit of membership, without actually getting it: 
signing a treaty with Kyiv was a necessary but obviously not sufficient condition to 
obtain entry. The Romanians were, however, keenly aware that with a treaty signed, 
they only might gain an invitation; without a treaty, they definitely would not be 
invited. The deadlock between the two sides was broken only on 28 April, the day 
before Romania presented its application to join NATO, at a meeting of the Black Sea 
73 Holos Ukrainy, 22 Jan 1997. 
74 Although the declaration was enshrined in the law 'On National Minorities' (adopted in June 1992), the latter 
failed to fulfil the objectives of the declaration - because of the increasing threats to the territorial integrity of 
Ukraine, the law failed to mention the issue of territorial autonomy, despite securing extensive rights for 
national minorities. As a result, in its place, a new law is being proposed by the member of Parliament for 
Chemivtsi Oblast in Northern Bukovina, Ivan Popescu 'On indigenous people, national minorities and ethnic 
groups in Ukraine' which would provide for this territorial autonomy. 
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Economic Co-operation Council (BSEC). At this meeting Presidents Kuchma and 
Constantinescu opened the way to an agreement on the text of the basic Treaty in May 
1997 after 10 bruising rounds of negotiations. The Treaty was finally signed, on 2 
June 1997 with less than 5 weeks to spare until the Madrid summit in July. 
The Ukrainians had got their way (i. e. made the least concessions) in what can 
only be described as a piece of brinkmanship. There was no mention of the infamous 
1939 Pact, only a reference in the preamble to the C unfair acts of totalitarian and 
military-dictatorial regimes, which in the past negatively influenced relations between 
the Ukrainian and Romanian nations'. In addition, and crucially for Ukraine, existing 
territorial borders were affirmed (Article 2). Also, while Serpents Island was 
acknowledged as the territory of Ukraine, the delimitation of the continental shelf 
along with the exclusive economic zones in the Black Sea was deferred for a period of 
two years, following which, if no agreement is reached, the matter was to be referred 
to the International Court of Justice in the Hague. 75 In the meantime, the Ukrainians 
agreed to refrain from stationing offensive weapons on the island . 
76 (Significant, in 
the light of the multi-layered integration process, is Article 8, which referred to the 
development of euroregions. Two were planned: 'Upper Prut' and 'Lower Danube'). 
Article 13, the largest in the Treaty by some margin, provided extensive rights for the 
Romanian minority in Ukraine (and vice versa) in line with Recommendation 1201, 
though subject to the important proviso that 'the Recommendation refers to collective 
rights and does not require that either of the Parties confer relevant bodies the right to 
territorial autonomy based on ethnic criteria'. 77 
Overall, the signing of the Treaty represented a major achievement for 
Ukraine. Despite the best efforts of the president and parliament, Romania found itself 
in a no-win situation: by failing to claim territories it felt a historically and morally 
justified right to, it would have left itself open to the accusation by the domestic 
constituency that it had abandoned the ethnically Romanian inhabitants of these 
disputed lands. By claiming them, it laid itself open to the charge of troublemaking in 
75 According to the Ukrainians the issue appears to hinge on the habitability of the island. They believe that if 
classified as 'habitable', international law provides for a 12 mile exclusion zone, something that 
does not apply 
in the case of uninhabitability. (Author's conversation with 
Volodymyr Zerebetski). 
76 Article 2 refers to a separate agreement regarding all of these matters, activated through an exchange of 
letters 
by the two foreign ministers, at the same time as the main Treaty. 
77 Author's translation. 
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a highly volatile part of the European continent, and, more seriously, would thereby 
prejudice its chances in the wider scheme of things. By contrast, Ukraine was in the 
luxurious position of being able to do no wrong: shielded by agreements, treaties and 
conventions , it was in legal though perhaps not moral terms invulnerable. The irony 
for the Romanians was that, in pursuit of their wider objectives they conceded to the 
Ukrainians without achieving those objectives - at least in the short term. However, 
when viewed in isolation, the Treaty was a significant step forward: the ongoing 
territorial dispute was one of the very few in any part of Europe and its resolution 
contributed to the peacefulness and security of the region. Despite the fact that the 
Romanian government incurred the wrath of the nationalists, who argued that the 
Treaty was rushed in pursuit of the elusive invitation to join NATO, it was highly 
unlikely that Ukrainian-Romanian relations would regress, as the Romanians had their 
eye firmly on the wider integration process. For Ukrainian foreign policy, the signing 
of a Treaty with Romania represented a major accomplishment, removing as it did a 
hazard that not only undennined the territorial integrity of the new state but also 
threatened to escalate into what could have been an assault on most if not all 
azimuths. That the dispute did not evolve into a security threat speaks as eloquently 
for Ukrainian foreign policy as it does for the Ukrainian military forces, for which the 
Romanians were no match. However, if in the immediate terni, relations between 
Ukraine and Romania appeared to be evolving successfully, it is pertinent to recall 
that the stimulus was extrinsic, rather than any inherent drive toward trouble free 
relations, something that characterised Ukrainian-Polish relations, for example. The 
very circumstances under which the Treaty was signed suggests that the relationship is 
reversible (especially if the Romanian nationalists were to get their way), dependent as 
it is on the continued successful evolution and openness of the regional integration 
process to which it was so closely tied. 
Relations With Moldova 
The development of relations with Moldova proved to be a considerably more 
complicated process than might have been expected when Ukraine and Moldova 
became independent in 1991. This forgotten comer of the Soviet empire was a 
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veritable Pandora's box of trouble when it came to geopolitical disputes, a receptacle 
which was well and truly opened with Moldovan independence. Historically, there are 
three dimensions to the issues which emerged. Firstly, its historical ties with Romania 
complicated Moldova's independence. Secondly, this complication was added to 
because of Moldova's former political relationship with Ukraine as an appendage of 
the Ukrainian SSR as an autonomous Soviet republic. Thirdly, Moldova occupied a 
strategically valuable geopolitical location of interest to Moscow in the pre and post- 
Soviet periods. These three issues combined to form a volatile cocktail of problems on 
Ukraine's South-western border. 
The Historical, Economic, Ethnic And Strategic Context for 
Ukraine's relations with Moldova 
Prior to independence the Moldovan SSR was a relatively underdeveloped republic 
sandwiched between Romania and Ukraine. The Prut river formed Moldova's 
Western border; while the Dniester formed much of Moldova's Eastern border. Most 
significantly, the Moldovan SSR also incorporated a sliver of land about 225 
kilometres long running along the left bank (if looking from north to south) of the 
Dniester; this sliver was known as Transdniester (or Prydniestrovye). The Moldovan 
SSR was recognised as formerly ethnic Romanian territory (known as Bessarabia in 
Romania); the same is not true of Transdniester, which has always been populated 
predominantly by Ukrainians and Russians. Indeed, in 1924, much of what is today 
known as Transdniester was formally incorporated into the Ukrainian SSR as the 
Moldovan Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republic (MASSR). Only when the Soviet 
Union annexed Bessarabia on 2 August 1940 were Bessarabia and Transdniester 
(MASSR) fori-nally joined in what came to be known as the Moldovan Socialist 
Soviet Republic (MSSR). However, the 'join' continued to show throughout 
Moldova's existence as a Soviet Republic. 
In ethnic terms, on Moldovan independence Ukrainians and Russians made up 
substantial minorities in Moldova (14 and 13 per cent respectively), 
but were 
concentrated in Transdniester where they made up 28.3 and 25.5 per cent of the 
population respectively; collectively they outnumbered the 
40.1 per cent of 
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Moldovans on the left bank. 78 Industry was as unequally dispersed as was the 
population in Moldova: 80 per cent of all Moldova's energy was produced in the 
Transdniester, along with 90 per cent of all steel and plastic and 40 per cent of food 
canning plants. 79 Transdniester was also point of entry for fuel and raw material 
coming in from Russia, on which Moldova as a whole was heavily dependent. 
Militarily important was the location of the headquarters and bulk of combat 
strength of the former Soviet 14th Army, in and around Tiraspol, 'the heart of the 
Russian-settled area of Moldova'. 80 In possession of an estimated 500,000 tons of 
military equipment, the 14th army would prove to be a decisive force in subsequent 
events. Much of the reason for the army being there and for Moscow's interest in this 
relatively quiet and seemingly unimportant comer of Europe lay in its potential 
strategic significance especially during the Cold War. Firstly, as part of the Odessa 
Military District, the Transdniester region was the launch pad for any operations in the 
Balkans, Greece and Turkey; the North African coast and Suez Canal were secondary 
strategic objectives. 81 However, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Army's 
significance had become distinctly regional. Thus by 1993 according to the Russian 
Association of Theories and Models in International Relations, the 14th Anny's role 
was to be more in line with Russia's goals in the area which were 
'to keep strategic positions in south-eastern Europe; to protect the 
interests of the Russian population there (as many as 500,000 people) 
and of other ethnic groups that consider Russia to be their historic 
homeland; to preserve co-operation with the Dniester (industrial) 
enterprises, several of which are unique, including some belonging to 
the military-industrial complex; to solve the (Dniester) conflict in 
order to ensure domestic stability ... and to strengthen relations with 
near-abroad states that have Russian minorities; (and) .... to establish 
78 T. R. W. Waters, 'Problems, Progress and Propsects in a Post-Soviet Borderland: The Republic of Moldova', 
gopher: //marvin. nc3a. nato. int: 70/00/secdef/csrc/s29. txt, p. 5; (originally published in Boundary and Security 
Bulletin, Volume 5, Number 1, Spring 1997). 
79 UNReport - Moldova, http: //www. un. mdiNEW/PUBS/NHDR/chapl. 
htn-fl, p. 4. 
80 M. Orr, '14 Army and the Crisis in Moldova', April 1992, gopher: //marvin. nc3a. nato. int: 70/00/secdef/csrcikI 1, 
P. 1. 
Waters, 'Problems, Progress and Propsects', p. 2. 
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more predictable and more stable relations with Romania, but at the 
same time to dam the growing Romanian nationalistic influence upon 
Moldova'. 82 
In the event of a renewed Union, or conflict in the Balkans, the Black Sea area and 
south-east coast of the Mediterranean, Moldova would become indispensable. 83 
Whatever the circumstances, Moscow perceived a need for its troops in the region, as, 
according to General Lebed, 'the Dniester area is the key to the Balkans .... if Russia 
withdraws from this little piece of land, it will lose that key and its influence in the 
region. 84 With the above mentioned ethnic divide, a partial and well armed military 
presence and convoluted history, all the ingredients were present for the conflict 
which duly arose. 
The Transdniestrian Conflict 
The problems first started just prior to Moldova's independence. In 1990, in the spirit 
of glasnost, and the atmosphere of thinking the unthinkable, Kishinev floated the idea 
of Moldova's reunification with Romania. More extreme elements in Moldova also 
suggested annexing the previously Romanian territories of Northern Bukovina, 
Southern Bessarabia from Ukraine. 85 These calls were accompanied by the 
reintroduction of the use of the Latin alphabet. The response of the Russian minority 
concentrated in Transdniester was swift and unambiguous: in August 1990 the 
Transdniester-Moldova Republic (TMR) was announced, with Igor Smirnov as its self 
proclaimed president. 86 This drastic move was one with which the 14th anny would 
come to have considerable sympathy. 
82 In Bezopasnonst. Informatsionnyi Sbornik Fonda Natsionalnoi I Mezhdunarodnoi Bezopasnosti, Nos., I and 2 
(January and February), taken from Transition, 20 October 1995, p. 6. 
83 Waters, 'Problems, Progress and Prospects', p. 2. 
84 
ibid. 
85 1. F. Selivanova, Trans-Dniestria, http: //www. rand. org/pubIicatons/CF/CF129/CF-129-chapter4. html, p. 
3. 
86 At the same time, the Republic of Gagauzian was established in 
Southern Moldova by the minority of Gagauzes 
who were driven by similar of fears of 
Romanization. The Gagauz make up 3.5 per cent of the population of 
Moldova, and are located mainly in the south of the country. 
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The Moldovan proclamation of independence in August 1991 and the 
subsequent Transdniestrian response threw into sharp focus three separate issues each 
of which were pertinent to Moldova's relations with Ukraine: firstly, Romanian 
claims to Moldova; secondly, the role of the 14th army and the threat it presented to 
Ukraine as well as Moldova; and thirdly, the fast diminishing prospects for Ukraine's 
claims to Moldovan territory. 87 In addition, the Moldovan imbroglio would serve to 
bring to the fore 'what appears to be a deeper-seated competition between Russia and 
Ukraine', both on a bilateral level and within the multilateral forum of the CIS. 88 
Moldovan independence elicited an immediate response on the part of TMR 
bolstered by the unofficial support of the 14th Army: by December 1991 Kishinev had 
effectively lost control of Transdniester. As the conflict became more militarised, 
Waters reports that 'while perhaps in the initial turmoil Ukraine may have harboured 
hopes of recovering its former territory of Moldovan Transdniester, Kiev seems to 
have come to the view, as the Dniester insurrection escalated, that a Russian ultra 
nationalist, militarised enclave to the west of independent Ukraine presents it with a 
-) 89 serious security problem . This latter aspect, rather than any efforts to claim former 
territories, was to characterise Kyiv's approach to the resolution of the conflict as it 
escalated. For example, when in March 1992 the fighting intensified, Kyiv, fearful 
that Moscow might use the crisis as an opportunity to destabilise the region as a 
means of putting pressure on the Ukrainians to back down on the issue of the BSF, 
Crimea and Sevastopol, issued a curt warning to Russia that it would not allow any 
violations of its borders. To show he meant business, on 18 March the Ukrainian 
President Leonid Kravchuk issued instructions for a 50 kilometre 'special regime' 
zone to be set up along the Ukrainian-Moldovan border in order to prevent incursions 
or infiltration by armed troops, or the smuggling of weapons into Ukraine. 90 The move 
was well judged in that it apparently anticipated Russia's attempts to get a tighter grip 
on the situation - on I April 1992, Yeltsin issued a decree subordinating the 14th 
87 N. V. Lamont, Territorial Dimension of Ethnic Conflict. - The Moldovan Case (Kansas: Foreign Military Studies 
Office, 1996) p. 3; (a version of this article entitled, 'Ethnic Conflict in Transdniester', appeared in Military 
Review, December-February 1995). 
88 
ibid. 
89 Waters, 'Problems, Progress and Propsects'. 
90 Lamont, Territorial Diniension of Ethnic Conflict, p. 5. 
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Army to Russian command, a move countered by Kishinev claiming Moldovan 
jurisdiction. 91 
The underlying Ukrainian-Russian friction briefly surfaced as a result of 
inflammatory remarks made by the Russian Vice-President Aleksandr Rutskoi arguing 
that Russia 'had to act to defend Russians throughout the former Soviet Union'. 92 
Clearly, aware that the remarks were aimed at Ukraine as much as they were at 
Moldova, Kyiv countered by, somewhat improbably, considering launching criminal 
proceedings against him. While up until that point the 14th Army mainly had a 
supporting role, as the conflict intensified, its units inevitably got more drawn in. The 
heaviest fighting occurred on 20 June 1992, when, in a move to pre-empt 
Transdniestrian forces occupying areas of the right bank, Moldovan forces attempted 
to gain control over the few remaining villages on the left bank that were still 
accessible. With the direct support of the 14th Army, the Transdniestrians successfully 
repelled the Moldovans, gaining the important right bank city of Bendery in the 
process. 
On 23 June , in a move 
designed to halt the fighting, and preventing it from 
escalating into a fully blown conflagration thereby further entrenching Russian forces 
in the region, the Ukrainian President, in a total reversal of former policy, floated the 
possibility of offering Transdniester the status of an autonomous republic within the 
Republic of Moldova. Soon after, on 3 July the Moldovans effectively sued for peace 
with the Moldovan President Snegur holding talks with President Yeltsin in Moscow 
during which they agreed on steps for defusing the conflict starting with a cease-fire 
on 8 July. The signing by Snegur and Yeltsin, but not Smimov, of the Agreement on 
the Regulation of the Transdniester Conflict on 21 July provided for the scheduling of 
a timetable for the withdrawal of the 14th Army and undefined special status for the 
TMR. In the words of Pavel Baev, the Agreement resulted in 'a compromise deal, 
which had no analogies in the annals of peacekeeping .... It envisaged the creation of a 
peacekeeping force comprising five (four of which were active and one in reserve) 
Russian battalions and three (two active and one in reserve) each from Moldova and 
Transdniester. The exclusion of the 14th Army from participation in this operation 
91 ibid., p. 6. 
92 ibid., p. 7. 
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9 93 meant that one Russian army is keeping a peace that another has broken . The 
peacekeeping force was to be supervised by a Joint Control Commission. In total, 
therefore, there were three main military forces present in Transdniester by the end of 
1992: the peacekeeping force, the 14th Army, and the Transdniester forces. 94 
As well as signalling the end of the bloody confrontation, the Agreement 
introduced onto the agenda a whole new issue, as unappealing to Kyiv as it was to 
Kishinev. This arose from an attempt by Moscow and Tiraspol to link the withdrawal 
of the 14th an-ny to the granting of special status to Transdniester, an interesting 
parallel situation to the one that existed between Ukraine and Russia with regard to 
Crimea and the BSF. Special status was understood as statehood; Tiraspol was not 
happy with the autonomy offered by Kishinev. According to an OSCE report 
'Transdniester leaders ... successfully 
blocked the negotiations on the withdrawal of 
the Russian forces by making their agreement conditional upon their obtaining a 
status akin to that of a separate state'. 95 General Lebed, appointed commander of the 
14th army in June 1992, with the approbation of the Russian Ministry of Defence, 
though contrary to the wishes of the Kremlin, assisted the Transidniestrians in this. 
Lebed insisted that the Army remain in the Transdniester for peacekeeping purposes, 
and because of the region's strategic role as 'the key to the Balkans'. 96 The Russian 
Ministry of Defence, taking advantage of the intransigence of the Transdniestrians 
and the insubordinate Army generals, sought to make the resolution of the 
Transdniester problem dependent upon Moldova granting the 14th Army permanent 
residency status, whether as a peacekeeping force, or an outpost of the Russian army. 
Ukraine On The Margins 
93 P. Baev, 'Peacekeeping and Conflict Management in Eurasia', in R. Allison and C. Bluth (eds. ), Security 
Dilemmas in Russia and Eurasia (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs 199 8) pp. 211-212. 
94 For details of numbers of troops involved and ordinance possessed by these forces see G. B. Solomon (Special 
Rapporteur), Peacekeeping in the Transdniester Region. - A Test Case for the CSCE, (Draft Special Report), 
November 1994, http: //www. intnet. net/pub/COUNTRIES/Moldova/Moldova. conflict. data. 
95 Solomon, Peacekeeping in the Transdniester Region. - A Test Casefor the CSCE, p. 9. 
9' According to Baev, Lebed 'worked a miracle' preventing either the disintegration of the 14th Army or anarchy 
with units getting involved in combat operations. Baev, 'Peacekeeping and Conflict 
Management in Eurasia', p. 




Ukraine's role in the evolving imbroglio was marginal. This marginal status was in 
the main attributable to Ukraine's own problems, namely the economic meltdown 
taking place and Russian moves to claim the BSF, Crimea and Sevastopol. It was also 
partly attributable to the fact that Kyiv overestimated Russia's capacity to impose its 
will on events in Moldova. To an extent, the signing of a Good Neighbourliness, 
Friendship and Co-operation Treaty between Ukraine and Moldova on 23 October 
1992 symbolised the increasingly aligned stances adopted by the two states and 
compensated for Ukraine's marginality. Indeed, whether deliberately or not, the treaty 
was to provide a sound basis for co-operation between the two in pursuit of 
subregional integration. The treaty also contributed to their collusion in the slowing or 
hindering of CIS integration. Crucially, given the political context, the Treaty 
prohibited 'the formation and transit of an-ned groups hostile to one of the sides on the 
territory of the other' in a move designed to prevent Russian troops crossing the 
territory of Ukraine to reinforce its forces in Moldova. 
In another morale boosting exercise for Moldova, Kyiv expressed its 
satisfaction with Ukrainian minority rights in Moldova after signing in March 1993 a 
whole host of agreements on issues ranging from minority rights to energy. At the 
same time Kyiv announced that it would not 'accept the transit of goods produced in 
the TMR unless they were cleared by Moldova'. 97 The support was reciprocated by 
Moldova's Ambassador to Ukraine, who was cited as saying that 'Ukrainian- 
Moldovan good neighbourly relations transcend the framework of merely state-to- 
state relations ... as Ukraine provides an umbrella against 
those forces which want to 
98 
bring down our independence and bring us into a neo-Soviet brotherhood'. The 
coincidence of interests between the two former Soviet republics was becoming 
explicit, with the key goals of Moldova's foreign policy announced in January 1994. 
The key goals were much stronger ties with the EU, with which a Partnership and Co- 
operation Agreement was initialled by Moldova in July 1994, and with NATO, with 
which the PfP was signed in March 1994. These objectives closely matched those of 
Ukraine and both objectives were at the expense of relations with Russia. 
99 Similarly, 
97 Radio Kyiv Report 7&8 March 1993, as translated in 'Moldovan-Ukrainian Rapprochement', SOVSET, II 
March 1993; taken ftom Lamont, Territorial Diniension of Ethnic Conflict, p. 18. 
98 RFEIRL, 18 February 1994. 
99 RFEIRL, 12 January 1994. 
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Moldova sided with Ukraine in December 1992 by not signing the CIS Charter once it 
became clear to Kishinev that Kyiv was not going to sign. 100 Significantly in this 
regard, it was made clear to Kishinev by Moscow that any resolution of the 
Transdniestrian conflict was tied to Moldova's fuller compliance with and adherence 
to the demands of the CIS, in which Moldova was only a half hearted participant. 101 
Indeed, Moldova was punished with large increases in excise and customs taxes as a 
result of its failure to ratify CIS documents in August 1993, leading to an inability to 
pay its growing gas debt to Russia. 102 The pressure paid off as Moldova ratified its 
membership of the CIS and the Economic Union on 8 April 1994, after having failed 
to do this once earlier; nevertheless, Kishinev continued to voice objections to its 
political and military integration with the CIS. 103 
The Impasse Between Russia And Moldova 
Kyiv5s support for Kishinev must have been welcome as the Moldovans repeatedly 
and fruitlessly tried to thrash out a resolution to the Transdniestnan problem and 
enforce the withdrawal of the 14th Army with an intransigent Moscow throughout 
1992-1994. However, the talks broke down time after time during this period 
primarily because Moscow was seeking basing rights in Transdniester 'as a minimal 
objective and on both banks of the Dniester as a maximal objective', according to 
General Kondratev, the Russian Deputy Defence Minister responsible for Russian 
peacekeepers, in return for a final resolution of the Transdniestrian situation. 104 In 
order to avoid either scenario the Moldovan Parliament put forward a draft law 'On 
the Special Status of the Territory on the Left Bank of the Nistru (Transnistna)'. The 
law provided for the use of Russian and Ukrainian as official languages in the area, a 
degree of political, economic and socio-cultural autonomy, and most importantly, the 
right to territorial self determination in the event that the status of Moldova as an 
independent state was to change i. e. if it was to unite with Romania. However, the 
100 RFEIRL, I December 1992. 
101 Lamont, Territorial Dimension of Ethnic Conflict, p. 12-13. 
102 RFEIRL, 14 March 1994. 
103 RFEIRL, II April 1994. 
104 RFEIRL, 22 February 1994. 
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Russian side was not impressed by the law and the 9th round of talks on 7-8 June 
1994 failed to bring a resolution of the impasse. In turn the Moldovan demand that the 
14th Army start its withdrawal on I July 1994 was replaced with a new demand, 
specifically, that a withdrawal start on 31 December 1995.105 
The breakthrough came at the 10th round of talks in August 1994 when 
Kishinev gave in to the linkage demanded by Russia. According to a joint press 
release 'practical steps toward the withdrawal (of the 14th army) ... within the agreed 
time period will be synchronised with the political settlement of the Dniester conflict 
and the determination of the special status of the Dniester region of Moldova'. 106 The 
actual signing of the Agreement on 21 October was subsequently overshadowed by a 
clause demanded by the Russians in the final moments of negotiation, which stated 
that the withdrawal would start not with the signing of the agreement, as the 
Moldovans insisted, but instead, with the 'entry into force' of the agreement, i. e. its 
ratification. In light of the fact that, in contrast to the Moldova, the Russian Duma had 
failed by that time to ratify the Russian-Moldovan treaty signed in 1990, this condition 
did not augur well for the early withdrawal of the 14th anny. So it proved. The 
invitation in talks on the 5 July 1995 for Ukraine to participate in future talks to help 
bring about a lasting solution to the crisis, while unlikely to be decisive, was 
significant and due primarily to the fact that it had 'a fair amount of influence in the 
region'. 107 The primary aim of this influence was to bring the two warring factions 
face to face to sign a joint Memorandum in July 1996. In the event, the failure of the 
signing to take place was caused by the fact that the territorial integrity of Moldova 
was not affin-ned in the Memorandum - there was simply too much scope for 
Transdniester to continue to pursue sovereignty, as shown by the TMR's insistence on 
the right to establish interstate relations. Indeed, because the OSCE basic principles on 
Moldova's territorial integrity and sovereignty were not confirmed in the 
Memorandum, the head of the OSCE in Moldova recommended against supporting it. 
In addition, the other parties had real qualms about the Memorandum. For example, 
the main 'regulator5 of the peace between the warring parties was to be the CIS, in 
which both Kishinev and Kyiv had little faith especially as this would legitimise the 
105 RFEIRL, 9 June 1994. 
106 RFEIRL, 12 August 1994. 
107 Transition, 20 October 1995, p. 10. 
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presence of a Russian force in the region. The Ukrainians continued to insist on a 
more prominent role for the OSCE instead. 108 
Ukraine's growing influence in the region was reflected in the decisive role it 
played in the formation of a subsequent version of the Memorandum. The new version 
was signed on 8 May 1997 by the presidents of Moldova and the TMR, with Russia 
and Ukraine acting as guarantors, the OSCE as mediator (until September 1997) with 
the CIS becoming the main organising structure following the implementation of the 
arrangements outlined in the Memorandum. 109 Most importantly from the point of 
view of both Kishinev and Kyiv, Moldova's territorial integrity was affirmed with the 
Transdniester only given 'special status'; the withdrawal of the 14th Army was once 
more confirmed. In line with this agreement on a withdrawal, and contrary to its 
earlier stance, Kyiv soon proved itself amenable to the removal of the 14th anny, and 
its 500,000 tons of materiel - taking up an estimated 11233 railway carriages - across 
its territory. 110 
The effects of Ukraine's input were evident in a number of regards. Firstly, the 
CIS was merely allocated a 'support' role in the Memorandum with primacy given to 
the OSCE. Secondly, Ukraine's role as guarantor challenged Russia's hitherto unique 
status. Thirdly, the Memorandum also opened the way for a tangible Ukrainian 
presence in the region, in the form of peacekeepers. However, the Russian Duma's 
subsequent claim that it had 'a basis on which to insist on the full membership of the 
TMR in the CIS' was ominous, as were other factors. ' 11 For example, by the time the 
Memorandum was signed, the Russia-Moldovan Basic Treaty had remained unratified 
by the Russian Duma for 7 years; similarly the critical 'breakthrough' October 1994 
Agreement also remained unratified, apparently at the request of Tiraspol. 
112 
The support of the Russian Duma is a key factor explaining the lack of 
progress after the signing of the Memorandum. For example, the president of the 
TMR, Smirnov, failed to attend a meeting with the Russian, Moldovan and Ukrainian 
108 Holos Ukrainy, 8 May 1997. 
109 Uriadoiy Kurier, 9 May 1997; also S. Garnett and R. Lebenson, Thy Nastane Myr u Prydnistrovyi? ', Polityka 
I Chas, January 1999, p. 58; (author's translation of article). 
110 G. B. Solomon (Special Rapporteur), Peacekeeping in the Transdniester Region: A Test Case for the CSCE, 
(Draft Special Report), November 1994, p. 12. 
11 Narodna A rmiya, 18 October 1997. 
112 H010S Ukrainy, 5 November 1997. 
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presidents in Kishinev in October 1997. A letter demanding that the TMR be included 
'in full scale political and economic CIS processes', was sent by the Duma In his 
stead. 1 13 Further provocative moves on the part of the TMR followed, mainly without 
the approbation of the Russian government, though probably with that of the 
parliament. The Transdniestrians blocked the removal of the 14th Army once it had in 
fact started in September 1997, when Tiraspol laid claim to what it regarded as its 
share of the anny weaponry. Similarly, its decision in August 1997 to set up border 
signs was implemented in May 1998 when it in fact went a stage further by setting up 
new customs points in areas under the control of peacekeeping forces. ' 14 
Ukraine - Moldova's New-found Ally? 
Ukraine's greater prominence in the peacekeeping process from 1995 onwards was 
paralleled by an intensification of ties between Kyiv and Moldova away from the 
Transdniestrian negotiating table on a bilateral level, and as will be seen on a 
subregional level, in terms of co-operation in the creation of a euroregion and 
considerable co-operation within GUAM, as well as in terms of continued co- 
operation in CIS non-co-operation. As has been pointed out, the 'strong Ukrainian- 
Moldovan relations which emerged in 1997 reflect the more active position of 
Ukraine in the region and within the former Soviet Union'. 115 In particular, just before 
the signing of the above mentioned Memorandum, Kyiv and Kishinev signed a 
Declaration laying the basis for the creation of a customs union between them in 
March 1997. However, Kuchma was careful not to snub the Transdniestrians and was 
particularly keen to renew economic ties with the heavily industrialised region. 
Crucially, both parties expressed willingness for Ukraine to make its presence felt in 
the region, in the form of a peacekeeping contingent, something which was agreed to 
by Kyiv but objected to by Moscow. 116 Furthennore, not only was that request 
reiterated by President Smimov in his visit to Kyiv in June of that year, but a further 
intensification of ties were pursued. In particular, Smimov, in recognition of the 
113 Garnett and Lebenson, 'Chy Nastane Myr' p. 59. 
114 ibid., p. 60. 
115 ibid., p. 61. 
116 Uriadovy Kurier, 13 March 1997; see also Den, 20 June 1997. 
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economic importance of Ukraine's neighbouring regions for the Transdniester 
economy, sought a liberalisation of ties between the two states, as allowed for by the 
Memorandum which permitted the region's economic independence within 
Moldova. 1 17 Clearly, Ukraine's regional influence was making itself felt in more ways 
than one. 
Nevertheless, the stalemate continued. A multilateral summit held in Kyiv on 
16 July 1999 to resolve disagreements between Moldova and Transdniester, fell short 
of expectations. Although the summit, which brought together the Moldovan 
President Luchinski and the leader of the Transdniester Republic, Igor Smimov, in a 
meeting mediated by Ukraine, Russia and the OSCE did not produce a final solution, 
it did provide a framework within which both sides could move towards a resolution 
of Transdniester's status within Moldova. Indeed, the joint declaration signed by both 
sides committed them to work towards reuniting in a single state. However, agreement 
could not be found on the form that the reunion was to take. The Moldovans pushed 
for the incorporation of the Transdniester region into Moldova as an autonomous 
republic. The Transdniestrians preferred that it should become an equal partner in a 
confederation. Nevertheless, both sides moved towards reconciliation, reaching 
agreement on the preservation of a common economic, political, legal and defence 
space. The key sticking point, as ever, remained the lack of common ground on the 
issue of Russian troops in the Transdniester region. While the Russian Prime Minister 
Stepashin reiterated the commitment of Moscow to withdraw its troops citing a 
withdrawal schedule as evidence, Smirnov remained intransigent. 118 In August 2000, 
William Hill, the head of the OSCE mission, suggested that the Russian contingent in 
Transdniester will be replaced 'in the distant future' by international peacekeepers. 
" 9 
The signing of the Memorandum and the subsequent gradual reconciliation 
between the two warring parties was a success attributable, at least in part, to the 
Ukrainians. It was also indicative of the change of locus of power that was taking 
place in parts of the CIS, in that while Ukraine was not an alternative to Russia as a 
source of such power, it was nevertheless a match in certain localised disputes, as in 
Moldova. As Garnett has pointed out 'it is now hard to envisage further efforts to 
117 Den, 20 June 1997. 
118 The Ukrainian Weekly, July 25,1999, No. 30, Vol. LXVII 
119 RFE/RL, 3 August 2000. 
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, 120 regulate the Transdniester conflict without the input of Ukraine . 
While it would be 
a simplification to attribute Ukraine's ascendancy to Russia's decline, in hindsight 
Russia's potential role was perhaps exaggerated by both sides of the confl, Ct. 121 Thus 
although Russia was clearly a decisive factor in halting the fighting between the 
protagonists and even maintaining an uneasy peace, it was incapable of imposing a 
final solution. It was precisely Russia's inability to impose its will on an assertive 
Moldova and an intransigent Transdniester that provided Ukraine with an opportunity 
to demonstrate a regional role. 
In sum, on a bilateral level, the development of Kyiv's relations with 
neighbours along the Western azimuth between 1991-1999 was not a straighforward 
affair. As will now be seen, this lack of systematic progress at the bilateral level had 
negative as well as positive ramifications at the subregional and regional levels. 
In theoretical terms, Ukraine as a newly independent state, the survival and 
security of which was far from consolidated, burderned with a history of occupation 
by territorially acquisitive neighbours, was at least initially concerned with any threats 
to its territorial integrity, as realists might predict. However, the threats failed to 
materialise - Romania's questioning of the legitimacy of the transfer of its former 
territory to Ukraine never amounted to a threat. As a result, along the Western 
azimuth, Ukraine could pursue a regionalist agenda from the very earliest days of its 
existence, the theoretical implications of which will be explored at the end of the 
following chapter. 
120 Garnett and Lebenson, 'Chy Nastane Myr', p. 60. 
121 ibid., p. 61. 
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Chapter 5: The Western Azimuth: Subregional And 
Regional Integration 
In comparison to Ukraine's North-eastern azimuth, the Western azimuth held more 
promise and at the same time held the scope for greater disappointment. Along the 
North-eastern azimuth Ukraine was driven by one overriding objective: avoidance of 
subordination to Russia on a bilateral and regional level. Moscow made no secret of 
its desire for much stronger ties with Ukraine, and to this extent policy was 
transparent: it was uncomplicated by suspicions as to Russia's hidden agendas, as 
Moscow's agenda was there for all to see. Along the Western azimuth, Ukraine was 
denied such frank partners. In particular, it will be argued that Kyiv's efforts along 
the Western azimuth were complicated by the intricate nature of relations between the 
bilateral, subregional and regional levels. Ukraine believed that han-nonious bilateral 
ties would provide a foundation for the attaim-nent of subregional level objectives 
along the Western azimuth. In turn, bilateral relations were expected to facilitate the 
attainment of regional level objectives, and further, it was expected that membership 
of subregional institutions would help in joining regional institutions. In practise, 
things were rarely so straightforward, certainly up until 1994, and hardly more so 
since then. As will be seen, if anything regional level developments led to 
deterioration in both Ukraine's bilateral ties and subregional prospects. Later, once it 
had become clear that some of the CEES were to be invited to apply for membership 
of NATO, did the political fog lift temporarily, only to come down again once EU 
membership entered the agenda. 
Ukraine's Failed Proposals For Subregional Security 
Structures 
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Participation in subregional integration was one of the means with which Ukraine 
sought to deal with the Russian problem, especially in security terms in the early years 
following independence. Initial efforts designed to deal with the security vacuum that 
had emerged in Central and Eastern Europe were home-grown attempts at creating 
subregional security institutions. Within these potential security communities, owing 
to their size and geopolitical significance in any such planning, Ukraine and Poland 
were destined to play central roles. Both Poland and Ukraine were crucial to the two 
plans - it was meaningless to talk about any plan without the participation of either 
state. Two plans stand out -a Polish initiative in the shape of "NATO-B" or "NATO- 
bis and the Ukrainian "Zone of Stability and Security"'. 
The first of these, NATO-B, reflected concern about the security vacuum in 
the region, following the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in April 1991. The proposal 
by Lech Walesa, the Polish president in 1992 also reflected increased assertiveness on 
the part of the Poles, and a desire to claim the role of regional leader. Finding itself in 
a security vacuum, with no chance of NATO membership, Warsaw, with the help of 
and under the patronage of NATO, suggested that an agreement be made between 
Central and East European states to give up territorial claims on one another, preclude 
the use of aggression in the resolution of bilateral difficulties, transfer control of 
weapons of mass destruction to NATO, and agree to joint action against any member 
in breach of the Agreement. ' The plan had two advantages. Firstly, it would reduce 
the apprehension felt by the CEES in the face of a still agitated Russia. Secondly, it 
would fill the security vacuum in the region. Polish analysts also believed that it 
would bring forward the dates of entry of some of these states into NATO. However, 
in reality it seems that the plan was driven by a hidden agenda. The proposal raised 
the profile of Poland as a regional actor and even leader, and Warsaw as a regional 
spokesperson. Warsaw believed Polish chances of entering NATO would in this way 
be enhanced. Warsaw was also demonstrating its credentials as a state displaying 
commitment to the stability of the region, willing to undertake responsibility for trying 
to ensure this stability within the framework of NATO, in the face of an outraged 
Moscow. 2 
1 Kobrinskaj'a, Dlugi Koniew Zimnej Wojny, p. 40. 
2 ibid., pp. 40-42. 
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However, the plan suffered from a number of predictable and insurmountable 
disadvantages. Firstly it elicited the ire of the Russians. Secondly, fellow CEES, in 
particular Czechoslovakia and Hungary - states with a very high chance of NATO 
membership in the first enlargement - were concerned by the fact that NATO-bis 
might be seen as precluding NATO enlargement at all. Thirdly, Polish efforts at 
regional leadership appeared over-ambitious in the light of the economic plight of the 
country. It was also something which would inevitably upset neighbours whose 
experience of such leadership in the past was hardly remembered with fondness i. e. 
Ukraine and Lithuania. For these and other reasons, the plan was stillborn. 
The second effort at a subregional security institution was the Baltic to Black 
Sea Security Zone, proposed by the Ukrainian President Kravchuk in May 1993. The 
notion of a nuclear-free zone of stability and security in the middle of Europe was 
hardly new, yet it soon became just another stillborn attempt to fill the security 
vacuum that had emerged in Central and Eastern Europe. 
The proposal required the consensus of Ukraine, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Belarus, Moldova, Austria, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, 
Hungary and Romania to work. The plan was riddled with other faults. Firstly, any 
alliance that so blatantly excluded Russia would inevitably come to be perceived by 
Moscow as a threat. Secondly, as with NATO-B, Poland, along with other CEES was 
reluctant to become a member of an organisation that would hinder its chances of 
joining NATO. Yet, 'owing to Poland's weight in the region, Warsaw's involvement 
in the project was pivotal'; the fact that it was not forthcoming undermined the whole 
plan. 3 Thirdly, despite its independence in 1991, Belarus was gradually moving back 
toward an alliance and eventual reunification with Russia, something that was the 
final nail in the coffin. The fact that subregional integration was again hindered by 
regional aspirations in general, and that relations between Ukraine and Poland were 
too weak to drive the plan forward was almost incidental. As will be seen, neither 
were Ukraine's relations with Poland or other CEES helpful in terms of integration 
with less security based subregional institutions. 
S. R. Burant, 'Foreign Policy and National Identity: A Comparison of Ukraine and Belarus', Europe-Asia Studies, 
Vol. 47, No. 7,1995, pp. 1125-1144. 
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Attempts To Join Politico-economic Subregional Structures 
The Vi'Segrad Group And CEFTA 
Ukraine's first effort at joining a specifically CEE subregional institution was an 
attempt in February 1992 to join the ViS'egrad Group, a loose formation (created in 
1991) consisting of Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Ostensibly the purpose of 
the organisation was to co-ordinate the efforts of the three countries in their 
interactions with European political and economic institutions, facilitate financial and 
trade flows amongst themselves, and collaborate on issues of security and ecology; in 
practice it was an attempt to escape from the influence still emanating from the East 
and to demonstrate their commitment to 'rejoining Europe'. Unfortunately for 
Ukraine, it also was to serve as a discriminating mechanism in that it created a clear 
line of differentiation between its members and those to their East. The purpose of this 
was twofold. First, it helped CEES avoid the accusation of interference in what Russia 
would term its 'near abroad'. Second, it precluded the possibility of the backward 
state of the Ukrainian economy affecting their application for European Union 
4 membership . For these reasons the February 1992 application was re ected. j 
Ultimately the competitiveness that led to the rejection of Ukraine's 
application undermined the effectiveness of the Visegrad group as a vehicle moving 
towards membership of the EU. This competitiveness was triggered in particular by 
the Czechs who, in 1993, rather than move forward as a member of the Visegrad 
group, tried to individualise their ties with the West and thereby enhance their chances 
of inclusion in the European regional integration process. 
As far as Poland was concerned, such an individualised approach was 
unappealing. Because of its structural economic weaknesses, enormous debt, large and 
backward agricultural base, and sheer size, Warsaw believed that Poland would not 
have been a credible contender for membership of regional institutions if assessed on 
an individual basis. With competition between aspirants to the EU and NATO fierce, 
especially on the part of the Czech Republic, Poland was especially vulnerable to 
being left outside (along with Slovakia). Poland was thus an active proponent of the 
' Conversation with an official from the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Warsaw, August 2000. 
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importance of subregional integration, as in the view of Pastusiak 'Poland perceives 
the Visegrad Group as a form of co-operation which enables the development of 
trends for the integration of the countries of Central Europe and brings them closer to 
.35 the West European structures of integration . By definition, such a stance did not 
extend to Ukraine. The contribution of the Poles to the rejection of Ukraine's 
application was clear. In particular Polish Foreign Minister Skubiszewski argued that 
the inclusion of Ukraine into the Visegrad group was impossible because of the 
'different levels of economic and political development'. 6 Thus the strategic 
partnership between Ukraine and Poland failed to deliver the expected benefits in the 
political and economic spheres, despite Kyiv's efforts. 7 
The political orientation of Visegrad was soon complemented by the more 
economy-oriented Central European Free Trade Area (CEFTA); with time the latter 
effectively replaced the more politically motivated Visegrad Group as a forum. 
CEFTA grew out of the free trade area established between Hungary, Poland, and 
Czechoslovakia on 21st December 1991, after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 
August of that year. It was modelled on EFTA and hence to a large extent was already 
harmonised with the trade requirements of the EU; in fact the free trade area was an 
extension of trade preferences obtained by the member states on a bilateral basis with 
the EU. CEFTA was created to help co-ordinate trade between Poland, Hungary and 
(then) Czechoslovakia, facilitate their interactions with European political and 
economic institutions, and demonstrate the willingness of its members to 'rejoin 
Europe'. Thus at no time was CEFTA, or the Visegrad grouping, seen by its members 
as an alternative to membership of the EU; rather it was a sort of a antechamber. It 
also functioned as a mechanism that helped discriminate its members from states to 
the East. This it did only too well: from early on it was clear that its entry criteria were 
harsh enough to preclude Ukraine's membership. 8 
5 L. Pastusiak (Rapporteur), Subregional Cooperation Among Central European Countries And Their Struggle 
Toward Membership of Transatlantic Structures, (Draft Special Report), Sub-Committee on Transatlantic And 
European Relations, AN 104, PC/TER (96) 4. 
6 H. Shmanko and E. Kish, 'Vishegradski Chotyrykutnyk', Polityka I Chas, January 1994, p. 50. 
7 For example, at a meeting of Ukrainian and Polish parliamentary deputies, and foreign and defence ministry 
officials, the Poles were explicitly urged by the Ukrainians to assist Ukraine in its efforts at membership of the 
Visegrad triangle. Konferencja Polsko-Ukramska nt. "Droga Ukrainy do Europy" , Sprawy Miedzynarodowe, 
1992, Vol. 4-6, pp. 149-170. 
However, Ukraine is unlikely to gain entry until it has signed bilateral treaties on free trade with all the CEFTA 
states; become a member of the WTO; signed an association agreement with the EU (the partnership and 
160 
In sum, up until 1994, the early hopes of Ukraine that membership of CEE 
subregional groupings would carry it along toward the regional institutions were 
dashed by an unhealthy competitiveness between the CEES. in addition, CEES were 
too concerned about their own prospects to be worried about Ukraine. Both of these 
factors negatively affected Ukraine's bilateral relations with CEES, in particular 
Poland. Despite the fact that bilateral relations with Poland were desirable, Warsaw 
was wary of getting too close to Kyiv politically and economically. This was because 
such closeness may have prejudiced Poland's own chances of being a member of the 
Central and East European bandwagon that was making its way, via subregional 
institutions, westwards. Up until 1994, as we have seen, Ukraine was effectively 
locked out of the subregional integration process, at least in part because of the lack of 
support of its 'strategic partner' - Poland. Despite Kyiv's hopes that Poland might 
serve as its ambassador in facilitating its participation in the subregional integration 
process, for good reason, Warsaw failed to do this in a quite overt fashion. Not only 
was there no incentive for Poland to have stronger ties with Ukraine. There was also 
the danger that strong ties with Ukraine might lead to Poland itself being locked out of 
not only the subregional process but also the regional process. 
Relations with the remaining CEES were not of the same order of importance, 
in terms of either importance or relevance in the subregional process. Following the 
dissection of Czechoslovakia in 1993, the Czech Republic was relieved of the burden 
of the preoccupation of neighbouring on former Soviet republics. Prague (as well as 
Budapest) could focus its efforts on joining Western institutional structures: the 
implications for Ukraine of such a move did not really enter its reckoning. Slovakia 
was preoccupied with its own internal ructions. It was itself too weak and small to 
help Ukraine in its drive westward, though it did prove a useful economic trading 
partner. Clearly, poor relations with Romania were not very helpful in regard to 
Ukraine's subregional and regional goals. Even though Romania was not a key actor 
in the subregional or regional integration process, animosity between the two meant 
that they were hardly desirable partners in a subregional movement that was already 
riven with splits. Furthermore, it also raised the spectre of instability in this comer of 
Europe. 
cooperation agreement signed between Ukraine and 
EU allows for the creation of a free trade area between the 
two starting from 1998; a free trade area is a prerequisite to an association agreement). 
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Ukraine's Subregional Prospects From 1994 
From 1994 onwards, a substantial improvement in bilateral relations between Ukraine 
and CEES in general, (except Romania with whom relations only improved from 
1997 onwards), and Poland in particular, was a prelude to an amelioration of 
Ukraine's subregional prospects. These advances in the bilateral and subregional 
spheres were helped by events at the regional level. As the West became ever more 
concerned with developments in Russia, especially the growing proximity between 
Russia and Belarus, the ongoing conflict in Chechnya and political instability in 
Moscow, the CEE region became more central to its strategy of dealing with Moscow. 
The reverberations of these concerns extended to Ukraine, especially in terms of its 
impact on Ukraine's relations with CEES and its prospects for subregional integration. 
Any improvement at the bilateral level was welcome in Kyiv, as Ukraine's 
prospects for membership of the key subregional institutions, in particular CEFTA, 
were heavily dependent on Poland's patronage. However, as was discussed earlier, 
this Polish patronage took some time to appear, in that as long as Poland's own 
prospects of participation in the regional process, namely membership of NATO and 
the EU, were in doubt, as they very much were until 1994, Warsaw was economical in 
its efforts at helping Kyiv achieve its subregional objectives. 
For example, as has been mentioned, Poland, along with other CEE states 
(other than Romania which was happy merely to be included), was exasperated and 
hoMfied at being put into the same category as Ukraine in terms of membership of the 
Partnership for Peace programme at the beginning of 1994.9 It was only when a 
differentiation was made between prospective NATO members, a group which was 
openly said to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, sometimes Slovakia, 
but not Romania on the one hand, and those that would remain beyond the alliance on 
the other, that a perceptible improvement was detected in CEES efforts at helping 
Ukraine join subregional institutions. In other words, once CEES states were assured 
their place in regional institutions, as was the case in the second half of 1994, they 
9 Kobrinskaj'a, Dlugi Koniec Zimnej Wojnj, -, p. 67. 
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became far more proactive. In October 1995 at a meeting of the leaders of the Central 
European Initiative (CEI) members in Warsaw, Hungary, the Czech Republic and in 
particular Poland came out in strong support of full Ukrainian membership of the 
organisation, obviously increasingly aware of the dangers for an isolated Ukraine, 
abandoned to its fate in the CIS. 10 In June 1996 Ukraine became a full member of the 
CEI. 
The economic and political gap with the CEES was demonstrated by Ukraine's 
failure to gain membership of the key subregional institution, CEFTA. By 1995 
Ukraine was still very isolated: in Brno in 1995 Slovenia was accepted as a member, 
and this status was by then being actively pursued by Bulgaria and Romania, while 
Turkey, Croatia and the Baltic states were looking to develop free trade with the 
CEFTA area. Ukraine was unable to participate in these discussions, much to the 
chagrin of Kuchma, who in June 1996 insisted that 'it is now not enough to 
acknowledge us as important partners, and it is time to make the next step - to support 
our political choice to integrate with Europe and link Ukraine to the club of Central 
and Eastern European states which are actively getting closer to the European and 
Western European Union. ' II The signing in January 1997 of the Memorandum on the 
Liberalisation of Trade, between Ukraine and Poland was a welcome if belated move 
in the right direction as far as Kyiv was concerned. 12 Poland had become increasingly 
supportive of Ukraine's intention to join the Central European Free Trade Agreement 
and by late 1997 a plan of entry, involving the conclusion of bilateral free trade 
agreements with existing members (which would also facilitate Ukraine's entry into 
the World Trade Organisation, originally anticipated for mid-1997), had been 
established. 13 
However, the remaining criteria for CEFTA membership were still too 
stringent for Ukraine. Of the three criteria necessary for membership - an Europe or 
10 The CEI was formed in 1989 by Italy, Austria, Hungary, Yugoslavia and subsequently Czechoslovakia. Poland 
joined in 1991 despite the objections of Prague which was concerned at the damage Polish membership may do 
to its own ambitions. The organisation was designed to establish a platform for cooperation on political and 
economic issues in the region. It was also designed to facilitate the process of preparation undertaken by 
member states for eventual entry into the European Union. See R. Wolczuk, 'Ukraine and Europe', p. 42. 
11 Speech to the Polish Sejm on 26 June 1996 
12 Uriadovy Kurier, 20 March 1997. 
13 0. Pavliuk, 'Ukrainian-Polish Relations: a Pillar of Regional Stability' in M. Wohlfeld (ed. ), The Effects of 
Enlargement on Bilateral Relations in Central and Eastern Europe (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 
Western European Union 1997) p. 46. 
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Association Agreement with the EU, membership of the WTO, and free-trade 
agreements with all CEFTA states - only the last of these was attainable thanks to the 
signing of the Memorandum. Ukraine's chances of a Europe agreement were 
negligible; Ukraine was not classified as a market economy, one of the criteria for a 
Europe Agreement. Furthermore, WTO membership was becoming increasingly 
unlikely as Ukraine reneged on its commitments to free trade. In the longer term, the 
real danger was that CEFTA would lose its appeal and significance to Ukraine as the 
CEES left it and joined the EU, thereby reducing the significance of CEFTA as a pre- 
entry economic forum for prospective members of EU which Ukraine considered 
itself 
At this juncture it is worth noting that Ukraine's ties with Moldova were 
getting increasingly amicable, a development which was reflected at the subregional 
level though in GUUAM along the Southern azimuth, and not along the Western 
azimuth. Indeed, despite the signing of yet more 'confidence building' documents 
between Kishinev and Tiraspol in March 1998 in Odessa, Moldova was increasingly 
turning away from the CIS and Russia in search of a solution to its problems. 14 
Specifically, the newly elected government in June 1998, was intent on 'turning 
Moldova 180 degrees away from the CIS' and, in the event of further failure as 
regards the Transdniestrian conflict, 'will turn for help to Western European 
countries, calling for economic sanctions against Transdniester'. This was something 
the Russians wished to avoid and the move restrained Russia in its dealings with 
Moldova. 15 A key part of this Westward strategy involved joining GUAM, a grouping 
the members of which had their own ambitions along the Western azimuth, under the 
leadership of Kyiv, something that was a direct response to pressures on Kishinev 
from Moscow. 
Overall, Ukraine's ambitions at the subregional level met with some, albeit 
limited success after 1994. Without a doubt Poland was the most important potential 
actor in promoting Ukraine's chances at the subregional level. Poland was, however, 
by far the most vulnerable at the regional level when compared to both Hungary and 
the Czech Republic. Up until 1994/5, there was a real chance that it might itself be 
" Zerkalo Nedeli, 21 March 1998. 
15 H010S Ukrainy, 5 June 1998. 
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excluded from regional integration owing to its vulnerable geopolitical locus and 
economic weakness, poverty and size, (though the probability of exclusion diminished 
very quickly as Poland's economy started to grow rapidly thereafter and once it 
became clear that NATO enlargement that did not include Poland was of marginal 
value). And even though its invitation to join NATO became increasingly likely after 
1994, as did its chances of being invited to apply for EU membership, Ukraine was 
too weighty an economic and political problem for a still enfeebled Poland to push for 
Ukraine's integration into subregional structures in all but the most symbolic way. 
Hungary was too preoccupied with Romania and Slovakia to do something similar, 
while Slovakia was itself too marginalized to help. Relations with Romania remained 
unresolved, especially regarding Serpents Island, even after the signing of a Treaty in 
1997. 
Yet despite all of these problems, Ukraine, after 1994, came increasingly to 
acquire CEE credentials, even though it remained beyond the key CEE institutional 
structure, CEFTA. On the one hand this was due to the relations Ukraine itself came 
to form with the EU and NATO on a bilateral level. It was also in part to do with the 
fact that Ukraine's neighbours were encouraged to be more inclusive toward Ukraine. 
In particular, there is evidence to suggest that regional structures, in particular NATO 
though not the EU, actively supported subregional developments, as will now be 
examined. 
Relations With Western Regional Institutions 
As has been noted, membership of and/or closer ties with Western regional 
institutions represented end goals in Ukraine's foreign and security policy. The 
reasons were all too obvious. As a result of the demise of the bipolar international 
structure, the significance of the EU as a structural component of the change increased 
(after all, it was a vast and growing market, a source of investment and subsidies, and 
membership increasingly had security implications), as did its role as a beacon for 
countries emerging from the decomposing Soviet system. This was, however, 
especially true for NATO, the clear cut victor in the drawn out confrontation with the 
Warsaw Pact. And while it is true that this has been argued to be a hollow victory to 
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the extent that NATO may lose its raison d'etre, the CEES did not subscribe to that 
view as they remained preoccupied with the threat that they believed Russia continued 
to represent. This was more than amply shown by the headlong rush by much of 
Eastern and Central Europe into economic and security integration with Europe. 
'Europe', embodied in the form of the EU, had come to symbolise salvation in more 
ways than one. 
Ukraine saw its salvation in a similar solution. As a result, Kyiv's main 
objective, despite the seemingly insurmountable barriers, was the political, economic 
and security benefits that accrue from membership of the EU and increasingly 
meaningful partnership with if not yet membership of NATO. 
NATO 
Up until 1994 meant Ukraine did not figure prominently in Western strategic planning 
or policy making. This only changed in the 1993-1994 period as NATO enlargement 
gained momentum, the Russian political scene deteriorated, a rapprochement between 
Moscow and Minsk took place, and the Russian assault on Chechnya reached its 
apogee. 
As far as NATO enlargement was concerned, Ukraine's primary objective in 
debate was to avoid ending up as the buffer between the West and Russia as they 
jostled for position. Originally this stance was cautious as Ukraine aimed to placate 
Russian sensibilities by not acquiescing to their objections but bearing them firmly in 
mind and insisting on their accommodation. 16 Most obviously, such accommodation 
meant the creation of a new security framework for the continent. 17 
However, there was a danger that this desire to join the North Atlantic alliance 
on the part of the CEES might damage Ukraine's bilateral relations with the CEES. 
Worst of all, the rivalry within Visegrad/CEFTA in the race to enter NATO might 
damage ties between Ukraine and Poland. This was particularly true between 1991 
and 1994 as the whole issue of NATO membership reverberated around Central and 
16 V. Horbulin, 'Ukraine's Place in Today's Europe', Politics and the Times, October - December 1995, p. 10- 15. 
17 See, for example, President Kuchma's speech to the Western European Union. Uriadovy Kurier, 8th June 1996, 
No: 104-105. 
166 
Eastern Europe. An example of the damage that this focus on NATO enlargement had 
on Poland's eastern policy was reflected in 'The Security Policy and Defence Strategy 
of Rzeczpospolita Polska' adopted in November 1992 for the period 1993-2000. The 
policy proclaimed that 'the strategic objective of Poland to the year 2000 is 
membership of NATO and the WEU' in contrast to the non-committal 'bilateral co- 
operation with Russia, Ukraine and Belarus'. 18 Warsaw rejected close ties with 
Ukraine or Russia or Belarus in order to avoid a slowdown in its progress westward. 
Indeed the fact that the three foriner Soviet states were lumped together speaks 
volumes for the lack of importance Poland attributed to relations with Ukraine at the 
time. Poland was focused on joining NATO, and would do what it had to in order to 
get in. The fact that this would place Ukraine in a predicament regarding Russia, in 
the sense that Ukraine would emerge as the no-man's land between Poland and 
Russia, did not seem to enter Warsaw's reckoning, something that might have been 
expected in light of the apparently 'strategic' relationship. Garnett has argued that the 
Poles 'postponed addressing these problems until after Poland and its Visegrad 
partners-enter NATO'. 19 
NATO at the time did try and help Ukraine out of its predicament. The stalling 
strategy devised by the Alliance was the Partnership for Peace initiative, designed to 
placate Russia, and offered to the Visegrad group on 12 January 1994, customised to 
the needs of individual participants. Few were more enthusiastic participants than 
Ukraine; none were less keen than the CEES. 
After signing up for the PfP, Ukraine became keen on joint exercises, in 
contrast to, for example, Russia, which, having joined reluctantly in June, was a 
noticeably less eager associate, slighted at its not being accorded the status 'due' a 
superpower. Ukraine also co-operated in the North Atlantic Co-operation Council and 
contributed to NATO-led peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavia from as 
soon as it was able. The bitter irony was that the greater Ukraine's participation in the 
PfP the worse was the perception of the programme by CEES - they did not want to 
be 
lumped into the same group as Ukraine, let alone Russia. Indeed, using less than 
diplomatic language the former deputy minister for Polish National Security argued 
18 Polityka Bezpieczenstwa I Strategia Obronna RP, 2 November 1992. 
19 Garnett, 'Poland: Bulwark or BrIdgeT, p. 77. 
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'that Poland and other states of the Visegrad group were reduced to a common 
denominator with the fon-ner Soviet bloc, a group to which we wanted to bade 
farewell'. 20 
In sum, the PfP programme was hardly universally approved. While the 
signing of the PfP by Ukraine in January 1994 was clearly a milestone in the 
improvement of Ukraine's geopolitical standing, this elevation of former Soviet 
Republics was seen as a retrograde step in Warsaw, Prague and other CEES capitals 
(other than Bucharest, which saw Pfl? as its 'salvation'). They were horrified at being 
lumped into the same category as Kyiv and Moscow. 21 Indeed, Polish nationalists 
suggested that 'the idea of Partnership for Peace is an idea that Stalin himself would 
have been proud of. 22 The PfP especially deflated the Poles, as they felt their role as 
the avant-garde in the anti-Soviet crusade earned them a special accolade. The fact 
that the Poles had just been put on an equal footing with Ukraine, was regarded by 
Warsaw as an 'inadequate step in the right direction'. 23 
Furthermore, PfP negatively impinged on prospects for subregional processes. 
Since the PfP failed to make an allowance for subregional groupings, some even 
regarded the subregional process doomed as a result. 24 For example, the PfP failed to 
specify any mechanism of co-operation with existing subregional groupings. Indeed, 
the contrary was true as again the individualised nature of the PfP exacerbated 
competitive tensions within the group, especially between the westernmost Visegrad 
members. The dissatisfaction of the CEES with PfP was such that a few months later 
a meaningful commitment to their inclusion in NATO enlargement was demanded . 
25 
As a result, Clinton proclaimed in Warsaw in July 1994, that NATO expansion was 
6no longer a question of whether, but when and how'. While on 30th September 1994 
'0 Kobrinskaja, Dlugi Koniec Zimnej Wojny, p. 67. 
21 The speech of 1. Raclu to the NATO Consultative Committee on 30 May 1994 was publised in the Romanian 
press under the title 'Partnership for Peace will save Romania'. See Kobrinskaja, Dlugi Koniec Zimnei Wojny, 
p. 69. 
22 ibid., p. 68 
23 ibid., p. 65. 
24 ibid., p. 67. 
2' Although at the same time as PfP was announced, the Alliance proclaimed that 'we expect and would welcome 
NATO expansion that would reach to democratic states to our East', no t1mescale was mentioned. 
P. 
Kolodziej'czyk, 'Poland -A Future NATO Ally', NATO Review, No. 5,1994, p. 7. The issue of the integration 
of Central and East European States into the European Union was finally discussed at the surMrflt of 
leaders of 
the EU in December 1994. Similarly, one of the first explicit and unambigous references to 
Poland's 
membership of NATO was made in September 1994 at a meeting of 
NATO defence ministers. 
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at a meeting of NATO defence ministers, the German Minister of Defence Volker 
Ruhe argued that 'We must at last say who is welcome to join NATO and who is not. 
I believe that the countries of the Visegrad Group should be the leading candidates for 
membership of the European Union and NATO'. 26 Ukraine was thus again placed in a 
predicament it had spent three years trying to avoid: with NATO enlargement 
threatening to take in its Western neighbours, Ukraine was in danger of being left to 
face the economic, military and political pressures from Russia on its own. 
Relations From 1994 Onwards 
Initially, the Ukrainians were not overtly opposed to the CEES entry into NATO, and 
Poland's in particular. They were however, certainly extremely concerned at the 
danger of Ukraine ending up in a buffer zone between the two military blocs, forced to 
remain beyond Western structures yet refusing to join CIS bodies. Furthermore, 
because it was not possible to predict the nature of Moscow's response to Polish 
membership, notwithstanding Yeltsin's original support for the idea, Kyiv was fearful 
that Ukraine might bear the brunt of Russia's wrath. This concern coincided with a 
growing Western interest in Ukraine. According to Zbigniew Brzezinski, along with 
the enlargement of NATO, 'the most effective means with which the West can impede 
Russia from becoming a expansionist state, is decisive support for Ukraine's battle for 
economic stability and democracy'. While it is misleading to suggest that there was a 
consensus in the West about the approach that needed to be adopted towards Ukraine, 
the fact that Nicholas Bums, a representative of the US Secretary of State, has argued 
that Ukraine is most likely to remain a key strategic priority for US in the next century 
suggests that Ukraine was beginning to figure more prominently than hitherto. 
27 
Ukrainian objections to Poland's entry into NATO were often vociferously 
expressed, leading to the occasional sharp exchange between the two 'strategic 
partners'. 28 It is perhaps worth pointing out that eminent Western analysts were in 
sympathy with the position of Ukraine. Zbigniew Brzezinski argued that if Poland was 
26 Pastusiak, Subregional Cooepration Among Central European Countries. 
27 Authors translation from Kobrinskaja, Dlugi Koniec Zininej Wojny, p. 89. 
28 On a visit of the speaker of the speaker of the Polish SqJm to Kyiv in October 1995, the then Prime 
Minister 
Marchuk urged the Poles to be cautious about joining NATO, in response to which the speaker Zych replied 
they would 'not retreat'. SWB, 9 October 1995. 
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faced with the choice of either NATO membership or continued Ukrainian 
independence, Warsaw should choose the latter, presumable because of the danger of 
leaving Ukraine isolated . 
29 However, despite the objections of the Ukrainians, 
Russians and others, the Poles, Czechs and Hungarians pressed ahead regardless, 
insisting on their right to membership of NATO . 
30 The Slovaks were more uncertain 
in this regard, as were the hesitant Romanians. The Moldovans remained preoccupied 
with their internal turmoil. 
Compounding the predicament of the Ukrainians was the fact that Poland's 
inclusion in NATO, had the potential to sow additional seeds of discord between Kyiv 
and Warsaw, more so than between Kyiv and any other CEE capitals. The most 
dangerous issue as far as Kyiv was concerned was Poland's over-willingness as a 
member of the Alliance to station nuclear weapons and foreign troops on its soil, 
despite Ukraine's objections. 31 On many occasions, the Ukrainians pressed their 
case. 32 The Poles remained intransigent, thereby demonstrating a lack of a coherent 
rational Eastern policy according to Garnett. 33 Indeed, Garnett suggested that 'Poland 
should declare that while it is prepared to be a full member of NATO, it sees no need 
under current military conditions to play host to nuclear weapons or foreign combat 
forces'. 34 The Poles nevertheless remained obstinate and eventually entered NATO 
without making such a declaration. 
Ukraine adopted a twin track approach. First, it started to press for a more 
formal relationship with Brussels. On 1 June 1995 President Kuchma proposed a 
special partnership with NATO in the form of a Charter on a Distinctive Partnership 
with NATO. 35 In the context of the drive of the CEES westward, Ukraine saw tighter 
29 Nashe Slove, 21 April 1996. 
30 For more details on this see the report 'Poland-NATO' which was the result of discussions at the Euro-Atlantic 
Association and the Stefan Batory Foundation. See also, W. Cimoszewicz, Building Poland's Security: 
Membership of NATO a Key Objective, NATO Review, No. 3,1996, pp. 3-5; also Kolodziejczyk, 'Poland -A 
Future NATO Ally', pp. 7-10 
3' This was made clear by the the Polish Defence Minister Zbigniew Okonski. PAP News Wire, 27 Sep 1995. 
32 For example, in his speach to the OSCE in Lisbon in December 1996, President Kuchma argued that 'Ukraine, 
more than any other country, has the full right to touch on the issue of non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the 
territories of the states of Central and Eastern Europe, and to be able to depend on understanding and support 
for its position'. Uriadovy Kurier, 5 December 1996. 
33 Garnett, 'Poland: Bulwark or BridgeT, pp. 66-82. 
34 ibid., p. 8 1. 
35 There is some confusion on who initiated the 
idea of the Charter. Kuzio argues that 'on a visit to NATO in June 
1995 by the Ukrainian foreign minister, Ukraine was offered a special relationship with the alliance along the 
lines of the one promised to Russia'. T. 
Kuzio, Ukraine Under Kuchnza (New York: St. Martin's Press 1997) p. 
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ties with NATO as critical to avoid ending up as a buffer state. Second, the Ukrainians 
took advantage of the expansion process to reinvigorate failing bilateral ties, in 
particular with Poland and Romania. Indeed support for Poland in the NATO 
enlargement process appears to have been exchanged for Warsaw's support for Kyiv's 
efforts at participation in the wider integration process. This was hinted at by 
President Kwasniewski, who suggested that 'decisions will be made about the 
widening of NATO, therefore Poland needs to demonstrate a lot of activity not only in 
the European Union and NATO, but also regionally'. 36 The link between Poland's 
prospects for inclusion in NATO on the one hand, and more vigorous regional 
activity, something that above all related to Ukraine, was made explicit. In turn, 
Ukraine's stance toward Polish entry into NATO softened as progress was made on 
the Charter, and as Ukraine joined European institutions. 37 Expressing this new found 
stance, in a television interview while on a visit to Poland, President Kuchma voiced 
the view that Ukrainian neutrality did not preclude co-operation with NATO or any 
other European institution, arguing that NATO expansion is not perceived as a threat 
in Ukraine. Thus early suspicions of NATO enlargement and opposition to the issues 
of foreign troops and nuclear weapons being stationed on Polish soil, came to be 
replaced by what might be called 'positive passivity' toward enlargement and 
acceptance of NATO assurance that there was no intention to station either troops or 
weapons on the soil of new entrants. The net result was that Kyiv's position on 
NATO enlargement shifted and it endorsed this process. This in turn eased Poland's 
accession into the Alliance. 38 
The Poles were accommodating in return. The visit by the Polish President to 
Kyiv in May 1997 to sign the much heralded 'Declaration on Agreement and Unity' 
between Poland and Ukraine, in addition to the earlier Memorandum on the 
Liberalisation of Trade in January, was designed to send a clear signal to NATO in 
194. However, according to Roman Luchinski, the late director of the NATO Inforination Centre in Kyiv, it was 
the Ukrainians who proposed the idea, one which apparently NATO originally scoffed. (Converstation with 
author, Kyiv 1997) Roman Zwarych, a Rukh member of parliament, suggested that Ukraine's position toward 
NATO only became crystallised following the Copenhagen Agreement in the summer of 1996. (Conversation 
with author, February 2000). 
36 Den, 5 Feb 1997. 
37 R. Wolczuk, 'Ukraine and Europe: Relations Since Independence', Ukrainian Review, Vol. 44, No. 1, Spring 
1997, pp. 38-53. 
38 Pavliuk, 'U-krainian-Polish Relations', p. 46. 
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anticipation of the upcoming 1997 summit as to the strength of the relationship 
between them. 39 In July 1997 Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic were invited to 
apply for membership at the NATO Madrid summit. At the same time, Ukraine signed 
a Charter with NATO formalising its hitherto ever warming ties and taking a step 
towards avoiding the isolation of finding itself between two military blocs, a position 
40 it so desperately feared . 
The signing of the Charter was thus a significant achievement for Ukraine and 
41 
the government was delighted . It 
had avoided isolation, or, worse being left to face 
Moscow on its own. Despite the fact that the Charter lacked juridical force, which the 
Ukrainians yearned for, it was imbued with political significance. 42 The document 
concerns itself with a delineation of spheres of co-operation and partnership. Broadly, 
the Charter is split into 5 sections. The first section provides a context for the 
Ukraine-NATO relationship, with a commitment to stronger and wider co-operation, 
and a distinctive relationship which promotes stability in Europe. The second section 
outlines the principles at the foundation of the relationship, such as recognition of the 
indivisibility of OSCE area states, and respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity 
and political independence of states. The third section delineates areas for consultation 
and military co-operation, while the fourth section outlines the practical arrangements 
for co-operation and consultation. The fifth section refers to the security assurances 
provided to Ukraine by the five nuclear powers on the former's accession to the NPT, 
and commits Ukraine and NATO to co-operation on CFE adaptation and crisis 
consultation mechanisms. For Sherr, the document represents further progress along 
the road of 'de facto integration with NATO' with the military-political nature of 
43 document reinforcing the ties evolving at the military-operational level . In summary, 
"the overwhelming benefit of the NATO-Ukraine relationship is the establishment of 
networks which both institutionalise and personalise the West's commitment to 
39 Uriadovy Kurier, 22 May 1997. 
40 The full Charter is in Narodna Armiya, II July 1997. 
41 Conversation with official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kyiv, July 1997. 
42 Inevitably, the signing of the document exacerbated internal domestic tensions. Marchenko, a Member of 
Parliament and a member of the Progressive Socialist Party, regarded the document as illegitimate as 
it was not 
subjected to ratification. He was almost definately right in arguing that it was not subjected to ratification as 
it 
was unlikely to have been ratified by the left-wing 
dominated parliament. (Conversation with author, Kyiv 
1997). 
43 Sherr, Ukraine's New Time of Troubles, p. 2 1. 
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enhance what Horbulin has called Ukraine's 'role in ensuring European political and 
economic stability. ý9 44 
A contrast with the Founding Act signed between Russia and NATO is also 
revealing of the nature of the document. For Russia, guided by the perception of itself 
as a major power and of NATO as an antagonist, the Founding Act is an instrument of 
control, designed to develop transparency between the two signatories; the document 
is in fact a corollary of arms control agreements and as such should contribute to the 
stabilisation of relations. On the other hand, Ukraine is a regional power lacking any 
global ambitions. As such it is not antagonistic to NATO, and does not perceive the 
latter as such; in the main Ukraine has excellent relations with NATO states. For 
reasons such as these, there was no need to incorporate confidence building measures 
and transparency. 45 
The strength of Ukraine's relations with NATO was amply demonstrated, and 
they were put under their severest strain, as a result of NATO's actions in Kosovo in 
March 1999. The Ukrainian parliament, both left and right wing, was outraged at what 
it saw as an attack on a sovereign state, a Slavic one at that. While the left was 
incandescent at the principle of NATO undermining the sovereignty of a state, the 
right was fearful of the establishment of a precedent which Russia might take 
advantage of in relations with Ukraine. On 24 March a resolution urging the 
Ukrainian government to 'change the country's non-nuclear status' was approved 
overwhelmingly by parliament. The parliament also unequivocally condemned the 
actions of the Western alliance, with the left wing vociferously calling on the 
President to withdraw Ukraine from the PfP, as had Russia. The Communists, in 
particular, threatened to 're-examine' relations with Russia and pushed for the 
withdrawal of Ukraine's ambassadors to NATO. Despite the intense pressure, the 
President remained steadfast in his commitment to continued participation in PfP and 
tighter ties with NATO, reiterating that 'Ukraine needs military and other co-operation 
46 with NATO' . He 
dismissed the proposal for renuclearisation. At the same time, the 
Foreign Ministry reassured the west 'that it was not paiting ways with Europe'. 
47 
44 
ibid., p. 2 1. 
45 Author's conversation with Roman Lishchynski, head of NATO Infori-nation Centre in Kyiv, 1997. 
46 STRA TFOR Global Intelligence Update, 26 March 1999. 
47K 
yiv Post, I April 1999. 
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Kyiv also rebuffed initiatives on the part of Minsk and Moscow for it to join 
forces with them in a joint stance against NATO. For example, at a meeting of Heads 
of CIS states in Moscow on I April, although Yeltsin called for a strategic partnership 
between Kyiv and Moscow, Russia was 'unable to wring sufficient concessions from 
Ukraine to stop the NATO bombing'. 48 The best Moscow could offer at the summit 
49 
was an agreement to co-ordinate efforts to achieve a rapid cessation of hostilities. 
By the end of the first week of April, the anti-NATO drive in Ukraine had 
fizzled out. On 6 April an attempt (one of six) to muster a parliamentary majority to 
support a resolution to sever Ukraine's ties with NATO failed. 50 This was primarily 
due to the fact that the right wing of parliament, while temporarily prepared to side 
with the left, was not prepared to sacrifice Ukraine's relations with NATO. Indeed, 
while the left proposed the renuclearisation resolution as an anti-NATO move, the 
right saw it as an anti-Russian step. The resilience of the President also helped explain 
the failure of parliament. The President was only too aware that breaking ties with 
NATO was a step he could ill-afford, threatening as it did not only isolation, but also 
the danger of being perceived as siding with Moscow. 
However, indubitably, the NATO bombing presented Ukraine with a problem. 
Firstly, there is little doubt that NATO's image as a stabilising influence had suffered 
in the eyes of the public. Secondly, the longer the bombing continued, the greater was 
the likelihood that Ukraine and Russia would eventually end up at loggerheads as 
regards the issue. Thirdly, the NATO bombing had a more pernicious and less 
tangible long term impact in that a worsening of relations with NATO represented a 
threat to Kuchma's multi-vectored foreign policy strategy. 
Kyiv was helped out of its predicament by the relatively early cessation of the 
bombing following the capitulation of the Serbs. To tackle the damage its public 
image had suffered in Ukraine, NATO invited Ukrainian journalists to witness what 
had gone on in Kosovo, something which brought the media onto its side, much to 
Brussels' relief Furthermore, the early cessation also meant that Ukraine's relations 
with Russia were saved from further deterioration, while Russia's financial 
dependence on the West spared Moscow further difficulties. 
"Reuters, I April 1999. 
49 Kyiv Post, 8 April 1999. 
50 ibid. See also Kyiv Post, 22 April 1999. 
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Overall, in the six years following independence, Ukraine's relationship with 
NATO underwent considerable change. The original commitment to neutrality and 
non-bloc status, which was in danger of leaving Ukraine in an uncomfortable limbo, 
was gradually replaced by a more positive stance toward the organisation, a stance 
which led to the institutionalisation of co-operation with NATO. Since the signing of 
the Charter, Ukraine has remained amongst the more enthusiastic participants in the 
Partnership for Peace programme. The Kosovo crisis put the relationship between 
Kyiv and Brussels under severe strain. Nevertheless, a year on, the relationship seems 
to have prospered with few long term repercussions. 
The European Union 
Membership of the EU represented the summit of Ukraine's ambitions in tem-is of 
foreign policy objectives. This was hardly surprising. In dramatic contrast to the 
North-eastern azimuth in general, and Russia in particular, the EU represented a 
potentially significant source of credits, finance and markets with which Russia 
simply could not compete. The policy of membership of the EU was initiated by 
Ukraine's first president, Leonid Kravchuk, and vigorously pursued by its second 
president Leonid Kuchma, who in 1996 proclaimed membership as a strategic 
objective for Ukraine. However, while Ukraine's relations with NATO underwent a 
qualitative transformation, those with the EU were characterised by quantitative rather 
than qualitative improvements, and even they were highly circumscribed. As will now 
be seen, the dual strategy of developing direct ties with NATO, while taking 
advantage of close ties with prospective EU member-states (especially Poland) and 
subregional institutions, was inadequate to drive Ukraine's relations with the EU 
forward. 
Ties With The EU 
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union (rendering obsolete the 1989 Trade and 
Co-operation Agreement with the European Union) an embryonic relationship began 
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to form between Kyiv and Brussels, culminating in the Partnership and Co-operation 
Agreement (PCA), agreed on 23 March 1994 and signed by Kravchuk in June 1994, 
'beating' Russia to the post by 10 days. This relationship was consolidated by the 
approval of the EU's Common Position on Ukraine soon after in November 1994. The 
pledge to support Ukrainian independence and sovereignty, endorse Ukraine's 
democratic transformation and efforts to maintain its economic stability and integrate 
with the world economy, outlined in the EU Action Plan for Ukraine in December 
1996, was a welcome statement of intent during what was a trying time for Ukraine, 
which in the context of continuing economic collapse, was facing challenges from 
both Romania and Russia. 
The plethora of bilateral committees that sprang up from the PCA, such as the 
EU-Ukraine Co-operation Council and all of its associated sub-committees, and the 
Parliamentary Co-operation Committee, suggested that the relationship was 
prospering. On the part of the Ukrainians the formation of a National Strategy on 
Ukraine's integration into the EU, signed in June 1998, and the creation of a National 
Agency for Development of European Integration, and the establishment of an EU 
Department within the Foreign Ministry all seemed to suggest that Ukraine was 
gradually putting together an infrastructure through which ties would come to be 
consolidated. Steps are currently underway for the establishment of a free trade zone, 
though as two leading Ukrainian economic commentators put it 'objective conditions 
make comprehensive negotiations on establishing a free trade zone premature ... 
fo r 
Ukraine it would mean abolition of its rather high customs tariffs in exchange for 
51 
abolition of comparatively moderate EU tariffs' . 
The establishment of formal ties was accompanied by desperately needed, 
though ultimately relative small-scale, economic assistance from the EU. Kyiv's 
anticipation that Ukraine's role in contributing to the demise of the Soviet Union and 
blocking role in the creation of a viable replacement would elicit a euphoric wave of 
support in the form of loans, aid and closer ties from a grateful West failed to 
materialise. The European response was mainly co-ordinated by the European Union 
on behalf of the G24/G7 in collaboration with the IN4F and the World Bank. 
Independently the European Union has been one of the principal international donors 
51 Burakovsky and Biletsky, Ukraine's Way to the European Union, p. 31. 
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to Ukraine, with ECU 3.9 billion having been provided between 1991-1998 in 
technical and financial assistance. The TACIS programme represented over ECU 823 
million of this, with ECU 105 million going to the nuclear safety program and ECU 
60.5 million to the EU/G-7 Action Plan for the Chernobyl shut down. It is estimated 
that between 1996 and 1999 ECU538 million of TACIS funds were channelled to 
Ukraine through the Country Action Programme, the EU/G-7 Plan for Chernobyl and 
the Interstate, Nuclear Safety and Cross-border Co-operation Programmes. 52 In 
addition, the EU provided macroeconomic assistance for 1997 to support the IMF-led 
programme for stabilisation and economic reform. For a nation of 50 million, these 
were not large sums of money. 
However, the grants, credits and loans that accompanied the establishment of 
formal ties have not prevented the emergence of damaging tensions between the two 
from early on. Much of this is attributable to actions by Kyiv. Firstly, Ukraine has 
pursued actions which are contrary to the provisions of the PCA, as well as those of 
the rules of the WTO, with which PCA provisions were effectively harmonised. By 
introducing excessive and expensive certification on certain goods, of tariffs and 
certain excise duties, Ukraine was effectively reneging on its commitment to eliminate 
protectionist measures and progress toward the liberalisation of trade. The argument 
put forward by Kyiv that Ukraine's drastic and ongoing economic collapse, resulting 
in massive underemployment, and growing unemployment, necessitated protection of 
the few domestic producers that were still producing, was not accepted. The Ukrainian 
retort highlighted the quotas, restrictions and/or anti-dumping measures imposed on 
the few Ukrainian goods that were internationally competitive, in particular, textiles, 
steel products and chemicals. 
It was clear that Kyiv got its strategy wrong. Above all, it fundamentally 
underestimated the implications of the demands of the PCA as well as the rules of the 
WTO, the membership of which was so fervently sought, but also the ramifications of 
rejecting the need to abide by laws and agreements which Ukraine voluntarily 
subjected itself to, or its 'legislative nihilism'. 
53 As Sherr points out 'Ukraine's 
political leaders have sometimes acted as if they could achieve integration by 
'2 Information gleaned from various editions of Ukraine- Country Report, Economist Intelligence 
Unit. 
530. Pavliuk, The European Union and Ukraine: The Needfor a New Vision, Policy Paper Based on the Study on 
the Current State and Prospects of Relations Between the 
European Union and Ukraine , 1999, p. 
12. 
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declaration, or simply by joining and participating in international organisational and 
political clubs rather than by undertaking concrete structural changes' . 
54 policy 
makers then, miscalculated the damage a reversal of liberalisation would do to 
Ukraine's wider objectives, namely membership of key international institutions such 
as the EU and the WTO. This in itself reflected flawed strategic reasoning, as 
4accession to the WTO was ... seen as a goal in itself, rather than as an element of 
comprehensive economic policy and development', something which Ukraine still 
55 sorely lacks . 
Secondly, Kyiv became increasingly convinced that the EU was not exactly 
welcoming Ukraine with open arms. For example, notwithstanding the limited 
economic value of the PCA, versions of which, after all, had been signed with a 
number of the other former Soviet Republics, the ratification of the PCA was such a 
drawn out process, that in 1996 Kuchma felt compelled to castigate the member states 
of the EU over their slowness. 56 This complaint was voiced in spite of the Interim 
Agreement (IA), which was signed by Kuchma in June 1995, becoming effective on 
the lst February 1996, on aspects of the Agreement not requiring ratification by the 
parliaments of the European nations. In addition, the economic support provided by 
the EU was small in relative as well as absolute terms: Poland, a smaller and less 
problematic case, received ECU 2 billion of technical assistance compared to the ECU 
823 million Ukraine received. The economic support was thus inadequate, especially 
when contrasted with Ukrainian expectations. In part this is attributable to the lack of 
progress in creating conditions for a market economy. However, much to the 
consternation of the Ukrainians, Kyiv also believes that Ukraine remains deliberately 
excluded from the European integration process and 'is not seen by the EU as a full 
and integral part of it', or in President Kuchma's words, 'nobody awaits us in the 
West 57 
At the root of these problems is a disparity of thinking, understanding and 
perception. Ostensibly, Ukraine's decision to pursue 'the strategic objective' of 
54 Sherr, Ukraine's New Time of Troubles, p. 12. 
55 ibid., p. 11. 
56 Only Spain, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Ireland and Luxembourg had ratified the agreement by that stage. 
See Uriadovy Kurier, 8th June 1996, No: 104-105, for the text of the speech delivered to the WEU. 
57 Pavliuk, The European Union and Ukraine, p. 12. 
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membership of the EU implied a two-tier objective. On one level, the objective of 
joining the EU represented a desire on the part of Ukraine to reverse its technological 
backwardness and non-competitiveness by gaining access to the foreign credits, 
investments, technologies and markets that come with membership of the EU. The 
alternative, a renewal of economic and political ties with Russia , is an anathema to 
strategists in Ukraine. The goal of membership of the EU reflects strategic thinking 
that is likely to shape Ukraine socio-economic and geopolitical direction in the 
decades to come. On another level, the decision to pursue membership implied a 
willingness on the part of the Ukrainians to satisfy the more concrete political and 
economic requirements of EU membership. While Ukraine's commitment to the first 
level objectives is beyond doubt, its willingness to adhere to the demands of the 
second set is distinctly more suspect. Specifically, while there are a few question 
marks over Ukraine's commitment to the ideals democracy, the rule of law, the 
promotion of human rights, and the protection of minority interests, Ukraine's 
relations with the EU continue to flounder principally because of doubts concerning 
Kyiv's commitment to a functioning market economy: liberalisation of prices and 
trade remain still distant goals; barriers to market entry and disappearance are still 
prominent. Property rights, laws and contractual obligations remain far from 
transparent. Progress in the transformation of the financial sector is slow and 
interference by the state continues. All remain significant impediments to the full 
58 emergence of a market economy in Ukraine. By 1999 , it was clear that the 
Ukrainians had fundamentally failed to understand that the admirable and far-sighted 
objectives of the first level were inextricably linked to the achievement of the 'bread 
and butter' second level objectives. In Kyiv, strategic thinking about the 'grand 
scheme of things' took precedence over the putting together of the nuts and bolts that 
would make such schemes work. There was a disparity between the desire to 
integrate, and the steps taken to bring about integration. 
58 Sherr argues that the West was not blameless in the problems encountered by Kyiv in the implementation of 
reform. Firstly, he suggests that the West misdiagnosed the problem, and as a result 'the dominant Western 
models of reform - macroeconomic rather than institutional in focus, financial and economic rather than 
political-economic in emphasis - were derived from 'medicine' successfully applied to poorly functioning or 
dilapidated market econonues instead of the command economy which Ukraine inherited'. Secondly, the 
national-economic cause of the collapse of the Soviet Union was misperceived as a politico-ideological issue. 
The third mistake, ironically, was to neglect political and institutional issues at the expense of econormc and 
technical solutions. See Sherr, Ukraine's New Time of Troubles, pp. 9-10. 
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This misunderstanding of the link between the two levels camouflaged a 
further flaw: guided by a strong conviction of its geopolitical significance for 
example, as a 'buffer against Russia', a commercial transit point, a country where 
'East meets West', Kyiv failed to appreciate that 'its democratic development and 
economic performance matter more for the EU' . 
59There has been a decade-long lack 
of realisation on the part of Kyiv, that geopolitical significance does not immediately 
translate into cash lump sums or painless integration into Western structures. There is 
only a budding awareness that there is a price to be paid for the benefits of belonging 
to Western structures. 
The Role Of The EU In Ukraine's Bilateral Ties And In Regard To Prospects 
For Subregional Integration 
If Ukraine's relations with the EU were disappointing on a bilateral level, they were 
even more so in two other regards. Firstly, the EU actively promoted measures, which 
contributed to the damaging of Ukraine's relations with Western neighbours. This was 
particularly so in relation to Ukraine's biggest trading partner, Poland. Poland's 
growing proximity to EU structures imposed demands on Poland. Joining the 
Schengen Agreement and the imposition of a visa regime with Poland would mean the 
effective closure of its increasingly open and lucrative border with Ukraine, to the 
detriment of its undeveloped border regions . 
60 Furthermore, the imposition of EU 
external tariffs is hardly likely to be looked upon favourably by a Ukraine already 
irritated by what it sees as unfair treatment. Such measures are likely to exacerbate the 
existing differences in the degree of economic transformation that so distinguish 
Ukraine from Poland. Furthermore, as Poland and other CEES come ever to closer to 
joining the EU there is the fear that Ukraine might be denied the already limited funds 
trickling in from Brussels, further emphasising differences between them. In addition, 
as the CEES integrate Ukraine is likely to face anti-dumping accusations as its non- 
competitive industries are exposed to the full blast of competition from more efficient 
59 ibid., P. 10. 
" Kowerski, Wplyw Handly z Ukraina. 
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producers. Furthermore, as the CEES prepare to access the EU, their relative interest 
in Ukraine is likely to tail 0 ff . 
61 
The EU strategy of focusing on CEES accession candidates had further 
ramifications, in that it fundamentally undermined a key dimension of Ukraine's 
strategy of integrating with European structures via bilateral relations with CEES. Of 
the few areas in which Ukraine produced goods of world class competitiveness, most 
were in military production, much of it very high technology. In fact, Ukraine saw 
military-industrial co-operation with the states of Central and East Europe because of 
their strengthening ties with NATO, as a means of tying itself more closely to 
European structures. This strategy is seen as especially pertinent in light of the 
ongoing consolidation that is expected to take place in Europe as a means of avoiding 
Europe's technological dependence on the USA something which Kyiv hoped would 
increase its appeal to the EU, especially in terms of its production of space technology 
and aeronautics. 62 
The second way in which the EU negatively affected Ukraine's regional 
objectives was by failing to place sufficient emphasis on subregional developments. 
For example, expectations as to the benefits of Euroregions in Ukrainian-Polish 
relations were not fulfilled. The first such region, the Carpathian Euroregion (with 
Poland, Ukraine, Hungary, and Slovakia as members and Romania as an observer) 
was created in 1993. It was known as the 'poorest Euroregion'. The initiative was 
acknowledged as having failed to provide the necessary stimulus for economic 
rejuvenation in these regions located far from administrative centres. By 1995 two of 
Hungary's four participating regions had withdrawn. 
63 Of more direct interest to 
Ukrainian-Polish relations was the Buh Euroregion created in 1996 and made up of 
the Volyn' oblast in Ukraine and four border provinces in Poland. However, by 1998, 
this Euroregion had singularly failed to deliver the investments that were hoped for. 
Worse, was the fact that in the case of Ukraine and Poland the creation of the 
Euroregions exacerbated the ethnic tensions they were meant to eliminate. According 
to some sources, this was especially true on the Polish side. For example, civic 
leaders 
in Przemyszl were suspicious of Ukrainian intentions in the region, believing that the 
61 Burakovsky and Biletsky, Ukraine's Way to the European Union, passim. 
62 Honchar, Moskalets and Nalivka, 'Vidhon-lin Serpnevoho Stusu', passim. 
63 Kvivski Vidomosti, 17 Jan 1997 
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Ukrainians were planning to 'dominate' in the region. 64 On the other hand, Ukraine's 
attitude towards Euroregions were shown when Polish proposals for other 
Euroregions on the Ukraine-Poland border were dismissed by the Ukrainian side. 65 
The extent to which the EU inadvertently undermined the development of the 
specifically CEE subregional institutions by not overtly encouraging the inclusion of 
new members was especially worrying for Kyiv as it set great store by these 
institutions. 66 In particular, the extent to which CEFTA would cease to be a viable 
institution as its members abandoned it for the EU was a major concern for Ukraine. 
In such a case, the alternatives for Kyiv remained very limited. 
Overall, Ukraine's relations with EU were characterised by grand 
pronouncements. This is hardly surprising, as from the standpoint of Kyiv 
membership of the EU formed the cornerstone of its emergence into the wider world. 
Ties with the EU were a means of avoiding being sucked back into the economic and 
political orbit of Russia, and the backwardness that that entailed. In contrast, the EU 
offered the capital, technology and markets that could propel Ukraine rapidly towards 
modernity. Yet despite the pronouncements, after a decade of independence, 
Ukraine remains nearly as far beyond EU structures as it was at the start. Indeed, 
Ukrainian expectations of some albeit vague and unspecified commitment on the part 
of the EU at the Helsinki summit in December 1999 went unfulfilled, something 
which was particularly distressing to Kyiv. 67 Clearly to a large extent this is 
attributable to Ukraine's own poor internal development. The lack of appreciation that 
economic reform (notwithstanding the dire state of the economy, and the hardship that 
further reform will impose) is a prerequisite for its future integration into the EU is 
causing a regression in relations with the EU. Kyiv's hopes that the Greek example 
would be followed in its case, when Athens was allowed into the EU for political 
rather than economic reasons, are forlorn. Ukraine is a considerably bigger and 
tougher problem from the perspective of Brussels. Indeed, the economic turmoil 
Ukraine went through in the summer of 1998 in response to the Russian economic 
64 Nashe Slovo, 5 April 1997. 
6' Authors conversation with Eva Figel, the second secretary at the Polish Embassy in Kyjv in June 1997. 
66 Conversation with official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Kyiv, October 1999. 
67 Converstation with Boris Hudyma, the Ambassador of the Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the EU, February 
2000, Wilton Park, Steyning. 
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crisis was a clear message to the EU that ties between the two states were such that by 
taking on Ukraine the EU would also bear a substantial Russian burden. 
Compounding the problem, from the perspective of Brussels, is the fact that 
Ukraine is a source of significant number of threats: Western capitals are already 
home to large and growing numbers of economic migrants from Ukraine (some legal; 
most illegal. It is estimated that currently there are 500,000 illegal immigrants in 
Ukraine, a figure that is likely to swell because of Ukraine's continued visa-free 
68 regime with GUUAM states reaffirmed in September 2000). In addition, Ukraine's 
nuclear problem remains worrying for Brussels. Furthermore, as far as the EU is 
concerned, the geopolitical reasons for including Ukraine are not compelling. The 
alternatives for Europe are such that Ukraine is not an indispensable component in the 
developing architecture of Europe: a route through Turkey for Caspian hydrocarbons 
is a more than viable alternative. Ukraine's technology, without further inputs of 
research and development is dating rapidly. Finally Ukraine, by pilfering Russian gas 
going toward the West has been instrumental in creating occasional gas shortages in 
the West: this unreliability on the part of Ukraine appears to be the motive behind the 
decision of key European gas companies to sip a memorandum of understanding in 
October 2000 to build a pipeline to further bypass Ukraine in the hydrocarbon 
transportation process. 69 Despite all the negative signals emanating from 
Brussels, according to policy-shapers in Kyiv, Ukraine has no viable alternative to the 
Western option and membership of the EU, as the Russian azimuth is simply not 
appealing. 70 However, all of the available evidence suggests that Ukraine's objectives 
count for little in Brussels. 
The Impact Of Ukraine's Relations with States Along The 
Western Azimuth On Relations With Russia And The CIS 
68 Wall Street Journal Europe, 15 September 2000. 
69 RFEIRL, Vol. 2, No. 39,24 October 2000. 
70 Discussion with M. Honchar, senior advisor to 
Volodymyr Horbulin, the secretary of the National Security and 
Defense Council, in Kyiv, October 1999. 
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The pressing objective for both Ukraine and CEES in the early years following the 
collapse of the Soviet Union was how to deal with the security problem presented by 
Russia. Because the issues in their respective relations with Russia differed, CEES 
capitals and Kyiv pursued independent, non co-ordinated and often incongruent 
policies. Inevitably, contradictory approaches would damage the development of 
bilateral relations between them, and their co-operation in subregional and regional 
integration. 
As far as Kyiv was concerned, harmonious bilateral ties with CEES, especially 
with Poland, were highly desirable. Such ties were important if Kyiv was to deal with 
the immense pressure emanating from Russia for both stronger military and security 
ties with Ukraine, and Kyiv's participation in CIS structures. However, at the same 
time as Ukraine's relations with Russia started to hit new lows from 1992 onwards, 
especially as regards the BSF and Russian claims to Crimea, Poland, more so than the 
other CEE republics, was cultivating its own relations with Moscow, at the expense of 
Ukraine. 
In 1991/2 Poland's chances of NATO membership were negligible. Thus 
Poland was forced to pursue an independent line regarding Russia, one that made its 
foreign and security policy incompatible with that of Ukraine. Irrespective of the 
damage to Poland's relations with Ukraine, the Polish Foreign Minister Andrzej 
Olechowski made clear that the Poles 'would not do anything that would make it more 
difficult for Russia to become democratic and friendly' toward Poland. 71 Indeed, the 
intensity of Warsaw's ties with Moscow construed a significant impediment to the 
development of ties with Kyiv, as will be seen below. Despite domestic criticisms, in 
1992 both the Minister of Defence Janus Onyszkiewicz and the Head of the 
Department of National Security, Jerzy Milewski, held to the line that co-operation 
with Russia was unavoidable and even indispensable to deal with Poland's 
geopolitical predicament. Working within a framework that presupposed that Russia 
was the dominant feature in Western strategic planning and that therefore Poland's 
chances of joining NATO were minimal, Polish strategists pursued a number of 
objectives. Firstly, while keen to remove foreign troops from Polish soil, they were 
also cognisant of the need to guarantee supplies and maintain access to spare parts for 
71 Jan B. De Weydenthal, 'Poland's Eastern Policy', RFEIRL Research Report, Vol. 3, No. 7,18 Feb 1994, p. 13. 
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the Soviet era technology used by Polish forces. Secondly, it was deemed important to 
support the Russian market in its purchases of Polish military production. Thirdly, and 
most directly impacting on relations with Ukraine, was the need to ensure the constant 
72 
supply of Russian raw materials. Fourth, was the desire of Poland to benefit from the 
transportation of gas from the huge Russian fields which met approximately 25 per 
cent of Western European energy needs in 1997, a figure which was projected to 
grow. 73 The temptation presented by the last issue was too strong to resist and is one 
of the clearest examples of Poland sticking to a Russia-first policy to the detriment of 
its relations with Kyiv. It is worth examining in some detail. 
Ukraine, Poland And The Transportation Of Russian Gas 
One of the few effective weapons Kyiv could take advantage of in its ongoing 
political and economic struggle with Russia was Ukraine's virtual monopoly on the 
transportation of Russia gas to the west - the Ukrainian network carried some 90 per 
74 
cent of the total . This monopoly conferred on Ukraine a number of significant 
advantages. Firstly, it provided an important source of income. Secondly, by fair 
means or foul Ukraine was virtually guaranteed a supply of much needed, though 
often unaffordable, gas. Thirdly, by threatening at times to cut off the pipeline in 
pursuit of political and economic advantage, Kyiv had at its disposal one of the few 
means of leverage against a much more generously endowed Russia. Fourthly, by 
virtue of the fact that the Russians were highly dependent on the hard currency 
generated by the sale of raw materials to the West, any threat by Moscow to 
undermine Ukraine's independence by suspending oil and gas supplies was hardly 
realistic. For these reasons, the decision by Moscow in 1992 to build a new pipeline 
bypassing Ukraine, going instead through Belarus and Poland, was therefore from a 
geopolitical viewpoint predictable and understandable. The proposed 2500 mile 
pipeline, running from the vast gas field on the Yamal peninsula, across Belarus to 
72 Kobrinskaja, Dlugi Koniec Zimnej Wojny, p. 38. 
73 According to the United States Energy Information Administration, while the anticipated growth in energy 
consumption in Western Europe is expected to continue more or less unabated, the bulk of the increase will be 
made up by gas, much of it provided by Russia, with some 33 per cent of known reserves, the largest in the 
world. Http: //www. eia. doe. gov/oiaf/ieo98/gas. html#wptrc. 
74 Http: //www. eia. doe. gov/emeu/cabs/ukraine. htn-d 
185 
Kondratki on the Polish-Belarussian border and then across to Gorzyca on the 
German-Polish border, was a conspicuous effort to reduce Russian reliance on 
Ukraine. Joint ventures between Polish and Russian companies for the design and 
management of the pipeline were created in September 1992, while an agreement 
between Moscow and Warsaw on the actual construction of the pipeline was signed in 
August 1994. In the context of its rapidly deteriorating relations with Russia, Ukraine 
75 
construed this step as a 'stab in the back'. In one fell swoop, the Poles deprived the 
Ukrainians of one of their single most important strengths. Irrespective of Ukrainian 
76 
concerns the project progressed, despite some difficulties and doubts. By October 
1996 various segments of the Polish route had been completed, leading to a contract 
being signed in that same month for the transportation of 65.7 billion cubic meters per 
annum by 201 0.77 (The pipeline was made operational at the beginning of 2000). An 
attempt by the Poles to placate the Ukrainians by inviting them to participate in the 
construction of pipelines and compression pumps was unsuccessful. It was an overt 
attempt on the part of Poland to become a link between Europe on the one hand, and 
Russian energy and Ukraine's machine building capacity on the other. 78 In this way, 
not only would Poland have a guaranteed supply of energy (Poland at the time 
received 60 per cent of its natural gas from Russia) and gain from the income derived 
from the transit of energy across its territory, it would also become an indispensable 
part of the European energy transfer network. 
In October 2000 Poland went some way toward redeeming itself in the eyes of 
Ukraine. On 18 October Russia's Gazprom signed a memorandum of understanding 
with major European gas companies to conduct a feasibility study into the building of 
a new section of the Yamal pipeline. The new section would be built going south from 
Poland to Slovakia. In doing so, the pipeline would further reduce the amount of 
Russian gas traversing Ukrainian territory. Poland promptly announced that 'it would 
not support any gas supply scheme that would be to the detriment of Ukraine'. 
79 
While Poland's stance is, from the point of view of Kyiv, admirable, it is unlikely to 
75 Bukkvol, Ukraine and European Security, p. 76. 
76 Http: //www. eia. doe. gov/oiaf/ieo98/gas. html#wptrc. 
77 Russian Oil and Gas Exports Fact Sheet, June 1998, 
United States Energy Information Adnuninstration. 
78 Uriadovy Kurier, 12 Oct 1996. 
79 RFEIRL, Vol. 2, No. 39,24 October 2000. 
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be sustainable. Firstly, in response to Poland's pronouncement, Moscow suggested It 
could examine the possibility of a pipeline crossing the Baltic, thereby bypassing 
Ukraine and Poland. Secondly, Poland is desirous of EU membership, and thus is 
likely to support any plan that links it to the Union more closely. Thirdly, Poland is 
itself in dire need of the revenue that such a pipeline might bring. On the other hand, 
as President Kuchma himself pointed out, 'it takes a lot of time [to proceed] from the 
project to its practical implementation'. 80 In any event, from Kyiv's point of view the 
real culprit is the EU. 
On a smaller scale, similar ties were established between Hungary and Russia, 
as Gazprom bought segments of the Hungarian DKG-IST oil processing plant. In fact, 
because of the intensification of Russia's ties with Poland and Hungary in particular, 
it has been argued that 'it is reasonable to talk about the creation of a regional CEE 
financial-industrial Gazprom group'. 81 In the meantime ties between Russia and 
Slovakia continued to be strong, with the latter acting as a key and enthusiastic 
transportation point for Russian materials. 
Emergent Tensions Between Kyiv and Warsaw 
Continuing the vein of Polish-Russian co-operation up until Ukraine's relations with 
Poland improved from 1994/5 onwards, and possibly even more alanning as far as the 
Ukrainians were concerned, was the proposal in 1992 on the part of the Polish 
Minister of Foreign Affairs that Poland, in collaboration with Russia take 
responsibility for the maintenance of peace on the territory of the former USSR. 82 
This proposal was of concern for two reasons. Firstly, it implied a lesser role for 
Ukraine in the region. Secondly it smacked of a revival of the deeply unpopular 
'Greater Poland'. Thirdly, and even more disconcerting as far as the Ukrainians were 
concerned, was the growing if somewhat far-fetched perception, that not only was 
Ukraine perceived by the Poles as a counterweight to Russia, but that Russia was seen 
as a counterweight to the military threat presented by a sovereign Ukraine. 
80 ibid. 
81 Kobrinskaja, Dlugi Koniec Zimnej Wojny, p. 117. 
" Kobrinskaja, Dlugi Koniec Zininej Wojny, p. 43. 
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Overall, the incompatibility of Moscow's respective relations with Kyiv and 
CEE capitals, whether by accident or design, functioned as a strategy of divide et 
impera up until 1994. In particular, Ukraine's desperate desire to avoid integration 
with the CIS and ever closer ties with Russia meant that Kyiv's relationship with 
Warsaw suffered as the latter sought to turn its position regarding Russia to 
advantage. Russia was disruptive in Ukraine's efforts along its Western azimuth. Not 
only did Russia disrupt Ukraine's ties with Poland. Russia's stance toward Ukraine 
also meant that NATO felt it had to tread carefully in its relations with Kyiv. Yet as 
will now be seen, from 1994/5 relations between Ukraine and the CEES improved 
dramatically thanks to regional developments. 
The Impact Of Ukraine's Relations With States Along The 
North-eastern Azimuth On Relations With States Along The 
Western Azimuth From 1994 
If Russia played a divisive role in the Ukrainian-Polish/CEE relationship prior to 
1993-1994, after 1994 Moscow's struggle to face up to the issues that were 
increasingly challenging it had a paradoxical result. After 1994, Russia inadvertently 
brought about a congruence of Ukraine - Polish/CEE interests. A number of causal 
factors stand out. 
Firstly, the continuation of the power struggle between the Yeltsin refon-nists 
and the Parliamentary conservatives highlighted the potential for a rapid return to the 
past, something as unpalatable for Poland and the other CEES as it was for Ukraine. 
The military attack on the Russian parliament in October 1993 served as a stark 
reminder to leaders in both Warsaw and Kyiv that the reform process in Moscow was 
far from irreversible. The subsequent election of a left-oriented replacement 
parliament in December 1993, reinforced the neighbours' feelings of vulnerability. It 
became clear that Yeltsin remained their best hope. In the case of Ukraine, Yeltsin 
was outspoken in his condemnation of periodic claims by the Russian parliament to 
Chmea and Sevastopol. By 1993 these claims had grown increasingly vociferous, and 
despite his occasional temper tantrum toward Ukraine, he was arguably still the 
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politician who was most tolerant of Ukrainian independence. Similarly, it was Yeltsin 
who in a joint declaration with Walesa in Warsaw on 25 August 1993 acquiesced to 
Poland's entry into NATO, accepting that such a move would not impede Moscow's 
relations with Warsaw. The attack on parliament served to remind both Kyiv and 
Warsaw how fragile their international status remained. A further reminder of the way 
things could still go was Russia's willingness to use force to resolve the 'Chechnya 
problem' in 1994. 
Probably the most significant factor in stimulating an intensification of 
Ukrainian-Polish ties in particular was the gradual return of Belarus to the Russian 
fold from 1993 onwards. The tightening of the economic ties between Belarus and 
Russia that had been created with the establishment of the new rouble zone in 
September 1993 was worrisome to Warsaw and Kyiv. Compounding this was Minsk's 
gradual abandonment of neutrality in favour of closer ties with Moscow culminating 
in a comprehensive military agreement between the two on II March 1994. When 
during 1994, 'Belarus had returned' in the words of Taras Kuzio 'to the status of a 
Russian gubernia, demanding a greater degree of integration than even the current 
Russian government was willing to provide', the signs looked ominous for both 
Poland and Ukraine. 83 Two 'joint' worries stand out. Firstly, the desire by Russia to 
use Belarus as a significant military base presented a major threat to both Ukraine and 
Poland. Secondly, plans for regional structures such as the Baltic-Black Sea axis, 
something Russia was vociferously opposed to and which it warned CEES against 
participating in, would be made obsolete at a stroke. The ever tighter ties between 
Moscow and Minsk, further intensified by the Belarussian referendum on the 
integration of Belarus and Russia in May 1995, culminated in the creation of a 
'Community of Sovereign States' in April 1996 in anticipation of impending NATO 
enlargement. 84 The response of Ukraine and Poland was to co-ordinate their positions 
on Belarus. For example, the Presidents of Ukraine, Poland, and Lithuania overtly 
criticised the closeness between Minsk and Moscow at the OSCE summit in Lisbon at 
the end of 1996, much to the dismay of Russia. 
83 Kum, Ukrainian Security Policy, pp. 79-80. 
84 Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 28 Oct 1996. 
189 
Predictably, Russia perceived the PfP, the enlargement of NATO and the 
formalisation. of Ukraine's ties with NATO through the same prism as it viewed all of 
NATO's activities in the region, namely, as the Western alliance starting to impinge 
on Russia's traditional stamping grounds. Yet in part, it was this narrow Russian 
perception of events to its West that reinforced that which it wished to avoid. By 
failing to develop more normal ties with CEES and Ukraine between 1994 and 1996, 
Russia itself intensified the focus on the security vacuum on the continent. This had 
the opposite effect from that intended. And as NATO's encroachment gained at the 
expense of Russia's proposals for de facto neutral and weakly armed CEE states, 
Primakov expressed the view that 
'if NATO, at the time created to repel global threats, comes to engulf 
the territory of the Warsaw Pact, from our point of view, the 
geopolitical situation will deteriorate. Why? Because, intentions 
change. But opportunities are a constant. Obviously I do not believe 
that NATO will attack us. However, on a hypothetical level a situation 
might emerge in which we will be forced to act in a way which is not 
in our best interests'. 85 
Belatedly, to preclude such a situation emerging, and end the impasse in ties with 
Ukraine at a time when Kyiv's ties with Brussels were improving, Moscow, as we 
have seen, hurriedly signed the Friendship and Co-operation Treaty with Ukraine days 
prior to Ukraine signing a Charter with NATO in 1997. This is a good demonstration 
of Russia's relative impotence, NATO's potency and the relative effectiveness of 
Ukraine's foreign policy stratagems. 
Conclusion To Part 3 
Between 1991 and 1998, Ukraine's relations along the Western azimuth underwent a 
noticeable transfonnation. Relations with CEES represented an avenue of real 
85 Obshchaya Gazieta, 21-27 September 1996. Authors translation taken from Kobrinskaj'a, Dlugi Koniec Zimnej 
Wojny, p. 107. 
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opportunity for Kyiv. The establishment of bilateral ties with Poland, in particular, 
was a key means for Ukraine to reduce its overwhelming economic reliance on 
Russia. And, while the progress in economic terms was not as fruitful as Kyiv (or 
Warsaw) might have hoped, this was to some extent compensated for by the eventual 
emergence of extremely harmonious political ties. It is noteworthy that the stimulus to 
the improvement of ties noted from 1994 onward was provided by extrinsic factors: 
relations between the two of them, despite the proclamations, were never quite 
dynamic enough. 
Relations with Hungary and Slovakia were never expected to be as fulfilling, 
and as a result there were fewer disappointments. Thus, while both proved to be 
important trading partners, neither matched the 'strategic' importance of Poland to 
Ukraine. Yet harmonious relations with them were clearly doing Ukraine no hann. 
The contrast to the above posed by relations with Romania was sharp. The 
removal of the territorial dispute between them came as no small relief to Kyiv. And 
though the matter was not fully resolved, even its temporary resolution made Kyiv 
feel less vulnerable both on its exposed south-western flank, and in general terms, as 
the potential for precendent- setting was there for all to see. The albeit temporary 
resolution of the crisis was driven by the demands of the regional integration process. 
In a similar vein even the partial and temporary resolution of the Moldovan 
problem brought some respite to the region. Russia's relative impotence to impose its 
solution was a relief in itself since it also opened the way for Ukraine to play a 
regional role. Ukraine's increased regional prominence not only bolstered KY1v's 
relations with Kishinev, but set in train a partnership that would come to serve them 
well in the formation of GUUAM, a key subregional organisation within the CIS. 
On a bilateral level, Ukraine's policy along its Western azimuth was a success: 
relations were established with all neighbours, even its most troublesome - significant 
points of contention were removed or postponed. The establishment of harmonious 
relations with CEES was naturally especially welcome in the context of the frequently 
poor state of Ukraine's relations with Russia. As such the Western azimuth brought 
Ukraine a much needed sense of achievement, and bolstered its sometimes fraught 
independent status. However, bilateral relations were merely one stage in a multi- 
stage process. Above all, Kyiv hoped that by developing ties with its Western 
neighbours, it would participate in the development of subregional and regional 
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institutions. Not only was eventual membership of Western institutional structures 
desirable per se, but it was also welcome in terms of the potential relief it could bring 
Kyiv as it sought to resist pressure emanating from Its Eastern azimuth. 
However, Ukraine not only currently remains beyond key subregional 
structures. It is difficult to envisage Kyiv satisfying the criteria for entry into, for 
example, CEFTA in the next few years. It has been argued that the many benefits of 
subregional institutions include the fact that they fill a political vacuum and restart 
regional economic co-operation. 86 Yet to a very large extent Ukraine was prevented 
from helping fill the political vacuum and restart economic co-operation at the 
subregional level. From the point of view of Kyiv, much of the blame in this regard 
must be attributable to regional institutions, in particular the EU. 87 By not encouraging 
subregional institutions to develop inclusiveness toward stragglers such as Ukraine, 
there is the widespread belief in Kyiv that the EU is in danger of driving Ukraine back 
into the economic embrace of Russia. 88 
There is the additional danger that once the CEES enter the EU, CEFTA, the 
key subregional organisation will lose much of its appeal and attraction, leaving 
Ukraine floundering in isolation once more. Furthermore, the EU's demands on 
aspirants such as Poland are likely to drive a wedge in economic and political 
relations with Ukraine in the absence of some mechanism designed to soften the 
impact of Poland's transition. Such EU demands will have already led to a hardening 
of the CEES stance toward Ukraine, leading it to remain isolated and beyond 
subregional organisations. 
Notwithstanding the fact that Kyiv has failed to fulfil its share of the bargain 
as regard institutional reform is concerned, a critical failure on the part of Ukraine, it 
is nevertheless difficult to establish exactly what Brussels' objectives toward Kyiv 
precisely are. On the one hand, the EU has been willing to establish a dialogue with 
Ukraine as evidenced by the PCA and the albeit limited flow of funds from Brussels 
to Kyiv. On the other hand, it is clear that 'the EU can be faulted for a lack of 
86 A. Bayles, 'Sub-regional Organizations: The Cinderellas of European Security', NATO Review, No. 2, Vol. 45, 
Mar 1997, p. 27. 
87 Indeed, in Kyiv in July 1997, In conversation with the EU Political 
Officer the author was told, that ' if Poland 
doesn't want to spoil its chances of membership, it had 
better not get too close to Ukraine'. 
88 Conversation with analyst at the Ukrainian Insititute of Strategic Studies, in Kyiv in 1997, who confirmed 
the 
widespread nature of the belief 
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enthusiasm at working level and a lack of strategic vision at the topi. 89 The lack of 
acknowledgement and acceptance of Ukraine's aspirations to membership of the EU 
at the 1999 Helsinki Conference not only provided more evidence for this contention 
but also intensified the disillusionment that had set in following a similar failure at the 
London Conference in 1998. The prioritisation by the EU of Russia as a partner has 
also not helped in Ukraine-EU relations. 
There is a view that part of the problem also lies in the fact that the EU as an 
institution that germinated from the ideological conflict that was the Cold War, has 
not undergone significant ideological change with the end of that conflict. The 
mechanisms of the EU were 'devised by governments whose aim was to contain the 
encroachments of the East rather than enlarge the domain of the West'. 90 In this 
regard, the EU contrasts with NATO, an institution that has purposefully sought to 
eliminate the boundaries between the insiders and outsiders. In sum , it is 'not 
surprising, therefore, Ukraine has been increasingly finding itself subject to two 
distinct, if not contradictory, vectors of Western policy: that pursued by NATO and 
that pursued by the European Union. With anxiety and surprise, knowledgeable 
Ukrainians are coming to the conclusion that the latter vector operates according to 
principles which are rather distinct from NATO's and which Ukraine may have 
limited ability to influence'. 91 A contrasting view is that the divergence between the 
stances adopted by the two regional institutions reflect their different functional 
perspectives. NATO's forthcomingness is attributable to its geopolitical perspective, 
namely the need to deal with Russia. The EU's attitude toward Ukraine is guided by 
the very practical issues of economic compatibility and manageability, areas in which 
Ukraine continues to provide major cause for concern. 92 
As far as the hypothesis is concerned, it is evident that Ukraine's efforts along 
the Western azimuth on bilateral,, subregional and regional levels were impelled by 
Kyiv's concerns as to the security threats it perceived as emanating from the North- 
eastern azimuth. While it is clear that it failed to achieve key goals (i. e. membership 
of CEFTA and at least a form of recognition that the EU was open to Ukraine's 
" Sherr, Ukraine's New Time of Troubles, p. 22. 
90 ibid., p. 24. 
91 ibid., p. 20. 
92 1 would like to thank Professor Neil Malcolm for his insight into this contentious area. 
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eventual membership), many other key objectives were attained. Above all, by the end 
of the decade the 'strategic' relationship with Poland was delivering tangible benefits. 
Furthermore, harmonious bilateral relations had been established with its most 
troublesome neighbour, Romania, and the Moldovan problem was relegated from that 
of a potential region of conflict to an area that required ongoing attention. 
Subregionally, Ukraine was gaining the credentials of a CEES, though the lack of 
membership of key subregional. and regional institutions still jars in Kyiv. 
Furthermore, the signing of the Charter with NATO in 1997 and the ongoing 
cooperation with the alliance suggest that ten years after independence Ukraine had 
indeed achieved a degree of success in preserving its security and enlarging its 
freedom of manoeuvre by so doing, especially in light of the numerous internal and 
external obstacles it faced. 
Ukraine's early efforts to create subregional security structures bolster the 
realist view that the formation of alliances is a natural strategy of weaker states in the 
presence of stronger foes. However, realist theory can take less comfort from the 
vigour with which Ukraine pursued membership of non-security subregional and 
regional institutions along the Western azimuth. While the theory of structural 
interdependence does provide some insight into Ukraine's willingness to pursue 
integration along the Western azimuth (the low salience of force and the lowly 
position of military concerns in the hierarchy of issues were clearly functional in this 
regard) ultimately it reveals little about Ukraine's stance towards institutions to its 
West. Much the same can be said about globalisation theory which struggles to 
provide meaningful commentary on Ukraine's policy choices in its regional behaviour 
along the Western azimuth. 
Neoliberal institutionalism is considerably more successful in its explanatory 
power, offering an insight into the rationale behind Ukraine's pursuit of membership 
of subregional as well as regional institutions. Faced with states that had at one time 
or another been hostile to it (and with which the resolution of hostilities had never 
been achieved on a bilateral inter-state and sub-state levels) Ukraine sought 
membership of subregional institutions (in particular CEFTA) in which many of these 
CEES participated in order to benefit from the security enhancing transparency and 
opportunity for communication that these institutions provided. The fact that the 
objectives underlying the existence of subregional institutions (i. e. closer ties with and 
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ultimately membership of regional institutions) meant that member states pursued the 
harmonization of democratic and economic laws and principles with the regional 
institutions (in particular the EU) indicated that Ukraine's pursuit of membership of 
subregional institutions was synonymous with its pursuit of membership of the EU. 
The advantages of subregionalism, claimed by 'subregional' regionalists, were 
not lost on Kyiv. Subregional institutions potentially offered Ukraine a means of 
avoiding ending up on the wrong side of a new division in Europe and, thanks to 
collectivism, of carrying greater weight than it might individually. Yet, for a variety of 
reasons Ukraine could not exploit these advantages as a result of which Kylv's 
strategy of EU membership via membership of key subregional institutions in CEE 
met with limited success. The prime reason was that regional institutions, and in 
particular the EU, were not overly supportive of the subregional process. As a result 
subregionalism in the region was racked with a competitiveness between members 
states and an over-concern for the damage that the 'slowest-moving' member would 
do to other, 'faster-moving' members' prospects. 93 This problem was further 
exacerbated by the contradictions inherent in treating members of subregional 
institutions as a group, 'but also treating the Central and Eastern European states 
individually in terms of their relationships with and prospects for membership of 
NATO and the EU. As a consequence, the Visegrad group's relations with NATO and 
the EU created both incentives and disincentives for regional cooperation' and the net 
loser in the end was Ukraine. 94 For these reasons, Ukraine's chances of membership 
of subregional institutions were circumscribed before it had even embarked on the 
strategy. In sum, Ukraine simply could not singlehandedly surmout the inherent flaws 
of subregionalism recognised by 'subregional regionalists'. 
New Wave regionalists extend the argument of subregional integration in CEE 
in a number of ways. Firstly, they recognise that 'PTAs might form ... 
because they 
usually have greater aggregate market power and thus more bargaining power than 
95 ru their constituent members' . 
This was certainly at least partly te in the case of 
CEFTA, the members of which wished to enhance their negotiating position 
in pursuit 
See for example A. Cottey 'The Visegrad Group and Beyond: 
Security Cooperation in Central Europe', pp. 69- 
89 in Cottey, Subregional Cooperation in the New Europe. 
94 ibid., p. 82. 
95 Mansfield and Milner, 'The New Wave of Regionalism', p. 
614. 
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of their unambiguous aim of EU membership. 96 (Although it has to be said that the 
welfare benefits from the increase in trade, hannonization of rules, standards and 
economic policy, and the growth of economic cooperation at the expense of irrational 
competition were neither lost on member states nor prospective members states such 
as Ukraine. ) Yet, it was precisely Ukraine's inability to implement economic refonn 
that precluded it from CEFTA membership and benefiting from a common 
negotiating position. 
Secondly, by making provision for the relationship between the political and 
economic, New Wave regionalists help explain Ukraine's failure at the subregional 
level, certainly as regards CEFTA membership. Ukraine's reluctance to implement 
essential economic refon-n, compatible with requirements for CEFTA membership 
(and also with the PCA) was the result of Kyiv's over-focus on the political at the 
expense of the economic. 97 Admittedly, Ukraine suffered inordinately from the 
'COMECON syndrome' - 'centralism, the prevalence of political over economic 
motives, an inefficient economic mechanism, a lack of mutual trust, and [the] one- 
sidedness of relations (biased towards the Soviet Union). 98 Yet even within these 
constraints, Kyiv's progress on the reform necessary for membership of CEFTA was 
lamentable, precisely because of the priority of the political over economic factors 
within Ukraine. This was not only a matter of external or international politics. By 
catering for a narrow domestic constituency of industrialists and oligarchs eager to 
exploit lax regulations, consecutive Ukrainian governments and presidents 
demonstrated their preparedness to subordinate the general societal welfare that 
derives from economic reform to self-serving politics. If it is true that 'whether a 
country chooses to enter a regional trade agreement is determined by how much 
influence different interest groups exert and how much the government is concerned 
about voters' welfare' it is evident that in Ukraine some interest groups exert huge 
pressure, and the governments have not been very concerned with voter's welfare with 
96 A. Kupich, 'The Central European Free Trade Agreement: Problems, Experiences, Prospects' in Cottey, 
Subregional Cooperation in the New Europe, pp. 90-112. 
97 For arguments on the relationship between cooperation and integration see A. Bjumer, 'Reflections on 
Subregionalism', P. 15. 
98 ibid., pp. 93-94. 
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the honourable exception of the short-lived govenunent of Viktor Yuschenko between 
autumn 1999 and spring 2001.99 
Kyiv's constructivistic emphasis on its Central European identity was 
complementary to the politico-economic bent of the above theories as it set out to 
participate in the community formation taking place on its Western borders, and 
which it saw as incomplete in the absence of itself. This effort to reconnect, which 
drew heavily on positive, though rare, 'European' experiences alongside moves to 
relegate divisive historical episodes to the history books, was indicative of Ukraine's 
desire to reconstitute itself as a member of European family. 
A key feature of this constructivism was also the emphasis placed by the 
leadership on the link between Ukraine's ongoing democratization and its return to 
Europe. Ukraine's post-independence leadership was quick to realise that the latter 
could not occur without the former, and by extension that Ukraine's regional 
objectives could not be attained without the implementation of democratic reform. 
This link was evident at the bilateral level with Poland especially keen on 
'europeanising' and democratising Ukraine. However, it was even more in evidence at 
the subregional level where 'while cross-border cooperation cannot easily be 
measured, a strong case can be made that it contributes to the development of 
democracy within and stable relations between the states concerned' (though in CEE 
the mechanism for such cooperation were Euroregions rather than, for example, 
CEFTA). 100 However, at the regional level, institutions have made the link between 
regionalism and democracy explicit with the EU indicating 'that various Eastern 
European countries must consolidate democratic reforms as one precondition for 
membership'. 101 Indeed, this message was reiterated most forcefully by Brussels for 
Kyiv's exclusive attention following the 1999 presidential elections, after the scale of 
corruption on the part of the incumbent and eventual winner, Leonid Kuchma, had 
become clear. (The same message, in the form of a 'last warning' was once again sent 
99 Mansfield and Milner, 'The New Wave of Regionalism', p. 603. 
100 A. Bayles, 'The Role of Subregional Cooperation in Post-Cold War Europe: Integration, Security, Democracy' 
in Coney, Subregional Cooperation in the New Europe, pp. 176-177. The two way nature of the relationship 
between regionalism and democratization was made highlighted by Cottey who argued that ' 'when the strategic 
situation changed - with the break-up of the Soviet Union - and Slovakia appeared to 
be turning away from the 
goals of democratization and Western integration shared by the other three states, the Visegrad group 
became 
moribund'. See Cottey 'The Visegrad Group' p. 88,. 
"' Mansfield and Milner, 'The New Wave of Regionalism', p. 606. 
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to Kyiv by Brussels following the albeit unproven implication of the Ukrainian 
President in the murder in 2000 of a young Ukrainian journalist critical of the regime). 
Although New Wave theorists steer clear of 'suggesting that the desire to gain access 
to a PTA has been a primary force driving democratization in Eastern Europe' it is 
evident that the EU has encouraged Ukraine to make such a link. 102 
102 ibid., p. 606. 
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Part 4- The Southern Azimuth 
Over the centuries it could be argued that Ukraine paid an enormous price in terms of 
its East-West predicament: subordination to Russia, and sometimes Poland, left scars 
which are still visible centuries later. With independence in 1991, this predicament re- 
emerged in a dramatic way. On Ukraine's independence, its ethnic, linguistic, 
religious and political splits appeared glaring. Movement Westward threatened 
secession in Eastern Ukraine, while tighter ties with the East threatened instability in 
Western Ukraine. While Ukraine tried to balance these pressures by implementing an 
often measured foreign and security policy, it simultaneously pursued one other 
avenue. The Southern azimuth was a key means for Ukraine to escape from these 
East-West pressures. According to Ukraine's foreign policy experts, 'the most 
positive changes, compared to other directions, are taking place in the process of 
Ukraine's integration into the Black Sea region'. ' Such positive changes included the 
discovery of energy resources, the development of transportation routes, a reduced 
role for Russia, and challenges to its dominance by subregional institutions and 
regional institutions. All of these things meant that the Southern azimuth has 
represented a field of considerable opportunity for Ukraine. 
Monitoring Foreign and security Policy of Ukraine, June 1998 Expert Poll, http: //www. public. ua. net/-potekhin/ 
ucpccrs/MONITOR/EXPOLL/poII98-2. htm- 
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Chapter 6: Relations With Black Sea Littoral 
Neighbours 
Kyiv, as did Moscow before it, regards Ukraine's 1632 kilometre coastline on the 
Black Sea as one of its main geostrategic assets. I There are a number of reasons for 
this. Firstly, the Black Sea is an important trading area. 2 Secondly, the Black Sea 
provides an outlet for industry on the Dunai, Dniester and Dnipro rivers. 3 Thirdly, the 
temperate climate of the Black Sea gives Ukraine's ports an all year round usability. 
Indeed, with the 'loss' of Ukraine in 1991, Russia was deprived of access to a 
significant proportion of its few warm water ports, the most important strategically of 
which was Sevastopol, home of the Black Sea Fleet (BSF). Fourthly, Ukraine's Black 
4 Sea continental shelf is a potentially very rich source of hydrocarbons . 
As will be 
seen below, Ukraine's claim to outright ownership of this submerged wealth did not 
go unchallenged, most notably, by Russia and Romania. Fifthly, because of the access 
provided to the Middle East, the Mediterranean-B lack Sea region, along with the 
Straits of Gibraltar has been identified by the US Department of Defence as one of the 
5 eight strategic regions regarded as containing significant chokepoints. Sixth, 
following the post-Soviet rediscovery of Caspian hydrocarbons, the Black Sea came to 
be spoken of as a transit route in bringing these resources to market in Europe. 6 From 
1 Once the delimitation and demarcation of the Black Sea boundary between Ukraine and Russia got underway, 
problems soon emerged in terms of the boundaries in Azov sea (linked to the Black Sea by the Kerch Straits). 
While both sides agreed to treat the Azov sea as a lake or 'internal waters', the Ukrainians insisted on full 
delimitation and demarcation of boundaries, something that the Russians were opposed to. Holos Ukrainy, 30 
May 1998. Moscow was concerned that if Kyiv's proposal was implemented 'the Sea of Azov would dejacto and 
dejure cease to be an internal sea, thus meaning that foreign warships and fishing fleets could enter'. Narodna 
Armiya, 18 September 1998. 
2 Ukraine's maritime trade is estimated at between 30-40 million tons. Narodna Armiya, 5 May 1998. 
' These are the Ukrainian names for the Danube, Dniester and Dniepr respectively. 
4 There are an estimated 70 billion cubic metres of gas on the shelf around the Crimean peninsula. Holos Ukrainy, 
27 March 1997. An 11000 square kilometer area around Crimean peninsula has also been estimated to contain 
about 1.3 billion barrels of oil-equivalent hydrocarbons. Http: //www. business-europa. co. uk/ukraine/crO7. html 
5 R. B. Peele, 'The importance of Maritime Chokepoints', Parameters, Summer 1997, p. 64. 
6 Much discussion has taken place over the size of the Caspian hydrocarbon deposits. The size of the deposits are 
in turn, likely to impact on the route taken to bring them to market. Such is the cost of some of the proposed 
pipelines, that they are only likely to be viable in the event of very substantial resources. It has been estimated 
that the current favourite pipeline, Baku-Ceyhan, costed at between S2.5-3 billion, needs 6 billion barrels of 
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very early on, Ukraine hoped and planned to become an integral segment of that route. 
This was not a forlorn expectation. As Balmaceda has pointed out 
'As the emergence of Ukraine as an independent state has changed the 
geopolitical map of Europe, it has also highlighted the importance of 
Ukraine's links with its western and southern neighbours across the 
Carpathian Mountains and the Black Sea. These geopolitical factors 
have also affected the issue of energy resources and their transport'. 7 
Ukraine based its hopes on the fact that the transit of oil via its territory represented 
the shortest route between the oil rich, cash poor Caspian region and energy hungry 
Western and Northern Europe. Inevitably, Ukraine's ambition put Kyiv into conflict 
with other regional states as theyjostled for advantage in pursuit of the grandprix. 
Clearly, there is an interconnectedness between many of the above mentioned 
points which, in many subtle and less than subtle ways, has the potential to damage 
Ukraine's status as a Black Sea power, its relations with other littoral states (in 
particular Russia) and its participation in subregional and regional developments. For 
example, Ukraine paid a heavy psychological price for Russia's desperation to hang 
on to the vast military infrastructure in Sevastopol. The eventual agreement between 
Russia and Ukraine, signed in 1997, legitimising the stationing of Russian troops in 
Crimea, which was explicitly forbidden by the Ukrainian constitution, was seen as 
undermining the sovereignty of Ukraine. However, if the Black Sea is a zone of 
potential conflict, it is also a region of great opportunity for Ukraine. So even though 
Kyiv would be hard pressed to replicate Moscow's traditional regional role - 
Ukraine's utter dependence on Russian energy resources see to that - Ukraine is 
nevertheless striving to become a major regional player, spurred on by a desperate 
proven reserves to make it viable. New York Times News Service, 20 November 2000. 
BP Amoco has estimated 
Azerbaijan oil reserves alone at 7 billion barrels, or 0.7 per cent of world reserves. The Azer, state oil company 
has put reserves at 17.5 billion barrels. (Gas reserves are put at 850 billion cubic meters, or 
0.6 per cent by BP 
Amoco). Financial Times (Special Supplement - Azerbaijan), 22 November 2000. Jaffe and Manning 
have long 
urged caution in making estimates owing to the distorting effect they 
have had on US policy formation for the 
region. A. M. Jaffe and R. A. Manning, 'The Myth of the 
Caspian 'Great Game': The Real Geopolitics of 
Energy', Survival, 01 January 1998, http: //www. al i yev. com/archive/ 19 98 0101 Survival. htm 
7 Balmaceda, 'Gas, Oil and the Linkages', p. 276. 
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need to diversify its energy sources and benefit financially from the transportation of 
Caspian oil and gas. 
Ukraine's Black Sea role lends itself to three levels of analysis, which this 
section will adopt. It will start by examining Ukraine's bilateral ties with the littoral 
states. Kyiv has made enormous strides in making its relative political weight felt. The 
focus of Ukrainian foreign policy was on becoming an accepted Black Sea state with 
recognised borders, co-operating on a bilateral as well as multilateral level with other 
regional states in an attempt to ensure the stability of the sea, tempering Russian 
regional power and influencing the direction in which Caspian oil would flow. This 
section will explore how these various issue-areas impacted on Ukraine's bilateral 
relations with its Black Sea neighbours, and the means Kyiv used to resolve, or not as 
the case may be, any problems encountered. It will then be argued that Kyiv's efforts 
at the bilateral level formed part of a concerted effort to pursue objectives at the 
subregional and regional levels. Thus, the section will also examine the extent to 
which Ukraine's bilateral ties with regional neighbours impacted on its membership 
of, and participation in the two main Black Sea subregional groupings, the 
institutionalised Black Sea Economic Co-operation forum (BSEC) and the non- 
institutionalised grouping of GUUAM. The interaction between these two levels 
reflects the primary focus of Ukraine's strategic foreign and security policy planning 
with respect to this region. Thirdly, while the link between bilateral ties and regional 
level institutions will be touched on where appropriate, the section will analyse the 
relationship between subregional and regional institutions. Kyiv sees the BSEC as a 
vehicle that may in some way contribute towards Ukraine's ambition of integrating 
with the pre-eminent regional institution, the European Union (EU). In a parallel vein, 
Ukraine's role in the informal GUUAM is an effort to provide an alternative 
leadership to that of Russia, for disaffected members of the CIS. Furthermore, 
Ukraine's ambitions within GUUAM appear to be directly linked to the issue of 
transporting Caspian hydrocarbons, something which policy makers in Kyiv hoped 
ied way to tighter ties between Ukraine might contribute in some vague and unspecif 
and the EU. Throughout, it will be argued that while efforts at each of the above 
mentioned three levels form part of a coherent foreign and security policy, significant 
domestic and international impediments existed that prevented the achievement of 
important regional policy objectives. The section will start by examining Ukraine's 
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bilateral relations with other Black Sea states, followed by an analysis of the single 
biggest issue that affected those relations, namely the politics surrounding potential 
transportation routes for Caspian oil. 
Relations with Black Sea Littoral States 
Ukraine 'shares' the Black Sea with five other states: Russia, Georgia, Turkey, 
Bulgaria, and Romania. Traditionally, Russia and Turkey have been the two main 
protagonists for control over the sea and the access afforded to the oceans of the 
world. Between the 17th and 19th centuries, in a two-pronged assault, Russia 
painfully and gradually wrestled control of the sea out of the hands of Turkey. On 
water this was achieved first by expelling the Turks from the Azov sea, then at the end 
of the 18th century by taking control of the Kerch straits. On land the annexation of 
the northern Black Sea coast and the Crimean peninsula gave Russia strategic control 
over the sea. Ukrainian independence in 1991 signified a momentous reversal of 
Russia's centuries long campaign, and was followed by an inevitable diminution of 
Russian influence in the region. Following the 'retreat' of Russia, a vacuum appeared 
which Ukraine tried to fill. As this inevitably meant that Ukraine's ambitions clashed 
with those of its neighbours, which nurtured similar ambitions to fill the vacuum, the 
maintenance of harmonious relations with Black Sea states was at the forefront of 
Ukraine's foreign and security policy. Relations with each of those states will now be 
examined. 
Russia 
Ukraine's location on the Black Sea has been a major factor exp aining ussia5s sense 
of loss of empire following the collapse of the Soviet Union. This sense of loss has 
been considerably exacerbated by Kyiv's determination to plough a lone, independent- 
of-Russia furrow on the international scene. 
The sheer vigour with which Moscow fought to keep control over the BSF and 
its associated infrastructure amply demonstrated the psychological importance of the 
region to the Russia, something that had inevitable political ramifications. 
The 
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involuntary 'loss' of Crimea, let alone Sevastopol, was a burden that weighed heavily 
in Russian domestic politics and was a frequent reference point for Russian politicians 
seeking to win quick political points. Despite the fact that Ukraine and Russia signed 
a Friendship, Co-operation and Partnership Treaty in 1997 and eventually ratified in 
February 1999, a number of Russian political figures came out against ratification of 
the treaty as it wound its way through the Russian Duma at the end of 1998 and 
beginning of 1999. One of the most vociferous opponents of the treaty was the mayor 
of Moscow, Yuri Luzkhov who argued that 'ratification of the treaty would in effect 
separate Crimea and Sevastopol from Russia forever., 8 
The political significance of Ukraine's southern border isl as might be 
expected, associated with the military- strategic importance of Crimea, and in 
particular, of Sevastopol, 'the city of Russia's military glory', as it is often referred to. 
The radar station in Sevastopol forms an integral component in Russia's early warning 
system against missile attack. Secondly, Sevastopol was the base of the Black Sea 
Fleet, and the vast infrastructure that went with it. 9 The loss of Sevastopol, and by 
extension the fleet, would have represented a heavy blow to Russia on its South 
Western flank. Ukrainian independence threatened to deprive Russia of some of its 
most important warrn water outlets, most notably Sevastopol, leaving Moscow with 
only 2 major ports, Novorossiysk and Tuapse, on the distant North-eastem comer of 
the Black Sea. 
Loss of access to Ukraine's Black Sea ports also imposed economic costs. 
Ukraine's ports were a small but significant outlet for Russian crude oil as it found its 
way westward. In part due to the transit costs incurred, only 0.2 MMBD (millions of 
barrels per day) were exported from Odessa on the Black Sea in 1997, a figure down 
by nearly 50 per cent from the 1990 figure of 0.36 MMBD. 10 However, in the long 
term, the economic costs of 'losing' Ukraine were considerably greater. Soon after 
independence, Ukraine started to insist on the delineation of the Black Sea and the Sea 
of Azov continental shelves. While the delineation of the seas was of itself important 
to a country keen to guard its territorial integrity, delineation would also confer the 
8 J. A. Corwing and J. Maksymiuk, 'Sparring Over Sevastopol', RFEIRL Weekday Digest, II February 1999. 
9 For an overview of the nature of these facilities see Sherr, 'Russia-Ukraine Rapprochement? ', pp. 33-50. 
10 In 1997 Russia exported 3.5 million barrels per day (bbl/d), of which 0.9 million bbl/d (MMBD) were 
transported through the Druzhba pipeline, a 70-70 per cent utilization rate. Russian Oil and Gas Exports Fact 
Sheet, United States Energy Information Administration, June 1998. 
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right to ownership of the significant hydrocarbon resources that were believed to lie 
under the waters of the seas. Balmaceda notes that despite the signing of the Ukraine- 
Russia Treaty in 1997 and the commitment that border delimitation would be defined 
and enshrined in law,, 'Russia's foot-dragging over the demarcation of its borders with 
Ukraine has delayed the exploration of new fields: drilling cannot begin in the Black 
Sea shelf until ownership is legalised, which in turn requires the clarification of the 
Ukrainian-Russian border .... If they were to be fully exploited together with deposits in 
the Crimean area . .... (they) could make Ukraine into a net exporter of energy. 
" 1 
Kyiv's confrontation with Moscow over the Black Sea 'Issues' had direct implications 
for Ukraine's long term economic prospects. Indeed it was only because of Ukraine's 
decision to start the delineation process unilaterally that a recalcitrant Russia agreed to 
co-operate. 
As we have seen, holding on to the BSF and by extension Sevastopol was a 
key tactic in Moscow's strategy of slowing and at some stage in the future reversing 
the decline of Russia's influence in the Black Sea region. In this light, the eventual 
signing of the Ukrainian-Russia Treaty on the Black Sea fleet and Sevastopol in 1997, 
can be seen as a major foreign policy success for Moscow and must in part be 
regarded as a blow to the prestige of Ukraine. However, harmonious bilateral relations 
with other influential regional neighbours tempered the impact of the setback for 
Ukraine. 
Turkey 
Even before Ukrainian independence in 1991, relations between the Ukrainian SSR 
and Turkey were noteworthy for their warmth. As early as 1989, when it was clear 
that the Soviet Union was in decline, a protocol was signed between the two states on 
economic development and trade. Ten days before the Ukrainian referendum on 
independence in 1991, Ankara announced its intention to establish consular relations 
with Kyiv. 12 In May 1992, during President Kravchuk's visit to Ankara, a Treaty on 
Friendship and Good Neighbourly Relations was signed. 
13 These early developments 
11 Balmaceda, 'Gas, oil and the Linkages', p. 26 1. 
12 Ukrainian Statehood in the Twentieth Century (Kyiv: Political Thought 1996) p. 215. 
13 H010S Ukrainy, 6 May 1992 
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were indicative of the mutual importance of each of the states for one another and they 
soon led to economic, political and even strategic co-operation. 
As two of the larger states on the Black Sea, Ukraine and Turkey were natural 
trading partners and following Ukrainian independence trade grew quickly. Between 
1993 and 1995, Ukrainian exports to Turkey rose from $185 millions to $442 
millions, with a trade surplus of $167 millions and $381 millions respectively 
accruing to the Ukrainians. By 1996, trade turnover was estimated to have reached the 
14 $1 billion mark , if shuttle trade was included. 
Even political issues with the potential to damage relations were dealt with 
amicably. For example, as was pointed out by Turkey's President on the 50th 
anniversary of the deportation of the Tartars by Stalin, 'our Tartar brethren ... are a 
great branch of the Turkish nation, and they are the strongest bridge of the friendship 
between Turkey and Ukraine'. 15 Although on a visit to Ukraine in May 1994 the 
Turkish President Demirel 'advised' Ukraine to allow any Turks of Crimean origin 
(the figure could be as high as 600,000) to return to their homeland, the Crimea, he 
did temper this advice, and demonstrated Turkey's potential moderating role in the 
region, with a call to the Crimean Tartars to act with caution. There was striking co- 
operation on the Tartar issue, with both presidents calling on the international 
community, and in particular the G7, to support Ukrainian and Turkish efforts to 
provide accommodation for homeless Tartars, a problem with which Ukraine has 
nevertheless continued to struggle virtually single-handedly. ' 6 
The level of strategic co-operation over oil and gas pipeline development in 
particular indicated that both parties were keen to pursue common benefits, to 
contribute to the marginalisation of Russia in the region, and to delay any regional 
Russian resurgence. One of the means for such a Russian resurgence was for Russia to 
become the main route for the transportation of Caspian oil, regaining its strangle hold 
over energy supplies as well as benefiting from the transportation fees. In this light, as 
will be examined in greater detail below, the agreement of both parties to build 
complementary pipeline systems for the transportation of Caspian oil was a key step 
forward. 
14 Finansova Ukraina, 28 January 1997. 
15 'Ukraine in Turkish Foreign Policy' in Ukrainian Statehood in the Twentieth 
Century, p. 217. 
16 Uriadovy Kurier, 16 May 1998. 
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Overall, good ties with Turkey were strategically vital for Kyiv. Ukraine was 
too weak to constrain Moscow's regional ambitions independently and to pursue its 
own; much the same could be said for Turkey. Ukrainian-Turkish co-operation in the 
Black Sea region, was a means of dealing with this predicament. Furthermore Ankara 
intended to extend the role of the Black Sea region as a factor in NATO strategic 
thinking. In James Sherr's words, 'Turkey has developed its relationship with 
Ukraine ... conscious that it will add a north-south dimension to a NATO-Ukraine 
relationship still largely seen in east-west terms'. 17 
Romania 
As we have seen, all aspects of Ukraine's relations with Romania were from the 
beginning overshadowed by controversy over territory. While the main dispute was 
over the former Romanian territories of Bessarabia and Bukovina incorporated into 
South-western Ukraine in 1940, matters were further exacerbated in 1995 by 
Romania's proclamations regarding Serpents Island in the Black Sea. 18 While 
Ukraine's ownership of the island itself was not disputed by Bucharest, ownership of 
the continental shelf surrounding the island was, after it had emerged that substantial 
amounts of mineral resources were contained therein. In December 1995 the 
Romanian government announced that it would appeal to the International Court of 
Justice in the Hague, challenging Ukraine's rights to the continental shelf Inevitably, 
given the context of Ukraine's deteriorating relationship with Russia, especially 
regarding the issue of Sevastopol and the BSF, the announcement was interpreted by 
Kyiv as a territorial claim on Ukraine. 19 However, as was described in Chapter 4, 
Bucharest's ambition of being one of the states invited to apply for NATO 
membership, a decision which was due to be announced in July 1997, placed 
significant constraints on the lengths to which Romania was prepared to go in areas 
where it might damage relations with Kyiv. The subsequent signing of a bilateral 
17 Sherr, Ukraine's New Tinie of Troubles, p. 5. 
18 R. Wolczuk, 'Relations between Ukraine and Romania in the Context of NATO Enlargement', The Ukrainian 
Review, Vol. 44, No. 4, Winter 1997, pp. 34-41. 
19 OMRI Daily Digest, 7 Dec 1995. 
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Treaty in June 1997 provided space for the two sides to agree to disagree. 20 Serpents 
Island was formally recognised as the territory of Ukraine, and the actual delimitation 
of the continental shelf around the Island was to be subject to negotiation for two 
years. If no agreement followed, the whole issue was to be referred to the International 
Court of Justice in the Hague. In the interests of co-operation, the Ukrainians agreed 
to halt and refrain from placing offensive weapons on island. 21 Crucially, as part of 
the treaty, both parties also agreed to refrain from geological exploration in the area 
under contention. 22 
However, if the Black Sea proved to be a source of friction between the two 
states, it also provided an opportunity for co-operation. In February 1998, the 
Ukrainian ambassador to Romania, Alexander Chalyi, suggested that 'Romania can 
benefit from important advantages as regards the Ukrainian project pertaining to the 
transportation of the Caspian sea oil. We are neighbouring countries who can and 
must participate jointly in shipment of Caspian Sea petroleum'. 23 This new-found 
warmth toward Bucharest was more than an attempt to take advantage of Romania's 
strengths in oil transportation, specifically the large capacity of the port at Constanta. 
This approach suggests a willingness on the part of Kyiv to demonstrate a degree of 
regional leadership and contribute to the stability of the Black Sea region by co- 
operating with its neighbours and avoiding needless competition in a volatile part of 
Europe. 
At around the same time as Ukrainian-Romanian relations were becoming 
turbulent a curious but minor territorial spat blew up between Kyiv and Kishinev. It 
emerged during the process of demarcating and delimiting borders between the two 
states, a process that was related to the transportation of oil. As things stood in terms 
of borders between the two states, the Moldovan border fell some 1800 metres short 
of the mouth of the river Prut as it joins the Danube in the region of the town of 
Dzurdzuleszti. As a result, Moldova is not accessible to tankers coming in from the 
Black Sea. However, in the interests of obtaining oil supplies from a source other than 
20 The Treaty acquired formal legal status only in November 1997, Uriadovy Kurier, 13 November 
1997. 
21 Article 2 refers to a separate agreement regarding all of these matters, activated through an exchange of 
letters 
by the two foreign ministers, at the same time as the main Treaty. 
22 H010S Ukrainy, 15 January 1998. 
2' G. Velea, 'Having joined the struggle for Caspian oil, Ukraine does not rule out cooperation with Romania'. 
208 
Russia, such access was indispensable. To this end the Moldovans requested of the 
Ukrainians access to a 400 meter length of the bank of the Danube. Both parties 
agreed to submit this question to a joint delimitation committee. However , in the 
summer of 1997 the Moldovan side commissioned a Moldovan-Greek consortium to 
start building an oil terminal (much of the $38 million cost of which was provided for 
with a $25.5 million credit from the EBRD) with a 2.1 million ton capacity. Because 
the proposed building was to go up on the state boundary, the Ukrainians reinforced 
the state border, arguing that the building presented a large ecological risk to Europe's 
largest wetlands, a few kilometres upstream from the proposed terminal, as a reason to 
halt the building. 24 It is likely that the Ukrainians were concerned about the impact 
that such an oil terminal might have on their own plans for the transportation of 
Caspian oil. A resolution to the problem was found when the three neighbours in the 
region of the dispute (Ukraine, Moldova and Romania) agreed to the setting up of a 
euroregion with an oil terminal as its focus. 
Overall, however, territorial disputes dwarfed all other issues in Ukrainian- 
Romanian relations. As far as Serpents Island was concerned, this was hardly 
surprising in light of what was at stake. And yet, the very same temptation brought 
about by the income to be derived from hydrocarbon extraction and transportation, 
contained the seeds of reconciliation between Ukraine and Romania. 
Georgia 
As former constituent parts of the Soviet Union, Georgia and Ukraine shared a 
political extraction that was to determine their geopolitical outlook, especially their 
perception of Moscow. The latter helped to shape their respective and often 
complementary regional ambitions. In turn, there can be little doubt that Russia's 
policy toward the 'near abroad' served to stimulate ties between the two smaller 
former Soviet republics. Between 1991 and 1997, Ukraine's relations with 
Georgia 
were driven, as one Ukrainian commentator expressed it 'from the romantic stage 
to 
that of concrete pragmatism'. 
25 
" Holos Ukrainy, 20 March 1998. 
21 zerkalo Nedeli, 8 Feb 1997. 
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The closeness of these relations was demonstrated by Ukraine's willingness to 
become involved in an issue that had poisoned relations between Russia and Georgia 
soon after the collapse of the Soviet Union, namely Moscow's support for Abkhazian 
separatists within Georgia. Russia's encouragement of Abkhazian separatism was 
directly related to Moscow's effort to reduce the growing appeal of Georgia as a 
transit route for the main Caspian oil. A conflict on Georgian territory close to any 
proposed pipeline was bound to jeopardise Georgia's chances and could tip the 
balance in favour of a route across Russia. Tbilisi turned to Kyiv for support. In 1996 
ties were formalised in a series of agreements demonstrating the new found 
assertiveness of the two states, particularly in Ukraine's support for the Georgian 
26 initiative 'For a Peaceful Caucasus' (effectively aimed directly against Russia). 
However, by 1997 it was clear that a stronger strand was developing to link the two 
states, and that relations had progressed beyond mere bilateral relations to co- 
operation in regional developments. Indeed, Ukraine and Georgia started to co- 
ordinate and co-operate on policy on a number of issues, to the extent that it was 
difficult to interpret them as not aimed against Russia. A good example of this was the 
fuss made by both parties as to the success of the ferry between Poti and Odesa, which 
in the words of a Ukrainian newspaper helped 'Georgia break through its geographical 
blockade' and reduce its reliance on the Russia rail network. 27 More significant was 
the meeting between Kuchma and Shevardnadze at which Georgia invited Ukrainian 
peacekeepers in to replace Russian 'peacekeepers' in the Abkhazia conflict once the 
Russian mandate ran out on 31 March 1998.28 Russian blunders contributed to the 
further intensification of ties between Kyiv and Tbilisi. In particular, Ukraine was able 
to take advantage of Russia's dismissive attitude toward the claims of former 
republics to their proportional inheritance of the wealth of the USSR following the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. For example, Russia's rejection of Georgian claims to 
what Tbilisi regarded as its share of the BSF, anchored at the Georgian ports of Poti 
and Batumi, contrasted with Kyiv's willingness to act on behalf of Tbilisi in Ukraine's 
bilateral discussions with Russia on the subject of the BSF. This intervention was 
interpreted by Tbilisi as a friendly and symbolic gesture on the part of Kyiv. It was 
26 Uriadovy Kurier, 12 November 1996. 
27 Uriadovy Kurier, 4 Jan 1997; Zerkalo Nedeli, 8 Feb 1997. 
28 This was an offer Kyiv rejected at the time, though it agreed to provide observers. 
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indicative of Ukraine's keen appreciation of the need to promote conciliation in the 
short tenn if Ukraine was to fulfil its regional leadership potential in the longer term. 
Overall, the development of ties between Ukraine and Georgia reflected the 
coincidence of the respective goals of both states, namely those of counteracting 
Russian influence and developing independent strands of power that would 
consolidate their respective independence. Georgian willingness to co-operate with 
Ukraine was undoubtedly associated, as one journalist in Kyiv expressed it, with the 
(expectation that with time Ukraine would inevitably become the leader of the Eastern 
European region', and by extension serve as a link with Western Europe. 29 
Furthermore, the development of ties between Tbilisi and Kyiv bolstered as we shall 
see Ukraine's leadership of the key subregional institution within the CIS, GUUAM, a 
grouping that was intended to facilitate the transportation of Caspian hydrocarbons 
across the territory of member states. 
Bulgaria 
Ukraine's ties with Bulgaria, as a Black Sea littoral state, have not been characterised 
by either significant affinity or hostility. This is primarily because of the geographical 
distance between the two and Bulgaria's marginal economic significance in the 
region. Nevertheless, Bulgaria is a potential competitor in the transportation of 
Caspian oil. Most of the traffic coming from Iran via Georgia to Europe passes 
through Burgas in Bulgaria on its way to the West. 30 
Overall, it can be seen that a number of issues either unite or divide Ukraine from its 
regional neighbours. As a former Soviet state, Ukraine had a natural affinity with 
Georgia as an ally against Moscow. Both could consolidate their independence 
by 
reducing their dependence on Russian energy networks. Furthermore, Ukraine, 
Turkey 
and Georgia are united by a common objective, namely to participate 
in the 
transportation of Caspian oil, something which would help them become more tightly 
integrated with European structures as well as providing welcome 
income. This 
29 Den, 26 Feb 1997. 
30 Zerkalo Nedeli, 27 June- 4 July 1997. 
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ambition put them into direct competition with Russia in an area where it had so long 
enjoyed a dominant position. In addition to the confrontation with Moscow, Kyiv was 
also challenged by Bucharest. While formerly Ukraine's status as a Soviet Republic 
protected it from Romanian challenges to its territorial waters, independence elicited a 
fresh bout of claims, tempered only by wider systemic developments and the prospect 
of participating in the transportation of Caspian oil. In the following section, the 
politics surrounding the transportation of the hydrocarbons will be examined in 
greater detail, since Caspian oil is clearly the key factor in Kyiv's relations with the 
other Black Sea states. 
The Politics Of Transporting Caspian Hydrocarbons 
Ukraine occupies a location directly between Northern Europe and the oil and gas 
reserves of the Caspian Sea. By emphasising its position on this diagonal axis i. e. 
between Berlin and Baku, as opposed to its more traditionally perceived position 
between East and West, Kyiv has attempted to take on a role in which it acts not so 
much as a weak border-land or buffer state and more as a state which can exploit its 
advantages as a link between an Northern Europe constantly seeking new and reliable 
energy supplies and the newly rediscovered Transcaucasian hydrocarbon sources. 
The plan to transport Caspian oil via Ukraine was part of grander scheme for a 
transport corridor - in effect a renewal of the 'Silk Road' - put forward by Georgia in 
1993. The 'Silk Road' plan had the backing of the European Union and was envisaged 
as linking Europe with the Caucasus, the Middle East, and eventually the Far East. 
31 
While such a corridor was ostensibly designed to facilitate trade, at its heart was the 
trade associated with the transportation of Caspian hydrocarbons. By the second Pan- 
European Transportation conference, on Crete in 1994, the notion of a Silk Road had 
become more concrete, with nine transport routes proposed. Of these nine, four 
traversed Ukraine, with one in particular intended to link up directly with the Caspian 
region. 32 
31 Narodna Armiya, 15 September 1998. 
32 Route 3 is planned to run along the Berl in-Wroclaw-Lviv-Kyiv axis while route 5 runs via Trieste-Liubliana- 
Budapest-Chop-Lviv. The most important from Ukraine's point of view is route 9 which goes through Helsinki_ 
Kyiv-Odesa-Dmytrovgrad and from there on up to the Euro-Asian transport corridor thereby linking Northern 
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It had long been known that the Caspian Region was a significant source of 
hydrocarbons. Although the Soviets had been adept at exploiting the onshore energy 
resources of Azerbaijan, the sea remained effectively unexplored and offshore 
resources remained intact because of a lack of deep sea technology. It was only with 
the collapse of the Soviet Union that these energy resources became accessible to 
Western companies. The 6 different hydrocarbon basins that were discovered under 
the waters of the Caspian Sea in addition to those that existed onshore, were estimated 
to contain between 15-29 billion barrels of oil and 236-337 trillion cubic feet of 
natural gas, though the figures are subject to some disagreement. 33 The key was 
getting these resources to market and therein lay the opportunity for Ukraine. 
There were very practical benefits for Ukraine. For example, Kyiv hoped to 
bring some desperately needed employment to workers on a much under-utilised 
pipeline network, (extending to some 4000 kilometres), with 6 major oil refineries 
working at far below capacity. 34 Kyiv also anticipated benefiting financially from the 
transportation of the oil across its territory, in particular, in terms of the lucrative 
transit fees (estimated at some $300 million per annum) that the oil would generate as 
it wound its way toward the West. The income would then be used to offset the cost of 
imported oil. 35 
There were a series of 'strategic' advantages that would accrue to Kyiv if 
Caspian hydrocarbons were to traverse its territory. Caspian oil represented a way out 
of a predicament that had proved to be Ukraine's single biggest handicap since the 
first days of independence. The oil represented a means of reducing Ukraine's almost 
total reliance on Russian oil. (Between 1991 and 1998 it was variously estimated that 
Europe and the Baltic region with the Transcaucasus. Route 7, the Danube waterway option, goes through Ukraine 
only tangetally via the ports of lzmail and Reni. Holos Ukrainy, 5 May 1998. Although it was originally planned 
that a firm decision as to the routes would be made at the third Pan European conference in Helsinki in June 1997, 
no decision was forthcoming. A Decree (number 346) 'On the Confin-nation of the Programme for the Building 
and Functioning of the National Network of the International Transport Corridors in Ukraine' (sic) was issued by 
the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers on 20 March 1998. 
33 'Caspian Sea Region', United States Energy Information Administration, October 1997. 
34 Ukraine has six oil refineries, with a total refinement capacity if 63 million tons of oil. Since 1991 when 38 
million tons of oil were refined, the amounts refined fell into a precipitous decline, with only 16 million (a figure 
which also included 3.5 million tons of oil extracted in Ukraine) refined in 1995. Holos Ukrainy, 22 April 1997. 
However, the superior quality of Caspian oil (as compared to that of Russian oil that the refineries were designed 
to process) meant that a substantial investment was necessary if processing was to take place in Ukraine. Holos 
Ukrainy, 23 June 1998. 
35 Kyiv Post, II September 1998. 
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Ukraine imported between 70 and 95 per cent of its oil from Russia. )36 Caspian oil 
also provided a means of escape from the energy blackmail that Kyiv felt it had been 
subjected to. Ukraine was highly vulnerable to any Russian strategic moves involving 
energy - as we have seen Moscow was not averse to stopping or slowing energy flows 
to Ukraine. Efforts by Kyiv at energy import diversification had been unsuccessful, 
especially those attempts which involved importing Iranian oil, which in turn brought 
the opposition of the United States. 37 The alternative energy source provided by 
Caspian oil provided a means out of this predicament. Finally, there was also a more 
serious, less immediate, and longer term practical consideration that Caspian oil 
would help address: Russian production was expected to fall between 2000-2005. As 
production fell, the Russians were likely to redirect the sale of oil to markets capable 
of paying in hard foreign currency. 38 In the even longer term, according to Ukrainian 
sources, Kyiv faced the possibility that in 20 years time, Russian oil could run out 
altogether. 39 This also in part explains Russia's determination to ensure that Caspian 
oil traversed its own territory. 
In addition to the practical and strategic advantages of transporting Caspian 
oil, Ukraine hoped to benefit in terms of its subregional and regional objectives. By 
becoming part of the Caspian transportation network, Ukraine, it was hoped, would 
become more tightly integrated with and hence increasingly indispensable to the 
European energy infrastructure . 
40 At the subregional level, this could bind Ukraine 
more tightly to the other states involved in the transportation, particularly Poland. In 
turn, it was believed in Kyiv that this subregional advantage could confer advantage at 
the regional level, namely facilitate Ukraine's eventual integration with the European 
Union and NATO, along the lines described in Chapter 5. 
36 Kyh, Post, 6 November 1998; Kyiv Post, II September 1998. Indeed, in 1998, Ukraine imported 28 million tons 
(or some 70 per cent) of oil from Russia, up from the 17.8 million tons in 1994 though 
down from the 55.1 
million tons of 1989, a figure which included oil for re-export from Ukraine. 
37 0. M. Smolenksy, 'Ukraine's Quest for Independence: The Fuel Factor', Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 47, No. 1, 
1995, pp. 67-90. At the beginning of the 90s, there were also efforts to gain access to Iraqi oil, which 
flowed from 
Kirkuk to Ceyhan, from where a pipeline was to be built to Samsun. These plans were put paid to by the ongoing 
Iraqi crisis. Holos Ukrainy, 23 June 1998. 
38 Finansova Ukraina, 12 November 1996. 
39 Finansova Ukraina, 18 Feb 1997. 
40 Discussion with official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kyiv, July 1997. 
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However for these advantages to be exploited, much depended on the specific 
route chosen. There were a number of competing routes, some attractive to Kyiv, 
some less attractive. Each of these three key options will now be examined. 
Proposed Transit Routes 
The oil was expected to flow in two different waves: 'early' and 'main' oil. 'Early' oil 
was planned to flow along the existing Baku-Novorossiysk and Baku-Supsa pipelines 
at the rate of 100,000 barrels per day respectively. Ukraine could play no role in the 
transportation of 'early' oil. Of interest to Kyiv was the transportation of the 'main' 
oil, i. e. the vast quantities believed to lie under the Caspian itSelf. 4 1 Ukraine's two 
main competitors in its proposals for bringing Caspian oil to market were Russia and 
Turkey. As one commentator has put it, 'for Russian politicians in search of a grand 
cause, re-establishing the empire and paying for it with Eurasian oil revenues is a 
winning proposition5.42 For Turkey, Caspian hydrocarbons were a matter of usurping 
Russia's traditional regional role, and preventing the 're-establishment of the empire'. 
The Turkish option suited Kyiv. 
Option 1: The Russian Option. 
41 There were a plethora of other proposals. One option involved transporting the oil by tanker from the port of 
Novorossiysk to a new terminal which would be built in Burgas (Bulgaria), on the Black Sea, and then onto 
Alexandroupolis (in Greece), on the Aegean Sea, and from there possibly to Genoa by tanker. However, this route 
required a 320 kilometer pipeline between the two terminals. A further disadvantage was that all the ports 
involved in the route were lirrUted to a 120000 tanker capacity. Another alternative was from Burgas to Constanta 
(in Romania). From there the oil would go either by pipeline on into Europe, and/or by river tankers (with the 
associated danger of ecological catastrophes) by the Danube into Hungary. (In a similar vein, at the beginning of 
1998, a pre-feasibility study was initiated between the Romanians and Italians for a $1.2 billion pipeline between 
Constanta and Trieste with a capacity of 34 Million tons. Adina Borta, 'Romania to participate in ENI-coordinated 
SEEL project'). Yet another alternative was from a terminal planned at Burgas to a terminal planned at Flora on 
Albania's Black Sea coast; the two terminals would then be linked by a new pipeline. While the route benefits 
from being able to use the very largest tankers from Albania onwards out of the Mediterranean sea, the option was 
unappealing because of the political instability in the region and the expense of so much extra building of new 
terminals. Nevertheless, the revival of the marine links in the region was taking place with some urgency as 
evidence by the opening of sea ferry links between Poti in Georgia and both Burgas (in Bulgaria) and Constanta 
(in Romania). Zerkalo Nedeli, 27 June -4 July 1997. Yet another route involves crossing the Black Sea (from any 
one of a number of ports), and avoiding the Bosphorus via a pipeline leading from just before the Bosphorus to a 
terminal on the Sea of Marmora. Turkey was not keen on this option, much preferring the Ceyhan route 
because of 
the transit fees the route would generate. 
42 A. Cohen, 'The New Great Game: Oil Politics in the Caucasus and Central Asia', The Heritage Foundation, 
Backgrounder No. 1065,1996. 
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The Russian option consisted of a proposal for a 1500 kilometre pipeline which would 
link the Tengiz oil field, on the Kazakh side of the Caspian sea, with the Black Sea 
port of Novorosslysk; it would supplement the existing pipeline carrying 'early' oil 
43 from Baku to Novorossiysk 
. The new pipeline was to have an initial capacity of 
500,000 barrels per day, rising to 1.34 million per day, and was to be operational by 
the year 2000.44 From Novorossiysk, it was proposed that the oil be transported by 
tanker through the Bosphorus to markets in the West. The plan had some significant 
drawbacks. 
For some time Turkey has been exploiting concern about the growing amounts 
of oil being transported from Russia's Black Sea ports via the narrow Bosphorus 
straits on to markets in the West. Despite the collapse of exports in 1991, (in 1990 
0.679 MMBD and 0.187 MMBD were exported via Novorossiysk and Tuapse 
respectively) by 1994 the amounts exported had reached their previous peaks, and by 
1997, a total of 1.06 MMBD, some 30 per cent of total Russian oil production, was 
45 exported from Russia through the Bosphorus . Ostensibly fearful of the 
environmental catastrophe that such large exports might cause in the event of a 
collision in the narrow straits, and much to the consternation of Moscow, Turkey took 
it upon itself in May 1994 to unilaterally introduce amendments to the 1936 Montreux 
convention 46 , which regulated the flow of maritime traffic through the Bosphorus. 
47 In 
particular, the Turks announced a 200 meter limit on the size of oil tankers traversing 
the strait, a major blow to Russian ambitions to transport oil from Novorossiysk, as 
43 The consortium behind the pipeline was the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, the ownership of which was split as 
follows: Russia was allocated 24 per cent of shares, Kazakhstan 19, and Oman 7; the remaining 50 per cent was 
split between a number of oil concerns including Chevron, Lukoil, Shell, Mobil, British Gas and others. 
44 However, by early 1998, little progress had been made in obtaining the necessary right of way, and the various 
federal permits necessary for the laying of the pipeline. As a result, in February 1998 the Western partners in the 
pipeline froze the $2 billion fund for the building of the pipeline, and started demanding a shake-up in the 
management of the Consortium, which was led at the time by the Russians, Wall Street Journal, 2 Feb 1998,. 
However, in May 1998, an investment feasibility study was secured by the CPC, which would then need approval. 
45 'Russian Oil and Gas Exports Fact Sheet', United States Energy Information Administration, June 1998. 
46 Signed in 1936, the Montreaux Treaty guaranteed the free and unhindered passage of vessels though the 
Bosphorus Straits, while guaranteeing the sovereignty of Turkey. In that pre-nuclear and pre-supertanker era, an 
average of 17, usually grain carrying, ships per day, weighing on average 13 tons, traversed the straits. By 1994, 
these figures had risen to I 10 ships, sometimes reaching 200,000 tons, carrying nuclear-waste and other hazardous 
materials passing through the straits daily. Nearly 25 per cent of the shipping going through the straits was 
Russian. The Reuter European Business Report, 31 January 1995. 
47 For example, vessels longer than 200 meters were only to be allowed through during daytime and then only 
during favourable weather, while ship height was set at 60 meters. The new measures were endorsed (and 
therefore legitin-ýsed) by the International Maritime Organization. APS Review Oil Market Trends, No. 17, Vol. 
43,31 October 1994. 
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the enforced use of smaller vessels would drive the costs of transportation up. 
Furthermore, in the longer term Ankara envisaged that oil tankers would be prohibited 
from passing through altogether. While the decision was made ostensibly on 
environmental grounds, it was interpreted by the Russians (and indeed others) as 
aimed against them, with the objective of reducing their capacity to act as a link in the 
transit of Caspian oil. The Russian response was to denounce Turkey's right to act 
unilaterally on the issue, and accuse Ankara of using safety and environmental 
concerns as a camouflage to disguise its own pipeline initiatives and regional 
ambitions. 48 Although the Turks subsequently failed to enforce the new measures 
stringently, the battle lines nevertheless appear to have been drawn. 
The Russian option had a second drawback. The United States did not favour a 
renewed Russian monopoly over energy provision in the region; this will be discussed 
in more detail below. Thirdly, the sheer expense of the Russian pipeline in the context 
of the abnormally low price of oil meant that by mid 1998, the prospects for the option 
looked dim. 49 
Option 2: The Ukrainian Option 
The most straightforward option from the point of view of Kyiv, and the least likely to 
be realised, was transporting oil by tankers from a Georgian port, most probably 
Supsa after the arrival of the oil from Baku, to a terminal to be built near Odessa 
which would then pump the oil westward . 
50 This option was the least likely to be 
implemented for the simple reason that both Turkey and Russia were competing for 
the very same oil. Ukraine, without the kind of backing afforded Turkey by the West 
or the geopolitical weight of Russia was not in a position to impose its preference. 
However, Kyiv was willing to combine its proposal with Turkey's. In other words, 
Ukraine was willing to take its Caspian oil via Samsun on Turkey's northern Black 
48 The Christian Science Monitor, 9 June 1994 
49 HOIOS Ukrainy, 28 July 1998. 
50 Socar, the Azeri state oil company, originally planned to bring oil from Baku to Supsa by an existing 
900 
kilometer long, 500 millimeter diameter pipeline, which was In need refurbishment at a cost of $315 million. 
However, in April 1998 it was discovered that an all new pipeline was required, as a result of which a proposal 
for 
a 1050 millimeter diameter pipeline capable of transporting 600,000 
barrels a day was made; the projected cost 
was $590 million. Wall Street Journal, 13 April 1998. 
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Sea coast, rather than directly from Georgia. The Turkish option and its Ukrainian 
subset will now be examined. 
Option 3: The Turkish Option(s). 
There were two Turkish options: Baku-Samsun in Northern Turkey on the Black Sea 
and Baku-Ceyhan in Southern Turkey, on the Mediterranean. From the beginning, the 
Baku-Samsun route was the less desirable option, as it depended on the narrow and 
congested Bosphorus to bring the oil to market. From the very beginning Western 
interest focused on the Baku-Ceyhan route. This option involved the transportation of 
oil by a new 1700 kilometre pipeline from Baku to the port at Ceyhan, on Turkey's 
Mediterranean south coast. 51 Much of the appeal of the route for the Western 
multinationals extracting the oil was based on technical aspects that gave it an 
advantage over the Novorossiysk route. Ceyhan was a modem port with four times the 
processing capacity of the Russian port. More significantly, the Ceyhan route could 
utilise 300,000 ton dead-weight tankers, something that lowered the transportation 
costs dramatically, compared to the Novorossiysk route, which was unable to use such 
huge tankers - they simply could not squeeze through the Bosphorus. Turkey's 
unilateral revisions to the Montreux Treaty mentioned above, only exacerbated 
Russia's predicament. 
From the point of view of Kyiv, the single biggest disadvantage of the Baku- 
Ceyhan route was that Ceyhan was too remote. However, Kyiv could benefit from the 
Baku-Ceyhan option. To do so, it was necessary to overcome the obvious technical 
obstacle of transporting oil across the harsh terrain of Anatolian Turkey northwards to 
the port of Samsun, from where the oil could relatively easily be transported across 
the Black Sea to Ukrainian ports. In apparent anticipation of this problem, as far back 
as 1993, the Ukrainians suggested the building of a 600 kilometre long, 1200 
millimetre diameter reversible pipeline linking Samsun and Ceyhan via Anatolia. The 
reversibility of the pipeline was a significant technical feature which reflected both 
Kyiv's and Ankara's desire to preserve flexibility. A reversible pipeline between 
51 The pipeline was to be built by the Azerbaijan International Oil Consortium (AIOC), a consortium headed by 
BP and Statoil (a Norwegian company) and a number of US companies. In September 1994, the Consortium 
signed a $8 billion contract to develop 3 Caspian oil fields over 30 years. In 1998, contracts were signed to invest 
$13 billion over 15 years. New York Tinies, 21 July 1998. 
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Samsun and Ceyhan meant that if the Baku-Samsun route was by any chance chosen, 
not only would Ukraine get its oil from Samsun, but also the port facilities at Ceyhan 
could still be utilised after delivery there by the reversible pipeline, the commitment to 
an ecologically Bosphorus preserved, and the costs of a lengthy new Baku-Ceyhan 
pipeline avoided. If instead the oil was delivered via the Baku-Ceyhan route, the 
Ukrainians would still get their oil from Samsun, after its arrival there from Ceyhan 
via the pipeline. Furthermore, the reversibility of the pipeline also meant that it could 
take Middle Eastern oil to Europe, something in which some of the Middle East 
powers had expressed an interest. 52 Pipeline reversibility was a shrewd feature, as it 
played on concerns in the United States about the dangers of energy and transportation 
power being concentrated in the hands of Iran by giving Middle Eastern oil an 
alternative route to the politically vulnerable Hormuz Straits. 53 The proposed pipeline 
was also the shortest route between the Caspian and Europe. On his visit to Odesa in 
May 1997, the Polish President, Alexander Kwasniewski propagated the notion of a 
Baltic-Black Sea corridor by emphasising the fact that 'the shortest route from the 
Near and Far East to Warsaw, Gdansk, Berlin, Hamburg and even Stockholm and 
London lies through Odesa, Illychivsk and Yuzmy'. 54 It was also, as a result, the 
cheapest route. 55 However, there was much work to do at the Ukrainian end of things 
if Kyiv was to become an integral segment of the route. 
Since August 1994, Kyiv had planned to take oil from Samsun, irrespective of 
the means by which it arrived there. More specifically, it was anticipated that oil 
would be poured into tankers at Samsun and transported to a new oil terminal to be 
built at Yuzniy, located 35 kilometres to the east of Odesa. The terminal was to have 
an initial throughput capacity of 12 million tons, later expandable to 58 million tons. 
The total projected cost of the terminal was $216 million, sponsored by 
UkrNaftoTerm, a Ukrainian state enterprise, with the EBRD guaranteeing a loan for 
52 Den, 10 June 1997. 
53 Indeed, in June 1997, the Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbara Velayati paid a visit to Ukraine, during which it 
was agreed that Iran would provide Ukraine with I million tons of oil in exchange for 50 turbines to 
be used in 
power stations. Soon after, US pressure put paid to these plans. Den, 10 June 1997. 
54 Zerkalo Nedeli, 27 June -4 July 1997 
55 According to one estimate, it was between $8.50 and $10 per ton cheaper to transport the oil via the 
Ukrainian 
route than by the cheapest of the other routes. Kyiv Post, 6 November 1998. Other earlier estimates suggested 
that 
the route through Ukraine would reduce the costs of transportation by $20-30 per ton. 
Uriadovy Kurier, 24 May 
1997. 
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$101 million. 56 A separate state owned company, UkrTransNafta 57 (Ukrainian Oil 
Transportation), was created 58 with the specific objective of constructing a 667 
kilometre 'Yuzniy' pipeline 59 link between the Yuznly terminal to the Brody pumping 
station on the Druzhba oil pipeline in Western Ukraine. From Brody, the 'Yuznly' 
pipeline would be extended to the city of Plotsk or the Adamowa Zastava in Eastern 
Poland. This link with Poland was important in the wider context of things, as noted 
by President Kuchma, who argued that 'One of the most important elements in the 
creation of a Europe-Caucasus-Asia transport corridor, is the resolution of oil routes. 
One of these could become the Ukrainian-Polish route'. 60 From Poland, it was 
planned that the oil could then be dispersed to Slovakia, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Austria, Germany (via the Leuna refinery) and the Baltic Sea region (via 
Gdansk). 
In light of all the above mentioned advantages of oil going through Ukraine, 
the Azeri rejection of the Ukrainian option in May 1997 on the grounds that it was not 
commercially viable was a severed disappointment. 61 The Azeri intervention was 
understandable. Despite the plethora of benefits that could potentially accrue to Kyiv, 
the whole enterprise was plagued by extensive procrastination at the Ukrainian end. 
Progress on the Yuzmy terminal was effectively non-existent between 1993 and 1997, 
something which had as much to do with clandestine features of Ukrainian domestic 
politics as anything else, while work on the Yuzniy-Brody pipeline could be best 
described as dawdling. Events beyond Ukraine were moving at a faster rate. 
56 EBRD Project Summary Document, February 1998. The author, in conversation with Melanie Yuniacke of the 
EBRD in Feb 1999 discovered that the loan had been suspended. The terminal has been plagued by financial 
problems from the outset. Owing to the lack of progress, a joint stock company was floated in the hope that more 
funds would be released by Western institutions. Den 29 Jan 1997. UkrNaftoTerm - Ukrainian Oil Terminal - was 
a special purpose state-owned joint-stock company, created at the beginning of 1997, and which would own the 
eventual terminal. Significantly, a 50 per cent stake in UkrNaftoterrn was held by the owners of the Druzhba 
pipeline, the network to which the terminal would eventually be linked up (and which had provided the majority 
of the funding up until that point). 
57 In an associated vein, UkrTransNafta is also the cofounder (along with Georgia and Azerbaijan) the company 
that will be responsible for the projected Euro-Asian transport corridor which would run from Odesa to the 
Caucasus; an agreement on its creation was signed between Ukraine, Georgia and Azerbaijan on the 'Cooperation, 
construction and functioning of the AETC' at the end of 1996. Uriadovy Kurier. 4 January 1997. 
58 Prior to the creation of UkrTransNafta, Ukrainian prospects for participation in the pipeline were starting to 
look grim. However, once it was established, 'investors started to queue up', Den 24 May 1997. 
59 An additional 51 kilometer link was to be created with the Kremenchuk-Odesa oil pipeline, which would 
then 
supply the Odesa and Kherson Oil Processing plants with oil. By January 1997,28 
kilometers of pipeline had 
been laid. Den 29 Jan 1997. 
60 Narodna Arndya, 15 September 1998. 
61 Baku's Black Gold: June Oil Highlights. http: //uslahq. usis. usemb. se/abtusia/posts/XAI/wwwtjn97. txt 
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The Azeri comment elicited a flurry of activity on the part of Kyiv. Soon after, 
in June 1997, following 4 years of negotiation, the long awaited agreement on the 
building of a pipeline between Ceyhan and Samsun was signed by Kyiv and Ankara. 62 
Also, progress was made with the laying of the Yuzniy pipeline in Ukraine: by June 
1998 about 256 kilometres had been constructed, rising to 351 kilometres by 
September 1998, giving some idea of the pace at which work had started to proceed 
after the very slow start. 63 Nevertheless, plans to have the terminal operational toward 
the end of 1998 were wildly optimistic, as by the middle of 1998 it was reported that 
'there was little news ... on the ground, where at some forgotten time they managed to 
put foundations for seven of the ten planned reservoirs, silence reigns'. 64 Much of this 
has to do with domestic politics in Ukraine, funding shortages (although following the 
creation of UkrTransNafta in May 1997 this became less of a problem), and even 
bribes required by minor officials. 65 The leisurely approach that characterised 
Ukraine's contribution was as much of an impediment to the achievement of Kyiv's 
objectives as were events beyond its control: by 1998, other factors were working 
against the Turkish option, and by extension, the Ukrainian segment. Firstly, the 
Azerbaijan International Oil Consortium (AIOC), the builder of the pipeline, was 
showing a distinct preference for the cheapest route, something the Baku-Ceyhan 
route most certainly was not (although the Turks accused BP, the leading member of 
the consortium, of exaggerating the cost). By late 1998, it was increasingly being 
argued by the AIOC that based on the production projections of Azeri oil, the Baku- 
Ceyhan route was beginning to look commercially unviable. While the route needed 
to carry I million barrels of crude per day to be viable, Azeri oil was expected to peak 
62 Apparently an agreement regarding the project was ready for signing by 1995 and suddenly halted when a 
presidential decree wound up the joint stock company specially created for the project, 'Ukrzahranneftehaztroy'. 
Zerkalo Nedeli, 2-8 Aug 1997. See Uriadovy Kurier, 24 June 1997 for details on the signing of the pipeline. The 
reasons for the long delay in the signing of the agreement are unclear, although Ukrainian observers attribute this 
to the 'interfering hand' of Russia, although they do not specify the precise mechanism of this interference. Holos 
Ukrahýy, 21 February 1997. In preparation for the building of the pipeline, (and evidence of the serious intent of 
Kyiv) the Ukrainians set up a state owned corporation (as opposed to joint stock company) called 
'Llkrzahranneftehaztroy' (the Ukrainian Foreign Oil and Gas Transportation Company) on 4 March 1997. Zerkalo 
Nedeli, 2-8 Aug 1997. 
63 Holos Ukrainy, 23 June 1998; Kyiv Post, II September 1998 
64 Porty Ukrainy, 1998(4), p. 53. 
65 It has been suggested that officials were 'satisfied with hundreds of dollars made from Russian energy 
transporters instead of looking further afield and receive thousands of dollars from non-Russian energy sources'. 
Zerkalo Nedeli, 8 Feb 1997. 
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at about 800,000 barrels per day. 66 By the end of 1998, owing to the Asian economic 
collapse, oil had reached its lowest price for 25 years, (though by mid-2000 the 
situation had changed considerably). 67 As a result, by December 1998, much to the 
consternation of Kyiv, and contrary to the wishes of the US government, according to 
The Economist the 'prospects for building a .... pipeline from Baku in Azerbaijan to 
68 Ceyhan in Southern Turkey rarely looked so doubtful'. Nevertheless, despite the fact 
that the US government was prevented from directly subsidising the Turkish option9 
in January 1999 a US official argued that 
'during the past 12 months, companies and regional governments have 
realised the importance of some broader considerations. These include 
long-term energy security ... and the attractiveness of large-diameter 
pipeline to a port like Ceyhan, which is able to handle exports from 
both sides of the Caspian ... mak(ing the) Baku-Ceyhan the optimal 
route for Caspian oil exports'. 69 
Overall, by late 2000, it was still unclear which route was the likeliest option. 70 Baku- 
Ceyhan, while the preferred choice of the US, still failed to find favour with others on 
cost and strategic grounds .71 What was clear 
however, was Ukraine had its own 
preferred option. The Russian option was likely to damage Ukraine's regional 
standing, while the Turkish option was likely to reinforce Ukraine's growing regional 
profile. However, the advantage of oil going via Ukraine into Europe goes much 
beyond oil - the wider context will be considered in the following chapter. 
66 A solution to this apparent underutilisation worked in favour of the Novorossiysk route proposed by the 
Caspian Pipeline Consortium. However, this was regarded as a short term solution as, if Kazakhstan both offshore 
and onshore potential was to be realized, the capacity of the 'Russian' Novorosslysk option would be exceeded. 
67 Financial Times, 4 December 1998. See also The Economist, 5-11 December 1998. 
68 The Economist, 28 November-4 December 1998. 
69Letter to The Economist, 2-8 January 1999, from Jan Kalicki, Counselor to the Department of Commerce, 
Washington DC. However, as has been pointed out 'Baku-Ceyhan is also self-defeating - its success depends on 
conditions that undermine its ends. The... commercial viability of the project depends on high oil prices sustained 
over a prolonged period ... But 
high oil prices provide the Kremlin with the resources to be mischievous in 
Chechnya, exporting its power and ignoring international pressures' i. e. the opposite of that which the US 
admininstration wishes. Christian Science Monitor, 24 January 2000. 
M For an update on events see Financial Times (Special Supplement - Azerbaijan), 22 November 2000. 
71 Christian Science Monitor, 24 January 2000. 
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As, along the Southern azimuth, Ukraine's cooperation with littoral 
neighbours, particularly Georgia and Turkey, in pursuit of a common strategy In the 
transportation of oil was inextricably linked to its regional agenda, the theoretical 
implications of these bilateral and regional objectives will be explored at the end of 
the following chapter. 
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Chapter 7: The Southern Azimuth: Subregional and 
Regional Institutions 
From the perspective of Kyiv, Caspian oil was also a means to an end. Kyiv was 
motivated by something more alluring than the consolidation of Ukrainian 
independence through ensuring energy supplies and the financial benefits. The 
transportation of Caspian oil across Ukrainian territory could make the single biggest 
contribution to Ukraine's eventual integration -a terin used somewhat loosely by 
Ukrainian analysts - with European subregional and, by extension, regional 
structures. ' From the Ukrainian point of view, Caspian oil was the fuel that propelled 
the development of Black Sea subregional institutions. For Kyiv, membership of 
subregional institutions would raise Ukraine's subregional profile, highlight its 
geopolitical weight, and in turn attract the kind of international financial resources and 
political attention Kyiv felt the state was entitled to, help counteract the overweening 
influence of Russia, and fill the security vacuum that Russian weakness had exposed. 
These are the objectives which explain Ukraine's desire to play a vigorous and active 
role in key subregional institutions, the BSEC and GUAM. This section will examine 
the extent to which Ukraine's role within these institutions has helped Kyiv achieve 
its objectives. 
Subregional Institutions in Black Sea Politics 
BSEC 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Black Sea had effectively became a free- 
for-all region in which, for the first time in decades, there was an opportunity for 
regional dominance by any state ready to challenge an emasculated Russia. There 
1 Author's conversation with Michalo Honchar from the National Institute of Strategic Studies, KY]v 1999. 
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were two competitors that were realistic contenders for Russia's mantle: Ukraine and 
Turkey. While Ukraine's relative military might and economic potential put it in 
contention, it was the weakest of the three - its economic collapse and energy 
dependence on Russia put paid to any immediate ambitions of single-handed regional 
leadership. Furthermore, any regional authority Ukraine aspired to was significantly 
undermined by the dispute over the ownership of the BSF as well as Russia's ongoing 
claims to Crimea/Sevastopol; any unfavourable resolution of the issues from 
Ukraine's point of view would reinforce Kyiv's relative weakness in relation to 
Moscow in the Black Sea. Yet the fact that between 1991 and 1997 Russia was unable 
to unilaterally impose a settlement regarding the BSF and Crimea/Sevastopol 
underlined Moscow's waning power and influence, which , in turn, raised Ukraine's 
profile. 
While Ukraine bickered with Russia, Turkey staked its claim. Energised by 
one of the strongest -a relative term - economies in the region, bolstered by the 
confidence of membership of NATO and emboldened by the fact that it was a 
convincing though unwelcome contender for European Union membership, Turkey's 
could aspire realistically to regional leadership. 
Turkish aspirations to regional dominance were reflected in Ankara's initiative 
in creating the Black Sea Economic Co-operation Forum (BSEC) in June 1992.2 
While ostensibly the organisation was to facilitate ties between Black Sea states and 
provide a common regional platform on which member states could voice their views 
about regional issues, arguably the BSEC was developed as a vehicle via which 
Turkey could exert its influence. Yet as will be seen, in many respects the co- 
operation of Kyiv was essential if Ankara was to succeed. 
On an economic level, the BSEC was to function as Turkey's tool. This was in 
line with Ankara's self-perception as the regional economic powerhouse, capable of 
influencing capital and technology flows to the foriner Eastern bloc countries, and 
even acting as the funnel through which any US financial influence spread throughout 
the region. Admittedly, the 'as and when' of the flow of funds for the regeneration of 
the region (i. e. the creation of a transportation network in general, and for the 
transportation of Caspian oil in particular) were uncertain. However, as the West's 
2 Perhaps giving a clue as to the source of the project is the fact that the idea was proposed in 1990 
by the former 
Turkish Ambassador to the United States, Siikrii Elekdag. 
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only ally in the region, that Turkey would be the viaduct through which funds would 
flow was unquestioned, at least in Ankara. As one Turkish commentator expressed it, 
'lacking sufficient resources itself, Turkey persuaded the West to provide financial 
aid ... to support Turkey's economic and cultural mission' in a region that extends 
beyond the Black Sea region. 3 Needless to say, devoid of its own funds, Kyiv 
welcomed such an input. 
Politically, there were detennined efforts on the part of both Ankara and Kyiv 
for the BSEC to take on a more meaningful status. This was shown by their efforts to 
establish a BSEC Parliamentary Assembly at a time when Ukraine was vehemently 
opposing the establishment of an equivalent CIS body because of its implied supra- 
national nature. Turkey had far reaching political objectives, specifically that of 
playing 'a strategic role in international politics through co-operation with 
surrounding countries (sic) - Balkan Co-operation in the west, the Economic Co- 
operation Organisation with Iran and Pakistan in the east, and the BSEC in the north', 
4 something which was not necessarily contrary to Ukrainian interests. Iran and 
Pakistan were both states with which Ukraine had been cultivating ties. For example, 
Kyiv had only just been persuaded by Washington not to sell power station turbines to 
Teheran in 1997. In the same year, the $800 million deal to sell Ukrainian tanks to 
Islamabad - with prospects of more sales to come - was hailed in Kyiv as the deal of 
the century. 
The Ukrainians, with the support of the Turks, have been keen to pursue 
solutions to military-security issues within the framework of the BSEC. Thus Kyiv, 
encouraged by Ankara, put forward security proposals for the Black Sea region, 
including banning the offensive capabilities of Black Sea navies, reducing the number 
of naval exercises in the sea, signing non-aggression treaties between Black Sea states, 
declaring the inviolability of borders, giving advance notice of naval activities and not 
admitting members who either utilise their naval forces against other BSEC members 
or allow the use of their territory by others for aggressive acts. These proposals 
formed part of a larger strategy adopted by the two states in tandem, namely one 
' 0. F. Genqkaya 'The Black Sea Economic Co-operation Project: A Regional Challenge to European Integration'. 
A paper presented at the 'Europe '92: International Conference on the European Community' at 
East Carolina 
University, Greenville, USA, 19-21 March 1992. 
4 ibid.. 
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aimed at denuclearization and demilitarisation of the Black Sea. 5 An increased 
Turkish and NATO presence in the Black Sea accompanied these initiatives. 6 
Additionally, co-operation between Kyiv and Ankara within the BSEC served 
'strategic' objectives - in particular, the marginalisation of Russia, a prerequisite for 
both Turkey's and Ukraine's regional ambitions. Indeed, the very existence of the 
BSEC was testimony to the extent to which Russian (and CIS) interests were 
neglected, and even counteracted. The formation of subregional groupings beyond the 
CIS, yet including CIS members, was not a welcome development from the point of 
view of Moscow, as it was clear evidence of a loss of control over a geo -economically 
attractive region now beyond Russia's control. Yet in this case the rationale 
underlying fori-nation was explicit: many BSEC states 'depend on outside sources of 
energy [i. e. Russia]' and were as a result 'interested in strengthening long-term 
interaction with those BSEC countries which possess significant resources of energy 
for providing sustainable energy supplies'. 7 
The 'strategic' nature of the BSEC is suggested by the sheer political diversity 
and geographical dispersion of BSEC member states. They include former Soviet 
states, actual and prospective EU member states, NATO members and non-members, 
European and non-European states, and indeed Black Sea and non-Black Sea states. 
The geographical dispersal of member states, a trail spreading from the Balkans to the 
Transcaucasus, provided strong hints as to the rationale of the organisation as a link 
between the European Union and the Caspian hydrocarbon resources. 8 Among this 
diversity, the influence of Russia was heavily diluted. 
Above all, the BSEC as a link in the transportation of Caspian oil was 
expected to facilitate Turkey's entry into the EU and, as Kyiv hoped, contribute to its 
own tighter ties and even eventual integration. Turkey made a great deal of its 
geopolitical location, arguing that 'without turning its back on the EC, Turkey is also 
able to develop ties with Central Asia as well as with the Middle East, the Balkans 
5 D. A. Connelly, 'Black Sea Economic Cooperation', REFIRL Research Report, Vol. 3, No. 26,1 July 1994, pp. 
31-38. 
6 Narodna Armiya, 24 July 1997. 
7 Black Sea Economic Co-operation. Http: Hwww. turkey. org/bsec2. htm 
8 On the establishment of the BSEC in 1992, signatories to the Summit Declaration included 
Albania, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine. By 1997 Poland, 
Tunisia, Egypt, Israel and Slovakia, had joined as observers. 
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and Western Europe'. 9 As far as Ankara was concerned, there was the potential for a 
link between the geographical dispersion of members of the BSEC, the issue of the 
transportation of Caspian oil, and Turkey's eventual integration with the European 
Union. As has been argued, the 'formation of the BSEC Project ... can be viewed as a 
link in this larger European chain'. ' 0 
However, as was mentioned above, the BSEC served Ukrainian interests 
equally well in a number of crucial regards. Primarily membership of the BSEC 
became yet another means by which Ukraine could demonstrate its pro-Western 
geopolitical preference and thereby underline its commitment to a creturn to Europe', 
despite the fact that as the century drew to a close the latter was an increasingly 
remote prospect at least in institutional terms. Influenced by Turkish rhetoric, Kyiv 
also perceived the BSEC as a potential link with the European Union. Other 
initiatives, such as the signing of an agreement between three BSEC members - 
Ukraine, Romania and Moldova - on the creation of a free economic zone between 
Reni (in the Odesa oblast of Ukraine), Galac (in Romania) and Dzurdzuleszti (in 
Moldova) in late 1998 need to be seen in this light. " That this was done with an eye 
on collaboration in the transportation of Caspian oil on the one hand and European 
integration on the other was supported by two facts. Firstly, an oil ten-ninal was being 
built in the Dzurdzuleszti. 12 Secondly, the Ukrainian-Romanian-Moldovan grouping 
was based on the Lower Danube Euro-region: there was a desire in Ukraine, as one 
newspaper expressed it, to 'take advantage of the Caspian transport corridor, to 
incorporate the Euro-region investors and breath some life into the region'. 13 
Additionally, the BSEC became a device with which Ukraine could 
demonstrate opposition to any strengliening of the CIS. A good example of this stance 
was the approach adopted by Ukraine toward the issue of ecological damage in the 
Black Sea. Ukraine was conspicuous by its absence at a meeting of members of the 
CIS in Moscow in February 1992 at which participants put their names to an inter- 
republican Agreement On Co-operation in the Area of Ecology. Ukraine also only 
9 Genqkaya, 'The Black Sea Economic Co-operation Project'. 
10 ibid. 
11 Holos Ukrainy, 22 October 1998. 
12 H010S Ukrainy, 27 October 1998. 
13 Holos Ukrainy, 27 October 1998. 
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participated as an observer at a follow-up meeting in Minsk in July 1992, where it was 
agreed that member states were to fund an Inter-State Ecological Fund at the rate of 
0.05 per cent of their GNP. Ukraine's omission from these agreements was all the 
more surprising in the light of the sheer extent of contamination of the Black Sea. 14 
This reluctance to participate in CIS structures was in sharp contrast to Ukraine's 
willingness to co-operate with Turkey, within the framework of the BSEC, in regard 
to ecological damage. In particular, the Declaration on Principals and Goals of 
Relations signed between the two states in fact made explicit reference to both states' 
desire to co-operate on environmental protection, in line with the first ever BSEC 
Summit Declaration, and work toward the creation of an environmental convention. A 
similar disparity existed between Kyiv's enthusiastic attitude toward the establishment 
of a BSEC Parliamentary Assembly as opposed to its reluctance to be involved in an 
equivalent CIS body. 15 In contrast, with Turkey pushing hard for EU membership, and 
keen to promote a Black Sea zone as one of the means of participating in the 
integration process in Europe, it was clear to Kyiv that Ukraine's regional objectives 
were more likely to be promoted by participation in initiatives promoted by Ankara 
than by backing Moscow's ones. 
Overall, while Ukraine was far from dominant within the BSEC, the spoken 
and unspoken objectives of the institution matched its own. To this extent, the BSEC 
contributed to the consolidation of Ukraine as a Black Sea power. 
GUUAM 
At the same time as the BSEC was evolving, another parallel, complementary and also 
competing grouping was taking shape. GUUAM (an acronym made up of the initials 
of its member states) started to emerge in 1996 as an informal, non-institutionalised, 
14 According to one journalist '90 per cent of the Black Sea can now be declared dead, a victim of hydrogen 
sulfide gas that is continuing to rise from the depths of the sea and contaminate Its upper layers ... the Black 
Sea 
will be totally destroyed by the year 2040 if the present trend continues'. It has been estimated that 
$15 billion is 
needed to decontan-iinate the Black Sea. TED Case Studies: Black Sea Pollution and Tourism. 
15 Holos Ukrainy, 23 March 1993. 
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consultative grouping initially made up of Georgia, Ukraine and Azerbaijan, 
subsequently joined by Moldova and later still Uzbekistan. 16 
Although the alignment was originally triggered by the shared concerns of 
states negatively affected by proposals by Russia for revisions to the Conventional 
Forces in Europe Treaty (Moscow made proposals which would have damaged the 
existing configuration of forces in the other former Soviet Republics to its own 
benefit), the group came to be consolidated by a number of common features. Firstly, 
each participant had been affected by separatist tendencies. The fact that these 
separatist tendencies were the result of a second commonality, namely the direct or 
indirect interference of Moscow, served only to reinforce the bond. Thirdly, the four 
states were united by a collective interest in a general transportation corridor between 
Europe and Asia, and specifically, the transportation of Caspian oil using a pipeline 
that bypassed Russia. For example, such a pipeline was described by the Financial 
Times as 'the jugular vein for Azerbaijan's oil and its independence from Russia'; it 
might be added that the belief that what applied to Azerbaijan applied equally to 
Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, was widespread. 17 Fourthly, in their desire to 
transport Caspian oil the states were put into direct confrontation with Russia, which 
itself had set great store on involvement in the transportation. The four GUAM states 
were united not only by shared experiences, but also by the desire to diminish Russian 
influence in their part of the world so that their own interests could prosper. 
Stimulated by such commonalties, bilateral relations between the four states went 
from strength to strength, contributing to GUAM's importance as a multilateral 
forination. 
That a new regional formation was in the offing was hinted at by a series of 
closely packed bilateral and multilateral meetings. In October 1996, a meeting took 
place between President Kuchma and President Aliyev of Azerbaijan at the Lisbon 
OSCE conference to discuss, amongst other things, Ukraine's potential role in the 
16 Moldova joined the original trio when, as a result of the Flank Linutations Agreement (a modification to the 
1990 Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe), Russia was offered significant concessions regarding the 
deployment of increased numbers of weapons in the Transcaucasus, Ukraine and Moldova. This was a sufficient 
stimulus for Kishinev to seek the relative security of GUA, despite or perhaps because of the orriýinous presence of 
the 14th an-ny in Transdnister. It is misleading to put a date on the actually precise inception of GUAM, as its non- 
institutional ised nature renders this a difficult task. Nevertheless, by late 1996 it was clear that this group of states 
was fornally co-ordinating policies on significant issues. On the security realignment of Uzbekistan with 
GUAM 
in 1999, the group came to be formally known as GUUAM. 
17 Financial Times, 5 September 1997. 
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transportation of Caspian oil. This meeting was followed by Ukrainian Prime Minister 
Lazarenko's visit to Tbilisi in November 1996, continuing the theme. Soon after, 
following a conference in Odessa at the end of 1996, an agreement was signed 
between Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Georgia to create a transport corridor between 
Europe and Asia. ' 8 Coincidentally, in the following days Xavier Solana, the NATO 
General Secretary, undertook a tour of the Caucasian region. 19 Following the 
agreement on the transport corridor, Eduard Shevardnadze made a surprise visit to 
Kyiv on 18 February 1997. While he was ostensibly there to sign a number of minor 
bilateral agreements, two particular issues were discussed, one of which was the 
possibility of Ukraine, as was mentioned earlier, displacing Russia as a peacekeeper in 
Georgia, -a hint as to Ukraine's growing significance within GUAM; the other issue 
was , inevitably, the matter of Caspian hydrocarbons. 
20 A week later Shevardnadze 
was in Baku, where, motivated by these very same hydrocarbons, a 'strategic' 
partnership was signed between Georgia and Azerbaijan. 21 The formation of tangible 
ties between member states represented an intensification of the emerging 
multilateralism of the region, a process in which Ukraine was heavily involved. 22 The 
first fruit of such co-operation was the announcement by the Azens that Georgia had 
been chosen as the route for the main oil. 23 This suited Ukraine's interests. Firstly, oil 
from Supsa or Poti directly to Odesa had become a real possibility. Secondly, it was 
evident that Russia was therefore not the route of the main oil. Thirdly, the decision 
would reinforce ties between Georgia and Ukraine. Georgia was a close ally of 
Ukraine and would be the automatic choice of Tbilisi if Georgia were to run into 
trouble with Russia, despite Shevardnadze's reassurance soon after the announcement 
that 'the project was not meant to impinge on Russian interests'. 24 However, a 
subsequent assassination attempt on the former Soviet foreign minister in February 
1998 (which itself followed a previous attempt in August 1995), in which Russian 
" Uriadovy Kurier, 4 Jan 1997. 
19 Zerkalo Nedeli, 8 Feb 1997. 
20 Zerkalo Nedeli, 10 March 1997. 
21 ibid. 
22 If nothing else, then Ukrainian pipe manufacturers were going to benefit from the building of the pipelines. For 
example, at a follow up meeting in Baku between 21-22 April, Ukrainian firms were contracted to build pipes and 
compressors to go along the Baku-Supsa route. Uriadovy Kurier, 24 April 1997. 
23 Den, 26 Feb 1997. 
24 ibid. 
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forces were apparently implicated, testified all too clearly to the fact that objections to 
Russian requests were not likely to be too constraining. 
Azerbaijan's invitation to Georgia stimulated the efforts of the leaders of 
GUAM member states to endow it with a more tangible form. Shevardnadze stated 
that Azeri President Aliyev's visit to Ukraine would strengthen the evolving ties 
between the states 'especially bearing in mind that the Ukrainian side is ready for 
serious co-operation in that direction. ' 25 Specifically, 'serious co-operation' meant a 
more prominent security role for Ukraine. Although the subsequent visit of President 
Allyev to Kyiv between 24-25 March 1997 focused on the transportation of the 
Caspian hydrocarbons, Allyev touched on a far more sensitive issue. Paralleling the 
request made by Georgia earlier, Allyev discussed the possible involvement of 
Ukrainian observers and/or peacekeepers in the Nagorno-Karabakh ethnic conflict. 26 
The Georgian/Azeri invitations were indicative of the fact that Ukraine was being 
offered a more central role than had been anticipated by Kyiv. In response, and 
cognisant of the implications such a role was likely to have for Ukraine's reputation in 
the region, Kyiv acquiesced to these requests, 27 a decision which was reiterated after 
the conference in Baku on oil transportation at the beginning of September 1998.28 
Reflecting the apparent disregard in which Russian opinion was by then held, Russian 
protests at the intensification of ties were dismissed by Aliyev who argued that 'any 
such far-fetched protests would have no basis, as Azerbaijan is acting in accordance 
with its rights as a sovereign state'. 29A seal was subsequently put on the visit by the 
signing of a strategic partnership between Ukraine and Azerbaijan, similar to those 
signed between Azerbaijan and Georgia, and Ukraine and Georgia earlier . 
30 GUAM 
was taking on a tangible form. The fact that this was a structure under the leadership 
of Kyiv was demonstrated at a meeting of the OSCE in Austria in October 1997, when 
the Ukrainian ambassador acted as a representative for all the GUAM states. Aware of 
25 ibid. 
26 The Azeris were irritated by the fact that Russia had supplied the Armenians with free weapons. 
The 
Ukrainians agreed to peacekeeping activity subject to it being sanctioned by a United Nations mandate. 
Den 26 
Mar 1997. The principle of the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, which was supported 
by Ukraine, was 
established at the Lisbon conference. Uriadovy Kurier, 27 March 1997. 
27 Holos Ukrainy, 5 November 1997. 
28 Narodna Armiya, 15 September 1998. 
29 Uriadovy Kurier, 27 Mar 1997. 
30 Den, 26 Feb 1997 
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the dangerous ramifications of these developments for its own regional status, Russia 
adopted a more subtle stance toward the states of the 'near abroad' in an attempt to 
reverse the undermining of the CIS: it conceded that Ukrainian peacekeepers were 
acceptable in the region, albeit under the aegis of the CIS. This, of course, was 
something Kyiv was vehemently opposed to. 31 
Instead, there was growing talk of co-ordinating GUAM's security policy in 
the Partnership for Peace framework (specifically in ternis of 16 + the 4 GUAM 
32 
members), first mooted during Kuchma's visit to Georgia in October 1997 . Anton 
Buteyko, the Ukrainian Deputy Foreign Minister, and then acting Head of the 
Department of Foreign Affairs of the GUAM states, complained that 'members of the 
Pfl? programme are not giving enough attention to these conflicts, which are slowly 
smouldering'. 33 Furthen-nore, the potential security role for GUAM and indeed its 
prospective institutionalisation, was subsequently reinforced by a proposal to set up a 
GUAM peacekeeping battalion. 34 
Even more pernicious from Moscow's point of view was the idea which 
35 
emerged at this time, that Turkey might become a member of GUAM. Any Turkish 
alliance with GUAM, would indicate the creation of an unparalleled aligm-nent of 
interests of BSEC and GUAM states, unlikely to be looked upon favourably by 
Moscow. Furthennore, Ankara's participation in GUAM would introduce an East- 
West dimension , if only 
by dint of Turkey's membership of NATO and ties with the 
EU , into the 
heart of the CIS. Indeed, a hint as to the effects that close co-operation 
between GUAM and Turkey might have was provided by the conference in September 
19981 organised under the auspices of the European Union, to discuss the issue of 
Europe- C aucasus-Asia transport corridors. While the Ukrainians, Georgians, Azeris 
and Turks were sufficiently satisfied with proceedings to sign a multilateral agreement 
on a number of issues pertaining to the creation of a transportation corridor, namely 
31 In addition to the fact that the Ukrainians did not want to be seen as legitimizing Russian activities in 
the 
Caspian region with their co-operation, there was also a cost consideration to be taken 
into account. As CIS 
peacekeepers, the Ukrainians would not benefit from the generous expenses they would 
be paid if they were there 
under the aegis of the OSCE or UN, their preferred option. Nevertheless, this was a 
financial burden they were 
willing to shoulder. Narodna Armiya, 17 September 1998. 
32 Uriadovy Kurier, 30 October 1997. 
3' Holos Ukrainy, II June 1998. 
34 Narodna Artniya, 17 September 1998. 
35 Den, 26 Mar 1997 
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the legal framework, ecological issues etc., the Russians failed to put their signature to 
the document, citing the fact that 'the Russian side did not participate in its 
fon-nulation'. 36 
Russia's presence at the conference was in effect that of an observer, with 
Moscow unable to influence proceedings. Taking account also the progress made on 
the development of competing transportation routes, and the tighter ties developing 
between the states that made up GUAM, the conclusion that Russia was effectively 
marginalized is inescapable. The conference also indicated that the coalition of forces 
gathered against Russia was not only growing in numbers, but also growing in 
strength. This was most clearly shown in April 1999, when Georgia, Azerbaijan and 
Uzbekistan, all reluctant signatories to the CIS Collective Security Treaty, failed to 
sign a protocol prolonging the validity of the treaty following its expiry on 20 April 
1999. Then, in a move steeped in symbolic meaning, on 24 April 1999, during 
NATO's 50th anniversary summit in Washington, Uzbekistan announced that it was 
joining GUAM. The significance of the event was multifold. Firstly, Uzbekistan's 
effective defection showed the inadequacy of Moscow's policies in the 'near abroad'. 
The inability of Moscow to ensure the continuation of the three states' continued 
participation in the Tashkent Treaty was clear reflection of its deteriorating position. 
Secondly, Ukraine's position was reinforced. By exempting themselves from 
Tashkent Treaty commitments, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Uzbekistan sided with 
Ukraine as a non-participant in the Collective Security Treaty. Thirdly, the fact that 
the announcement was made in Washington at the NATO summit was the clearest 
possible indication of the Western orientation that the member states had adopted. 
Moscow's ambitions for the CIS were publicly rebuffed by the states. The message 
was reinforced with the pronouncement of their intention to intensify their co- 
operation with the Partnership for Peace programme, in contrast to Russia's avowed 
non-participation. After the summit and following the example set by Azerbaijan 
earlier, Georgia made clear its goal of membership of NATO. 
After a period of quiescence, in September 2000 in New York, GUUAM re- 
emerged onto the international stage with an announcement by the presidents of the 
member states (other than Uzbekistan, the president of which sent a representative). 
36 HOIOS Ukrainy, 10 September 1998. 
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Firstly, an agreement had been made to initiate negotiations on the creation of a free- 
trade area between member states, something which was highlighted as being in 
marked contrast to the failure to achieve the same within the CIS. Secondly, a 
commitment to visa-free travel between member states was reiterated, again, 
something which put into sharp relief Moscow's decision in May 2000 to abandon the 
CIS agreement on visa-free travel. Thirdly, it was expressly hoped that both moves 
would encourage not only other CIS states to join GUUAM, but also non-CIS states 
(in particular Romania). 37 
Overall, using its geographical location and geopolitical significance as a 
fulcrum, Kyiv was able to lever Ukraine into a favourable position with regard to the 
key states which hoped to be involved in the transportation of Caspian oil i. e. Turkey, 
Azerbaijan and Georgia, and by extension into the two key subregional institutions 
analysed above. As a result, by the end of 1998, Ukraine found itself in a potentially 
highly advantageous position within the two institutions, though urging caution, 
Olcott et al argue that 'it would be wrong ... to exaggerate the significance or influence 
of GUUAM' for a plethora of reasons, including the poverty of and competition 
between member states and Russia's 'hold' over them . 
38 However, as we shall see, 
GUUAM has played an important role in a wider context, in forwarding Ukraine's 
goals at the regional level. 
Regional Institutions In Black Sea Politics 
The benefits derived from the establishment of strong bilateral ties with Black Sea 
littoral states, and Ukraine's firm entrenchment within the two subregional institutions 
extended to the regional level. Thanks to tighter bilateral ties and participation in 
subregional processes, Kyiv could now counteract Russian pressure to become further 
integrated with the CIS. From the point of view of the Ukrainians, there was a certain 
geographical inevitability about Ukraine's tighter links with Europe, especially in 
light of Ukraine's geographical location between Europe and the energy resources of 
the Middle East and the Caucasus. The eminent Ukrainian analyst, Serhiy Pyrozkov, 
37 Wall Street Journal Europe, 15 September 2000. 
11 oicott, Aslund and Garnett, Getting it Wrong, p. 168. 
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argued that Ukraine's geographical location would help realise Ukraine's aspirations 
to get 'more tightly integrated with the countries of the EU and other European 
international organisations, ' on "'a vertical level" thus linking northern regions of 
Europe with Perednaya (i. e. the nearest part of) Asi h ia and North AE ca'. 39 The 
following section will examine the Western and North-eastern regional dimensions in 
terms of Ukraine's Black Sea regional policy. 
cis 
From the moment of its inception, the CIS failed to ftinction as a post-Soviet 
institution of the type envisaged by Moscow, especially in terms of integrating 
Ukraine. On the one hand, the tendency for CIS structures to benefit Moscow repelled 
Ukraine . 
40 So, while the CIS was a framework within which Kyiv participated, 
Ukraine did so as little more than an observer. The CIS,, or Russia for that matter, had 
little power to enforce either compliance, or indeed insist on full membership for 
Ukraine. On the other hand, the lure of factors beyond Russia's control, such as 
investment and income to be derived from transportation of oil were too great for 
Kyiv to resist. In pursuit of Western investment and greater freedom from CIS 
structures, Kyiv took advantage of the strength of the bilateral relations it had built up, 
and its role within the various Black Sea subregional organisations to attempt to 
undermine the CIS by at least questioning the purpose of its existence. For example, 
not only were Ukraine and Azerbaijan highly supportive of each other's policy stances 
within the CIS - they were at the forefront of the growing scepticism about the 
41 
effectiveness of the institution , its 
future, and the need for a replacement. Indeed, 
driven by the belief that the CIS was designed to serve the needs of Moscow, they 
questioned its very purpose. Thus, any challenges by Ukraine to Russia's all 
pervading authority within the CIS through the formation of strategic alliances with 
other post-Soviet states was deemed by commentators in Kyiv to be treading on 
dangerous territory as it was believed that 'such strategic collaboration, if it is to be 
39 Zerkalo Nedeli, 28 February 1998. 
" R. Wolczuk, 'Ukraine and Europe: Relations Since Independence', The Ukrainian Review, Vol. 44, No. 1, 
Spring 1997, pp. 38-53. 
41 Den, 26 March 1997. 
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without consequences, was only possible with one member of the CIS' i. e. Russia: 
apparently 'the very thought of such partnerships was even more painful than the fact 
.) 42 of their existence . By precluding the development of ties beyond the 'one member 
of CIS', Russia was precisely trying to prevent the evolution of a structure such as 
GUUAM. Yet develop it did. As has been discussed, the signing of bilateral 
gstrategic' ties between Georgia, Ukraine and Azerbaijan and the tangible framework 
which began to grow up around GUUAM suggested that a creeping deterioration was 
taking place within the CIS. Indeed, with time the GUUAM states became highly co- 
ordinated in terms of their stance on and within the CIS, to the detriment of its 
functioning. Such co-ordinated moves were of course interpreted by Russia as anti- 
Russian in nature, but Moscow's essential helplessness was amply demonstrated by its 
response, which was described by a Ukrainian newspaper as 'nothing more than a 
stream of abuse'. 43 
The role of Ukraine within GUUAM was of course intended to have far- 
reaching implications for the CIS and Russia's role within it. Firstly, it has been 
argued that Ukraine used GUUAM as a vehicle to replace Russia as a leader of states 
within the CIS. 44 Ukraine was the only country within the CIS capable of at least 
partially counteracting the effects of Russian influence in the Caucasus. When 
member GUUAM states Georgia and Azerbaijan invited the Ukrainians to participate 
in peacekeeping activities, it was to supplant Moscow's forces not to complement 
them. With this invitation, the extent to which Russia's traditional role as regional 
leader had been eroded was made plain. Furthermore, in light of the fact that the entire 
rationale underlying the proposals for a GUUAM battalion, mentioned above, was the 
protection of the Georgian segment of the pipeline, it was clear that with Kyiv's input, 
Moscow's all important ace - its monopoly over energy supplies - was in danger of 
45 being neutralised by GUUAM . It was growing 
increasingly true in the words of a 
Ukrainian newspaper that 'Russia has no ffiends on the Black Sea, especially after the 
, 46 fall of the communists in Bulgaria . 
Secondly, with Ukraine's involvement, the 
42 Zerkalo Nedeli, 10 Mar 1997. 
43 ibid. 
44 ibid. 
45 H010S Ukrainy, II Dec 1998. 
46 Zerkalo Nedeli, 08 Feb 1997. 
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potential of GUUAM to provide an alternative to the CIS as a post-Soviet institution 
linking regional members was real. Ukraine's relative military, political and economic 
weight conferred on GUUAM some gravitas with which to provide competition to the 
CIS as a forum for a group of post-Soviet states. Furthermore, while the CIS was 
perceived as the tool of Moscow in pursuit of the re-animation of its empire, GUUAM 
was a forum set up in the interests of its member states. The same could not be said of 
the CIS. 
In sum, the encroachment of BSEC onto previously sacrosanct territory and 
the evolution of GUUAM, a non-cooperative subregional grouping within the CIS, 
was a painful experience for Moscow. Moreover, as will now be seen, Moscow's 
predicament was compounded by the fact that, Western actors were encroaching on 
the 'near abroad'. However, to Kyiv's consternation, not only did Ukraine remain 
something of a bystander in these developments, its efforts at the subregional level 
brought it few tangible benefits. 
NATO and the EU 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Western actors inevitably became more 
involved in Russia's 'near abroad'. For example, as the extent of Russia's inability to 
affect Caspian developments, especially decisions regarding transportation routes, was 
becoming clear at the beginning of 1997, Xavier Solana visited Moldova and 
afterwards the Caucasian region. Soon after, representatives of NATO and the ex- 
Soviet Central Asian republics gathered in Kyrgyzstan to discuss the possibility of 
co-operation. 47 Despite the symbolic nature of these events, the fact that these visits 
took place around the time that Aslan Maskhadov was sworn in as Chechnya's 
president was an unwelcome confluence of events in the eyes of the Russian 
leadership. More seriously from the point of view of Moscow, in that same year 
invitations were issued to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to apply for 
NATO membership. 48 Soon after these events, Ukraine consolidated its reputation as 





staging the 'Sea Breeze' NATO manoeuvres in the Black Sea, and signing a Charter 
with the transatlantic alliance in mid 1997. Ukraine's willingness to get involved in 
Georgia's problem with Abkhazia by agreeing to send peacekeepers there, within the 
framework of the PfP, further demonstrated the confidence Kyiv had in the Western 
alliance. 49 However, despite the flourishing ties between GUUAM states, the option 
of oil going across Ukraine up into Europe was deemed as flawed by the United States 
and was as a result rejected by an American official who scoffed that 'we don't see 
them [i. e. non Baku-Ceyhan routes] as practical and we don't see who would finance 
them. Baku-Ceyhan is the way to go '3.50 There were a number of reasons for this 
rejection of alternatives. Even 8 years after independence, Ukraine's destiny was far 
from certain. Three possible scenarios involving Ukraine can be envisaged. The first 
scenario envisages that if Ukraine's relations with Russia were to remain those of an 
independent sovereign state, the choice of the Ukrainian route would be more than 
justified, as it was the shortest and also the most cost effective. The second scenario 
suggests that any need for US/NATO involvement to protect the pipelines in the event 
of a conflict between Ukraine and Russia was a considerably less appealing option 
than that requiring involvement in the event of Kurdish insurrection should the 
Turkish route be chosen. 51 The third scenario suggests that if Kyiv's relations with 
Moscow were to revert back to their former Soviet-era status the entire rationale for 
selecting the Ukrainian route i. e. a reduction in the Russian monopoly on energy 
provision, would become undermined. The odds for US support for a Ukrainian 
pipeline were not good. 
In contrast, Turkey, a NATO member, has been sponsored by the USA in its 
efforts to ensure that Caspian oil traverses Turkish territory. The institutionalisation of 
US interest in the region took the form of the project referred to in 'The 1997 Law on 
the Silk Road strategy'. 52 At the root of policy, devised by the Senatorial Committee 
on International Relations, under the guidance of a sub-committee on Western and 
Southern Asian Affairs, was a desire to marginalize the influence of Iran in a 
4'Holos Ukrainy, II June 1998. 
50 NeW York Times, 6 November 1998. Although, confusingly, the USA $750000 grant for a feasibility project 
into the viability of Odesa-Brody line seems to contradict this somewhat. 
51 Kyiv Post, 10 November 1998. 
52 Zerkalo Nedeli, 7- 14 November 1997. 
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profoundly Islamic region, parts of which, such as Afghanistan, were succumbing to 
Islamic fundamentalism. 53 Behind this policy was the objective of keeping Caspian oil 
reserves and its transportation out of Iranian control, and within the influence and 
control of the Western world. The Turkish/NATO route was the key means by which 
Washington could control the flow of Caspian oil and hang onto the power that went 
with it, notwithstanding Turkish efforts to build stronger bonds with Iran and other 
54 Muslim states. Such a route would also intensify Turkey's role in NATO. 
According to some sources, 'the political decision in favour of the route from 
Baku to Ceyhan on Turkey's Mediterranean coast was made some time ago, and in 
late 1998 was reconfirmed in the Ankara Declaration, signed by the US energy 
secretary, and the presidents of Azerbaijan, Turkey, Georgia, Kazakhstan and 
Uzbekistan', though this was subject to the approval of the AIOC which was paying 
for the pipeline . 
55 Although USA support for the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline was holding 
firm by late 1998, the route was losing its appeal, ostensibly on ground of cost. 56 For 
political reasons, the USA could not offer direct financial support to build the Baku- 
Ceyhan route; nevertheless Washington was behind the array of incentives laid down 
before the AIOC, the main builders of the pipeline. 57 
Ties between Ukraine and the European Union on Black Sea issues were quite 
tenuous. The $101 million loan the EBRD was prepared to make the Ukrainians for 
the building of the terminal at Yuzniy was barely more than symbolic, 58 as was the 
visit of Peter Schuterle, the General Secretary of the European Energy Charter, to 
examine the building of the Odesa-Brody pipeline in the middle of 1998 . 
59 Similarly, 
the EU has been linked to the activities of GUUAM by a very thin strand, the most 
obvious example of which was the fact that the September 1998 Baku conference on 
53 Iran was a country with which Ukraine had on more than one occasion tried to establish strong ties - e. g. for 
energy source purposes, trade such as turbines etc. See Balmaceda, 'Gas, Oil and the Linkages'. 
54 Sherr, Ukraine's New Time of Troubles, p. 5. 
55 Kyiv Post, 6 November 1998. 
56 The Economist, 28 November to 4 December 1998. 
57 One way in which the Americans hoped to get involved financially was via subsidies through the 
Overseas 
Investment Corporation and the Export-Import Bank. The United States was also behind Turkish efforts to 
provide subsidies for the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline. New York Times, 8 November 1998. 
58 Kyiv Post, II September 1998. Though, as has been mentioned, in a conversation with a representative of the 
EBRD in London in February 1999, the author was told the whole package was in suspension. 
59 Holos Ukrainy, 28 July 1998. Signatories to the Charter include Azerbaijan, Turkey, Georgia, Russia 
Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Romania, Bulgaria and Poland. 
240 
the Caspian transport corridor was organised under the auspices of the European 
Commission. 
Despite Turkey's ambition that the BSEC serve as an institution that might 
complement the EU and, so Ankara hopes, reinforce the chances of Turkey's entry 
into the EU, ties between the two organisations have yet to take on a tangible forin. So 
far, relations extend to the fact that Greece, an EU member, belongs to the BSEC. In 
turn, the EBRD has shown some interest in supporting the creation of a Black Sea 
Trade and Development Bank, with headquarters in Thessalonica in Greece, in other 
60 words, within the orbit of the EU . 
By the end of 2000, it was still unclear via which route the hydrocarbons were 
going to be transported. Despite the price of oil surging throughout 2000, thereby 
making Baku-Ceyhan a more viable alternative, the option has been labelled a 
'strategic and economic disaster' for the US. 61 In light of the agreement signed in 
October 2000 between the EU and Russia for the latter to increase by as much as 100 
per cent its hydrocarbon supplies to the former, preferably by a route bypassing 
Ukraine and marginalising it yet further, the Baku-Ceyhan route was becoming a 
urgent necessity rather than a luxury for Ukraine's future energy security. 62 
Conclusion To Part 4 
The Southern azimuth was of critical importance to Ukraine: it was a potential link to 
the West and at the same time an avenue along which it could undermine Russia's 
energy hold over it. Yet it is clear that such objectives were over-ambitious in light of 
Ukraine's limited capacity to impose its will. Firstly, Ukraine was far from the key 
player in the region. Both Turkey and Russia were the chief competitors in the battle 
for transporting Caspian oil and ensuring any pipeline traversed its territory. Ukraine 
was always going to be placed third in such a competition. Secondly, Ukraine did not 
have the wherewithal to entice any of the consortia to build a key pipeline across its 
territory. The best it could offer was an adjunct to the Turkish option. Thirdly, 
60 Until the BSTDB determined an alternative, the EBRD was to be the depository of capital payments. 
61 Foreign Policy Briefing No. 63, http: //www. cato. org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb-063es. html. 
62 International Herald Tribune, 21 October 2000 
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Ukraine's competitors offered more appealing alternatives for economic and 
geopolitical reasons. Fourthly, Ukraine did not have the support of the US in regard to 
the transportation of Caspian oil, although it could benefit from Washington's support 
for the Baku-Ceyhan option. 
Yet the Southern azimuth was a source of success especially in terms of the 
achievement of objectives along the North-eastern azimuth. The establishment of 
bilateral ties with Black Sea neighbours was a contributing factor to the evolution of 
subregional institutions , in particular, GUTLJAM. Although this has been dismissed as 
a talking shop, such a view misreads the significance of the emergence and 
subsequent growth of the institution. The very fact that such a body developed within 
the CIS, and was made up of CIS member states, demonstrates not only the 
inadequacy of the Commonwealth as an integrating body, and the willingness of its 
members to search for an alternative institution that is more customised to their group 
needs, but above all the relative weakness of the Commonwealth. In addition,, 
GUUAM facilitated Ukraine in its goal of avoiding further integration within the CIS. 
The Southern azimuth at least in part contributed to Ukraine's success in avoiding too 
close ties along the North-eastern azimuth. 
However, Ukraine's efforts along the Southern azimuth failed to facilitate the 
achievement of goals along the Western azimuth. Kyiv's focus on energy 
transportation and hopeful references to Ukraine's geopolitical significance to Europe, 
that is its location between Northern Europe and the energy resources of the Caucasus 
and Middle East, was not misconceived. However, Ukraine failed to achieve these 
over-optimistic goals and fulfill the latent potential of its geopolitical location exposed 
its relative political and economic weaknesses and its inability to recognise that EU 
membership necessitates above all institutional change, reform, economic planning, 
and the eradication of corruption. 
In theoretical terms, Southern azimuth subregional and regional developments 
pose some interesting challenges to theories of regionalism while at the same time 
offer support for some off-stated claims. For example, it is evident that Ukraine's 
pursuit of Black Sea alliances, especially its key contribution to the creation and 
maintenance of GUUAM, testified to Ukraine's willingness to balance Russia, albeit 
tentatively, despite protestations by Kyiv to the contrary. In realist terms, Russia, as a 
declining hegemon, elicited an alliance-forming response on the part of former 
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underlings. Furthermore, because 'for Russia, the Commonwealth was the 
institutional framework for continued hegemony over the former Soviet regions' the 
creation of a subregional alliance by the GUUAM states was a means of undermining 
63 Russian efforts to re-create this hegemony. Along the Southern azimuth, the 
fori-nation of subregional alliances was indeed the response of weak states in the 'near 
abroad' of the strong. 
Similarly, the ever denser network of political, economic and even military 
cooperation that characterised the development of GUUAM, despite predictions of its 
imminent demise, endorses the neoliberal institutionalist explanation of regionalism. 
However, as a theory which suggests that institutions are collective solutions to 
problems which emanate from increasing interdependence (an interdependence which 
grew as the GUUAM states adopted a more-or-less common strategy in pursuit of 
energy independence from Russia), along the Southern azimuth the theory of 
neoliberal institutionalism struggles to provide a plausible explanation for the growth 
of interdependence in the absence of any. 
However, subregional developments along the Southern azimuth pose 
interesting questions for 'subregional regionalism'. 
Firstly, Southern subregional institutions were qualitatively different from 
Western subregional institutions and therefore it is difficult to talk about a generic 
subregional institution as subregional theorists are prone to. Compared to 
Visegrad/CEFTA, the BSEC, for example, was 'more likely to have longer term roles 
because [it] include[s] former Soviet states, above all Russia, unlikely to join NATO 
-) 64 or the EU . 
(This likely longetivity applies equally to GUUAM, which has over time 
become increasingly institutionalised. ) This difference highlights the transitory nature 
of subregional institutions along the Western azimuth, which had an altogether 
different brief to Southern institutions in terms of function, scope and long-term 
institutional objectives. (In a similar vein, as will become evident, it is difficult to talk 
about a generic subregional institution along the Southern azimuth. The BSEC and 
GUUAM also differ extensively on these same criteria. ) 
63 1. Bremmer, 'Southem Tier Subregionalism', Perspectives on Central Asia, Vol. 11, No. 4, July 1997, p. 2, 
(http: //www. cpss. org/casianw/percaO797. txt). 
64 Cottey, Subregional Cooperation in the New Europe, p. 5. 
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Secondly, Southern subregional institutions were affected by different flaws to 
Western subregional institutions. The membership of the BSEC in particular was 
more extensive, considerably more heterogenous, and overall (probably) more 
pauperised that was CEFTA/Visegrad, something which considerably limited the 
scope of what it was able to achieve. 65 Arguably, the BSEC, as does GUUAM, also 
lacks some of the prerequisites for a successful subregional institution identified by 
subregional regionalists, such as a common historic sense or identity. 66 
Thirdly, the BSEC was less institutionally focussed than was either Visegad or 
CEFTA. For example, in contrast to Russia 'Bulgaria and Romania view the BSEC 
largely from a political point of view: as a complementary and helpful instrument for 
their future integration into European institutions.... A similar approach is taken by 
Ukraine. Membership of the BSEC corresponds to Ukraine's general approach of 
gradual integration into Europe using inter alia the possibilities offered by subregional 
groups. Consequently, Kyiv also considers the BSEC a necessary component of 
European integration'. 67 The discrepancy between member states on their view of the 
purpose of subregional institution could only but impact on what that institution was 
able to achieve. In this regard, the coincidence of views as to the purpose of CEFTA 
(i. e. harmonization of rules, regulations, laws and policies between member states and 
with those of the EU in pursuit of membership of the latter) for example, contrasts 
sharply with the BSEC which served the very different needs of member states. 
Above all, southern tier subregional institutions struggled for support from 
regional institutions, one of the prerequisites for successful subregionalism, 
demonstrating once again the extent to which subregional regionalism, to be 
successful, needs to be 'sponsored' by a regional institution. As has been noted, 
6 subregions and subregional arrangements that are geographically 
distant from 
"richer" cooperation arrangements, such as the EU, are obviously in a more 
difficult 
situation'. 68 For example, the BSEC was at best 'encouraged' by symbolic gestures, 
650. PavlIuk, 'The Black Sea Economic Cooperation: Will Hopes Become Reality? ' in Cottey, 
Subregional 
Cooperation in the New Europe, p. 137. 
66 Cottey, Subregional Cooperation in the New Europe, passim. 
670. Pavliuk, 'The Black Sea Economic Cooperation', p. 140. 
68 A. Bjurner, 'Reflections on Subregionalism', p. 12. 
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and at worst, cold-shouldered by the EU. 69 GUUAM was an institutional orphan 
regarding Western and Northeastern regional institutions: NATO and the EU kept it 
well and truly at arms length, despite the ambitions of some of the former Soviet 
republics for closer ties if not membership of the latter two. The CIS was downright 
hostile towards it. Somewhat ironically, GUUAM has continued to evolve despite this 
lack of support. Realists rather than subregional regionalists provide a clearer 
explanation as to why this is so. 
Despite the ostensibly economic focus of the BSEC, impediments to the 
development of the institution have been created by 'political tensions' within the 
region, highlighting once more the importance of the link made by New Wave 
regionalists between economics and politiCS. 70 As a result of these tensions, although 
moves have been made toward a BSEC common energy market, the 'BSEC still lacks 
a clear priority or unifying core for its activities (for example, a free trade agreement 
or a customs union)' .71 
As has been noted 'economic development - international 
investment, pipeline construction, and the rebuilding of infrastructure - will not be 
free to follow its own non-zero-sum logic until fundamental political problems have 
been resolved'. 72 In contrast, with the political underpinnings in place, the economic 
dimension of the ostensibly political GUUAM appear to be growing, as evidenced by 
the proposal for a free trade area between member states. 
69 ibid., pp. 145-147. 
70 ibid., p. 13 1. 
71 ibid., p. 135. 
72 1. Bremmer, S. Clement, A. Cottey and T. Dokos, 'Emerging Subregional Cooperation Processes: South-Eastern 
Europe, The Newly Independent States and the Mediterranean', in Cottey, Subregional Cooperation in the New 
Europe, p. 230. 
245 
Part 5-A Conclusion 
Support for the Hypotheses 
The research hypothesis of this thesis proposed that Ukraine consistently pursued a 
policy of responding to security threats by attempting to integrate with or avoid 
integrating with regional security complexes (RSQ. The hypothesis postulated, firstly, 
that Ukraine sought to integrate with RSCs along the Western azimuth and, secondly, 
avoid integration with RSCs along the North-eastern azimuth. (Ukraine's objective of 
integration along the Western azimuth was pursued in conjunction with the pursuit of 
a special relationship with Russia and highly circumscribed relations with the CIS 
along the North-eastern azimuth. ) The thesis also argued that participation in RSCs 
along the Southern azimuth was pursued insofar as they facilitated the achievement of 
the previous two objectives. It was further hypothesised that Ukraine achieved a 
degree of success in preserving its security and enlarging its freedom of manoeuvre by 
integrating or avoiding integration with RSCs, bearing in mind the numerous internal 
and external obstacles it faced. The empirical findings outlined below will summarise 
the extent to which these hypotheses have been supported. 
Empirical Findings 
In 1991, following the proclamation of independence, Ukraine found itself facing an 
unforeseen opportunity - the chance to reorient its primary geopolitical and 
geoeconomic ties from East to West. A decision to reorient from East to West was not 
as straightforward as might have been expected by observers at both 'ends' of the 
continent. Russia had for centuries been a friendly, even 'brotherly', state. 
Notwithstanding the sometimes enforced linguistic and cultural Russification of 
Ukraine, the two states did not share a history besmirched by mutually inflicted 
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atrocities, as was the case, for example, between Ukraine and Poland. On the contrary 
Ukrainians and Russians shared a collective history of hardship and misfortune, 
whether that be the costs of industrialisation and collectivisation, or the demographic 
losses which were the price of victory for the USSR in the Second World War. In a 
great many respects, there was more linking than separating the two states: the choice 
for Ukraine of remaining oriented toward the 'East' might have seemed self evident 
and the obvious one to make. 
The fact that this choice was not made was highly indicative of the profoundly 
changed geopolitical context Ukraine found itself in. Firstly, it was unclear to Kyiv 
when again it was likely to find itself in a position of autonomously deciding on its 
own geopolitical fate. This was an opportunity seemingly too good to miss, especially 
in the light of the fact that ties with Russia had turned Ukraine into very much of a 
backwater. Secondly, by 1991, economic power had seemingly displaced military 
power, and Europe represented one of the three poles of economic power in the world, 
along with Japan and the USA. Furthen-nore, the West's victory in the Cold War was 
comprehensive: it was moral, economic, social, political and technological. The East's 
defeat was total: moral bankruptcy, economic collapse, military decrepitude, political 
civil war and social breakdown. Thus the West was a lure for Ukraine with which the 
East simply could not compete, other than on emotional, social and historical terms. 
Because the ties of loyalty to Moscow of decision makers in Kyiv were by 1991 so 
stretched by the prosperity that the West offered, the dilemma of choosing to reorient 
Ukraine from East to West was not as great as Moscow might have expected, or as 
Brussels might at times have wished. It hardly needed an economist to calculate that 
for Ukraine modernity and thus the future lay in the West, while backwardness and 
retardation awaited in the East. 
However, the Western azimuth was not immediately accessible to Ukraine. 
That is, it was an option, but only up to an all too limited point. There were at least 
two reasons for this. Firstly, Russia, the vanquished, was hardly likely to 'let Ukraine 
go' without a fight or some opposition. There is little doubt that Russia would be 
prepared to go a long way to prevent such a reorientation, at the very least by 
exploiting Ukraine's economic dependence on it. The second problem facing Ukraine 
in the implementation of a decision to turn westward was that few in the West were 
really prepared to countenance Ukrainian membership of its key institutions. 
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Furthermore Europe was not willing to side with Ukraine if it were forced to make a 
choice between Ukraine and Russia. Russia was the preferred partner for Europe. 
For these reasons, in 1991, following its announcement of independence, 
Ukraine found itself in a dangerous limbo facing a major security predicament: the 
West was an unwilling partner, while Russia was a somewhat too willing collaborator 
for Kyiv's liking. The thesis argued that Ukraine responded to the resulting security 
threats that emanated from this context by attempting to integrate with or avoid 
integrating with regional security complexes (RSQ. In particular, it was argued that 
Ukraine sought to integrate with RSCs along the Western azimuth and avoid 
integrating with RSCs along the North-eastern azimuth, while participation in RSCs 
along the Southern azimuth was pursued insofar as it facilitated the achievement of 
the previous two objectives. As was discussed in the first chapter, in order to measure 
the extent of 'success' or 'failure' within a given RSC, the thesis explores the extent 
to which Ukraine was able to influence the dominant pattern of security management, 
or regional orders, along each of the azimuths. Outcomes were matched against five 
ideal types of regional order. These types form a hierarchy reflecting increasing levels 
of cooperation with regional neighbours: power-restraining power, concert, collective 
security, pluralistic security community and, finally, integration. ' Each azimuth will 
now be analysed in terms of these five types. 
The North-eastern Azimuth 
In the early days of independence, Ukraine was above all motivated by a desire to 
avoid any form of reintegration into the post-Soviet space. Indeed, the greater the 
pressure emanating from Russia on Ukraine to reintegrate, the more resistant did Kyiv 
become. Russia's motivation to bring about this reintegration was powerful: the 
deeply interwoven ideological, economic, political, ethnic and military ties were such 
that Moscow was unlikely to have too much difficulty in mobilising its forces to 
bring 
about a desired outcome, or so Kyiv believed. Thus the outcome predicted 
by 
hegemonic stability theory, namely, that Russia - the hegemon - was perceived as 
willing, if not actually able, to impose its version of security and stability on 
the 
1 P. M. Morgan, 'Regional Security Complexes and Regional Orders' in Lake and Morgan, pp. 21-44 
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region, was confirmed. At least up until 1994, Russia remained the hegemon, albeit a 
declining one, which strained to maintain its pre-eminent position in the regional 
powerplay, especially in terms of its 'hold' over Ukraine. It is the fear of Russian 
hegemony which explains Ukraine's somewhat crude efforts in 1992/3 to establish 
what it promoted as a collective security system verging on collective defence in the 
middle of Europe, but which Moscow perceived as efforts to balance against it. It is 
precisely because of these perceptions that the efforts failed. 
Efforts by Russia and Belarus to promote the highest levels of co-operation 
with Ukraine, namely its integration 1 the CIS, met with very limited success, 
notwithstanding the 1999 decision of the Ukrainian parliament to join the CIS 
Interparliamentary Assembly. The move by parliament to join a CIS institution was a 
stark and sudden reminder to the pro-Western president Kuchma that there was a 
domestic constituency in Ukraine that did not necessarily share the geopolitical 
ambitions of the foreign policy elite in Kyiv. Nevertheless, as of March 2000, Ukraine 
remains beyond most key CIS institutions: it is not a signatory to the CIS Charter, or a 
member of the Economic Union. 
Yet in the light of the sheer number of ties linking Ukraine with Russia and the 
post-Soviet region - trade flows, financial interests, ethnic ties - the ability of Kyiv to 
remain beyond the hegemonic pull of Russia is all the more surprising. To all intents 
and purposes Ukraine's involvement in the RSC along the North-eastern azimuth 
remains highly circumscribed in anything other than economic terms. 
The Western Azimuth 
In the early days following independence, Ukraine pursued the creation of a 
subregional Central European collective security system. The fact that a collective 
security system was construed by potential participant states as well as by Russia as an 
effort to balance ('power balancing power' in the terminology of Lake et ao against 
the latter put paid to these efforts. 
2 However, partial regional success for Ukraine in 
participating in emerging collective security management was achieved with the 
attaimuent of stronger ties with NATO, primarily through PfP, something which 
2 Lake and Morgan, Regional Orders, passint. 
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reflected the changing nature of NATO as a security structure. After joining the PfP in 
1994, Ukraine became a willing if only peripheral contributor to an emerging 
collective security system along the Western azimuth. Even the Kosovo crisis in 1999, 
which so badly disrupted the uneasy peace between Russia and NATO leading to 
Moscow's temporary withdrawal from the PfP, did little to damage Ukraine's 
relations with NATO. Despite the fact that the Ukrainian parliament appeared to be 
virtually unanimously outraged by developments in Kosovo, the Presidential 
Administration continued to pledge its wholehearted support to continued co- 
operation with NATO within the framework of the PfP, a notable tribute to the 
strength of the ties which had developed between Kyiv and Brussels. This emerging 
security relationship served as an impetus for Kyiv to pursue economic and political 
integration along the Western azimuth. 
The first stage towards the 'strategic objective' of integration with the EU, 
announced in 1996 by President Kuchma, was integration with subregional 
institutions along the Western azimuth. The desire to integrate with subregional 
institutions reflects Ukraine's recognition that key regional goals i. e. EU membership, 
even closer ties with NATO, were effectively unattainable in the short term. Kyiv was 
convinced that not only would membership of subregional. institutions prevent 
Ukraine from becoming isolated 'between East and West', but would also facilitate 
Ukraine's integration into regional structures. In the absence of viable alternatives, 
Ukraine was by 1994 intent on joining CEFTA, despite the growing obsolescence of 
the latter as many of its member states drew ever closer to the EU. Ukraine's 
continued failure to integrate with CEFTA, a stepping-stone along the way toward the 
key regional institution - the EU - must thus be seen as a major failure of Ukraine's 
regional policy. However, Kyiv's inability to form closer ties with the EU is an even 
greater failure. The signing of a Partnership and Co-operation Agreement with the EU 
in 1994 remains the only real milestone in relations between the EU and Ukraine. The 
fact remains that Ukraine has overestimated its geopolitical importance in the region, 
and singularly failed to implement the economic and political refonns that are at the 
root of successful integration into the Western bloc and which are a prerequisite for 
Ukraine's entry into the EU. Indeed, rather than progress along the road of reform, 
Ukraine has actually made a number of retrograde steps in the last few years. As a 
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result, Ukraine is even more distant from its strategic goal of integration with the EU 
in 2001, than it was in 1996. 
However, another explanation for this failure is that Ukraine's objectives at the 
subregional level were hindered by neighbours along the Western azimuth, because of 
their own regional objectives. Indeed, regional level developments actively damaged 
subregional level developments, because of the belief held by individual states that 
participation in subregional developments was likely to inhibit their own individual 
chances of membership of regional institutions. Thus fearful of being locked out of 
NATO integration and EU enlargement, CEES effectively cold-shouldered Ukraine 
along the Western azimuth at least until 1994. There is certainly no evidence to 
suggest that Western institutions in any way encouraged the inclusion of Ukraine into 
subregional structures up until 1994, something which they could have easily be done, 
with little added burden to themselves. After 1994, things changed somewhat, but 
then only with regard to NATO in that enlargement encouraged Poland to 'think 
regionally' and try and bring Ukraine in 'out of the cold' and avoid leaving it isolated. 
However, the opposite is true when it comes to the EU. As the CEES moved ever 
closer to EU membership, Ukraine became ever more marginalized on the EU's future 
Eastern border. 
The Southern Azimuth 
The regional order pursued by Ukraine along the Southern azimuth is inextricably 
linked to objectives along the North-eastern and Western azimuths. In particular, 
Southern azimuth objectives were pursued to the extent that they facilitated Ukraine's 
integration with the West, and hindered its integration, or prevented Ukraine from 
being too drawn into the hegemonic regional order of the North-east. For example, 
Kyiv hoped that ties with Turkey, the key BSEC state, would help integrate Ukraine 
into the BSEC more tightly. There are two key reasons that explain 
Ukraine's 
enthusiastic participation in the BSEC. Firstly, the institution helped temper 
Russian 
influence in the region. This was because the co-operation between BSEC member 
states, led by an assertive Turkey and not an emasculated Russia, 
hinted at shared 
concerns for the soft security of the region, concerns which were not 
dominated by 
Russian priorities. Anything which tempered Moscow's ambitions was welcome in 
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Kyiv. Secondly, Kyiv hoped that the BSEC might influence the route of the flows of 
Caspian oil westward, and hence reduce Ukraine's energy dependence on Russia. The 
diminished influence of Russia in conjunction with a new found assertiveness on the 
part of Black Sea littoral states suggested the emergence of a collective security 
management approach, although the BSEC remains constrained by its limited 
financial clout. 
If the BSEC merely implies confrontation between Ukraine and Russia, 
GUUAM is a different proposition; the objectives of GUUAM appear to be much 
more blatant. GUUAM can interpreted as a limited and somewhat desperate attempt at 
power-restraining power, or balancing against Russia. 'Ganging up' against Russia for 
protection was one of the few means available for regional actors to pursue a common 
objective while limiting the interference of the regional hegemon. 
However, the underlying regional objectives of GUUAM member states hint at 
an attempt at collective security management. The fact that member states were 
prepared to form a battalion, albeit under Ukrainian leadership, seeking ties with 
NATO, supports the contention that GUUAM has taken on collective security 
ambitions. It could also be seen as bandwagoning with NATO - after all, one of the 
goals of these ambitions was identical to that of the US, namely to determine the 
direction of Caspian energy flows in favour of the main member state's interests, 
which were antagonistic to those of Russia. The fact that GUUAM has also proposed 
a battalion to function under the aegis of NATO supports this contention. 
GUUAM can thus be perceived as an anti-hegemonic, anti-Russian, anti-CIS 
phenomenon, and hence an anti-integrationist reaction to events along the North- 
eastern azimuth. Joining forces with other former Soviet republics was a means for 
Ukraine and other former Soviet republics to alleviate some of the pressures exerted 
on them by Moscow. The growth of trade ties and military co-operation between CIS 
non-Russian member states was evidence of the waning power of Russia to influence 
bilateral and subregional developments in its 'near abroad'. These subregional 
processes, especially the development of GUUAM, were not welcome by Russia. 
GUUAM was useful in impeding the attainment of CIS objectives, if only to pursue 
its own. The development of GUUAM within the CIS is from Moscow's perspective a 
pernicious development. If GUAM states were to combine to produce a battalion, if 
Turkey was to become a member of GUAM as has been mooted, and if any of these 
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events were to take place with the framework of the Partnership for Peace programme, 
the CIS as an integrative body would have sustained a meaningful blow, and GUUAM 
would have taken on the distinct shape of a collective security structure with links to a 
larger one, something which may even resemble bandwagoning. Whether or not these 
perspectives are exaggerated only time will tell. However, the decision in September 
2000 for the member states to push for the institutionalisation of GUUAM, reiterating 
in the process their common interests and objectives, suggests that the options for 
GUUAM are far from exhausted. 3 
Nevertheless, the Southern azimuth remains one of little more than hope for 
Kyiv. By the end of 1999, there was little likelihood that Ukraine was going to 
become an indispensable part of the energy conduit taking energy resources 
Westward, despite its prominence in GUUAM and willing participation in BSEC. 
Theoretical Implications 
Systemic Level Theories of Regionalism 
Realism and Neorealism 
As far as the North-eastem azimuth was concerned, Kyiv's prime preoccupation was 
with how a spurned Russia would respond to Ukraine's independence in 1991. Its 
second concern was with Russia's response to Ukraine's subsequent fall blown 
military and political though not economic de-integration from former Soviet 
structures. As the process of deintegration gained momentum, the world stood 
helplessly by while a political vacuum prevailed on the territory of the former Soviet 
Union. Ukraine's initial concerns were purely realist in their nature -a military 
response on the part of Moscow, while unlikely, was not ruled out by Kyiv. 
As a 
result in the first days of independence the policies adopted by Ukraine were those of 
a classic self-help state: a commitment to fully independent military forces. 
Ukraine's 
3 Wall Street Journal Europe, 15 September 2000. 
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decision to nationalise the Soviet forces on its territory (other than strategic military 
forces) was thus a dramatic step congruent with that predicted by neorealist theory - 
although it was potentially highly destabilising, Kyiv's recourse to such action spoke 
volumes about the vulnerability Ukraine felt. In this instance, survival rather than 
power was the priority in Kyiv, as Waltz might have postulated. 4 
From a theoretical point of view there was however, one key anomaly in 
Ukraine's post-independence behaviour. This related to Kyiv's willingness to adhere 
to its earlier commitment to denuclearise and start decommissioning its nuclear 
weapons. This was anomalous as the decision went against the grain of one of the 
main tenets of realist theory, namely the pursuit of self-help by states. However, the 
fact that the commitment to denucleanse was later reneged on as the international 
scene became more hostile to Ukraine only apparently supports the realist perspective. 
In practice, a bankrupt Ukraine wanted to retrospectively make money from the 
weapons, after realising that it had committed itself to giving away a valuable 
commodity. 
Although a Russian military threat failed to materialise, an economic and 
political offensive nevertheless ensued: by taking advantage of Ukrainian economic 
dependence on Russia, and on the CIS in general, Moscow strove to undermine 
Ukraine's independence and drive it ever more deeply into the CIS and into continued 
dependence on itself Had Russia been successful, the Ukrainians themselves argue 
that that would have condemned Ukraine to 'vegetate in the backyard of history' 
It is argued by realists that the economic objectives underlying regional 
integration do not derive from the pursuit of welfare, but rather from the close 
5 
relationship between political power and economic wealth. From a Ukrainian 
perspective, Russia and the CIS were hardly associated with economic wealth, and by 
extension political power. Thus, regional integration along the North-eastern azimuth 
was not the preferred option - it was the wrong way to go. The 
fact that Ukraine's 
economic objectives lay in the West rather than the Northeast strongly suggested that 
Ukraine sought the benefits that derive from economic wealth and political power. 
Ukraine's adaptation to the international environnient, and its pursuit of security 
4 K. Waltz, Theory of International Politics. 
5 Hurrell, 'Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective', in Fawcett and Hurrell, p. 48. 
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required that it gain the economic and technological advantage conferred by 
subregional and regional integration with the West. 
Ukraine's search for security in Western and Southern subregional alliances, 
some of which were suggested on Kyiv's initiative, bolsters the realist view that the 
formation of alliances is a natural form of self-help: balancing against perceived foes 
is one of the few options available for weak states in the presence of stronger foes. 
The ambition to create or participate in a subregional security structure, which 
included CEES and conspicuously excluded Russia, was an explicit demonstration of 
this point. Yet the effort to balance with CEES against Russia (especially the Baltic- 
Black Sea Security Zone) was an abject failure. Furthermore, the theory says little 
about the pursuit of membership of non-security subregional institution along the 
Western azimuth: membership of CEFTA was pursued with greater vigour than was 
membership of earlier security based institutions (e. g. NATO-bis or Zone of Stability 
and Security). 
Objectives along the Southern azimuth were an inherent part of Ukraine's 
strategy of integration with the Western azimuth: by attempting to become part of the 
energy transportation network, Ukraine hoped to become indispensable to Europe's 
energy needs. Supporting realist theory is the fact that relations along the Southern 
azimuth were also intended as a means of escaping the direct pressure coming from 
Russia: Black Sea alliances, co-operation in the creation of transportation corridors 
and participation in peacekeeping duties in the Caucasus all sent clear messages to 
Moscow that it could no longer simply dictate affairs to its former underlings. 
Specifically, the emergence of GUUAM hints at the readiness of former Soviet 
republics to balance, even if only tentatively, against Russia. In sum, the pursuit of 
both harmonious bilateral relations and membership of subregional institutions along 
the Western and Southern azimuths testifies to a willingness on the part of Kyiv to 
balance Russia. 
6 
Realists also argue that hegemons stimulate the formation of regions . Thi s 
occurs in a number of ways. While Russia was clearly willing to contribute to the 
creation of a regional security grouping along the North-eastern azimuth, it 
nevertheless failed to successfully establish such a regime fully involving Ukraine - 
ibid., p. 50. 
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the latter was not willing to bandwagon with Russia. While Ukrainian perceptions 
were such that Kyiv saw Russia as a hegemon, it is also possible to conceptualise 
Russia as a declining hegemon, seeking actors with whom burdens could be shared, 
thanks to whom policies would be legitimised, and through whom actions would be 
internationalised in pursuit of self interest. However, despite Moscow's willingness - 
as a declining hegemon - to take on the burden of regime formation, Kyiv was an 
extremely reluctant participant in the CIS, unwilling to trade the economic benefits for 
the political costs. Ukraine was simply unwilling to undertake the role of helping 
manage the decline of Russia: Kyiv was too suspicious of Moscow's motives to risk 
its sovereignty. Instead of successfully drawing Ukraine more deeply into the CIS, 
Moscow the hegemon in fact elicited a counter-response on the part of Kyiv: the latter 
actively started to form or participate in subregional and regional groupings along its 
Western and Southern azimuths as a response to the perceived military and later 
economic threat emanating from Russia. Russia the hegemon elicited an inclination to 
alliance formation on the part of former Soviet republics. There is no evidence to 
suggest that Ukraine's albeit limited participation in the CIS was designed to restrict 
Russia, as is predicted by some versions of the theory. In contrast, Western and 
Southern hegemons, if they can be characterised as such (Germany/USA and Turkey, 
respectively) were not perceived as threats by Ukraine: instead, they were 
characterised as 'strategic' partners. Partnership was sought, and all the evidence 
suggests that progress towards closer ties with such hegemons was welcomed. 
Some standard criticisms of the (neo)realist approach, however, have a 
particular resonance in CEE and the post-Soviet space. Firstly, 'realism is particularly 
weak in accounting for change, especially where the sources of that change lie in the 
world political economy'. 7 The most telling example of such a criticism is the 
inability of the theory to have predicted the end of the Cold War and the implosion of 
the Soviet Union. The second criticism levelled at (neo)realism, namely that it 
neglects the role of domestic factors as determinants of foreign policy is more easily 
dismissed. Waltz's work is particularly pertinent in this regard, especially as applied 
to Ukraine's post-independence behaviour. The realist contention that states, or more 
specifically policy makers, assess threats and determine policy on the basis of 
7 R. 0. Keohane, 'Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond' in R. O. Keohane (ed. ), Neorealism 
and its Critics (New York: Columbia Univeristy Press 1986) p. 159. 
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perceived threat and aggressive intention, certainly contributes to an understanding of 
the twists and turns that the evolution of Ukrainian foreign and security Policy 
8 underwent as Kyiv sought regional accommodation following independence. 
Additional evidence of this is the Ukrainian parliament's vociferous denouncing of 
NATO attacks in Serbia and demands that Ukraine withdraw from the PfP. Only the 
consitutionally enshrined preponderance of presidential power over the parliament 
stopped these moves in their tracks. In other words, domestic factors are not wholly 
neglected in realist theory. Thirdly, (neo)realism contends that states 'are extremely 
unwilling to assign importance to international institutions or to allow them to 
constrain their freedom of action'. 9 Certainly, in the light of Ukraine's 'strategic 
objective' of integration with the European Union, to say nothing of subregional 
institutions, the contention is discordant. Ukraine was seemingly only too willing to 
cassign importance to international institutions' as evidenced by President Kuchma's 
unambiguous proclamation of the strategic goal of membership of the EU in 1996. 
The fact that Ukraine has failed to attain this goal in 2000 is attributable to Ukrainian 
bureaucratic inertia rather than the threat the EU presented to Ukraine's sovereignty. 
In this regard (neo)realism is at fault as it provides an 'inadequate analysis of 
economic integration and of the roles played by formal and informal international 
institutions'. 10 Wendt, while acknowledging a propensity toward anarchy in the 
international system, argues that the very intersubjectivity that characterises inter-state 
behaviour renders realism 'ill-suited as a comprehensive basis for systemic theory' in 
that it neglects the 'the nascent sociology of the international community'. " While in 
Ukraine's case it is true that Kyiv was 'extremely unwilling to assign importance to 
international institutions' along the North-eastern azimuth, the same just does not hold 
true for Ukraine's objectives along its Western azimuth: membership of the EU as a 
strategic objective has been doggedly adhered to. Indeed, Ukraine's 'strategic 
objective' of membership of the European Union hints at an importance ascribed to 
economic issues by Kyiv that even the neorealist version of the theory cannot 
8 R. Wolczuk, 'The Evolution of Ukraine Foreign and Security Policy 1991-1994', Journal of Slavic Military 
Studies, Vol. 12, No. 3 (September 1999) pp. 18-37. 
9 J. M. Grieco, 'Realist International Theory and the Study of World Politcs' in M. W. Doyle and G. J. Ikenberry 
(eds. ), New Thinking in International Relations Theory (New York: Westview Press 1997) p. 184 
'0 Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, p. V. 
11 Wendt, 'Collective Identity Forination and the International State', p. 394. 
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accommodate. Significantly, non-security subregional organisations played a more 
prominent role in Ukrainian foreign and security policy than realist theory would have 
predicted. Indeed, economic ties with CEES which had joined NATO were seen as 
Ukraine's potential 'way in' to membership of subregional RSCs along the Western 
azimuth and eventually the EU; for Kyiv, NATO membership has never really been 
on the cards. Thus, realist theory fails to explain why Ukraine's objective of 
membership of non-security subregional institutions was to serve the same 
legitimising role for Ukraine's Western orientation that NATO served for CEES. As 
Balmaceda points out, along the Western azimuth 'bandwagoning does not seem to be 
fully capable of explaining Ukraine's international behaviour'. 12 Furthermore, the 
realist approach is ultimately somewhat barren in its explanatory power. It falls to 
account for Ukraine's initial de-integration from the Soviet Union: the sheer number 
and strength of ties linking the Ukrainian SSR and Russia were such that Ukrainian 
independence was an almost unthinkable phenomenon. The fact that it occurred 
despite these ties suggests that by neglecting to examine the precise nature of ties at 
micro level the (neo)realist approach is overlooking potentially important 
independent/causal variables. 
Structural Interdependence 
By allowing for the complexities of the type of interdependence, complex 
interdependence and regime change that characterised Ukraine's relationship with 
Russia in the years following independence, the theory of structural interdependence 
addresses a key flaw of realist theory, namely the inability of realist theory to explain 
the changed nature of the security threat Ukraine faced from Russia from around 1994 
onwards, namely the politico -economic rather than military challenges emanating 
ftom Moscow., 3 The theory helps explain how Ukraine came to be threatened by the 
vulnerabilities that are a natural corollary of interdependence between states, and why 
the probability of a successful and voluntary reintegration of Ukraine into the post- 
Soviet space was so unlikely. 
12 M. M. Balmaceda, 'Institution, Alliance and Stability: Thinking Theoretically About International Relations in 
Central-East Europe', European Security, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Autumn 1997), p. 98. 
13 Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, passim. 
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The very real, albeit asymmetrical interdependence, the first theme of the 
theory of Structural Interdependence, as opposed to mere interconnectedness, that 
existed between Ukraine and Russia was demonstrated by Ukraine's extreme 
sensitivity and vulnerability to costs imposed by Russia in terms of energy. Kyiv was 
not only very badly hit by (i. e. sensitive to) the price increases the Russian side 
imposed as prices were brought up to world level - Kyiv could do little to cushion the 
shocks of such increases, i. e. it was highly vulnerable. Not that Russia was totally 
invulnerable - Kyiv's moves to undermine the reliability of Russian supplies to the 
West were a painful reminder to Moscow of the 'strategic' role this once loyal ally 
played. Interdependence was indeed a two-way process. 
However, somewhat awkwardly for the theory of Structural Interdependence, 
the albeit asymmetric interdependence between Ukraine and Russia along the North- 
eastern azimuth failed to adequately stimulate or promote harmonious ties between 
them either on a bilateral level, or within subregional or regional structures. In fact the 
opposite was true: Ukraine, rather than remain dependent on Russia as the sole source 
of energy supplies and hence vulnerable and sensitive to any disruption in those 
supplies, desperately sought alternative supplies, something which motivated its 
ambitions along the subregional dimension on the Southern azimuth and was tied to 
objectives along the Western azimuth. Russia's corresponding vulnerability, its 
reliance on Ukraine as the key transit route for gas and oil supplies to the West was 
acted on by Moscow from very early on - the building of alternative pipelines around 
Ukraine, had it been completed rapidly, would have significantly reduced Ukraine's 
bargaining position vis-a-vis Russia and their interdependence would have been 
reduced, with Ukraine coming off very much worse. In fact, Ukraine's vulnerabilities, 
in the absence of successes along the Southern azimuth would have endured, while 
Russia's would have dissipated. Interdependence was hardly conducive to integration 
in this particular instance. 
Ukraine's reluctance to build on its interdependence with Russia can in part be 
explained by the second theme of structural independence theory, namely complex 
interdependence and the role of its three key components - multiple channels of 
contact, hierarchy of issues, and salience of use of force, most particularly the 
latter 
two. Firstly, as far as the hierarchy of issues was concerned, competing military 
security concerns for both states dominated the agenda 
between them in the early 
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years following Ukrainian independence. Although tensions over the Crimea, 
Sevastopol, the BSF, air defence and nuclear weapons reached their peak under the 
presidency of Kravchuk, they certainly did not immediately disappear on the election 
of his successor, Leonid Kuchma. Secondly, these tensions were further exacerbated 
by the fact that at least on the part of Ukrainians there was the perception that for 
Russia the use of force was highly salient. The war in Chechnya, the attack on the 
Russian parliament, Russian 'peacekeeping' duties throughout the former Soviet 
Union, ongoing events in Moldova, all fostered the suspicion that post-Soviet Russia 
was not averse to merely threatening the use of force, but was actually using it. It is 
probable that the very thing that prevented the total breakdown in relations were the 
multiple channels of contact that existed between the two states on an interstate, 
intergovernmental and transnational level. Indeed, there are suggestions that despite 
the formal independence from each other of the two states, there remains a vein of 
intimacy between them that strongly suggests that Ukraine's independence is a myth 
and that the two are defacto integrated. 14 
The third theme of the theory, that of regime change, exposes the salience of 
wider issues in Ukraine's efforts to remain aloof from regional developments along its 
North-eastern azimuth. There are four features to regime change: the role of economic 
processes, the overall power structure in the world, the power structure within issue 
areas and the role of international organisations. 
As far as economic processes are concerned, the growing obsolescence of the 
technological base of the former Soviet Union was evident to policy makers in Kyiv - 
integration with the CIS suggested a further ossification of Ukraine's fast dating but 
occasionally still impressive technology. This was in direct contrast with what Kyiv 
believed integration with the West would offer. A second economic factor explaining 
Ukraine's drive out of the network that made up the former Soviet Union, and a 
refusal to get drawn more deeply into the CIS was a demand at the popular 
level for 
an improvement in standards of living. Nothing more emphatically supports this view 
than the overwhelming and uniform popular support for independence across Ukraine, 
driven as it was by hoped for economic benefits of independence -a process not 
held 
up by amorphous concepts linked to national identity or suchlike. 
14 'How Ukraine's Fake Independence Promotes "Collective Security"', Soviet Analyst, 1996, Vol. 
23, No. 8, pp. 
1-6. 
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To say that with the collapse of the Soviet Union the overall power structure in 
the world had changed, is merely to reiterate an off-stated truism. However, to suggest 
that Ukraine sought solutions along the Western and Southern azimuths at the expense 
of the North-eastern azimuth, and that objectives along the fon-ner two of those 
azimuths were intertwined and linked to objectives along the North-eastern azimuth is 
to make a less obvious claim. With a decline in Russian power, the regime change 
was so great owing to the overhaul of the overall power structure in the world, that 
Ukraine was able to adopt a hitherto unthinkable policy stance. 
This new policy stance was most evident in the change that took place in the 
power structure within the issue areas affecting the former Soviet Union, the second 
feature of regime change. As should by now be evident, Kyiv adopted a pro-active 
role in bringing about this change in the power structure within certain key issue 
areas. Indeed, the collapsing power of Russia meant not only that regime change was 
inevitable, but also that Ukraine was likely to adopt a prominent role in the push for 
regime change. There is strong empirical support for the contention that Ukraine was 
the catalyst that brought about the change in the 'implicit and explicit principles, 
norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations 
converge'. 15 For example, Ukraine was highly pro-active in preventing the emergence 
of a post-Soviet successor regime. Furthermore, Kyiv pursued with vigour the creation 
of a sub-CIS regime along the Southern azimuth, which challenged the CIS. 
Moscow exerted great efforts to manage its political, military and economic 
decline by linking issue areas, for example, by making the continued supply of cheap 
energy to the republics conditional on their membership of the CIS. However, despite 
Ukraine's dependence on Russian energy, Moscow could not prevent Ukraine's 
military and political deintegration from the Soviet Union; neither was it able to 
compel Ukraine to integrate fully with the CIS. Indeed, arguably, the CIS itself 
provided a forum within which regime change could be arranged and managed. 
Furthermore, the very weakness of the CIS emboldened some of its members to 
support regime change whether Ukraine led or not, much to the consternation of the 
strongest member of the institution. 
15 S. Krasner, International Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1983). 
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The role of the key international institution along the North-eastern azimuth, 
the CIS, was in Kyiv's eyes to be limited to that of ensuring a 'civilised divorce'. 
However, while the break with the former Soviet Union has not been total, Ukraine 
remains estranged from Russia. The role of the CIS in managing this change has been 
circumscribed, to say the least, by Kyiv efforts to impede ambitions for the institution, 
as well as the inadequate institutional framework of the body itself As for the CIS 
itself, it could be argued that, at best, the CIS has not drastically impeded the type of 
regime change favoured by Ukraine; at worst it has hindered the evolution of normal 
interstate ties on the territory of the former Soviet Union. 
If the structural interdependence theory successfully helps explain the process 
via which Ukraine managed the change from its status as a former constituent republic 
of the USSR to an independent state, the attempt to use the theory to fully account for 
Ukraine's Western orientation meets with mixed results. Ukraine was interdependent 
with states to its West to the smallest possible degree - shuttle trade with Poland was 
amongst the most tangible measures of those relations. While arguably the West was 
vulnerable to a disruption of energy supplies coming via Ukraine, this vulnerability 
was something of a phantom - Ukraine needed the income from the transportation of 
supplies. In other words, there was interconnectedness rather than interdependence, 
something which tends not to be conducive to integration. 
As far as complex interdependence along the Western azimuth was concerned, 
the multiple channels of contact certainly enhanced relations with states along that 
azimuth, as did the lack of threat to the military security of those states presented by 
an independent Ukraine (certainly once nuclear weapons had been eliminated), as did 
also the lack of salience of the use of military force (reinforced by the decision to 
denucleanse). That this was not enough to make Ukraine an alluring candidate for 
integration is hardly a moot point. 
In terms of regime change, the economic success of the West was such that 
integration with it was seen as a solution to many of Ukraine's long terin problems, if 
only Ukraine could contribute to a change of regime that was willing to include it. 
However, the fact that Ukraine was not a key actor in the management of this change 
(i. e. Ukraine could bring about a deintegration from the Soviet Union and avoid full 
integration with the CIS, but not bring about its integration with the West), merely 
reflected not only the overall power structure in the world, but highlighted where that 
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power lay. Ukraine's efforts to link issue areas by for example trying to participate in 
the transportation of Caspian oil as a means of facilitating its integration with the 
West merely highlighted its inability to influence developments. Thus despite all of its 
efforts, Ukraine's relations with key international institutions along the Western 
azimuth remained highly circumscribed, much more so in the case of the EU than with 
NATO. In sum, all the ingredients necessary to explain Ukraine's lack of success 
along the Western azimuth are present. 
Overall, by making an allowance for the compelling prerogatives of realism, 
the all-pervasive impact of technology, and the challenges presented by economic 
competitiveness on the one hand, and economic interdependence on the other, the 
theory of structural interdependence provides a plausible explanatory framework 
explaining Ukraine's regional behaviour along the various azimuths. Yet this very 
comprehensiveness equates to a lack of parsimony; with so many potentially causal 
variables potentially capable of explaining Ukraine's objective of avoiding full 
integration along the North-eastern azimuth, it is difficult to pinpoint the impact of 
any one variable at any given time. Additionally, the theory of structural 
interdependence does not commit itself to placing causal variables in any sort of 
hierarchy or primacy of effect. Indeed, as the political constellation changed, so did 
the priorities of the actors. So, for example, up until 1994 Ukraine was concerned with 
the military threat presented by Russia, and hence military deintegration was an 
absolute priority for Kyiv. Yet by 1994, as Russia's relative military impotence grew 
ever more evident, the threat had become primarily economic. Underlying this 
economic threat was a concern as to the damage economic integration within the CIS 
could do to Ukraine's independence and sovereignty. Thus the theory tells us very 
little about how the nature of the issue-areas which formed the focus of policy makers 
at any given time changed - how one lost salience at the expense of the others. 
The 
theory also falls to allow for factors from beyond a given region: as the West became 
more interested in Ukraine from 1994 onwards, there was a corresponding impact on 
Ukraine's prospects along the Western azimuth, which albeit, subsequently failed to 
materiallse primarily due to Kyiv's inability to implement meaningful structural 
economic reform. Finally, it is plausible to argue that Ukraine's objectives along the 
North-eastern azimuth, that is of remaining a minimal participant in subregional and 
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regional processes, were achieved despite the complexity of the interdependence 
between Ukraine and its fon-ner Soviet brethren. 
As expected and despite its ubiquitousness, Globalisation Theory struggles to 
contribute to an understanding of Ukraine's regional behaviour. The theory falls to 
explain the salience of security issues that affected Ukraine's regional planning 
especially in the early years of independence. It also fails to account for the extent to 
which Ukraine was prepared to endure the profound economic downturn that a 
disruption of ties with Russia brought, in pursuit of pastures new in the West. 
In sum, the first two of the systemic theories examined provide some insight into the 
peculiarities of Ukraine's situation and its efforts to adjust throughout the 1990s to the 
repercussions of having been part of a collapsed empire. Of the three theories, 
however, realist theory most convincingly encapsulates the context of threat and 
uncertainty that Ukraine found itself in, in the few years following independence and 
hence has most to contribute during this early period. The fact that Kyiv's 
preoccupation with military and security issues only subsided once the context had 
become less threatening and Ukraine's international status had become 
instiutionalised, meaning that it could turn its attention to economic affairs,, suggests 
that realist theory needs to be supplemented by other explanations. The theory of 
structural interdependence complements realism by virtue of the fact that It 
successfully explains this transition from a preoccupation with solely hard security 
issues to soft security issues, for example, Ukraine's dire economic status. 
Regional Level Theories of Regionalism 
Neofunctionalism 
As was stated in the introductory chapter the relevance of neofunctionalism 
to 
ble. However, neoffinctionalism regionalism outside the European Union, is questionanu 
does partially explain Ukraine's willingness to subsume its independence 
to that of the 
EU - Kyiv believed membership would enhance 
its security and increase its 
prosperity. Furthermore, it is arguable that Kyiv was reliant on and 
hopeful of the 
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functional, political and cultivated spill-over that comes with closer ties with the 
Union as long as such spill-over is again compensated for by enhanced security and 
increased prosperity. These hopes in part explain the disappointment of the Ukrainians 
at not even being offered the prospect of membership of the EU at Helsinki in 1999. 
Neoliberal Institutionalism 
The main tenet of neoliberal institutionalism is that institutions are the solution to 
problems thrown up by the collective action demands of increasingly interdependent 
states. Nevertheless, in contrast to functionalism, neoliberal institutionalism is firmly 
state-centnc. This is a major plus of the theory, as along the North-eastern azimuth the 
CIS had different functions, according to whose perspective was adopted. From 
Moscow's point of view, the CIS was to serve as a replacement for the Soviet Union. 
In contrast, as Ukraine struggled to come terms with the dilemmas of independence, 
the CIS was perceived as a means of achieving a 'civilised divorce'. Furthermore, for 
the Ukrainians the role of the CIS was to be strictly restricted to economic issues. 
They only allowed themselves to be drawn reluctantly into other areas, as in the case 
of the air-defence agreement. While clearly the CIS could have functioned as a forum 
for multilateral communication, maintaining transparency and the plethora of other 
benefits institutions are deemed to offer, in practice its utility was highly 
circumscribed by the fact that it was dominated by Russia. The fact is that, in contrast 
to Russia, on anything other than economic issues, Ukraine saw the CIS as a means to 
an end - deintegration - rather than an end in itself 
For Ukraine, history and experience seemed to suggest that institutions along 
the Western azimuth functioned as liberal institutionalists suggested they should: they 
were fora that were security enhancing by virtue of the fact that they reduced the 
uncertainty connected with collective action and interdependence. Furthermore, the 
sheer density of institutions along the Western azimuth (in contrast to the dearth of 
such institutions along the North-eastern azimuth) meant that the benefits of such fora 
(information provision, communication, facilitating transparency etc. ) were mutually 
reinforcing. While the North-eastern azimuth offered the all-or-nothing CIS, the 
Western azimuth offered a plethora of alternatives which indicated an ever more 
complex yet integrated whole, something demanded by increasing co-operation. 
The 
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fact that those options were not available to Ukraine suggested that it was not yet 
interdependent with states along its Western azimuth. 
Once again, the Southem azimuth can also be seen as a continuation of the 
Western azimuth - the creation of GUUAM reflected Ukraine's inability to cope with 
Russia on an individual basis, and the need for collective action if objectives were to 
be achieved along this azimuth. Thus while the co-operation behind the creation of 
GUUAM was driven by alliance formation in pursuit of the objective of transporting 
Caspian oil, it also resulted in an ever denser network of political, economic and even 
military co-operation between those particular former Soviet republics. 
Constructivism 
The post-imperial setting in which Ukraine and Russia found themselves means that 
the extensive cultural, social, ethnic and familial ties that linked them were inadequate 
to sustain the sense of community that once existed between them. While there is 
lingering nostalgia in Eastern and Southern Ukraine caused by the shared sense of 
history, mutual sympathy and loyalty, and compatibility of economic and political 
values with Russia, such emotions have not yet been mobilised sufficiently to drive 
integration. While there is, admittedly, support for closer ties with the CIS, it was 
inadequate to ensure the election of the communist candidate for the presidency, Petro 
Symonenko, who stood on a platform of deeper integration with the CIS in the 1999 
presidential elections. 
Constructivism does however show that despite the highly circumscribed and 
dated shared structural context, the limited opportunities for the expression of the 
power of systemic processes and strategic practices linking Ukraine with states along 
the Western azimuth, Kyiv was intent from the earliest days of independence on 
forging ties with them in pursuit of community formation. Kyiv emphasised Ukraine's 
Central European social and collective identity, even if that meant that a gloss had to 
be put on the data and myths that supposedly portrayed Ukraine's European 
credentials. This was done especially in terms of the role of systemic processes (such 
as highlighting instances of historical interdependence and transnational convergence) 
and strategic practice (such as repeated instance of cooperation in the past, while 
underplaying divisive historical events. The single most outstanding example of 
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Ukraine's willingness to consign divisive events to history was the signing of a 
Declaration on Agreement and Unity with Poland in 1997). Furthermore, it can be 
argued that CEES, with Ukraine in tow, are striving for membership of key regional 
institutions because they share, or in Kyiv's case, strive to share, community values, 
norms and values. While this is perhaps bending the tenets of the theory somewhat, 
the spirit of the theory is maintained. Nevertheless, the simple fact remains that 
Ukraine remains beyond the integration process to its West, on the grounds that 
Ukraine currently just does not share the norms and values of its Western neighbours, 
has failed to fully democratise itself, and has not created the infrastructure for the 
development of a market economy. This is what really lies behind Ukraine's lack of 
success in the integration process along the Western azimuth. 
New Wave Regionalism 
As expected New Wave regionalism fills a gap in Hurrells' framework by elaborating 
on the important link between economics and politics, something which was at best 
implicit in other theories. Despite being more of an approach than a theory, New 
Wave regionalism does indeed shed light on Ukraine's regional behaviour and the 
extent to which political factors guided Ukraine's efforts to participate in regional 
institutions, or more accurately, PTAs. 
Along the Northeastern azimuth, it was precisely the suspicion that PTAs were 
being used by Russia as political instruments to engineer the renewed subordination of 
other CIS member states that prevented Ukraine from fuller participation in the CIS. 
This suspicion was fueled by Russia's crude exploitation of CIS institutional 
mechanisms to explicitly link the economic policies adopted by the institution with 
the political status of member states. It was precisely because regionalism within the 
CIS was 'a political process characterized by economic policy cooperation and 
coordination' [italics in original] that Ukraine steered clear to the extent that it did. 
16 
Although secondary to the preservation of independence, welfare considerations were 
important to Kyiv, which is why it sought to encourage yet at the same time limit the 
functioning of the CIS to economic issues. 
" Mansfield and Milner, The New Wave of Regionalism, p. 591. 
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Along the Western azimuth, New Wave regionalism helps explain both why 
Ukraine strove for and failed to gain membership of key subregional institutions or 
make much process in establishing closer ties with the EU. While the benefits of 
greater aggregate power conferred on members in pursuit of EU membership was not 
lost on Kyiv, the political aspect of regionalism was both over and underestimated. 
For example, on the international arena Kyiv prioritised the political over the 
economic - membership of CEFTA and the EU was pursued as a political objective, to 
the detriment of economic reform, despite the warnings from both CEE capitals and 
Brussels. Thus, by highlighting the economic dimension of regionalism as a political 
process, New Wave regionalism exposes the flaw of Ukraine's overfocus on the 
international political dimension of membership of CEFTA and the EU at the expense 
of the economic. 
Conversely, Kyiv underestimated the importance of domestic political factors 
for participation in PTAs. This was evidenced by the apparent impunity with which 
the incumbent abused his power in the 1999 presidential elections as well as his 
dismissal of the international condemnation of his response to the publicisation of his 
implication in the murder of a journalist critical of his regime. The unambiguous 
message sent by the EU to Kyiv as to the need to temper its authoritarian tendencies, 
(re)introduce freedom of the press, and permit free and fair elections as a sine qua non 
for closer ties demonstrates that PTAs can be used 'to help prompt and consolidate 
economic and political reforms in prospective members'. 
17 By allowing for the 
prerogatives of domestic political factors in the formation of or participation in PTAs, 
New Wave regionalists highlight an important variable which affected Ukraine's 
subregional and regional prospects and one which has been underestimated by other 
theories . 
In sum, New Wave regionalism both helps explain the rationale 
behind 
Ukraine's stance towards the CIS and lays bare the flaws in Ukraine's strategy 
in 




17 ibid., p. 601. 
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As has been discussed in Chapter 1, 'subregional' regionalists have sought to fill the 
niche left by other theories of regionalism by focussing on the generally grey 
transitional area that exists between the state and the regional institution. 
Along the Western azimuth, subregional opportunities were enthusiastically 
gasped by Ukraine following independence. This was because subregional 
institutions in CEE offered one of the few means of 'rejoining Europe' available to 
Kyiv, along with the other theoretical advantages 'subregional' regionalists claimed 
would accrue from membership. In practice along the Western azimuth Ukraine 
struggled to overcome the flaws inherent to the process: for CEES membership of 
subregional institutions was an inadequate substitute for membership of the regional 
institution to which they all aspired, the EU. The foriner could never replace the latter, 
and would be abandoned at the first opportunity, despite the efforts of 'subregional' 
regionalists to encourage the EU to support the former. Yet, problematically for Kyiv, 
although Visegrad/CEFTA, as effectively transitory phenomena, were in a sense 
doomed before they had started, Ukraine could do little other than strive for 
membership of them - its options were so tightly circumscribed. 
Problems were exacerbated by the nature of relations between regional and 
subregional institutions. By not encouraging CEES to think collectively, and indeed 
by evaluating their membership prospects on an individual basis, the EU engendered a 
competitiveness that undermined the process of subregionalism and which left 
Ukraine looking vulnerable and isolated on the Eastern borders of CEES. 
Furthermore, in the shorter term, barriers to, for example, CEFTA membership, 
appeared insun-nountable; yet in the longer term CEFTA was in danger of becoming r- 
irrelevant as key member states abandoned the institution for membership of the EU. 
18 
Despite the best intentions of 'subregional' regionalists, along the Western azimuth, 
the benefits of subregionalism have not materialised and as such the phenomenon is in 
danger of becoming obsolete. ' 9 
18 See 0. Pavliuk 'Subregional Relations and Cooperative Initiatives in East-Central Europe' in R. Dwan, Building 
Security in Europe's New Borderlands, p. 50 and p. 63. 
19 According to Pavliuk, 'as the NATO Madrid summit of 1997 approached, western states increasingly perceived 
subregional cooperation as a useful tool for "cushioning" possible new dividing lines between "ins" and "outs", 
ibid., p. 48. For the proposed benefits of subregionalism also see also A. Cottee, 'Europe's Security 
Architecture and the New "Boundary Zones"', in R. Dwan, Building Security in Europe's New Borderland, p. 
175. 
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There is little doubt that, along the Southern azimuth, both GUUAM and 
indeed the BSEC would have evolved more successfully had they successfully 
garnered the support of key Western regional institutions. Both of the subregional 
institutions failed to attract either the support of the EU or NATO, closer ties with 
which most GUUAM and many BSEC members states aspired to. Moscow did not 
look on upon GUUAM favourably to say the least; the BSEC was merely tolerated. 
The lack of support of the wealthy regional bodies and its effects are plain to see. 
Of the two subregional institutions, theoretically, GUUAM is the more 
interesting. Even if GUUAM as a grouping of heterogenous states has not exactly 
prospered, then at least it has continued to survive and, against the odds, 
institutionalise in the face of adversity and impecunioSIty. 20 Furthermore, it has 
evolved despite the fact that the collectivism of GUUAM has provided member states 
with little in the sense of proportionally greater influence as predicted by the 
proponents of subregionalism. Neither is it a staging post en route to membership of 
regional institutions nor is it a forum for equal status negotiations with other 
institutions - it is treated far too cautiously by Western regional states for those 
advantages to obtain. For these reasons, ultimately, 'subregional' regionalism 
disappoints - it struggles to readily explain the enigma of GUUAM' s continued 
existence, something which realists, for example, can as a matter of course. 
In sum, empirical findings both negate and support the arguments of 
'subregional' regionalism. Along the Western azimuth, the validity of treating 
subregional developments as a distinct phenomenon to regional developments is 
questionable: the existence of CEFTA, for example, is so closely tied to prospects for 
EU membership that it resembles an ante-chamber. The built in obsolescence of 
subregional institutions in the sense that they tend to exist to promote the attainment 
of regional goals of member states merely reinforces this view. If along the Western 
azimuth, the existence of subregional institutions as a distinct entity is questionable, 
arguably along the Southern azimuth the opposite is true. GUUAM as a distinctly 
subregional institution, bereft of regional support, is a particularly interesting 
theoretical phenomenon, as a body which is burdened by the major disadvantages of 
subregionalism, is blessed with few of the advantages yet continues to endure. 
20 Pavliuk in fact refers to GUIJAM 'as an example of a rather successful newly emergent subregional initiat've'; 
see Pavliuk, ibid., p. 60. 
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Domestic Level Theories of Regionalism 
Regionalism And State Coherence 
Upon independence, and indeed nearly a decade on, Ukraine lacks genuine territorial 
and ethnic integrity, continues to be emaciated by limited economic viability and 
remains barely politically or geographically coherent. In other words, according to the 
theory, in all of these key respects Ukraine barely satisfies the prerequisites for 
partaking in regionalism. This did not stop Ukraine from trying to participate in the 
subregional and regional developments along the Western azimuth and subregional 
developments along Southern azimuth. However, in theoretical terms, Ukraine's lack 
of success alon the key azimuth the Western one, could be partially attributed to its 911 
fractured internal state and its proto-sovereign status. There can be little doubt that a 
Ukraine in its current fractured and barely viable state would present NATO and the 
EU with an indigestible problem. In this regard, the theory of state coherence is 
supported. 
From a theoretical point of view, in the longer term, Ukraine's regional 
prospects along the Western azimuth appear dim. Although in the early years of 
independence separatism was an unthinkable prospect, there are increasing signs that 
as Ukraine continues to stagnate, Galician separatism is being viewed as a preferable 
alternative (by Galicians at least) to continued decline within a unitary Ukraine. 21 
Whether or not policy-makers in Brussels, Berlin, Warsaw or even Moscow would 
agree is debatable. 
Regime Type And Democratisation 
The democratization of Ukraine was far more fundamental to its participation in 
subregional and regional developments along the Western azimuth than policy-makers 
in Kyiv had envisaged in the years following independence. Even as late as 1999 the 
Galicia (Halychyna) is a region of Western Ukraine, on the border with Poland, that was the cradle of Ukrainian 
nationalism and has remained its hotbed. 
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Ukrainian political elite was guided by the belief that Ukraine's geopolitical position 
mattered more to the EU and NATO than did the minutiae of domestic events. This 
misapprehension was exposed by two events in 1999 and 2000 respectively. 
The opprobrium of the international community heaped on Kuchma following 
his re-election in the 1999 presidential elections reflected the scale of corruption in 
bringing about his victory. It was the EU's exasperation with the lack of democracy in 
Ukraine which lay behind Brussels' decision not to offer Kyiv even the prospect of 
EU membership at some unspecified time in the future in Helsinki in 1999. This alone 
reveals the close link between democracy and regionalism. 
However, Ukraine as a democracy plumbed new depths with the death of 
Ukrainian journalist, allegedly on the orders of the President late in September 2000. 
It was because of Ukraine's failure as a democracy that the link between regionalism 
and democracy was made explicit by the West. Whether or not Kuchma was involved 
in ordering the murder of the joumalist, as apparently demonstrated by a recording of 
him doing so, is a moot point. The inadequacy of his subsequent response to the event 
is not. In pursuit of 'the truth', Ukraine as a democracy, with Kuchma as its president, 
failed to satisfy even the most basic criteria of the term: transparency, openness, and 
accountability. Ukraine's response was not lost on the EU. Ukraine was subsequently 
marginalised along the Western azimuth, with the Council of Europe calling for the 
suspension of Ukraine's membership of the body (on the grounds of lack of press 
freedom). At the end of 2000, Ukraine's regional prospects along the Western azimuth 
looked dim indeed. 
Kuchma had failed totally to grasp the point that what mattered within Ukraine 
would impact on its external relations, especially along the Western azimuth. From a 
theoretical point view Ukraine was failing regionally, because 'the culture, 
perceptions and practices that permit compromise and the peaceful resolution of 
conflicts without the threat of violence within countries come to apply across national 
boundaries toward other democratic countries'. The use of violence within Ukraine 
implied that it could not be trusted to participate in the regional institution to which it 
aspired according to the norms and principles of that institution. 
The power of systemic level theories shines through in the above analysis. They still 
show themselves capable of explaining macro level behaviours, and even 
in some 
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instances micro level behaviours. Indeed, systemic theories provide a view of the 
broad picture, and thereby provide a context without which any examination of 
Ukraine's regional behaviour comes across as somewhat two-dimensional. It is the 
systemic approach that provides an opportunity to examine 'the arch' of which the 
keystone is an integral part and critical component. Amongst these theories, the 
robustness of the realist approach continues to present a formidable challenge to 
newer pretenders. However, with its allowance for the economic aspects of 
international relations, complex interdependence takes up where realism leaves off. 
Regional level theories complement systemic level theories. Ukraine's pursuit 
of institutional membership along the Western azimuth strongly suggests that 
international institutions play a more prominent role in international relations than 
realist theory in particular can account for. However, while the neo functionalist 
approach provides some limited insight into Ukraine's regional behaviour, as does the 
neoliberal institutionalist approach, both struggle to provide a coherent and consistent 
explanation along all three azimuths. 
Domestic level theories perhaps currently lack the academic ngour to compete 
with the aforementioned two levels. This is not to denigrate the contribution of 
domestic level theories: without a sufficient appreciation of the subtleties and 
intricacies of the keystone, it might be difficult to appreciate how it fits into the 
whole. It is evident that international relations still lacks a theory that is capable of 
accounting for the variety of variables and the intricate interplay between them that 
are international relations. 
It is concluded that the research hypothesis, that Ukraine consistently pursued a policy 
of responding to security threats by attempting to integrate with or avoid integrating 
with regional security complexes (RSC) has been supported. Although Ukraine failed 
to fully integrate with key subregional and regional institutions along its Western 
azimuth, by the end of its first decade of independence, its security was enhanced 
thanks to bilateral, subregional and regional relations along that azimuth. Secondly, 
although it failed to fully avoid integration with the CIS along the North-eastern 
azimuth, by the end of 2000 Ukraine remained anything but a fully-fledged member of 
the CIS. Participation in RSCs along the Southern azimuth was clearly productive 
insofar as they facilitated the albeit limited achievements along the Western and 
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North-eastern azimuths. In sum, Ukraine indeed achieved a degree of success in 
preserving its security and enlarging its freedom of manoeuvre by integrating or 
avoiding integration with RSCs, bearing in mind the numerous internal and external 
obstacles it faced. 
Limitations 
Inevitably, this research suffers from a plethora of limitations. First and foremost are 
the flaws ansing from the rationalist-constructivist methodology employed. The 
subjective nature of interpretation means that the final product can but reflect one 
person's interpretation not only of events, but also of others interpretations of events. 
While this is perhaps over harsh in that works by eminent workers in the field 
contributed to the formation of the perspective which was finally adopted, it remains 
true that the end result is effectively the viewpoint of one individual. The result is at 
best an effort to recreate a reality the reader might be familiar with. There is no doubt 
that the author's own perceptions - as a 'Western' based researcher - accessing 
primarily English and Ukrainian language primary and secondary sources (Russian 
language materials were primarily sourced from Ukraine) reflects a viewpoint actors 
in Moscow are likely not to concur with. However, the researcher is confident that the 
assertions made, based as they predominantly are on verifiable raw material, (i. e. 
primary data), stand up to scrutiny by dispassionate observers. 
Secondly, the thesis has not purported to explain i. e. establish cause and effect, 
as much as to understand, that is to search for meaning. However obvious 
methodological flaws, such as those of reliability, cannot be ignored. 
More 
specifically, there must be doubt as to whether or not another researcher, armed with 
the same evidence would draw the same conclusions. In part, this 
is due to the fact 
that variables have not been operationalised sufficiently, that 
is made precise enough 
to measure or assess in a systematic way. It is also partly to 
do with the actual nature 
of the dependent variables selected - membership of RSCs is merely one variable 
in 
what is the complex world of international relations. 
Thirdly, the historical approach suffers from what are known as selection 
effects, i. e. the tendency to select 
for examination one course of action (typically one 
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which produced a result, or which stood out) at the expense of another course of 
action. As has been pointed out 'part of what really happened Is often calculations 
about what would have happened had a different course been followed. The path 
chosen is unlikely to be detennined without consideration of the counterfactual 
-) 22 consequences of actions not taken . 
One might question the use of the case study method. The uniqueness of 
Ukraine, a relatively new nation-state, simultaneously embarking on nation and state- 
building, under conditions of severe economic decline, transforining itself from an 
non-democratic centrally-controlled economy into a democratic and market-oriented 
economy, must severely limit the generalisability of the conclusions that can be 
drawn. 
In terms of strict methodology, criticisms could be made of the interview 
method adopted that was used. In the first instance, research was limited by access to 
interviewees. On the one hand only one official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
refused to be interviewed, on the other hand Ukrainian interviewees are over 
represented in the overall total. Published interviews were frequently relied on. 
Further Research 
Ukraine is an under researched country in an under researched part of the world. To a 
point, it continues to suffer from its perennial problem - located in the shadow of 
Russia it remains a relatively small player. Yet as Russian power ebbs and flows, and 
Western power encroaches every time Russia retreats, the unknown side of Ukraine 
becomes an ever more glaring lack. 
Amongst the great unknowns remain the domestic determinants of foreign and 
security policy making. Currently policy remains the product of a narrow circle of 
decision-makers in Kyiv - little account is taken of the view of the massive Russian 
minority, for example. Furthermore, under-researched domestic foreign-policy think 
tanks have an underestimated impact on foreign policy making. In a similar vein, the 
constitutional aspect of Ukraine's foreign policy making remains opaque. It is unclear 
22 B. Bueno de Mesquita, 'The Benefits of a Social-Scientific Approach to Studying International Affairs' in N. 
Woods, Explaining International Relations Since 1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1996) p. 62. 
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who has responsibility for what - some forms of foreign and security policy making 
power seem to have been usurped by an ambitious and assertive executive; the left 
wing dominated legislature seems to have been sidelined in the policy making 
process, despite rights accorded it by the constitutions. 
Much more research needs to done to determine the sheer extent of the under- 
researched and less glamorous dimension of Ukrainian-Russian relations: informal 
channels of contact, business relationships, family ties. In a similar vein, much more 
needs to be done to examine the Russian minority in Ukraine, and the role it plays or 
might play in Russian foreign policy making - its impact on Ukraine is potentially too 
great to ignore. 
Clearly, the research would benefit from being brought much more up-to-date. 
Ukraine ties with the EU are, as of January 2001, somewhat strained, as the latter 
steadfastly refused to offer Kyiv a glimmer of hope as to eventual membership. Such 
events have inevitable ramifications for Ukraine's ties with its neighbours. On the one 
hand they hints at a reinvigoration of ties with Moscow, and a weakening of ties with 
Western neighbours, in particular Poland. If it is true to suggest that Ukraine has 
achieved some foreign policy successes such as stable bilateral ties with all 
neighbours, some progress toward integration along the Western azimuth and 
deliberately limited membership of the CIS, it remains to be seen whether these 
successes can be sustained in the longer term. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the Ukrainians continue to have high hopes 
for the Southern azimuth - success along this azimuth would, Kyiv 
believes, alleviate 
so many of its problems. A more detailed investigation of efforts along the Southern 
azimuth would reveal much more not only about Ukraine's long ten-n ambitions, 
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